Niveluri si reductie vs. emergenta

1. Niveluri

In explicarea cognitiei, e tipic pentru filosofi sa gandeasca in termeni de niveluri

micro- (nivelul neuronal) si macro (nivelul mental). Sunt 2 tipuri de interactiuni:

intraniveluri (interactiuni orinzontale) adica interactiuni intre componentele la acelasi

nivel, si interniveluri (interactiuni verticale) adica interactiuni intre niveluri. Daca

“substante” implica interactiuni orizontale (adica uniunea lor), niveluri implica relatii

ontologice sau epistemologice verticale (vertical referindu-se la ontologic,

organizational, metodologic, de analiza sau epistemologic). Sunt deci niveluri

ontologice, organizationale (mecanisme sau sisteme), epistemologice sau de descries

au analiza.

2. Reduction and emergence

Istoria emergentei1 este destul de complicata pentru ca are multe interpretari.2

Emergence involves certain vertical relationships between low-level and high-level

properties. The notion of “levels” implies the concept of emergence. When we talk

about reduction or emergence, we need to specify what is reduced to what or what

emerges from what. We can reduce one property or level to another or one property or

one level can emerge from another.

On the one side, we can relate reduction and epistemological levels/properties

and epistemological emergence to identity theory and even to eliminative materialism.

(Week 3)

According to van Gulick, emergence is “’Xs are more than just Ys’ and that

‘Xs are something over and above Ys.’” He distinguishes as classes of emergence

between properties and causal powers or forces. (van Gulick 2001) The emergent

features go beyond the features of parts from which they emerge (p. 16) and it can be

categorized as “metaphysical emergence” (it refers to the relation between real things)

or “epistemic emergence” (cognitive explanatory relations about real world items).

What does “over and above” or “emergent features go beyond the features of parts”

1 Kim wrote “Since around 1990, the idea of emergence has been making a big comeback, from decades of general neglect and disdain on the part of mainstream analytic philosophy.” (Kim 2006, p. 547) 2 Kim again: “‘Emergence’ is very much a term of philosophical trade; it can pretty much mean whatever you want to mean…” (Kim 2006, p. 548)

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mean? Earlier than van Gulick, there were other people insisting upon the difference

between ontological and epistemological emergence considering that people many

times conflate them. (Silberstein and McGeever 1999; O’Connor and Wong 2002)

Emergence has the same properties as nonreductive physicalism: distinctness

and dependence. (Crane 2001) It involves the whole-part relationships. Now, some

properties are simply combinations of parts at the same level, as it were. The

emergent properties are different from the sum of their parts; they presuppose novelty.

It is quite difficult to define this “novelty”. In Crane’s definition, the novel properties

of an object would be “those determinable properties whose determinates are not had

by all of the object’s parts.” (p. 8) From this perspective, surface colour and wetness

are novel properties. However, in order to distinguish emergent properties from

reductive properties, novelty is not enough. According to Crane, a stronger notion of

emergence conceives of it as a property of a whole with powers that are not related to

the powers of its parts. This strong notion of emergence denies that the emergent

properties of a whole are supervenient upon the properties of its parts. A dependent

property implies that the properties of the whole supervene on the properties of its

parts. Therefore, for Crane emergence is strongly related to the supervenience of a

whole’s properties on the properties of its parts. (Crane 2001, p. 9) However, for an

emergentist, such properties would be “over and above" the physical properties.

One essential dichotomy is the difference between epistemological and

ontological emergence. People many times conflate them. (Silberstein and McGeever

1999; O’Connor and Wong 2002)

2.1 Ontological emergence

According to van Gulick, metaphysical emergence has three forms: (1) Specific value

emergence (“The whole and its parts have features of the same kind but have different

specific subtypes or values of that kind.” He offers the example of a bronze statue and

the molecular parts with common property, the mass. (2) Modest kind emergence:

“The whole has features that are different in kind from those of its parts …”

(Examples are color and life.) (3) Radical kind emergence: “The whole has features

that are both 1) Different in kind from those had by its parts and 2) Of kind whose

nature and existence is not necessitated by the features of its parts, their mode of

combination and the law-like regularities governing the features of its parts.” (van

Gulick 2001, p. 17)

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According to O’Connor and Wong, there are different versions of such

emergence but the most common versions are as following:

Predictive: Emergent properties are systemic features of complex systems which could not be predicted

(practically speaking; or for any finite knower; or for even an ideal knower) from the standpoint of a

pre-emergent stage, despite a thorough knowledge of the features of, and laws governing, their parts.

Irreducible-Pattern: Emergent properties and laws are systemic features of complex systems governed

by true, lawlike generalizations within a special science that is irreducible to fundamental physical

theory for conceptual reasons. The macroscopic patterns in question cannot be captured in terms of the

concepts and dynamics of physics. (O’Connor and Wong 2002)

The authors consider that epistemological emergence has applications in particular

sciences mainly regarding the relationship between macro-and micro-levels. In their

opinion ontological emergence is equivalent to what they call “supervenience

emergentism”.

Even if some of proponents of ontological emergence consider that the world

is composed by fundamental entities, they maintain the layered view of nature.

Ontologically emergent properties are not determined or reducible to basic

properties.3 However, ontological emergence is highly controversial and there are not

too many philosophers who believe in the existence of ontological levels or

ontological emergence.4

If we are trying to relate the notions of levels to van Gulick’s view on

emergence, we can say that ontological levels would be correlated with radical

emergence, organizational levels with modest emergence, and levels of analysis with

specific value emergence. The last two levels can be both divided into weak and

strong epistemic emergence. The problem is that if we accept ontologically different

levels and radical emergence then we collapse into Cartesian dualism that is rejected

by the majority of philosophers. Nevertheless, for saving the phenomena some

philosophers (mainly non-reductive materialists) knew that rejecting Cartesian

3 One classical example of ontological emergence is quantum mechanics. (Silberstein and McGreever 1999)4 Ontological emergence is applied not only to the mind-brain topic but also to the macro-micro levels of reality. Authors like Prigojine and R. B. Laughlin -both Nobel laureates- assert the irreducibility of certain macroscopic properties to micro-properties. In this sense, Prigojine introduces the “dissipative structure” of non-equilibrium thermodynamics and Laughlin brings in the “protected” properties (like crystalline state) of a high level of reality insensitive to microscopic properties. (O’Connor and Wong, 2002)

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dualism involves the acceptance of some anomalies. Therefore they consider the

human being as a limited entity that has limited knowledge (McGinn) or they seek

refuge under the ontology-epistemology distinction (with levels of analysis and the

corresponding epistemic emergence, weak and strong) or they introduce

organizational levels (related to layered view of nature).

For Chalmers, a strong emergent property is one in which “the high-level

phenomenon arises from a low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon

are not deducible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain.” (Chalmers

2006) If the strong emergent phenomena cannot be deducible from the laws of

physics, for instance, then we need new laws of nature for explaining such

phenomena. The only known phenomenon that cannot be explained by physical laws

is consciousness. The examples for supporting this idea are those of the colorblind

scientist and zombies. However, consciousness is correlated with or supervenes on

physical, neural states.

2.2 Epistemological emergence

More complex is the status of epistemic emergence (weak and strong). For Silberstein

and McGeever, Stephan, van Gulick, O’Connor and Wong, Chalmers, and Kim,

epistemic emergence is related to our incapacity to explain and predict such a

property of a whole system in terms of its parts. However, the property of the whole is

determined by the properties of parts. For van Gulick, epistemic emergence is

subjective and there are weak and strong emergences that characterize predictive and

explanatory emergence and representational emergence. For Silberstein and

McGeever, we can analyze epistemological emergence only from a viewpoint given

by the relationship between human knowledge and simple or complex systems. This

concerns the functional or descriptive/analysis of emergence. A property of an entity

is an epistemological emergent if that property is determined to or deducible from the

intrinsic properties of the fundamental entities that compose the object. However, it is

difficult to explain or predict such a property in terms of its fundamental constituents.

(Silberstein and McGeever 1999) “Epistemologically emergent properties are novel

only at a level of description.” (Silberstein and McGeever 1999, p. 186)

For Chalmers, a high-level phenomenon represents a weak emergence in

relation to a low-level domain when that phenomenon is “unexpected” in accord with

the laws or principles from low-level area. By “unexpected” he means that emergent

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properties are somehow deductible from low-level properties (with initial conditions).

Examples of such emergence are “the game of life”, connectionist networks,

evolution (for intelligent creatures) and high-level patterns in cellular automata.

Chalmers’ definition of weak emergence is (a) high-level properties are those

properties of a system that are not possessed by any of its part (b) deductibility

without reducibility.

A more complicated investigation of the notion of emergence is made by

Achim Stephan. (Stephen 2002, 1998) He distinguishes several theories of

emergence: weak, synchronic, and diachronic emergence. According to weak

emergentism, the properties of a system are emergent if they belong to the system as a

whole, but not to the parts of that system. This kind of emergentism is equivalent to

property reductionism because the emergent structures are explainable and completely

definable in terms of the combination of parts already defined. The system as a whole

is the sum of parts plus the organization or cooperation of parts. A typical example of

weak emergentism is connectionist networks but this emergentism is also applicable

to the theories of self-organization and artificial intelligence. (Stephen 2002, 1998)

According to Stephen (2002), weak emergentism has three characteristics. The first is

physical monism: all entities, properties and structures emerge from certain

fundamental physical parts. The second characteristic consists in systemic properties.

There are two classes of properties: the properties that the parts of the system also

have (e.g., velocity) and the properties that do not belong to the parts of the system

(e.g., pain). The laws properties represent the second feature. The third feature is

synchronic determination (or mereological supervenience), and reflects the

relationship between basic structure and emergent properties. The last properties

depend on the parts’ properties and their arrangement. (Chalmers 2006)

The main characteristics of diachronic properties are the novelty and the

unpredictability of the system that evolves. (Stephen 2002, 1998) The difference

between weak and diachronic emergence is the unpredictability of properties. The

difference between diachronic and synchronic emergence is the irreducibility of

properties. Moreover, if one property or entity has not existed before and suddenly

comes into existence, it means that the property or entity is diachronically new.

Synchronic novelty is time independent. (Scholz 2004, p. 2) These two kinds of

irreducibility produce either downward causation or epiphenomenalism. An

irreducible property means one that (a) does not follow from the behavior of the

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system’s parts that has this property and (b) does not follow from the behavior of the

system’s parts in constellations simpler than the system. Qualia are the typical cases

of synchronic emergent properties.

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