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GHEORGHE VLĂDUŢŢESCU (Romanian Academy), ALEXANDRU BOBOC (RomanianAcademy), FLORIN CONSTANTINIU (Romanian Academy), CRISTIAN PREDA (University

of Bucharest), LAURENTIU VLAD (University of Bucharest), VLADIMIR OS IAC (Universityof Craiova), CĂTĂLIN BORDEIANU („Petre Andrei” University of Iaşi)

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Editor in chief: AAUURREELL PPIIŢŢUURRCCĂ Deputy editor in chief: IIOONN DDEEAACCOONNEESSCCUUEditorial board: CCEEZZAARR AAVVRRAAMM,, VVLLAADDIIMMIIRR OOSSIIAACC,, MMIIHHAAII CCOOSSTTEESSCCUU,, AANNCCAA PPAARRMMEENNAA OOLLIIMMIIDD,, CCOOSSMMIINN LLUUCCIIAANN GGHHEERRGGHHEE,, CCĂĂTTĂĂLLIINN SSTTĂĂNNCCIIUULLEESSCCUU,, CCĂĂTTĂĂLLIINNAA GGEEOORRGGEESSCCUU,, TTIITTEELLAA VVÎÎLLCCEEAANNUU,, MMIIHHAAII GGHHIIŢŢUULLEESSCCUU

NNNOOO TTT EEE ooo f f f ttt hhheee EEE DDD III TTT OOORRR III AAA LLL BBB OOOAAA RRR DDD

R R e e v v i i s s t t a a d d e e S S t t i i i i n n t t e e P P o o l l i i t t i i c c e e .. R R e e v v u u e e d d e e s s S S c c i i e e n n c c e e s s P P o o l l i i t t i i q q u u e e s s wwaass eevvaalluuaatteedd aanndd aauutthhoorriizzeedd bbyy tthhee NNaattiioonnaall CCoouunncciill ooff SScciieennttiiffiicc RReesseeaarrcchh iinn SSuuppeerriioorr EEdduuccaattiioonn ((CCNNCCSSIISS)) iinn tthhee BB++ ccaatteeg g oorryy ––

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R evista de Ştiinţe Politice. R evue des Sciences Politiques • Nr. 21-22 • 2009 5

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Aurel PIŢURCĂ, Romanian education system and national minorities in theinterwar period

7

Marusia CÎRSTEA, Romanian Kings’ official visits to London 16Antonio MOMOC, Radical and moderate political groups in the SociologySchool of Bucharest 21

Mihaela Camelia BUZATU, Anul 1938 şi înfiinţarea Frontului Renaşterii Naţionale – context european şi context naţional

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Cosmin Lucian GHERGHE, Planul Marshall și consecințele sale pentru Europa 32Ionuţ ŞERBAN, Florian OLTEANU, The birth of EU. Historiographical and political aspects regarding the period 1945-1970

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Mihai GHIŢULESCU, De la internaţionalismul socialist la naţional -comunism. Despre metamorfozele ideii naţionale în România comunistă

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RRR OOO MMM A A A NNN III A A A TTT OOO DDD A A A YYY ::: PPP OOO LLL III TTT III CCC SSS ,,, LLL A A A WWW A A A NNN DDD A A A DDD MMM III NNN III SSS TTT RRR A A A TTT III OOO NNN

Mircea CRISTE, Il y a 20 ans… (Un panorama constitutionnaliste de larévolution roumaine)

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Anca Parmena OLIMID, Supradimensionarea şi disproporţionalitatea legislativă.Uninominalul, reformă electorală sau miză politică? 66

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IIINNNTTT EEERRRNNN A A ATTT III OOONNN A A A LLL PPPOOOLLL IIITTT IIICCCSSS::: HHH OOOWWW TTT OOO DDD EEE A A A LLL WWW III TTT HHH TTT HHH EEE RRR EEE CCC EEE NNN TTT III SSS SSS UUU EEE SSS ???

Michael R ADU, How to Kill Civilians in the Name of “Human Rights”: Lessons from Sri Lanka

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Ion DEACONESCU, Mihai Ovidiu CERCEL , Statul independent Kosovo – cui prodest?

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Cezar AVRAM, Roxana R ADU, Drepturile socio-economice ale cetăţeniloreuropeni

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Mihai Alexandru COSTESCU, Olga COSTESCU, Management of publicinstitutions’ changes in the European Union integration 113


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POLITICAL HISTORY

THOUGHT AND PRACTICE


Romanian education system and nationalminorities in the interwar period

Aurel PIŢURCĂ

Abstract: The article is structured into two parts: in the first part theauthor makes some theoretical conceptual specification on minorities,

ethnical minority, minority of language, race and religion andnational minority. In the second part the author highlights andanalyzes some of the issues of the relation between the Romanianeducation system during the interwar period and national minorities from Transylvania.Keywords: national minorities, inter-ethnic relations, education system,confessional education, Romanianization, Hungarianization.

inorities’ issues, no matter their

nature or historical period, haveconstituted a theme with a large

audience and public debate, with multipleimplications for the political life and social practice. One can discuss on the presenceof ethnic, linguistic, religious minority groupseven from the antiquity, perpetuating tillthe present moment. Since the establishmentof the national state, during the modern period, national minorities have been

appeared, fact which would amplify andtense the communities’ social life, bothinternally and internationally. Today onecan speak of a great diversity of minorities,cultural, sexual, racial groups, immigrantsor the Roma.

In one form or another, ethnic andnational minorities have been present duringthe whole history, representing importantcomponents of any social community,

including the present type of human

development.Most of the dictionaries, studies,

papers define the minority as the smallestnumber or part from a collectivity1. Inrelation to the majority, the minority groupis in a position of numeric inferiority andfrom this its social, political, cultural, ofstatute and social role. The determining,discriminating element is of a quantitative,numeric nature, and in no instance of

qualitative nature or value.In the sociologic sense, the majority isa segment of the population which exceedsall the other segments2.

The notions of “ethnic minority”,“language, race and identity minority”,and “national minority” were used havingthe same meaning and value for a very longtime, their meaning not being completelycleared up even today. Understanding the

issue of national minorities in the


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POLITICAL HISTORY Aurel Pițurcă


contemporary period requires sometheoretical, conceptual specifications. Ethnicminority is a notion characterising the pre-national period, its members being united

through a commune descendant given bythe same language, way of living, tra-ditions, behaviour, religious belief, culture.This concept highlights the cultural com- ponents which render the group the feelingof belonging and that of being differentfrom the majority, which determines themto make social, political, cultural claims thatwould make them equal to the majority, orto benefit from a special treatment based

on the recognition of the autonomy, and,in extreme cases, on separation.The concept of “language, racial and

religious minority” was used during thewriting of the Peace Treaties of Paris, during1919-1920, and was also adopted by theLeague of Nations. An attempt to definethe concept was made by Helmes Rosting,who defined it as “those groups of personswho differ through race, religion or

language from the majority of a country’sinhabitants”3. The respective definition doesnot accomplish a new and consistentapproach of the concept of minority, thelatter being imposed rather form politicalnecessities, necessary in order to draw upthe peace treaties. Moreover, even from 1922,Jacques Duparc, referring to the definitionof the concept of minority, appreciated thatit is “an abstract notion which does notimply the existence of determinant features, but a juridical relation, whose meaningsvaried… within a certain époque and withina certain geographical area”4.

Rasting’s definition, although it doesnot have in view elements belonging tonational minorities as imposed by thenational state, has the merit of includingthe notions of language, race and religion,ancient elements of distinction and exem- plification of ethnic groups and whom all

local communities took into account, as

well as the states and political officials ofthe time.

The concept of “national minority”was used for the first time by C. A.

Macartney in the interwar period. He triedto apply this concept to the new state-nation realities which were constituted inEurope after the First World War. Nationalminorities were circumscribed both to thestate and to majority nations.

During the post-war period of the1970s Francesco Copatari would try todefine “national minorities”, viewed by himas “a numerically inferior group to the rest

of a state’s population, in a non-dominant position, whose state-obedient membersshare, from an ethnic, religious or linguistic point of view, characteristics whichdifferentiate it from the rest of the populationand who manifest, in an implicit manner, afeeling of solidarity which allows it to keepits culture, tradition, religion or language”5.

More clearly, complete definitions andwhich apply to the new contemporary

realities of national minorities are found inthe documents of the Council of Europe. National minorities are conceived as: groupsof persons from a state who own the state’scitizenship, have and use the language ofthe majority in a certain manner, have theirown cultural, linguistic, religious identity,which they conserve, take part to the politicallife of the respective state through theirown organizations and bodies, but alsothrough the organizations and bodies ofthe state they belong to, trying to promote,through dialogue, political way, and, inextreme situations, through other means,their own interests, aspirations, which, inmost of the situations, coincide to those ofthe majority; are integrated and loyal to thestate they belong to; share the same rights andfreedoms with the majority population.

A radically changed, special situationof the relation between majority and national

minorities exists in the European Union. It


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THOUGHT AND PRACTICE Romanian education system and national minorities in the interwar period


mostly blurred the tensions and conflicts between majority and minorities throughthe newly created framework and gave ahighly different meaning to the relations

between them, determined by a series ofmeasures: the abolition of national borders,free movement of persons, the possibilityto work and establish the place of residencein any part of the EU, to participate in thesocial-political life of the residing community,to be represented, single currency, commonCommunity institutions. The European Unionturned motherlands of EU states into themotherland of the states. Many of the

causes which generated and fuelled conflicts,tensions between the majorities andminorities have vanished or do not findtheir place within the new reality andsocial-political organization. Through thecreation of the European citizenship thedifferences between majority and minoritytend to wipe out and the possible harshness between them tends to disappear. Underno circumstance are they perceived anymore,

or understood according to their ancientmeanings. On the contrary, in some EUMember States, minority groups tend to geta different meaning, that is of immigrantgroups which are constituted of Communitynon-citizens, distinct both from the majorityand from national minorities, and have as purpose to acquire the status of Communitycitizen and all that the latter implies anddevolves upon somebody.

For the first time, ethnic minorities oflanguage, race and religion have become asocial and political issue, transferring alsoin the field of international relations, sincethe signing of the Peace Treaties of Paris(1919-1920). The Peace Conference shouldhave found the answer and solutions forthe new political reality which appearedfollowing the First World War through thedisappearance of two empires and theestablishment of new national states or the perfection of national unity by others,

among which Romania and the issue ofnational minority existing before the waror appeared following the drawing of thenew European political map. From huma-

nitarian, democratic principles, in order tosolve the new European political reality, to prevent the possible conflicts, abuses ofthe majority against the minority, toobviate the arguments among the stateswhich had national minorities and thelatter’s mother-states, the political anddiplomatic world of the great European powers tried to offer protection to nationalminorities through international treaties,

putting them under the League of Nations’guarantee. The independence of the statessucceeding the Austrian-Hungarian Empire,among which was Romania, was conditioned,along with the signing of the Peace Treaty, by the signing of a Treaty of the Minoritiesthrough which they bound themselves toensure minorities equal treatment to that of themajority. Such a measure lead to differentreactions among the succeeding states which

were forced to sign it, Romania having themost visible reaction of opposition to it.Prime-Minister Ionel Brătianu claimed that, as regards Romania, the minorities issuewas solved as the latter had equal rights tothe majority. Being pre-occupied withrendering full independence and sovereigntyto Romania, of stating equal principles andapplicable to all Member States of theLeague of Nations, the Romanian prime-

minister highlighted: “Romania would notadmit a special treatment that does notapply to all other sovereign states nomatter their size and position, as in suchmatters there are no great and small states,states that would subject to the first… weunderstand to have here… within the kingdom,as much freedom and independence as inany other great sovereign authority”6.

Ionel Brătianu was against theencroachment of other states, including theLeague of Nations, in solving the national


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minorities issues as “such interference is tothe prejudice of the minority itself, becauseit can cause problems in their relations tothe majority of citizens of the respective

state when internal laws equally justify allcitizens, both minorities and majority, theyrecognize the state which they belong to astheir natural protector, their unique support”7 with such conviction and for “these seriousmotives we cannot admit a treaty that wouldimpose control from abroad and whichwould invite some Romanian citizens togo against their state and which would putus in an inferior international situation, in a

situation incompatible to the dignity weclaim for our state”8 the Romanian prime-minister argued referring to the signing ofthe Treaty of the Minorities.

The great powers of the time, GreatBritain, France, the United States reactedharshly to such a position and, by comingto threats and blackmail, would determineIonel Brătianu to leave the Peace Conference proclaiming the “resistance policy”. Such

a situation was viewed and interpreteddifferently by the Romanian political class,the opposition accusing him of lack of political and diplomatic tact, of putting indanger the relations with the great powers,with his own allies and supporters of theGreat Union. In such a situation, IonelBrătianu quit. Encouraged by the attitudeof some successor states of the empiresuch as Poland, which on July 26th, 1919signed with no reserves the Treaty of theMinorities, the League’s Supreme Council,which managed the minorities issue, withouttaking into account any proposition and promoting its own politics, decided to signthe Treaty on September 10th, 1919, puttingRomania and other successor states beforethe completed fact. The new governmentled by Alexandru Vaida Voievod made asimple formality by signing the Treaty onDecember 9th, 1919, thus assuming the

documents referring to race, language andreligion minorities.

The minorities issue is linked to inter-ethnical relations which are one of the

most delicate and sensitive spheres of thesocial life, especially in the situationcharacterising Romania following the GreatUnion.

The relation between national minoritiesof Romania during the interwar period andthe education system, understood both as ageneral process and as language of un-folding, held an especially important placein the social life. The education system, the

principles, values and language in which itunfolded can have a contradictory actionin relation to minorities. On the one hand,education in the maternal language constituteda component, an essential means in preser-ving its national identity, in individualisingthem. In return, the absolutization of edu-cation in the minorities’ maternal languagecan give birth to a discrimination process,of social inequality with the majority, can

lead to their isolation and marginalization,to the impossibility of their participating tothe social life, to the promotion of theirown aspirations and ideals, to showingtheir own human fund to advantage. Sucha policy can lead to the appearance oftensions and animosities between majorityand minorities, to the annulment of dialogueand communication, to social and ethnicconflicts.

In the field of education, a multitudeof problems stood before the unitedRomania. Romanian authorities wished tomake out of education an element of unity,of liaison of the newly established state, ofdialogue and communication with all itscitizens, of putting the latter in state ofequality in all the domains of social life.To such a policy one opposed that of theGerman minority’s leaders, but especiallythe Hungarians. Putting education under

the control of Romanian authorities and


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imposing the Romanian language meantreducing their influence over a great massof minorities, including the HungarianizedRomanians before 1918, limiting or even

removing some privileges at the level ofthe local administration, subjecting to the newlegislation and regulations, removing somecommon law of the Hungarian aristocracy,limiting and controlling the irredentist politics promoted by Hungary with the support ofHungarian Transylvanian leaders.

The entire politics in the domain ofnational minorities promoted by Romaniaduring the interwar period, including in the

field of education, was based on the res- pect of the adopted programs during theunity meetings with Romania, of the Treatyof the Minorities signed in December1919. All national minorities were ensured primary, secondary, private, confessionalor public education in their maternallanguage, thus having the possibility toconserve their identity, cultural, linguistic,religious traditions. In order to put national

minorities in a state of equality with themajority and to ensure the dialogue andcommunication with all their citizens, toremove any possibility of isolation, mar-ginalization one ensured the study of theRomanian language at all education cyclesand forms, still an aspect which gave birthto disputes and controversies in the rela-tions to the German and Hungarian minorities.

Following the accomplishment of the

Great Union, along with the other problemsof the social life, education raised a mul-titude of problems within the united provinces:

1. A first problem constituted in thecreation of a unitary, laic, scientific, de-mocratic education system, under the con-trol and coordination of the state. Such ameasure was absolutely necessary as,following 1919, in the United Romaniaexisted four systems of education fromAustria, Hungary, Russia and the Ancientkingdom.

The process of the unification of theeducation system unfolded with difficultydue to many causes:- prior to 1923, there was no fundamental

act, a Constitution according to whichone accomplished a unitary, legitimate policy in the education system andwhich allowed the adoption of the newlaws and regulations. The Constitution of1866, in use, was completely obsolete,had no stipulations which would respondto the new changes appeared in Romania’slife after 1918;

- the powerful opposition to changes and

innovations sustained by the Germanminority leaders and especially Hungarianwho did not recognize the union andwished to turn education into an elementof opposition, of counterpoint towardsthe Romanian authorities;

- the political instability until 1924 hadended since the beginning of the liberalgovernance.

As a consequence, until the adoption

of the Constitution of 1923 and of theeducation laws of 1924, there was a periodof transition, of cohabitation of the edu-cation systems form the Ancient Kingdomwith the ones from the united provinces.

The unification of the educationsystem on the entire territory of Romaniawas a necessary process, a condition forstrengthening and consolidating nationalunity, a proof of imposing Romanian

authority, the beginning of the creation ofmodern education, destined to progress, aright which originated in its independenceand sovereignty.

2. A second problem was the diminishin the percentage of confessional educationand the growth of the public, laic education, being under the state’s control and coor-dination.

Mostly, education in Transylvania waslaic, as the Hungarian state used it in thede-nationalization politics carried against


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national minorities, of Hungarianization,of forming national consciousness.

Besides public education, in Transylvaniathere was also a powerful confessional

(catholic, reformed, Unitarian) education,with a large autonomy, including in con-ferring diplomas. As a reaction to the factthat public education passed under thecontrol of the Romanian state authority,German minorities, but mostly the Hungarianones, in their opposition and resistancetowards the union act, in order to exit thecontrol and get rid of the new requests,would pass to the establishment of nu-

merous confessional schools.During the period 1919-1920 thenumber of confessional schools increasedfrom 438 to 895. The numeric growth ofconfessional schools was determined byother motives such as: the elusion of theuse of the Romanian language which wasnot mandatory in confessional education;attracting pupils from other minorities,including of the Hungarianized Romanians;

the association of education and religiousfreedom could be a motive of the clerics intheir protests both internally and inter-nationally, religious freedom being a verysensitive element and with high audienceto the public opinion; the use of confessionalschools as centres of propaganda and anti-Romanian agitation, in the accomplishmentof Hungary’s irredentist policies. Becauseof these, the Hungarian minority, mostly,lead its children towards confessional edu-cation, turning roundabout the public one,the Romanian state reacted towards theincrease in the number of confessionalschools through a series of measures: theinclusion of confessional schools under thecontrol of the education legislation adoptedafter 1924; the interdiction of subscribingto these institutions of pupils of a differentreligion and confession than that of theethnic group that created and supported

them; the obligation of the use of the

Romanian language in the study of somedisciplines such as the Constitution, thecountry’s history and geography, the studyof the Romanian language, its knowledge

by the didactic personnel and taking all theexaminations of certification and promotionin the Romanian language, not financingstate confessional schools etc.

The measures taken by the authoritiesfrom Bucharest reached their purpose, thenumber of confessional schools decreased,confessional education entered under thecontrol and coordination of the authorities,it increased its scientific, laic content in the

detriment of the religious confessional one.3. A third problem was represented bythe imposition of the Romanian languagein the entire education system, no matter itsform, level, proportion of minorities, province.This objective gave birth to a strongcontroversy, opposition, protests amongthe leaders of the German and Hungarianminority and the Romanian state. For thetwo minorities from Transylvania, the

Germans and the Hungarians, the purposesand objectives followed through the oppo-sition towards the imposition of the Romanianlanguage were different: the German minoritywished to keep its cultural, religious,national identity. In return, the leaders ofthe Hungarian minority conferred it strong political connotations, turning it into a permanent motif of internal protest, butmostly international. This is why the Hungarianleaders spoke of the “Romanian culturaloffensive of de-nationalization”, “the perilof minorities’ disappearance”, “Romania-nization” etc.

The Romanian state, through the minis-ters of education of the time, P.P. Negulescu(1920-1921), but mostly C. Angelescu (1922-1928, 1933-1937), considered that theimposition, knowledge and use of theRomanian language in this important fieldof the social life had as purpose the

following: the consolidation of the Romanian


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national identity; the increase in the cohesionof the Romanian people and of the act ofunion; the unification and functioning ofeducation at the level of the entire country;

ensuring equality and possibilities ofaffirmation of all its citizens, no matter thenationality, means of dialogue, communicationand participation in the social life of allRomanian citizens; the diminish in the possibilities of using propaganda materialshaving irredentist purposes coming fromHungary and having access to the great massof Hungarians; ceasing the process ofHungarianization of Romanians from the

areas in which they were minorities and bringing them back to the Romanian nation.

There were multiple and diverse protests, such as: the refusal to subscribetheir children to public education; protestsaddressed to local, county, central authorities,including the Parliament and the League of Nations; postponing within the Parliamentthe adoption of the education laws, by theminorities’ representatives, and also their

application, demanding for longer termsfor the learning of the Romanian languageor for its use in education and admi-nistration.

4. The fourth issue, in close connectionto the imposition of the Romanian languagewas the de-politicization of education.

During the whole period of dualism,the Hungarian kingdom had as mainobjective towards minorities their de-

nationalization, their Hungarianization. Inthis sense, it used politics and imple-mented it in all domains of the social life,including in that of education. No matterits nature, either public, private or con-fessional, education was used as a meansin the policy of de-nationalization especiallyof the Romanians from Transylvania, asthey formed the majority, also being itsfirst and oldest inhabitants, but also of theSzecklers, Swabians, Saxons of Transylvania.That is how we could explain their support

and agreement regarding the union withRomania in 1918. Minorities’ assimilationhas become state politics during thegovernments of Tisza K ălănean, Banffy

Dezso and Tisza Istvan. School and itsinstitutions were politicized, especiallyduring Minister Albert Apponyi, having as purpose the creation of the Hungarianunitary nation, of Hungarian conscienceand identity which were based on the ideaof Hungarian citizenship according towhich all individuals, no matter theirethnicity, compulsorily belong as citizensto the unitary Hungarian nation.

Following the union, under the cir-cumstances in which public education enteredunder the control and administration ofRomanian authorities, the opposition ofthe Hungarian leaders used confessionaleducation as a means of political struggle,of propagating the revisionist andirredentist politics of Hungary, and anti-Romanian politics.

Under the protection of religious

freedom, confessional schools turned into propaganda centres and anti-Romanian subversiveactions, of stocking and spreading ire-dentist materials coming from Hungary, ofavoiding the control by and contacts withRomanian authorities and their policies, ofcivic and political insubordination.

Through the education laws createdstarting with 1924, the law of public, private, confessional education, of the

school-leaving examination, the Bucharestauthorities have been preoccupied with eli-minating politics from the education system,with maintaining it outside its perimeter ofaction, as it had been established throughthe Peace Treaty of Paris and the Treaty ofthe Minorities.

The problem of the education systemfrom Great Romania and national mino-rities, especially the Hungarian one fromArdeal during the interwar period hasgiven birth to acute disputes, protests,


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tensions and crises, mostly determined by the political opposition of the TransylvanianHungarian leaders who did not recognizedthe union, by the revisionist irredentist

politics fuelled and supported by Hungary, but also by some subjective and objectivecauses which were linked to the Romanian politics itself towards minorities, such as:- the lack of experience as regards mi-

norities politics of the governance fromBucharest which had not encounteredsuch an issue within the AncientKingdom;

- the tensed situation between Romania

and Hungary during 1919 and 1920 whichgenerated and fuelled the opposition ofTransylvanian Hungarian leaders towardsRomanian authorities;

- the contradiction between the policy ofcentralisation promoted by the liberalgovernance, adept of a centralised, strongand unitary state and the policy of local,regional autonomy wished and promoted by minorities, especially the German

and Hungarian ones, whose interests and privileges were directly affected by thecentralised policy;

- the lack of unity of the Romanian po-litical class towards the policy thatwould be applied as regards the united provinces. For instance, the leaders ofthe National Peasant Party, especiallythe Transylvanian group, were adepts ofthe policy of local autonomy, which wasalso promoted by the minorities. Such a policy had its reasons in their state ofopposition to the liberals, in their desireto keep Transylvania and its provinceswithin their political-electoral pool.Local autonomy, many times understoodas a culture, would bring both Transyl-vanian political leaders and those ofnational minorities the maintenance ofold privileges, economic and politicalinterests;

- the lack of efficient communication between central and local authorities de-termined by the lack of qualified personnel, of administrative experience

and science, by the opposition of theleaders of the Hungarian minority andeven Romanian;

- psychological, moral factors which actednot only with the minorities, especiallythe Hungarian one, but also with theRomanian nation. Temporally, psychically,morally, but especially politically, theTransylvanian Hungarian minority didnot wish, nor was it able to accept the

new social-political situation. From adominant, all-ruling nation, following theunion, it woke up as a minority, turnedinto equal to those whom it had ex- ploited and despised. Through their leaders,the Transylvanian Hungarians consideredthemselves to be the successors of theHungarian state, thus wishing to preserveits old political, social and economicstatus, they considered themselves to be

a governing party, at least equal to theRomanian state. Placed before the new political reality, they refused to accept it,it became opposed with or withoutmotives, being manoeuvred by Hungaryin its revisionist policies.

To this was added the presence andaction of strong international laic, political,ecclesiastic centres of Hungarian ethnicitythat encouraged and financed the oppositionand secessionist tendencies of the Hun-garians within the area, including fromArdeal.

One must also have in view the psychicand moral pressures that the Romaniancentral and local authorities were subjectedto from the part of an important segmentof the public opinion, of the TransylvanianRomanians who demanded satisfaction asthey had been underestimated, offended,de-nationalized for ages, politics which in

many areas continued to be performed


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POLITICAL HISTORY



Romanian Kings’ official visits to London

Marusia CÎRSTEA

Abstract: Within the interwar period, the Romanian diplomacy hasalways followed the consolidation of the relationships with the greatEuropean powers. In this context, a series of Romanian diplomats –

Nicolae Titulescu, Take Ionescu, Grigore Gafencu, Victor Antonescu – have tried to intensify the diplomatic, economic and militaryrelations with Great Britain. Moreover, during 1924, 1936, 1938, the Romanian sovereigns – Ferdinand and Charles II – have paid officialvisits that contributed to a better knowledge of the two parties asregards the bilateral and also international relations. One mustreveal that the press of the time has highlighted in highly-praisedterms the relations between the two monarchies noticing theimportance of the discussions between the delegations of the twocountries.

Keywords: monarchy, international relations, economic interests,official visit, diplomatic instruments.

fter the First World War, Romaniandiplomacy considered three directions:strengthening ties with the Great

Powers that had been allied during thewar, maintaining good relations withneighbours, and developing relations with

all countries, both neuter and hostile1

.When World War I finished, GreatBritain, advocate of an isolationist policy,ceased to maintain any engagement of political or military support for Romania.That’s why the Romanian diplomats’ efforts – Take Ionescu, Nicolae Titulescu, GrigoreGafencu, Victor Antonescu and others –were directed towards amplifying diplomatic,economic and military relations with GreatBritain2. Nicolae Titulescu, accredited minister

in London (December 1921 – July 1927and August 1928 – October 1932) broughthis contribution to strengthening bilateralEnglish-Romanian relation3. From the very beginning, Nicolae Titulescu and TakeIonescu’s support, who spotted, among the

first, the importance Great Britain playedin international relations evolution, thinkingthat “London is a first rank outpost”4.Titulescu’s activity in Great Britain’scapital was unanimously appreciated inBritish diplomatic circles. His first attemptsin his diplomatic activity there show hewas prove to set as a basic for the futurecooperation, the feeling of complete trust.Consequently he stated that “the only thingI can do to please the English people is to


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Entente was against the Habsburgs’ return,succeeding to convince the British leadersto suggest it to Prince Starhemberg, whowas then in London10.

The relations between Great Britainand Romania were very close between1936-1937. Victor Antonescu, NicolaeTitulescu’s successor, met Sir AnthonyEden, Secretary of State on the ForeignOffice in Geneva on September 26th, 1936,in order to assure him he would continue Nicolae Titulescu’s policy but “not so brilliantly or passionately”, although, hecontinued, “his country’s foreign policy

would be based on the friendship withFrance and Great Britain”11.In the following months, Victor

Antonescu approached the problem ofrelations with Great Britain, insisting that“they continue to be excellent”12.

In 1937 the Romanian officials re-affirmed Bucharest’s wish to create a newframework for the relations with GreatBritain. This was confirmed by Victor

Antonescu in his talks with Eden atGeneva and London in January and April1937. In his turn, Carol II thrice repeatedhis wish of amplifying British-Romanianrelations.

In 1938, between the 15th and 18th of November, Carol II paid a visit to GreatBritain, accompanied by Ernest Urdăreanu, I.V. Stîrcea, marshall C. Flondor, GeneralG. Mihail, N. Petrescu, C. Cesianu, I. Raduand M. Mihăilescu.

King Carol II, together with PrinceMihai and his suite, left the country on November 13th 1938. On November 15th,Carol II was welcomed by King GeorgeVI and his brother the Duke of Gloucester, by Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax andothers.

The media of the time largely rendered both the preparation and the visit of CarolII to Great Britain, pointing out the

importance of the talks between the two

delegations. So, the newspaper “GazetaPolska” underlined in November 13th 1938that “Romania, which in September andOctober [1938] was more of a witness to

events happening on its western border,comes out of its reserve consciously imposed.The position of passive observer consequently preserved lately by Bucharest, was theresult of the conviction that Bucharestcannot exert a real influence on changes inCentral Europe, even if they concerneddirectly the Romanian interests. Thathappened because the only diplomaticinstrument which could be practically

used, the Little Entente, had been uselessfor a long time, and its futility becameobvious the moment we knew Englandand France had no intention of engaging inthe Czeck matter… Only now Romaniachooses the diplomatic action which wedefined as an assembly of elements for thefuture action”13, and, in this context, “kingCarol’s visit to London would favour politicaltalks whose aim, from a Romanian view-

point, would certainly be the examiningwhether and how much Britain wished toactively imply itself in the Balkans in thenear future.

If London did not show anyenthusiasm in this direction, the tendenciesof getting closer to Germany, especiallyeconomically, would automatically grow”14.During the talks between Carol II andChamberlain, the latter said that Romania’sgeo-political position seemed inevitablycloser to Germany from an economic point of view, but that it did not mean thatthe British Government was not interestedin any commercial possibilities that could be effected, and assured him that therumour, spread in German circles, abouthis agreeing in Munich that Hitler couldtreat Central and South-Eastern Europe asa space reserved for the German mo-nopoly, was not true.


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THOUGHT AND PRACTICE Romanian K ings’ official visits to London


The English press also underlined thefact that, following the visit, “Romaniawill receive financial aid from England,which will enable her to oppose to the

growing German expansion. It will be anew English attempt aiming at maintainingits influence in South-Eastern Europe”15.Other newspapers and magazines of thetime emphasized the main discussion themes between Great Britain and Romania. ThePolish newspaper “Coniec Warszawski”,on November 15th 1938, considered that“the visit of King Carol II to London willcontribute a great deal to clarifying the

state of the Danube basin.After Czechoslovakia’s division, after

weakening the French influence anddisappearance of the Little Entente, afterHungary’s enlargement and strengtheningof the German, Italian and Polish influence,the state of the Danube basin has not yetcrystallized. Until now, we do not knowwhat political factors, will prevail andwhat the Danube states’ orientation will

be. Added to all these, is the problem ofsub-Carpathian Russia, which interests notonly Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia but also Romania. Most certainly these problems will constitute the object of theBritish-Romanian talks. In fact, the Englishinvested great capitals in Romania and it isimpossible that they are not interested inthe Romanian problems”16.

Concluding the talks, King Carol II

reviewed the main economic proposalsmade by the Romanian government to theBritish government: the nautical base onLake Tasaul; developing the commercialnavy on the Danube; lumber and silos.Chamberlain promised that the Britishgovernment would examine the Romaniansuggestions as presented by the king anddeclared that he would be very content if,following the examination, they wouldcome to the conclusion that it was possibleto undertake some action on the proposed

lines; he remarked that the Britishgovernment had already shown that it wasinterested in an economic co-operation withRomania, by the act that it had purchased

200,000 t of Romanian wheat. King Carol’stalks with Prime Minister Chamberlain, nodoubt contributed to a better knowledge ofthe two sides’ position in the tackled problems, showing that, due to its Munich policy,the British Government evaded wideningthe British Romanian collaboration.

But, the two governments avoidedmaking any commitment, which meant, infact, that Romania could not count on the

support of Great Britain or France. Eventhough the visits were practically a failure,the media in the country presented them assuccesses. They were broadcast live on theradio, and the press could not find the rightwords to praise Carol II, a great politicalman of Europe, respected both by thevisited peoples and by their leaders. All the papers in Bucharest commented ineulogistic terms Carol’s visit. For instance,

“Îndreptarea”17

newspaper marked theimportance of the meetings in London andstated that they “will create a cordialBritish-Romanian Convention, that GreatBritain’s interest in Romania increased, sothat an English character could say that“the border of English Indies lie on theCarpathians”, while “Universul” emphasized“the enthusiasm of the British peopleopinion” and showed that the visit “is

more meaningful than thought, Romania’srole being of utmost importance in thegiven situation”18. The fact that the kingreceived the “Order of the Garter”, thehighest British decoration, was appreciated by the press in Romania as the clearest proof of the fact that the sovereign wasconsidered one of the most prominent personalities of the time. Carol II was toappreciate that “a peace which was toculminate with the Munich shame, could


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throw us, willy-nilly, under the Germaninfluence”19.

The evolution of international life between 1936 and 1939 determined a change

in the ratio of forces on the continent. Inthis context, Romanian diplomacy remainedconnected to the old paradigms – theLeague of Nations, alliance with France,close relations with Great Britain, regionaltreaties, etc., corroborated to efforts ofadapting to new realities.

Note 1 Academia Română, Istoria Românilor , vol.

VIII, România Întregită (1918-1940), coordi-nator Ioan Scurtu, Bucharest, EdituraEnciclopedică, 2003, pp. 445-447.2 See, in detail, Marusia Cîrstea, Din istoriarela ţ iilor anglo-române (1936-1939), Bucharest,Editura Mica Valahie, 2004.3 Ion M. Oprea, Nicolae Titulescu, Bucharest,Editura Ştiinţifică, 1966, pp. 130-167.4 Marusia Cîrstea, op. cit ., p. 70.5 „Adevărul”, 5 July 1922.

6 Gheorghe Buzatu, coordinator, Titulescu şi strategia păcii, Iaşi, Editura Junimea, 1981, p. 379. 7 Constantin Vlad, Diploma ţ ia secolului XX ,Bucharest, Titulescu European Foundation,2006, pp. 96-97.8 See, in detail, Gheorghe Paşcalău, Rela ţ ii politice româno-engleze (1929-1933), Bucharest,Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică, 1995. 9 Marusia Cîrstea, op. cit ., p. 94.10 Nicolae Titulescu, Documente diplomatice,Bucharest, Editura Ştiinţifică, 1967, p. 718-719.11 Ion Pătroiu, Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, România, Anglia şi Europa anilor ’30, Craiova,Editura Scrisul Românesc, 1996, p. 45.12 Ibidem, p. 46.13 Foreign Relations Ministry Archive,

Bucharest, fund 71 Anglia, vol. 16, f. 312.14 Ibidem, f. 314.15 Ibidem, f. 318.16 Ibidem, f. 316.17 Ibidem.18 Idem, London fund, vol. 76, un-paged.19 Apud Ioan Scurtu, Istoria românilor în timpulcelor patru regi (1866-1947), vol. III, Carol al II-lea,Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2001, p. 254.


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Radical and moderate political groups inthe Sociology School of Bucharest

Antonio MOMOC

Abstract: The Sociology School of Bucharest has not been yet studied

from the perspective of the political views of its members. This articlerepresents only a part of a larger research that exhaustivelyinvestigates the political orientations of the disciples, as well as thementor of the Sociology School. We have identified the groups formedinside the School in the ’30s and their relationship to the political power. Keywords: sociology, political view, elite, society, propaganda,legionarism, communism.

fter the 1918 Union, the socio- political actors of the new Romanianstate proposed various modernization projects. These political projects com-

peted after 1929 to become solutions duringthe Great Depression. The SociologySchool of Bucharest – first through itsfounder Dimitrie Gusti, and then in the’30s, through the already intellectuallygrown-up disciples – presented both to the

civil and political society with its ownmodernization project, entitled Science ofthe Nation1.

Dimitrie Gusti’s sociological, political andethical view involved more than the mono-graphic research of the Ro-manian villages.His ideal was achieving a Sociology of thenation, based on researching all theRomanian villages and cities, in order to provide an exhaustive vision upon thesocial realities in Romania. The outcomeof the huge research was going to become

useful to the politicians with decision power, to the King and his ministers.However, the School of Bucharest did

not develop as a unitary block. In the back-ground of the parliamentarian democracycrisis, centrifugal tendencies occurred in-side the School. In the ’30s, the systemic parties were replaced with the extremeright movement, which was attractive dueto its promise of radical system changes.

Some of Gusti’s collaborators remainedloyal to his project according to whichspecialists should serve the nation throughoutthe state. Other monographers separated fromthe School and approached the projects ofthe other social or political actors. Some ofthem embraced certain political ideals intheir public life, in the press or by adhering to political movements.

According to our modest knowledge,The Sociology School of Bucharest has not been yet studied from the perspective of the


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political views of its members. This articlerepresents only a part of a larger researchthat exhaustively in-vestigates the politicalorientations of the disciples, as well as the

mentor of the Sociology School2

. We haveidentified the groups formed inside theSchool in the ’30s and their relationship tothe political power.

Our research method reconstructs thecultural-political biography of Gusti and ofhis main collaborators. The representativebiography3 follows the history of an indi-vidual. The resear-cher’s interest does notorient towards what is unique, but towards

tracing the formative contexts and the ex- periences shared with others, which followedsimilar cultural and political paths. Com- plementary, the method focuses on differences,explaining the choice between differentintellectual and political-cultural options. Inorder to reconstruct the cultural and poli-tical paths, we have identified the members’attitudes reflected in their scientific workand in their articles from print media. We

have insisted on personal documents that became public: journals, correspondence,memoirs and more recently in oral historyinterviews4.

In the ’20s the School materialized inthe Sociology Seminar and in the publicdebates from the Romanian Social Insti-tute (RSI), where Gusti treated problemsof society from the Science of the Nation perspective. The politicians included histhemes in their speeches, adding their own political and electoral solutions5.

At RSI Gusti was interested informing a lobby group that would uniteintellectuals based on their professional skillsand gain legitimacy of the social inter-vention above the party organizations. After1921, RSI organized 2 conferences regardingthe project of the New Constitution6. Gustigathered at RSI experts keen on Romania’sinstitutional development7. Any politician

was able to become an RSI member had he

been invited by Gusti, and the professorhad no other criterion except for them toaccept the program of the institution. In the’20s the Sociology School manifested itself

outside the influences of political power,as part of the civil society.When King Carol II came back in

power, he became the RSI President ofHonour. In the ’30s the School starts anundeclared competition with the otheractors on the Romanian political scene.Politically unaffiliated, Gusti accepted in 1932the proposal to join the Government led bythe National Peasant Party. Invited in the

Council of Ministers as a technocrat, professorGusti led the Ministry of Instruction, Cultsand Arts in the National Peasant Govern-ments presided by Alexandru Vaida-Voievod and Iuliu Maniu.

Once Gusti ended his Ministry mandate,the King named him Active President,General Manager of the Cultural RoyalFoundation “Principele Carol”. Throughthe cultural action that took place in the

villages after 1934, the Royal teams of theFoundation constituted themselves asmessage carriers and builders of thenational specificity as the latter wasdefined by the national doctrine, con-centrated in Gusti’s political view.

During the second part of the ’30s,RSI and the Foundation served Carol’smonarchy. Through the propaganda8 coordinated by Gusti while he was leading the“Principele Carol” Foundation, the Kingwas trying to win the competition with theLegionary Movement by attractting theyoung elites and the rural society. Some ofGusti’s disciples employed in the mo-narchist state institutions: Henri H. Stahlwas the Research Manager in the Foun-dation, Octavian Neamţu was the mainorganizer of the royal teams on field and,together with Anton Golopenţia, theydedicated themselves to the village cultural

work.


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THOUGHT AND PRACTICE Radical and moderate political groups in the Sociology School of Bucharest


According to the Social Service Law introduced on October 18th, 19389, theRomanian royal dictatorship made thecultural action work man-datory. Although

not a member of the Council of Ministers,Gusti had the position of a Ministerresponsible exclusively in front of theKing. The royal dictatorship offered Gustithe opportunity to apply his village moder-nization national program, as if he was astate minister. As President of the SocialService, the professor was res-ponding politically exclusively to the King, whilethe other ministers in the Council were

obliged to provide their support andassistance.

Other monographers like MirceaVulcănescu, Xenia Costa-Foru or TraianHerseni refused to be culturally active atthe Royal Foundation „Principele Carol”in the ’30s. As a student, Mircea Vulcănescuwas enrolled in the Romanian ChristianStudents Association (nationalist- orthodox), but also attended the summer courses

organized by the International UniversityFederation for the Society of Nations.Between 1926-1929 he participated with acertain consistency at the monographicresearch, but at the beginning of the ’30s heabandoned the village campaigns, as researchstarted to be replaced by propaganda.Although a sympathizer of Nae Ionescu,Vulcănescu does not join the radical rightmovement, but chooses public admi-

nistration, preferring to be a clerk of theliberal bourgeois state10.Under the pressure of the legionary

nationalism, Gusti’s School sufferedinternal conflicts and dissidences. Thedissident group from Rânduiala, Arhivă de gând şi faptă românească review deniedMonography, separated from Gusti andentered the Legionary Movement. In thefirst 4 numbers of Rânduiala review, theattacks of the group formed by DumitruCristian Amzăr, Ernest Bernea, Ion I.

Ionică and Ion Samarineanu against theMonographic School were shy. But in itssecond year of issuing, the magazine tookthe shape of some Notebooks (Caete) with

strict legionary inclination, containingeditorials signed by “Capitan” CorneliuZelea Codreanu.

Similarly to the other groups thatemerged from the Sociology School, thelegionary group was not very united. Oneof the most fervent protestors against theMonographic School, D. C. Amzăr, abandonedthe Legionary Movement in 1938 and became a diplomat.

The founder’s of the SociologySchool attitude regarding to the politicalviews of his students was conciliatory. Hedid not remove neither the legionarystudents (D.C. Amzăr, E. Bernea), nor thecommunist ones (Miron Constantinescu)from the School. All those adhering toGusti’s modernization project were able to part of the School. Gusti’s support forHerseni even after the latter joins the

Legionary Movement is the clearest proofthat becoming a legionary did not auto-matically led to being excluded from themonographers’ circle.

Herseni moved from communism tofascism because the attraction of the poli-tical extremes derived from the commonvalues of the radical political promises. Inthe interwar period many communistmilitants migrated to fascism, just as some

of the fascists adhered to communism. Thewandering of the militants can beunderstood only by referring to the world both communism and fascism had proposed to replace11.

Herseni collaborated in 1932 withleft-wing reviews such as Societateade mâine and Stânga, Linia generală avremii.After writing for Stânga, he refusesto be a militant for the Foundation, but

joins the Legionary Movement in


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1937. The mobilizing speech Herseniuses in the brochures Mişcarea Legio-nară şi Muncitorimea12 and Mişcarea Legionară şi Ţărănimea13 is identicalto the one of the cultural activists fromthe „Principele Carol” Foundation. Whatdiffers is the Hero they were worshi- ping: Gusti’s students served the Monarchyof Carol the Second, while for Herseniand the legionaries, Corneliu ZeleaCodreanu was the Savior.

Notes 1

See Dimitrie Gusti, (1934), Sociologia militans. Introducere în sociologia politică, vol. I, ISRPublishing House, Bucharest and Dimitrie Gusti,(1937), Ştiinţ a na ţ iunii, Imprimeria CentralăPublishing House, Bucharest, no. 2-3, year II,February-March 1937, Romanian Social Institute.2 Momoc, Antonio (2008), O istorie politică aŞcolii de Sociologie de la Bucureşti, PhD thesis,coordinated by Proffesor Zoltán Rostás,University of Bucharest, Faculty of Sociology3 See Jerry Muller, (1987), The other God that

failed: Hans Freyer, and the deradicalization of

German conservatism, Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, New Jersey.4 See Rostás, Zoltán (2001), O istorie orală aŞcolii Sociologice de la Bucureşti, PaideiaPublishing House, Bucharest.

5 Gusti, Dimitrie (1924), Doctrinele partidelor politice: 19 prelegeri publice organizate de ISR,in „Arhiva pentru Ştiinţa şi Reforma Socială”,year V, Romanian Social Institute, Cultura Naţională Press, Bucharest. 6 Gusti, Dimitrie (1923), Noua Constitu ţ ie a

României: 23 prelegeri publice organizate de ISR,cu o anexă cuprinzând Noile Constituţ ii Europene, Cultura Naţională Press, Bucharest 7 Manoilescu, Mihail (1993), Memorii (vol. I),Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucureşti, pp. 49-50.8 Rostás, Zoltán „Strategii de comunicare la ŞcoalaSociologică a lui Dimitrie Gusti. Direcţii de cer-cetare” in The Romanian Communications Sciences

Review “Jurnalism & Comunicare”, year II, no. 2,spring 2003, pp. 3-7.9 Hamangiu, Constantin (1939), Codul general al

României, (Coduri, Legi. Decrete-legi şi Regu-lamente), vol. XXVI, 1938 – Part II, MonitorulOficial Publishing House, Bucharest, pp. 2001-2007.10 Mircea Vulcănescu was a referent at the Office forResearch in the Ministry of Finance between 1929-1933. In 1933 he was also a Government Auditor forthe Romanian Agriculture Bank. From June 1935until September 1937 he was the Managing Directorof the Customs. Then he was named Manager of the National Debt in the Ministry of Finances.11

Chioveanu, Mihai (2005), Fe ţ ele fascismului. Politică, ideologie şi scrisul istoric în secolul XX ,University of Bucharest Press, p. 69.12 Herseni, Traian (1937), Mişcarea Legionară şi

Muncitorimea, Bucovina Publishing House, Bucharest.13 Idem (1937), Mişcarea Legionară şi Ţărănimea,Bucovina Publishing House, Bucharest.


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Anul 1938 şi înfiinţarea Frontului Renaşterii Naţionale –

context european şi context naţional

Mihaela Camelia BUZATU

Abstract: In 1938, the map of Europe was devided in four kinds of political regimes: communist, fascist, parliamentary and authoritarian. In

Romania, which was included in the last category, the year 1938represented the political triumph of the king Charles II, who changedthe constitution, dissolved the political parties and established the National Rennaisance Front. These changes were a part of theEuropean political transformations which will determin the beginningof the second world war.Keywords: party, constitution, king, government, foreign policy.

eceniul al IV-lea al secolului XX1 a

fost pentru Europa unul al schim- bărilor majore, un deceniu con-

vulsiv, al sfârşitului crizei economice, alnaşterii şi dezvoltării regimurilor autoritaresau extremiste. „De la comunism la fas-cism sau nazism – arăta un istoric român –aproape toate ţările Europei trec, maidevreme sau mai târziu, prin febra tota-litarismului (provocată de dezgustul demo-raţiei şi de mitologia unei «lumi noi» şi a

unui «om nou»).”2

Manifestarea acestorideologii extremiste – de stânga sau dedreapta – care în ţările de origine au fostacceptate drept politici de stat, dublate de politica de conciliere a puterilor europenedemocratice, vor deteriora vizibil relaţiileinternaţionale la nivel european şi vorduce, în final, la izbucnirea celui de-aldoilea război mondial.

Într-o hartă a Europei, corespunzând

începutului de an 1938, Serge Berstein şiPierre Milza împărţeau continentul în patru

categorii de state: state cu regim parla-

mentar sau democraţie liberală (Franţa,Regatul Unit, Irlanda, Ţările de Jos, BelgiaLuxemburg, Elveţia, Norvegia, Suedia,Finlanda, Cehoslovacia şi Islanda), state curegim fascist (Italia şi Germania), state curegim comunist (U.R.S.S.) şi state cu regim autoritar tradiţionalist (Spania, Portugalia,Turcia, Grecia, Bulgaria, Iugoslavia, România,Ungaria, Austria, Polonia, Lituania, Letoniaşi Estonia)3. Ţările din această ultimă

categorie, exceptând Portugalia şi Spania,se găseau geografic între ţările cu regimfascist şi ţările cu regim comunist, iar ceamai mare parte a lor vor intra după cel de-al doilea război mondial fie în componenţaUniunii Sovietice, fie în orbita politică aU.R.S.S.-ului. Anul 1938, la nivel european, a continuat evoluţia politică ce aveasă se sfârşească cu izbucnirea celui de-aldoilea război mondial, în timp ce în

România, acelaşi an a reprezentat perioadatriumfului în politica internă pentru regele


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POLITICAL HISTORY Mihaela Camelia Buzatu


Carol al II-lea, acum fiind instaurat re-gimul personal al suveranului, adoptându-se o nouă constituţie care să-l legitimeze,luându-se o serie de măsuri ce au dus la o

implicare tot mai activă a monarhiei înviaţa politică, implicare ce o regăsim înscoaterea partidelor politice în afara legii şiîn crearea climatului ce a dus la apariţiaFrontului Renaşterii Naţionale.

Unul dintre evenimentele politice im- portante ale anului 1938 şi primul în or -dine cronologică, este cel petrecut la 10/11februarie, atunci când guvernul Goga-Cuza îşi depune demisia, în locul său fiind

constituit guvernul condus de PatriarhulMiron Cristea4; Henri Prost considera cădin acel moment „suveranul devenise pro- priul său prim-ministru”5. Lovitura de stat6 dată de rege, prin care acesta alcătuia unConsiliu de Miniştri obedient şi la con-ducerea căruia îl numea pe patriarh, a fostinterpretată diferit de istoricii români. O primă orientare ar fi aceea, potrivit căreia,regele Carol al II-lea trecuse la instituirea

regimului personal după o lungă perioadăde tatonări, perioadă în care a făcut totceea ce a depins de el pentru a discreditaatât partidele politice cât şi instituţia Parla-mentului, istoricii susţinând ideea unui plan privind instaurarea unei dictaturi încăde la urcarea pe tronul României, februarie'38 reprezentând doar momentul prielnic pentru punerea în aplicare a planului7.Al.Gh. Savu merge mai departe, afirmândcă regele îşi propusese „încă înainte de ur -carea pe tron” impunerea unei astfel deforme de guvernare8. O teorie interesantă,care vine să o contrazică pe cea expusăanterior, este aceea lansată de SorinAlexandrescu:

„Carol a fost învinuit mai târziu de urzirea,în aceşti ani, a unui plan diavolesc: el ar fidorit, încă din 1930, să înfiinţeze o dic-tatură personală, dar neîndrăznind să treacă imediat la fapte, a făcut tot ce a putut ca să

destabilizeze democraţia parlamentară şi

să aibă astfel un pretext, în 1938, de-a o şidesfiinţa formal, ca ineficientă. O aseme-nea interpretare mi se pare a păcătui princeea ce se numeşte teleological phallacy: priveşti anii 1930-1938 din perspectiva lui1938 şi interpretezi prin urmare toate eve-nimentele precedete drept tot atâtea etapecare trebuiau să ducă la evenimentul anului 1938, declanşarea dictaturii regale. În cemă priveşte aş dori să văd anii 1930-1938mai curând ca un complex joc în trei întrerege, Garda de Fier şi partidele democra-tice tradiţionale. Acest adevărat triunghi almor ţ ii – replică grotescă la «triunghiul»mor ţii din primul război mondial – n-a fostdecât un clasic triumvirat, în care doi

dintre participanţi se aliază pentru ca să-lelimine pe-al treilea şi luptă apoi pe viaţăşi pe moarte , între ei, pentru adjudecarea puterii absolute.”9

Perioada cuprinsă între venirea pe trona lui Carol al II-lea în 1930 şi anulschimbărilor politice – 1938 – este văzută,astfel, ca o perioadă având trei actori po-litici: regele, Garda de Fier şi partidele tra-diţionale. Pentru a putea prelua puterea

într-o formă autoritară, Carol al II-leatrebuia să-şi înlăture ceilalţi doi adversari –Garda şi partidele. Conştientizând faptulcă noul context politic creat prin insta-urarea regimului autoritar nu-i este delocfavorabil şi anticipând următoarea mişcarea regelui, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu aanunţat, la 21 februarie 1938, dizolvareaGărzii10. Această autodizolvare reprezentaînsă un gest formal, instituţional, căci

spiritul gardist şi sprijinul Germaniei pentru ideile gardiste au continuat să existeşi după această dată11. Ameninţarea pe careo constituiau ideile Gărzii de Fier chiar şidupă 21 februarie, o regăsim în deca- pitarea mişcării de dreapta extremă pecare Carol al II-lea şi Armand Călinescu ostr ucturează în câteva etape, etape influ-enţate şi de evoluţiile politice externe:arestarea lui Corneliu Zelea Codreanu12,

fabricarea unui proces şi uciderea căpita-


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nului împreună cu alţi 13 legionari, pre-textul fiind fuga de sub escortă, în timp ceerau transportaţi din închisoarea de laRâmnicul Sărat la cea de la Jilava, în

noaptea de 29/30 noiembrie 193813

. Anul1938 ne apare astfel ca un an al victorieilui Carol al II-lea asupra Gărzii de Fier;este însă o victorie de scurtă durată,deoarece, cu sprijinul Germaniei şi subconducerea lui Horia Sima, Garda se varevigora şi va deveni foarte puternică înanii următori lui '38, căci „în pânzele ei bătea vântul succeselor Reichului”14.

Cel de-al doilea adversar al lui Carol

al II-lea – partidele politice tradiţionale –este mult mai uşor de învins; de aceastădată opozantul principal al regelui nu puteafi identificat în postura unei singure per-soane, ba mai mult, era vorba de un numărimpresionant de partide15, a căror coeziuneera aproape nulă. Rezultatul alegerilor dindecembrie 1937, potrivit căruia nici un partid nu reuşise să atingă pragul de 40%( prima majoritară) necesar formării guvernului

şi instalarea guvernului Goga-Cuza, aureprezentat semnalul de alarmă ce a dus la„trezirea” partidelor; „democraţii se trezescşi strâng, în fine, rândurile.”16 Era, însă,destul de târziu, cel care va juca de acumînainte rolul principal pe scena politică aţării fiind Carol. Fără un sprijin extern, precum cel al Gărzii de Fier şi având un pronunţat caracter eterogen, opus omoge-nităţii Gărzii, partidele sunt scoase în afaralegii la 30 martie17; cu toate acestea ele vorcontinua să-şi desfăşoare activitatea, vor fiînsă înlocuite, în mai puţin de un an, printr-o organizaţie politică de tip monolit – Frontul Renaşterii Naţionale. Dacă încazul Gărzii de Fier, Carol al II-lea nuoferise o alternativă politică la uciderea luiCorneliu Zelea Codreanu, lipsa acesteialternative determinând mai târziu renaş-terea Gărzii, alternativa la desfiinţarea partidelor politice a fost însuşi Frontul Re-

naşterii Naţionale. În aceeaşi zi cu decretul

privind scoaterea partidelor politice înafara legii, este dat şi decretul lege nr.1421, prin care era înfiinţat Consiliul deCoroană18. Acest organism al statului

funcţionase şi în tr ecut, elementul de no-utate fiind legat de caracterul permanent pe care consiliul îl căpătase; nici acesta,însă, nu venea să îngrădească puterea pecare regele Carol al II-lea şi-o arogase cu puţin timp în urmă, deoarece rolul Consi-liului era unul consultativ, hotărârile luinefiind obligatorii pentru rege19.

Concomitent cu punerea în umbră saucu eliminarea adversarilor, Carol al II-lea a

încercat să creeze cadrul instituţional ne-cesar schimbărilor iniţiate în februarie1938, pasul cel mai important fiind pro-mulgarea noii Constituţii, care venea săschimbe pe cea adoptată în timpul domnieitatălui său, regele Ferdinand şi datând dinanul 1923. Fără a insista asupra preve-derilor noii legi fundamentale, vom men-ţiona faptul că regele a folosit şi acest pri-lej pentru a sublinia popularitatea de care

se bucura regimul inaugurat la 10/11 februarie; pentru aceasta, el a supus textulconstituţiei, redactat de Istrate Micescu,unui plebiscit care a avut loc pe data de 24februarie şi, prin intermediul căruia, popu-laţia şi-a putut exprima „liberă” opiniaasupra constituţiei. Rezultatul plebiscitului – 4.297.581 voturi pentru şi 5.843 contra20 – nu poate fi considerat unul obiectiv, dacăse ţine cont de timpul extrem de scurt, dedoar 4 zile, care a trecut de la data publi-cării textului constituţiei şi până la data lacare s-a desfaşurat plebiscitul. Fără îndo-ială, alegătorii nu cunoşteau conţinutul ex- plicit al textului elaborat de oficialităţi; cutoate acestea, Carol va sublinia în nenu-mărate rânduri larga adeziune manifes-tată de populaţia României faţă de noulsistem, adeziune concretizată prin rezul-tatul favorabil înregistrat cu ocazia ple- biscitului21. Nu este mai puţin adevărat fap-

tul că o parte a populaţiei vedea în regele


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Carol al II-lea singurul om care ar fi pututsă conducă ţara spre mai bine în perioadarespectivă, iar actele acestuia, fără a fichestionate, considerate drept cele mai

bune soluţii22

.Cât priveşte politica externă, Carol aîncearcat iniţial urmărirea liniei tradiţio-nale, aceea a apropierii de Anglia şi Franţaşi menţinerea alianţelor regionale – MicaÎnţelegere şi Înţelegerea Balcanică. Anul1938 nu va fi, însă, unul lipsit de eveni-mente majore pe plan european, fapt ce-lva determina pe rege să adopte poziţiacerută de circumstanţe, iar nu aceea pe

care atât el cât şi marea parte a populaţiei oconsiderau corectă. Interesant de observatcum vedea regele, la 1 septembrie 1938,situaţia României şi ce soluţii propunea:

„E adevărat că ne găsim într -o situaţie politică extrem de gravă şi care ne poateantrena la o modificare a politicii noastreexterne, ce am ţinut-o cu dinţii de câţivaani. Legăturile cât mai strânse cu Franţa şi,îndeosebi, cu Anglia, fidelitate absolutăaliaţilor noştri (adesea foarte greu) şi să nune lăsăm angajaţi niciodată într -un complex care să ne ducă, în mod automatic, înconflic‹t› cu Germania, iar faţă de U.R.S.S. nici o legătură prea strânsă, care să facă pegermani să creadă că facem un act ostillor.”23

Perspectivele României se înrăutăţesc,însă, odată cu semnarea acordului de laMünchen24; era evident că marile puterioccidentale nu erau dispuse să apere in-

teresele ţărilor mici25. Ultima încercare deobţinere a unor garanţii, menite să ofere unoarecare echilibru României în politica ex-ternă, se va materializa în noiembrie 1938,atunci când vor avea loc vizitele oficialeale lui Carol al II-lea la Londra (15-18 no-iembrie) şi Paris (19-21 noiembrie). Pre-zentate în termeni destul de îngăduitori de presa vremii, acţiunile diplomatice nu auavut rezultatul scontat, nici unul dintre

reprezentanţii Angliei sau Franţei neasu-

mându-şi nici un fel de angajament faţă deRomânia26. Singura soluţie viabilă pentruţara noastră rămânea o apropiere deGermania, fapt ce l-a determinat pe rege să

aibă la 24 noiembrie, la Berchtesgaden, oîntrevedere cu Hitler 27. Cunoscând rezul-tatul întâlnirilor avute de Carol cu ofi-cialităţile din Londra şi Paris, Führerul aavut un ton ultimativ, cerându-i regeluiromân să se hotărască dacă va mergealături de Reich, sau dacă se va poziţionaîmpotriva acestuia. Pe lângă cererile ce ţinde politica externă, conducătorul germanva încerca din acel moment şi o intervenţie

în treburile interne ale ţării şi anume,aducerea Gărzii de Fier la conducereaRomâniei28. Aşa cum s-a afirmat în isto-riografia românească, cererile insistente alelui Hitler ca Garda de Fier să fie adusă la putere l-au determinat pe Carol al II-lea sărecurgă la măsuri rapide pentru decapi-tarea mişcării legionare29; prin eliminarealui Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, regele ră-mânea singura persoană de contact a Führerul.

Deşi nu a fost încântat de acţiunile între- prinse de regele român, Hitler, după o pri-mă reacţie negativă, va accepta noua con- junctură creată în România, interesele eco-nomice ale germanilor fiind mult preamari pentru a lăsa incidentul petrecut la 30noiembrie 1938 să afecteze relaţiile co-merciale româno-germane30.

Ieşind pentru moment învingător şi în„bătălia” contra Reichului, Carol îşi vaîndrepta atenţia asupra problemelor careapăruseră în politica internă; o creionare aacestor probleme face şi Al. Gh. Savu:

„Nemulţumirile s-au concentrat, firesc, îm- potriva regelui Carol al II-lea. Căci, în tim pce sub regimul parlamentar actele regeluiîşi găsiseră o acoperire în guvern, iar ac-tele guvernului în parlament şi în partidulaflat la putere, sub dictatură, datorită con-centrării puterilor statului în mâinile mo-narhului, lichidării parlamentului şi dizol-

vării partidelor politice, Coroana rămăsese,


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practic, descoperită. Faptul că noua consti-tuţie înscrisese responsabilitatea miniştrilor pentru politica ordonată de rege nu puteasă constituie în nici un caz o disculpare alui în faţa opiniei publice.”31

Se auzeau tot mai des voci care îlîndemnau pe rege la luarea unei decizii înceea ce priveşte reînceperea activităţii par-tidelor politice; această repunere în drep-turi a vechilor politicieni, Carol nu numaică nu şi-o dorea, dar o considera de ne-acceptat în condiţiile în care pasul important în „eliminarea” partidelor fusesedeja făcut la 30 martie. Pentru a finaliza

conflictul dintre el şi partide în avantajulsău şi pentru a încerca o apropiere de cetă-ţeni, regele a creat, la 16 decembrie 1938,Frontul Renaşterii Naţionale32, prin decretul-lege de înfiinţare acesta devenind „unicăorganizaţie politică în Stat”. Constituindacest organism, regele încerca să deţină uncontrol cât mai amănunţit asupra treburilorinterne, dar şi asupra populaţiei României, populaţie ce era sprijinită să se înscrie în

partidul nou format, al cărui conducătorera însuşi Carol al II-lea.Deşi Frontul Renaşterii Naţionale a

fost văzut adeseori drept partidul lui Carolal II-lea, ideea înfiinţării unui astfel deorganism politic o găsim menţionată şi deArmand Călinescu, fapt demonstrat de unmemoriu înaintat de acesta regelui, la 20octombrie 193833; în memoriu, era subli-niată necesitatea alcătuirii unei formaţiuni politice subordonată suveranului. Prin consti-tuirea acestei noi organizaţii se urmăreaînlăturarea definitivă a vechilor partide poli-tice, care, deşi fuseseră desfiinţate, îşi con-tinuau activitatea sub diferite forme.Aceasta nu se dorea a fi o structură politicăîn sensul partidelor tradiţionale, ci, mai cuseamă, o mişcare populară care să atragăintelectualitatea, tinerii, dar şi celelaltecategor ii sociale; ea trebuia să unească nu politicieni, ci oameni simpli, cărora să le

ofere un ideal comun. Dacă analizăm obiectiv

planul propus de Armand Călinescu, acesta nu poate fi considerat decât o utopie, visulsău, acela de a pune alături bogaţi şi săraci,intelectuali şi ţărani, copii şi vârstnici fiind

unul irealizabil. Oameni care nu îşi mani-festaseră adeziunea faţă de noul regim şicare erau „ameninţaţi” de contextul extern,nu puteau deveni peste noapte adepţii unoridealuri care nu le apar ţineau. Cu toateacestea, Carol II a trecut la punerea înaplicare a ceea ce se dorea a fi o mişcarede renaştere naţională, înfiinţând, cumspuneam mai sus, la 16 decembrie 1938,Frontul Renaşterii Naţionale34.

Legea de înfiinţare, cuprinzând 8 arti-cole, redactate într-un stil concis, chiar la-conic, era semnată de Carol al II-lea, de prim-ministrul Miron Cristea şi de miniştrii Justiţiei şi Internelor, Victor Iamandi şiArmand Călinescu. Încă de la început, sesublinia unicitatea FRN-ului (art. I), „oricealtă activitate politică”, exceptând Frontul,urmând „a fi socotită clandestină” (art.VII); în privinţa scopului înfiinţării FRN,

în lege se amintea „mobilizarea conştiinţeinaţionale în vederea întreprinderii uneiacţiuni solidare şi unitare româneşti” (art.II). Cine putea face parte din Frontul Re-naşterii Naţionale? De drept, consilierii re-gali, la cerere, cetăţenii români de peste 21de ani, exceptând „militarii activi” şi„membrii ordinului judecătoresc” (art. IVşi V). Din punct de vedere politic, demo-craţia românească urma să fie circumscrisăde nou-înfiinţatul organ politic, deoareceacesta, se arăta în articolul VI, „are, singur,dreptul de a fixa şi depune candidaturile pentru alegerile parlamentare, administrativeşi profesionale”. O explicaţie a caracteruluiconcis al legii din 16 decembrie 1938, ogăsim în articolul VIII – „un regulamentspecial, făcând parte integrantă din prezentalege, va determina condiţiunile de organi-zare şi funcţionare a «Frontului Renaşterii Naţionale»”35.


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Printr-un document de mai puţin de o pagină, Carol al II-lea oferea o singurăalternativă vieţii politice româneşti, dupăce, în urmă cu mai bine de şase luni, pu-

sese capăt unei activităţi politice dominatăde mai multe partide. 1938 se arătase, atât pe plan intern, cât şi pe plan extern, ca unan zbuciumat, cu evenimente în perma-nentă schimbare, iar finalul său îl găsea perege în fruntea statului, conducând atâtdirect, din tronul Hohenzollernilor dinRomânia, cât şi indirect, prin intermediulnou-înfiinţatului Front al Renaşterii Naţionale.Pentru moment, Carol al II-lea învinsese.

Un an mai târziu, Europa intra în cel de-aldoilea război mondial, statele de pe con-tinent se divizau în tabere politice şi mi-litare, sfârşitul marii conflagraţii trasândharta europeană pentru următoarea jumă-tate de secol.

Note 1 Pentru o istorie a Europei în secolul XX, veziSerge Berstein, Pierre Milza, Istoria Europei,vol. V. Secolul XX (din 1919 până în zilelenoastre), trad. de Monica Timu, ediţie îngrijită,note şi comentarii de Doina Bercan-Sterpu, Iaşi,Institutul European, 1998.2 Lucian Boia, România, ţară de frontieră aEuropei, Bucureşti, Editura Humanitas, 2002, p. 90.3 Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza, op.cit., p.112.4 Printre primele măsuri luate de guvernulMiron Cristea se numără cele care vor ajuta lainstituţionalizarea noului regim şi anume: in-troducerea stării de asediu şi a cenzurii,

demiterea prefecţilor şi numirea în locul aces-tora a unor ofiţeri de rang superior (IoanScurtu, Gheorghe Buzatu, Istoria românilor însecolul XX, (1918-1948), Bucureşti, EdituraPaideia, 1999, p. 344).5 Henri Prost, Destinul României (1918-1954),trad. de Valer Moga şi Valeria Pioraş, ediţieîngrijită, notă asupra ediţiei, note şi indice deValer Moga, Bucureşti, Editura Compania,2006, p. 169.6 Etapele loviturii de stat fuseseră plănuite în

detaliu de către regele Carol al II-lea şi co-

laboratorii săi apropiaţi, Armand Călinescu,Gheorghe Tătărescu şi Ernest Urdăreanu, dupăcum aflăm din însemnările făcute de ArmandCălinescu în jurnalul său, la 9 februarie 1938(Armand Călinescu, Însemnări politice, 1916 -1939, ediţie îngrijită şi prefaţată de dr. Al. Gh.Savu, Bucureşti, Editura Humanitas, 1990, p.377).7 Printre susţinători se numără: Ioan Scurtu (înContribu ţ ii privind via ţ a polit ică din România.Evolu ţia formei de guvernământ în istoriamodernă şi contemporană, Bucureşti, EdituraŞtiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1988, passim) sau Neagu Cosma (în Culisele palatului regal. Unaventurier pe tron Carol al II-lea (1930-1940),Bucureşti, Editura Globus, 1990, passim).8 Al.Gh. Savu, Dictatura regală (1938-1940), Bucureşti, Editura Politică, 1970, p. 154. 9 Sorin Alexandrescu, Paradoxul român,Bucureşti, Editura Univers, 1998, p. 99. 10 Petre Ţurlea, Nicolae Iorga între dictaturaregală şi dictatura legionară, Bucureşti,Editura Enciclopedică, 2001, p. 28. 11 La 13 martie 1938, Armand Călinescu (înop.cit., p. 384) nota în jurnalul său: „... străiniicentrali vor încuraja tot pe gardişti şi la mo-mentul decisiv vor conta tot pe ei, chiar când

oficialitatea română ar crede potrivit să schi

Revista de Stiinte Politice Nr21-22

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