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SUPORT DE CURS

LIMBA ENGLEZ pentru

TIINE POLITICE

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Materialul de mai jos este destinat cursului de limba englez pentru studenii facultii de

tiine Politice. Materialul nu reprezint un curs de limba englez, ci un course pack

(sau suport de curs) destinat studenilor amintii. Acesta este compus dintr-un numr de

texte teoretice de profil, complementate pe alocuri de scurte indicaii i explicaii i

nsoite de un numr de ntrebri i exerciii de traducere. Materialul este gndit astfel

nct (a) s familiarizeze studenii cu termenii de specialitate din domeniile de profil; (b)

s i obinuiasc pe acetia cu lectura unor texte de specialitate din domeniile amintite;

(c) s le ofere studenilor ocazia de a utiliza n discuii conceptele deprinse. Cu puin

ans, suportul de curs se poate dovedi i o experien util n raport cu alte cursuri

urmate de studenii departamentului de tiine Politice.

Materialul presupune o cunoatere adecvat a limbii engleze, care s permit

parcurgerea textelor (fie i cu ajutorul unui dicionar), nelegerea i rezolvarea

ntrebrilor i traducerea fragmentelor indicate. Presupune, de asemenea, i o minim

familiaritate cu filozofia politic sau tiinele politice. Pentru a primi o not final pe baza

suportului de curs, studenii trebuie s (a) participe la examenul final; (b) s prezinte un

caiet de exerciii care s conin rezolvrile ntrebrilor i exerciiilor de la cel puin trei

din cele ase teme/subteme din suportul de curs; (c) s prezinte o lucrare de minimum

2500 cuvinte pe oricare dintre temele/subtemele amintite.

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Contents

A. CONCEPTS IN POLITICAL THOUGHT .................................................................... 4 I. COSMOPOLITANISM VS. PATRIOTISM................................................................ 4

Martha Nussbaum David Held Michael Walzer Alasdair MacIntyre Richard Rorty

Maurizio Viroli

II. POLITICAL LIBERALISM..................................................................................... 20

Thomas Jefferson Richard Rorty John Tomasi John Rawls

III. MODELS OF DEMOCRACY................................................................................ 32

Montesquieu James Madison Robert Dahl James Fishkin Anthony King

Benjamin Barber Andrew Shapiro Cass Sunstein

IV. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM ................................... 55

John Milton John Stuart Mill Louis Brandeis Raymond Allen Ronald Dworkin

Dinesh DSouza Catharine MacKinnon

B. THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION.......................................................................... 75

Short introduction Text Issue for discussion

C. GLOBALIZATION...................................................................................................... 92

Anthony Giddens Robert Gilpin Timothy Taylor John Gray Thomas Friedman

Robert Kaplan David Held

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A. CONCEPTS IN POLITICAL THOUGHT

I. COSMOPOLITANISM VS. PATRIOTISM

The dialogue between cosmopolitanism and patriotism below is introduced by Martha

Nussbaums plea in favor of the former (and against the latter). She is joined by David

Held, who defines the main characteristics of the cultural cosmopolitanism he

advocates; and taken to task by Michael Walzer, who seems to argue that he does not

know what to do with the notion of cosmopolitan citizenship.

Alasdair MacIntyre provides a definition of patriotism, which distinguishes it

from apparently similar attitudes, and likens it to other, apparently less similar ones.

Another supporter of patriotism, Richard Rorty, advances two different definitions of the

political community which might help us distinguish between the philosophical

underpinnings of the cosmopolitan and the patriotic stances. Finally, Maurizio Viroli is

careful to differentiate patriotism from nationalism.

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I.1 Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism

(excerpted from Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, Boston Review,

Vol. 19, No. 5, 1994)

[Tagores novel] The Home and the World is a tragic story of the defeat of a

reasonable and principled cosmopolitanism by the forces of nationalism and

ethnocentrism. I believe that Tagore sees deeply when he sees that at bottom nationalism

and ethnocentric particularism are not alien to one another, but akin that to give support

to nationalist sentiments subverts, ultimately, even the values that hold a nation together,

because it substitutes a colorful idol for the substantive universal values of justice and

right. Once one has said, I am an Indian first, a citizen of the world second, once one

has made that morally questionable move of self-definition by a morally irrelevant

characteristic, then what, indeed, will stop one from saying, as Tagores characters so

quickly learn to say, I am a Hindu first, and an Indian second, I am an upper-caste

landlord first, and a Hindu second. Only the cosmopolitan stance so boringly flat

has the promise of transcending these divisions, because only this stance asks us to give

our first allegiance to what is morally good and that which, being good, I can commend

as such to all human beings.

Proponents of nationalism in politics and in education frequently make a thin

concession to cosmopolitanism. They may argue, for example, that although nations

should in general base education and political deliberation on shared national values, a

commitment to basic human rights should be part of any national educational system, and

that this commitment will in a sense serve to hold many nations together. This seems to

be a fair comment on practical reality; and the emphasis on human rights is certainly

necessary for a world in which nations interact all the time on terms, let us hope, of

justice and mutual respect.

But is it sufficient? As students here grow up, is it sufficient for them to learn that

they are above all citizens of the United States, but that they ought to respect the basic

human rights of citizens of India, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Norway? Or should they, as I

think in addition to giving special attention to the history and current situation of their

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own nation learn a good deal more than is frequently the case about the rest of the

world in which they live, about India and Bolivia and Nigeria and Norway and their

histories, problems, and comparative successes? Should they learn only that citizens of

India have equal basic human rights, or should they also learn about the problems of

hunger and pollution in India, and the implications of these problems for larger problems

of global hunger and global ecology? Most important, should they be taught that they are

above all citizens of the United States, or should they instead be taught that they are

above all citizens of a world of human beings, and that, while they themselves happen to

be situated in the United States, they have to share this world of human beings with the

citizens of other countries?

Asked where he came from, the ancient Greek Cynic philosopher Diogenes

replied, I am a citizen of the world. He meant by this, it appears, that he refused to be

defined by his local origins and local group memberships, so central to the self-image of

a conventional Greek male; he insisted on defining himself in terms of more universal

aspirations and concerns. The Stoics who followed his lead developed his image of the

kosmou polits or world citizen more fully, arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in

two communities the local community of our birth, and the community of human

argument and aspiration that is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither

to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun (Seneca,

De Otio). It is this community that is, most fundamentally, the source of our moral

obligations. With respect to the most basic moral values such as justice, we should

regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors (Plutarch, On the Fortunes

of Alexander). We should regard our deliberations as, first and foremost, deliberations

about human problems of people in particular concrete situations, not problems growing

out of a national identity that is altogether unlike that of others. Diogenes knew that the

invitation to think as a world citizen was, in a sense, an invitation to be an exile from the

comfort of patriotism and its easy sentiments, to see our own ways of life from the point

of view of justice and the good. The accident of where one is born is just that, an

accident; any human being might have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, his

Stoic successors held, we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic

membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings.

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We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients,

reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.

Boston Review

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I.2 David Held, National Culture, the Globalization of Communications and the

Bounded Political Community

(excerpted from David Held, National Culture, the Globalization of Communications

and the Bounded Political Community, Logos, Vol. 1, No. 3, Summer 2002)

Cultural cosmopolitanism is not at loggerheads with national culture; it does not deny

cultural difference or the enduring significance of national tradition. It is not against

cultural diversity. Few, if any, contemporary cosmopolitans hold such views Rather,

cultural cosmopolitanism should be understood as the capacity to mediate between

national cultures, communities of fate and alternative styles of life. It encompasses the

possibility of dialogue with the traditions and discourses of others with the aim of

expanding the horizons of ones own framework of meaning and prejudice. Political

agents who can reason from the point of view of others are better equipped to resolve,

and resolve fairly, the challenging transboundary issues that create overlapping

communities of fate. The development of this kind of cultural cosmopolitanism depends

on the recognition by growing numbers of peoples of the increasing interconnectedness

of political communities in diverse domains, and the development of an understanding of

overlapping collective fortunes which require collective solutions locally, nationally,

regionally and globally.

Cultural cosmopolitanism emphasizes the possible fluidity of individual identity

peoples remarkable capacity to forge new identities using materials from diverse

cultural sources, and to flourish while so doing. It celebrates, as Rushdie put it,

hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected

combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. But it is the

ability to stand outside of a singular location (the location of ones birth, land,

upbringing, conversion), and to mediate traditions, that lies at its core. However, there are

no guarantees about the extent to which such an outlook will prevail. For it has to survive

and jostle for recognition alongside deeply held national, ethnic and religious traditions.

It is a cultural and cognitive orientation, not an inevitability of history.

The core requirements of cultural cosmopolitanism include:

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Recognition of the increasing interconnectedness of political communities in

diverse domains including the social, economic and environmental;

Development of an understanding of overlapping collective fortunes which

require collective solutions locally, nationally, regionally and globally;

The celebration of difference, diversity and hybridity while learning how to

reason from the point of view of others and mediate traditions.

Like national culture, cultural cosmopolitanism is a cultural project, but with one

difference: it is better adapted and suited to our regional and global age.

Logos

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I.3 Alasdair MacIntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue?

(excerpted from Alasdair MacIntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue?, in Ronald Beiner, ed.,

Theorizing Citizenship, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995)

A necessary first step in the direction of any clarification is to distinguish patriotism

properly so-called from two other sets of attitudes that are all too easily assimilated to it.

The first is that exhibited by those who are protagonists of their own nations causes

because and only because, so they assert, it is their nation which is the champion of some

great moral ideal. What distinguishes their attitude from patriotism is twofold: first it

is the ideal and not the nation which is the primary object of their regard; and secondly

insofar as their regard for the ideal provides good reasons for allegiance to their country,

it provides good reasons for anyone at all to uphold their countrys cause, irrespective of

their nationality or citizenship.

Patriotism by contrast is defined in terms of a kind of loyalty to a particular nation

which only those possessing that particular nationality can exhibit. Only Frenchmen can

be patriotic about France, while anyone can make the cause of civilisation their own. But

it would be all too easy in noticing this to fail to make a second equally important

distinction. Patriotism is not to be confused with a mindless loyalty to ones own

particular nation which has no regard at all for the characteristics of that particular nation.

Patriotism does generally and characteristically involve a peculiar regard not just for

ones own nation, but for the particular characteristics and merits and achievement of

ones own nation. These latter are indeed values as merits and achievements and their

character as merits and achievements provides reasons supportive of the patriots

attitudes. But the patriot does not value in the same way precisely similar merits and

achievements when they are the merits and achievements of some nation other than his or

hers. For he or she at least in the role of patriot values them not just as merits and

achievements, but as merits and achievements of this particular nation.

To say this is to draw attention to the fact that patriotism is one of a class of

loyalty-exhibiting virtues, other members of which are marital fidelity, the love of

ones own family and kin, friendship, and loyalty to such institutions as schools and

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cricket or baseball clubs. All these attitudes exhibit a peculiar action-generating regard

for particular persons, institutions or groups, a regard founded upon a particular historical

relationship of association between the person exhibiting the regard and the relevant

person, institution or group. It is often, although not always, the case that associated with

this regard will be a felt gratitude for the benefits which the individual takes him or

herself to have received from the person, institution or group. But it would be one more

mistake to suppose patriotism or other such attitudes of loyalty to be at their core or

primarily responses of gratitude. For there are many persons, institutions, and groups to

which each of us have good reason to feel grateful without this kind of loyalty being

involved. What patriotism and such other attitudes involve is not just gratitude, but a

particular kind of gratitude; and what those who treat patriotism and other such loyalties

as virtues are committed to believing is not that what they owe their nation or whomever

or whatever it is simply a requital for benefits received, based on some relationship of

reciprocity of benefits.

State University of New York

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I.4 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Affection

(excerpted from Michael Walzer, Spheres of Affection, Boston Review, Vol. 19, No. 5,

1994)

I am [not very] convinced by [Nussbaums] underlying and overriding world view

perhaps because I am not a citizen of the world, as she would like me to be. I am not even

aware that there is a world such that one could be a citizen of it. No one has ever offered

me citizenship, or described the naturalization process, or enlisted me in the worlds

institutional structures, or given me an account of its decision procedures (I hope that

they are democratic), or provided me with a list of the benefits and obligations of

citizenship, or shown me the worlds calendar and the common celebrations and

commemorations of its citizens. I am wholly ignorant; and while a cosmopolitan

education would be a very good thing, I dont see, from Nussbaums account, that it

would teach me the things that any world citizen would need to know. It would, however,

teach me things that American citizens need to know: why isnt that good enough? Cant

I be a cosmopolitan American (along with all the other things that I am)? I have

commitments beyond the borders of this or any other country, to fellow Jews, say, or to

social democrats around the world, or to people in trouble in faraway countries, but these

are not citizen-like commitments.

Boston Review

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I.5 Richard Rorty, Moral Universalism and Economic Triage

(excerpted from Richard Rorty, Moral Universalism and Economic Triage, Unesco

Philosophy Forum, online at http://www.unesco.org/phiweb/uk/2rpu/rort/rort.html)

In what sort of situation might someone ask the question who are we?. It seems most

appropriate in the mouth of someone trying to shape her audience into a more coherent

community. It is the sort of rhetorical question a party leader might ask at a party rally. In

such situations, it means something like what unifying ideal can we find to make us less

like a mob and more like an army, less like people thrown together by accident and more

like people who have united to accomplish a task?

Who are we? is quite different from the traditional philosophical question what

are we?. The latter is synonymous with Kants questions, What is Man?. Both mean

something like how does the human species differ from the rest of the animal

kingdom? or among the differences between us and the other animals, which ones

matter most?. This what? question is scientific or metaphysical.

By contrast, the who? question is political. It is asked by people who want to

separate off the human beings who are better suited to some particular purpose than other

human beings, and to gather the former into a self-conscious moral community: that is, a

community united by reciprocal trust, and by willingness to come to fellow-members

assistance when they need it. Answers to the who? question are attempts to forge, or

reforge, a moral identity.

Traditional moral universalism blends an answer to the scientific or metaphysical

what? question with an answer to the political who? question. Universalism

presupposes that the discovery of traits shared by all human beings suffices to show why,

and perhaps how, all human beings should organize themselves into a cosmopolis. It

proposes a scientific or metaphysical foundation for global politics. Following the model

of religious claims that human beings are made in the image of God, philosophical

universalism claims that the presence of common traits testifies to a common purpose. It

says that the form of the ideal human community can be determined by reference to a

universal human nature.

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[T]he question who are we? should replace what are we? as the primordial

question of philosophy. For it is the one to which we shall always return, the one which

has already been answered when we answer other questions. Every account of what

human beings are is a disguised proposal for shaping a new human community. The

question who are we? replaces the Greek question What is Being? and also Kants

questions What can I know? and What is Man?. It replaces all these with a new form

of Kants question What may I hope?

In this new form Kants question becomes what may we hope?. For it is no

longer, as it was for Kant, a question about the immortality of the individual soul, but

about the future of the species. The question who are we? is future-oriented in a way in

which the question what are we? is not. The what? question enshrines the pre-

Darwinian notion of a human essence, which has its place in a Platonic heaven of other

essences. The who? question sets aside the notion of essence, of intrinsic reality... It

thereby stops asking a timeless question, and asks a question about future time. But this

question about the future is not a request for a prediction, but rather for a project. To ask

who we are becomes a way of asking what future we should try, cooperatively, to build.

[I]f you cannot render assistance to people in need, your claim that they form part

of your moral community is empty. This in turn is an illustration of a more general,

philosophical point: that it only makes sense to attribute a belief to someone if such an

attribution helps one to predict the persons future actions. On this pragmatic account

of belief, to believe that someone is one of us, a member of our moral community, is to

exhibit readiness to come to their assistance when they are in need. To answer the

question who are we? in a way that is relevant to moral questions is to pick out whom

one is willing to do something to help. Pressing [this] point, I would argue that one is

answering the question who are we? in a useful and informative way only if one

thereby generates reliable predictions about what measures the group identified as we

will take in specified circumstances.

It follows that it is neither useful or informative to answer this question by

reference to a class of people whom one has no idea how to help. Moral identification is

empty when it is no longer tied to habits of action. That is why it is either hypocritical or

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self-deceptive for the doctors to think of those who are left outside the hospital as us.

It would be equally self-deceptive or hypocritical for those who do not believe that the

industrialized democracies can bring either hope or human rights to the billions who lack

both to use the term We, the people of the United Nations.

I have been putting forward a philosophical argument that depends upon three

premises. The first is that the primordial philosophical question is not what are we? but

who are we?. The second is that who are we? means what community of reciprocal

trust do we belong to?. The third is that reciprocal trust depends on feasibility as well as

on good will. The conclusion I draw from these premises is that thinking of other people

as part of the same we, depends not only on willingness to help those people but on

belief that one is able to help them. In particular, answering the question who are we?

with we are members of a moral community which encompasses the human species,

depends on an ability to believe that we can avoid economic triage.

Richard Rorty

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I.6 Maurizio Viroli, For Love of Country

(excerpted from the Epilogue to Maurizio Viroli, For Love of Country: An Essay on

Patriotism and Nationalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)

Republican patriotism places the main emphasis on political participation. It was not

primarily concerned with freedom in the modern sense of negative liberty and equal

protection of individual rights, but with participatory self-rule. Political participation

reinforces bonds of civic friendship, a sense of common history, and the feeling of

belonging to a common political entity which constitutes the essence of patriotism.

patriotism grows in a republic that allows for and encourages democratic self-

government.

All the theorists that have argued in favor of a patriotism based on the idea that to

love ones country means to love the republic as a political community based on the

principle of common liberty, with its own culture and way of life, are in fact indicating

the possibility of a patriotism without nationalism. It is a patriotism that stresses that the

citizens love can and must be obtained primarily by political means; that is, through the

practice of good government and through justice. And by justice they mean the protection

of civil rights and the political rights of citizens. To be loved by its citizens, the republic

must not tolerate discrimination and privileges and must allow the citizens to participate

in public life. To love the republic they must feel close to it; they must feel it as theirs,

which means to feel their fellow-citizens dear, worthy of respect and compassion. The

emphasis on citizenship is not only motivated by the argument that popular sovereignty

guarantees that laws aim at the common good, but also that direct political participation

reinforces attachment to the republic.

As I have argued, patriotism of liberty does not need social, or cultural, or

religious, or ethnic homogeneity. If the fatherland is less that a republic in the classical

sense, citizens cannot be virtuous: they cannot love a state that treats them unjustly

(though in fact they sometimes do). If the fatherland is more than a good republic if it is

a good republic and a religious or cultural or social community civic virtue will

probably reach its maximum. It may also, however, degenerate into the zealots love of

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oneness, not the citizens political love. This implies that to see the right sort of

patriotism grow, we need not strengthen homogeneity and oneness but work to strengthen

the practice and the culture of citizenship.

There seem to be two distinct, though partially overlapping, pathways to civic

virtue: the path of homogeneity and that of liberty. Our way should be that of liberty; that

is, a political way. We do not need more citizens attending national festivals with great

fervour; nor do we need more citizens willing to offer their lives to protect their countrys

religious or ethnic or cultural unity. We need, instead, more citizens willing and capable

of mobilizing when one or more citizens are victims of injustice or discrimination, when

unfair laws are passed or constitutional principles are violated.

Patriotism is different from heroic self-abnegation. The former requires us to do

something more than attending to our private business; the second demands the sacrifice

of our personal concerns and even our life for the common good. The virtuous citizen

goes to the public square or the meeting room when he or she has to, but then he or she

goes back home, or to his shop, or to join his friends. The hero sacrifices all to the

republic. His love of the republic is more than a political love; it is a love enhanced by

religious identification or passion for glory. But republics, except for extraordinary

circumstances need less than that; they need citizens who can practice civic virtue as a

completion of private life and private interest.

Clarendon Press

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Questions and Exercises:

I.

1. (a) Provide a short definition of the concept of cosmopolitanism, as defined by

Martha Nussbaum.

(b) According to Nussbaum, ones place or community of birth are morally irrelevant

characteristics. She later writes that The accident of where one is born is just that, an

accident; any human being might have been born in any nation. Explain in what sense

the community of ones birth is morally irrelevant.

(c) Does the fact that something is an accident necessarily mean that that something is

morally irrelevant?

(d) Do you think that the characteristic which David Held identifies as central to his

cultural cosmopolitanism the ability to stand outside of a singular location (the

location of ones birth, land, upbringing, conversion), and to mediate traditions is

something people should do and are capable of doing?

2. (a) Point to distinctions between Nussbaums understanding of patriotism and

MacIntyres.

(b) In what way is ones love of country similar to ones love of family and friends?

3. (a) What is Michael Walzers point?

(b) Try to give a short account of what cosmopolitan citizenship would involve in

terms of obligations toward the other citizens of the world.

(c) Do you think that world citizenship is something that may be achieved today?

4. (a) How does moral universalism, according to Richard Rorty, define the concept of a

moral community? And how does Rorty understand this concept in the second part of

the fragment?

(b) In what way does Rortys argument resemble Walzers?

(c) Rorty sums up his argument in the final paragraph by saying that in order to be able to

think of other people as members of the same moral community (the same we), two

conditions need to be satisfied. What are these two conditions, and is the second

condition necessary?

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(c) If Rorty is right about the first condition, is cosmopolitanism (world citizenship)

possible today?

5. (a) Define the patriotism of liberty.

(b) To which of the previous notions of patriotism is that of Maurizio Viroli similar?

II.

1. Translate into Romanian the fragment by Michael Walzer.

2. Translate into English the following text:

Cosmopolitismul pe care ncerc s-l elogiez are puine lucruri n comun cu

vechiul refren umanist despre cetenii lumii. Acel refren, legat de filozofia

Luminilor, presupune optimism, credin n progres i, n definitiv, visul despre

societatea universal, care nu mai sunt actuale: am sfrit prin a nva c nu

este de ajuns s depeti sau s desfiinezi cteva frontiere pentru ca totul s

mearg mai bine; noi frontiere, noi limite i noi excluderi sunt ntotdeauna pe

punctul s se instaleze din nou, uneori chiar mai barbare dect cele vechi. Nu poi

fi cetean al lumii dac trebuie s te smulgi tocmai din lume. Cosmopolitismul

despre care vorbesc nu este nici vechea utopie despre o comunitate a tuturor

oamenilor; ncepem s ne dm seama c nu exist o bun comunitate i c

puinele experiene care, depind msurile comune, merit s fie trite nu sunt, la

drept vorbind, umane.

(Guy Scarpetta, Elogiu cosmopolitismului, Iai: Polirom, 1997)

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II. POLITICAL LIBERALISM

In its political version, modern liberalism was born out of the religious wars of the 17th

century. John Locke, arguably the founding father of political liberalism, was the chief

inspiration for the Declaration of Independence and, indeed, for its author, Thomas

Jefferson. Jefferson was also a staunch advocate of the separation between the church and

the state. The first fragment below is excerpted from his Notes on the State of Virginia.

Jefferson is followed by Richard Rorty, who provides an updated version of

political liberalism, situated somewhere between the author of the Declaration and John

Rawls, probably the best known contemporary theorist of this political doctrine. In the

third text, John Tomasi provides a more general account of modern political liberalism

and of the way in which it differs from some versions of classical liberalism. The

selection concludes with a small fragment by John Rawls himself.

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II.1 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia

Along with the American Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson regarded the

Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom as one of his most important writings. As

probably the least pious founder of the American republic, Jefferson was in great part

responsible for the doctrine of the separation between state and church which, in the

United States, is extremely strict. The Statute became a law in 1786, while Jefferson was

serving as ambassador to France. While in Paris, he also oversaw the publication of

another important work, Notes on Virginia (1785), in which he expresses similar views to

those contained in the Statute, and from which the following fragment was extracted.

(excerpted from Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XVII: The

different religions received into that state)

The error seems not sufficiently eradicated, that the operations of the mind, as well as the

acts of the body, are subject to the coercion of the laws. But our rulers can have authority

over such natural rights only as we have submitted to them. The rights of conscience we

never submitted, we could not submit. We are answerable for them to our God. The

legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it

does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither

picks my pocket nor breaks my leg. If it be said, his testimony in a court of justice cannot

be relied on, reject it then, and be the stigma on him. Constraint may make him worse by

making him a hypocrite, but it will never make him a truer man. It may fix him

obstinately in his errors, but will not cure them. Reason and free enquiry are the only

effectual agents against error. Give a loose to them, they will support the true religion, by

bringing every false one to their tribunal, to the test of their investigation. They are the

natural enemies of error, and of error only. Had not the Roman government permitted

free enquiry, Christianity could never have been introduced. Had not free enquiry been

indulged, at the era of the reformation, the corruptions of Christianity could not have

been purged away. If it be restrained now, the present corruptions will be protected, and

new ones encouraged. Was the government to prescribe to us our medicine and diet, our

bodies would be in such keeping as our souls are now. Thus in France the emetic was

once forbidden as a medicine, and the potatoe as an article of food. Government is just as

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infallible too when it fixes systems in physics. Galileo was sent to the inquisition for

affirming that the earth was a sphere: the government had declared it to be as flat as a

trencher, and Galileo was obliged to abjure his error. This error however at length

prevailed, the earth became a globe, and Descartes declared it was whirled round its axis

by a vortex. The government in which he lived was wise enough to see that this was no

question of civil jurisdiction, or we should all have been involved by authority in

vortices. Reason and experiment have been indulged, and error has fled before them.

It is error alone which needs the support of government. Truth can stand by itself. Subject

opinion to coercion: whom will you make your inquisitors? Fallible men; men governed

by bad passions, by private as well as public reasons. And why subject it to coercion? To

produce uniformity. But is uniformity of opinion desirable? No more than of face and

stature. Introduce the bed of Procrustes then, and as there is danger that the large men

may beat the small, make us all of a size, by lopping the former and stretching the latter.

Difference of opinion is advantageous in religion. The several sects perform the office of

a Censor morum over each other. Is uniformity attainable? Millions of innocent men,

women, and children, since the introduction of Christianity, have been burnt, tortured,

fined, imprisoned; yet we have not advanced one inch towards uniformity. What has been

the effect of coercion? To make one half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites.

To support roguery and error all over the earth. Let us reflect that it is inhabited by a

thousand millions of people. That these profess probably a thousand different systems of

religion. That ours is but one of that thousand. That if there be but one right, and ours that

one, we should wish to see the 999 wandering sects gathered into the fold of truth. But

against such a majority we cannot effect this by force. Reason and persuasion are the only

practicable instruments. To make way for these, free enquiry must be indulged; and how

can we wish others to indulge it while we refuse it ourselves. But every state, says an

inquisitor, has established some religion. No two, say I, have established the same. Is this

a proof of the infallibility of establishments? Our sister states of Pennsylvania and New

York, however, have long subsisted without any establishment at all. The experiment was

new and doubtful when they made it. It has answered beyond conception. They flourish

infinitely. Religion is well supported; of various kinds, indeed, but all good enough; all

sufficient to preserve peace and order: or if a sect arises, whose tenets would subvert

23

morals, good sense has fair play, and reasons and laughs it out of doors, without suffering

the state to be troubled with it. They do not hang more malefactors than we do. They are

not more disturbed with religious dissensions. On the contrary, their harmony is

unparalleled, and can be ascribed to nothing but their unbounded tolerance, because there

is no other circumstance in which they differ from every nation on earth. They have made

the happy discovery, that the way to silence religious disputes, is to take no notice of

them.

24

II.2 Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-stopper

(excerpted from Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-stopper, in Rorty, Philosophy

and Social Hope, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999)

[The] inference from privatization [of religion] to trivialization [of religion] is invalid

unless supplemented with the premise that the nonpolitical is always trivial. But this

premise seems false. Our family and love lives are private, nonpolitical and nontrivial.

The poems we atheists write, like the prayers our religious friends raise, are private,

nonpolitical and nontrivial. Writing poems is, for many people, no mere hobby, even

though they never show those poems to any save their intimates. The same goes for

reading poems, and for lots of other private pursuits that both give meaning to individual

human lives and are such that mature, public-spirited adults are quite right in not

attempting to use them as a basis for politics. The search for private perfection, pursued

by theists and atheists alike, is neither trivial nor, in a pluralistic democracy, relevant to

public policy.

Such exclusion, however, is at the heart of the Jeffersonian compromise, and it is

hard to see what more just arrangement might take the place of that compromise.

Contemporary liberal philosophers think that we shall not be able to keep a democratic

political community going unless the religious believers remain willing to trade

privatization for a guarantee of religious liberty

The main reason religion needs to be privatized is that, in political discussion with

those outside the relevant religious community, it is a conversation stopper.

It is one thing to say that religious beliefs, or the lack of them, will influence

political convictions. Of course they will. It is another thing to say that the public square

should be open to religious argument, or that liberalism should develop a politics that

accepts whatever form of dialogue a member of the public offers. What is a specifically

religious form of dialogue, except perhaps a dialogue in which some members cite

religious sources for their beliefs? What could a specifically religious argument be,

except an argument whose premises are accepted by some because they believe that these

premises express the will of God? I may accept those same premises for purely secular

25

reasons for example reasons having to do with the maximizing of human happiness.

Does that make my argument a nonreligious one? Even if it is exactly the same argument

made by my religious fellow citizen? Surely the fact that one of us gets his premises in

church and the other in the library is, and should be, of no interest to our audience in the

public square. The arguments that take place there, political arguments, are best thought

of as neither religious nor nonreligious.

The epistemology suitable for a democracy is one in which the only test of a

political proposal is its ability to gain assent from people who retain radically diverse

ideas about the point and meaning of human life, about the path to private perfection. The

more such consensus becomes the test of a belief, the less important is the beliefs source.

Richard Rorty

26

II.3 John Tomasi, Liberalism Beyond Justice

(excerpted from Chapter One of John Tomasi, Liberalism Beyond Justice, Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 2001)

The liberal principle of legitimacy like each of the others reflects what its proponents

believe is most important in human social life. For liberals, this is the idea that in the

conditions of pluralism that mark modern societies, individual citizens must be

recognized as the ultimate arbiters of what gives value to their own lives. Political power

must be justifiable in principle to each of them. For liberals, the justification of social

structures must be provided not in the unified terms of any single religious doctrine, story

of nation, or all-encompassing economic theory. Rather, justification must proceed in

terms of whatever questions citizens themselves think fit to ask. The liberal principle of

legitimacy says that a system of social order is justified only if it is conducted on the

basis of principles that citizens might be expected to endorse after asking their questions

and considering the best answers the defenders of that social order might give.

Political liberalism was born out of a crisis in this principle of legitimacy. The

ambition underlying all versions of liberalism has long been to define the common good

of political association in terms of a minimal moral conception that is, a basic value or

set of values that most citizens share despite even their many important differences.

Political principles are neutral and thus satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy

insofar as they can be justified by reference to such shared values, without assuming the

validity or truth of any particular (controversial) conception of the good life.

This liberal principle of legitimacy does not require that every person must agree

with every particular rule, policy, or court decision that is enforced by the liberal state.

Rather, the idea is that if many people agree to have some set of foundational principles

regulate the basic structure of their society, including the processes by which particular

policies and laws will be arrived at, then they affirm the use of political coercion even

regarding the particular outcomes they dislike.

In the seminal formulations of Kant and Mill, the liberal commitment to state

neutrality was justified ultimately by reference to a particular view of human moral

27

nature one championing autonomy (for Kant, a life lived according to rational will) or

individualism (for Mill, an experimental attitude toward ones projects). Both Kant and

Mill, each for his own reasons and in his own way, affirmed the idea that the liberal state

should not seek to impose any particular view of the good life on its citizens. Rather,

these liberals argued that forms of life have their value to people because, and only when,

individuals freely come to affirm those ways of life for themselves. However, many

other liberal theorists have come to worry that even a broadened ideal of individualism is

something on which people may reasonably disagree.

On the traditional or comprehensive liberal approach the hope has been to

defend some suitably general liberal view about true human moral nature against critics

by means of philosophical argumentation. The critics having been confronted and their

beliefs about human moral nature shown to be false, philosophers could then use their

own true view of moral personality as a shared moral basis for liberal politics. But

accepting the fact of reasonable value pluralism1 requires that liberals now abandon all

such philosophical ambitions. In conditions of institutional freedom, convergence on a

single conception of human moral nature is unlikely, no matter how long or cleverly

philosophers argue. A new trailhead must be considered: perhaps liberals should begin

looking for the shared moral basis for liberal politics merely in the cluster of moral ideas

that people in Western democracies already hold, however inchoately, regarding their

political lives.

Political liberals thus propose two major adjustments to the traditional liberal

paradigm. First, political liberals recast their arguments for state neutrality as arguments

that appeal only to peoples beliefs about politics itself. Rawls sets aside questions

about the truth of the (various) foundations of those shared public elements. He

emphasizes instead the formative role of liberal institutions in leading otherwise diverse

people to share a common set of political ideas central among them the shared idea that

whatever their differences, all people in liberal societies should be respected as free and

equal for political purposes. This first adjustment, a change in the way the liberal

conception of justice is justified, is known as the politicization of justice. 1 The fact of reasonable value pluralism refers to the reality that in todays societies (and, as a matter of fact, in those of the past too), people differ with one another on a variety of beliefs and principles, which are apparently irreconcilable.

28

Princeton University Press

29

II.4 John Rawls, Political Liberalism

(excerpted from Lecture I of John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia

University Press, 1993)

In formulating [a conception of justice independent of the opposing and conflicting

philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm], political liberalism applies the

principle of toleration to philosophy itself. The religious doctrines that in previous

centuries were the professed basis of society have gradually given way to principles of

constitutional government that all citizens, whatever their religious view, can endorse.

Comprehensive2 philosophical and moral doctrines likewise cannot be endorsed by

citizens generally, and they also no longer can, if they ever could, serve as the professed

basis of society.

Political liberalism, then, aims for a political conception of justice as a

freestanding view. It offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine beyond

what is implied by the political conception itself. As an account of political values, a

freestanding political conception does not deny there being other values that apply, say,

to the personal, the familial, and the associational; nor does it say that political values are

separate from, or discontinuous with, other values. Our aim is to specify the political

domain and its conception of justice in such as way that its institutions can gain the

support of an overlapping consensus [of the various comprehensive and other doctrines].

In this case, citizens themselves, within the exercise of their liberty of thought and

conscience, and looking to their comprehensive doctrines, view the political conception

as derived from, or congruent with, or at least not in conflict with, their other values.

Columbia University Press

2 According to Rawls, a comprehensive doctrine (philosophical, religious, or otherwise) is one which provides us with answers about such ultimate matters as the meaning of life, or truth, or virtue, the human condition, etc.

30

Questions and Exercises:

1. (a) Read the text by Thomas Jefferson and try to summarize his views of religion.

Give at least four arguments why Jefferson thinks the state should not be involved with

religion.

2. (a) Provide a short summary of Richard Rortys argument about religion and politics.

(b) What is the meaning of the phrase the Jeffersonian compromise?

(c) What does Rorty mean when he says that in public political debate religion is a

conversation-stopper?

3. (a) Since the plurality of values makes it impossible, according to John Tomasi, to use

the true view of moral personality as a shared moral basis for liberal politics, where

should people look for much a moral ground?

(b) Explain Tomasis idea of the politicization of justice.

(c) What is the difference between classical liberalism (i.e. the comprehensive

liberalism of Mill or Kant) and political liberalism?

4. (a) What does American philosopher John Rawls mean by his definition of political

liberalism as a doctrine which applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself? In

what sense does here philosophy resemble religion?

(b) Why does Rawls say that a (liberal) political conception of justice needs to be

freestanding? Freestanding from what?

(c) What should, according to Rawls, be the relation between the citizens comprehensive

doctrines and political liberalism?

II.

1. Translate into Romanian the fragment by John Rawls.

2. Translate into English the following text:

n opinia majoritii istoricilor gndirii politice, liberalismul, n varianta sa

politic, s-a nscut n urma rzboaielor religioase din secolele XVI-XVII, ca o

ncercare de rezolvare a celebrei probleme teologico-politice. A dori s subliniez

aici n mod special anterioritatea liberalismului politic n raport cu cel economic;

acesta din urm a aprut ulterior cristalizrii principiilor liberalismului politic.

31

Exist, ns, i un curent (mai recent) de interpretare, care afirm c nu se poate

vorbi cu adevrat despre liberalism dect n secolul al XIX-lea, dup Revoluia

francez, o dat cu trecerea la un liberalism de guvernmnt n Anglia sau Frana.

Indiferent de interpretarea pe care o dm, este evident faptul c, la sfritul

secolului al XVII-lea, tolerana statului n raport cu diferite doctrine religioase a

fost singura cale de a impune pacea social unor comuniti divizate pn atunci

de interminabile lupte intestine. Sfera de intervenie a statului a fost astfel limitat

n baza unor reguli clar stabilite (de obicei, constituionale), n timp ce legile

urmau s vegheze nu la pedepsirea ereticilor, ci la sigurana public a cetenilor.

(Aurelian Criuu, A fi sau a nu fi liberal?, n Criuu, Elogiul libertii: Studii

de filosofie politic, Iai: Polirom, 1998)

32

III. MODELS OF DEMOCRACY

The following selection of texts starts with two classics. First, Montesquieu briefly

discusses in a sub-chapter of his Spirit of Laws some of the advantages and disadvantages

of small republics, large republics, and confederacies. Secondly, James Madison in his

well-known Federalist 10 essay takes up roughly the same questions, only to provide

what seems to be a different answer.

As a good starting point for assessing the merits and demerits of the various forms

of democratic association above, Robert Dahl offers five criteria according to which

democracies can be tested. Both James Fishkin and Anthony King focus on one of these

criteria in order the evaluate the state of current democracies, as well as possible options

for enhancing democracy in the future.

Finally, Benjamin Barber expresses his optimism with respect to the power of

modern technologies to advance the cause of democracy, while Andrew Shapiro and Cass

Sunstein provide us with several reasons to think twice.

33

III.1 Montequieu, The Spirit of Laws

(excerpted from Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Book IX, 1)

If a republic be small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be large, it is ruined by an

internal imperfection.

To this twofold inconvenience democracies and aristocracies are equally liable,

whether they be good or bad. The evil is in the very thing itself, and no form can redress

it.

It is, therefore, very probable that mankind would have been, at length, obliged to

live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of

constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external

force of a monarchical, government. I mean a confederate republic.

This form of government is a convention by which several petty states agree to

become members of a larger one, which they intend to establish. It is a kind of

assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means of

further associations, till they arrive at such degree of power as to be able to provide for

the security of the whole body.

It was these associations that so long contributed to the prosperity of Greece. By

these the Romans attacked the whole globe, and by these alone the whole globe

withstood them; for when Rome had arrived at her highest pitch of grandeur, it was the

associations beyond the Danube and the Rhine associations formed by the terror of her

arms that enabled the barbarians to resist her.

The associations of cities were formerly more necessary than in our times. A

weak, defenseless town was exposed to greater danger. By conquest it was deprived not

only of the executive and legislative powers, as at present, but moreover of all human

property.

A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself

without any internal corruption; the form of this society prevents all manner of

inconveniencies.

34

If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme power, he could not be

supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to

have too great an influence over one, this would alarm the rest; were he to subdue a part,

that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those

which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.

Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others

are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that

remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the

confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

As this government is composed of petty republics, it enjoys the internal

happiness of each; and with regard to its external situation, by means of the association, it

possesses all the advantages of large monarchies.

35

III.2 James Madison, Federalist 10

James Madison wrote this essay, originally published in the Federalist journal under the

pseudonym Publius, at a time when Americans were trying to craft a constitution for

the 13 colonies recently liberated from British rule. Americans were facing two options:

that of building a confederate structure of powerful small states with a weaker central

government (the anti-federalist position); and that of creating a federation of states with a

more powerful central government and less power for the individual states (the federalist

stance). Madison, who together with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay published in the

Federalist periodical a number of essays later known as The Federalist Papers, supported

the latter alternative. Not surprisingly, he was a knowledgeable reader of Montesquieu.

(excerpted from James Madison, Federalist 10, The Federalis Papers)

Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves to

be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of

faction. The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for

their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice.

He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the

principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice

and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth been the mortal diseases

under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the

favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most

specious declamations. ...

By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority

or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of

passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and

aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: The one, by removing

its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: The one by

destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every

citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

36

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the

disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly

expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political

life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is

essential to animal life because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as

the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions

will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love,

his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the

former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the

faculties of men from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable

obstacle to an uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object

of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring

property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results:

And from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective

proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them

everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different

circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion,

concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an

attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to

persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions,

have in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and

rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for

their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual

animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and

fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite

their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions, has

been the various and unequal distribution of property. The regulation of these various

and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the

spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government.

37

It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing

interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will

not always be at the helm: Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all,

without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail

over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of

another, or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be

removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican

principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: It may

clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and

mask its violence under the forms of the constitution. When a majority is included in a

faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice to its

ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure

the public good, and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same

time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to

which our enquiries are directed.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the

existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time, must be

prevented; or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered,

by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of

oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that

neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not

found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in

proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy

becomes needful.

From this view of the subject, it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by

which I mean a society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and

administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A

common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole;

a communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is

38

nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious

individual. Hence it is, that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and

contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of

property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in

their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have

erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political

rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized, and assimilated in their

possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation

takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking.

Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall

comprehend both the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must derive from the

union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic, are first,

the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by

the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over

which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the

public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose

wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love

of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under

such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the

representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if

pronounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the

effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister

designs, may be intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and

then betray the interests of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or

extensive republics are most favourable to the election of proper guardians of the public

weal; and it is clearly decided in favour of the latter by two obvious considerations.

In the first place it is to be remarked, that however small the republic may be, the

representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of

39

a few; and that however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in

order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence the number of representatives

in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the constituents, and being

proportionally greatest in the small republic, it follows, that if the proportion of fit

characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a

greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of

citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy

candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often

carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre on

men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established

characters.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of

territory which may be brought within the compass of republican, than of democratic

government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations

less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer

probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct

parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and

the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass

within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of

oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests;

you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to

invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more

difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each

other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that where there is a

consciousness of unjust or dishonourable purposes, communication is always checked by

distrust, in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a republic has over a

democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small

republic is enjoyed by the union over the states composing it. Does this advantage

consist in the substitution of representatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous

40

sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice? It will

not be denied, that the representation of the union will be most likely to possess these

requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety

of parties, against the event of any one party being able to out-number and oppress the

rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties, comprised within the union,

increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the

concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority?

Here, again, the extent of the union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states,

but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states: A religious

sect, may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety

of sects dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national councils against any

danger from that source: A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal

division of property,3 or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to

pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular member of it; in the same

proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an

entire state.

In the extent and proper structure of the union, therefore, we behold a republican

remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the

degree of pleasure and pride, we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in

cherishing the spirit, and supporting the character of federalists.

3 These were all debates contemporary with Madison. Most were raised in the context of the American war of independence and its aftermath.

41

III.3 Robert Dahl, On Democracy

(excerpted from Chapter 4 of Robert Dahl, On Democracy, New Haven and London:

Yale University Press, 1998)

Within the enormous and often impenetrable thicket of ideas about democracy, is it

possible to identify some criteria that a process for governing an association would have

to meet in order to satisfy the requirement that all the members are equally entitled to

participate in the associations decisions about its policies? There are, I believe, at least

five such standards.

Effective participation. Before a policy is adopted by the association, all the

members must have equal and effective opportunities for making their views known to

the other members as to what the policy should be.

Voting equality. When the moment arrives at which the decision about policy will

finally be made, every member must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote, and

all votes must be counted as equal.

Enlightened understanding. Within reasonable limits as to time, each member

must have equal and effective opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative

policies and their likely consequences.

Control of the agenda. The members must have the exclusive opportunity to

decide how and, if they choose, what matters are to be placed on the agenda. Thus the

democratic process required by the three preceding criteria is never closed. The policies

of the association are always open to change by its members, if they so choose.

Inclusion of adults. All, or at any rate most, adult permanent residents should have

the full rights of citizens that are implied by the first four criteria. Before the twentieth

century this criterion was unacceptable to most advocates of democracy.

Yale University Press

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III.4 James Fishkin, The Voice of the People

(excerpted from the Introduction to James Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public

Opinion and Democracy, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995)

There is a classic Jimmy Stewart movie, Magic Town, about Grandview, a small town

in the Midwest that is a perfect statistical microcosm of the United States, a place where

the citizens opinions match perfectly with polls of the entire nation. A pollster

(Jimmy Stewart), secretly uses surveys from this mathematical miracle as a shortcut to

predicting public opinion. Instead of collecting a national sample, he can more quickly

and cheaply collect surveys from this single small town. The character played by Jane

Wyman, a newspaper editor, finds out what is going on and publishes her discovery. As a

result the national media descend upon the town, which becomes, overnight, the public

opinion capital of the U.S. The citizens of Grandview become self-conscious because

they are now the perfect barometer of national opinion. They begin to feel a heavy

responsibility, knowing that what they say will be listened to throughout the world. They

arrange to collect their own survey, The Official Grandview Poll, but with the proviso

that reference libraries be provided at every polling booth. Because the issues are

important, they believe people should be informed.

With this new sense of responsibility, and their heightened interest in the issues,

the townspeoples views soon diverge from those of the rest of the country. The climax

comes when the town announces the result that 79 percent of them would be willing to

vote for a woman for president! This is taken as such a preposterous departure from

conventional opinion that they become a source of national ridicule.

Yet which opinions are more worth listening to? The conventional opinion of the

time, offered in response to questions from the Gallup poll, that people should not

support a woman for president, or the very different view the citizens of Grandview

finally came to, when they thought their opinions would actually matter, and after they

had had a chance to reexamine their prejudices and preconceptions? Those considered

judgments were, indeed, unrepresentative of the views of the rest of the country. But then

again, the rest of the country had not really thought much about the question.

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Obviously, public opinion polls of the standard kind give us a snapshot of what

the country is actually thinking. They are a valuable means of telling both the country and

its political leaders about the current state of mass opinion. For that purpose, the new

opinions of the Grandview citizens became worthless, just as the Jimmy Stewart

character had said they would, once word got out. But for other purposes, particularly for

finding a public voice worth listening to, the final views of Grandview offer a useful

supplement to the vagaries of an inattentive public. There is a kind of recommending

force to the new opinions at Grandview: this is what a microcosm of the country thinks

about an issue once it has had a better chance to focus on it, to discuss it, and to

reexamine shared preconceptions. Perhaps this is what the entire country, not just the

microcosm, would think about the issue if it focused on it in a more sustained way.

Grandview symbolizes a central problem: when can a microcosm, or some other

small part of the country, speak for the whole, speak for the entire citizenry and its

interests?

Accepting that there are many portions of the people who purport to speak for

everyone, can we find conditions when all the people can speak without requiring

surrogates, conditions where the whole can, in some sense, speak for itself? Even if we

were to ask everyone what they thought about an issue, we would still be offering a

representation, a picture, of public opinion. That opinion would have been formed under

certain conditions, and those conditions may be far from favorable for the public being

able to form a reasonable opinion, or even any coherent opinion at all. Representation

comes from taking a part for the whole but it also comes from taking what the people

seem to be saying at a snapshot in time under one set of conditions as a representation

of what they really think. As we shall see, they may not really be thinking much at all.

In a broad sense, there will always be conflicting representations of public opinion, but

there will also be conditions, which we can distinguish, under which the voices of the

people are more, or less, worth listening to.

Conflicting representations of public opinion are inescapable. In spite of these

conflicts, there is one simple answer to the question When can the people best speak for

themselves? that runs through the history of democratic experimentation: The public

can best speak for itself when it can gather together in some way to hear the arguments

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on the various sides of an issue and then, after face-to-face discussion, come to a

collective decision. The image of the New England town meeting or the Athenian

Assembly provides a picture of people discussing things democratically in one place. It is

the longstanding model for how to conduct democracy under conditions where not only

does everyones vote count the same but social conditions have been provided that

facilitate everyones thinking through the issues together. We can call this image the ideal

of face-to-face democracy. A key issue in the continuing American experiment with

democracy is: How can we adapt this ideal to the large-scale nation-state, to a population

which cannot possibly gather together in the same room to take decisions?

What happens to the vote when the ideal of face-to-face democracy no longer

applies? What happens when we vote without the social conditions that encourage

everyones gathering together in face-to-face discussion? Much of the continuing saga of

the democratic idea can be thought of as an answer to that question. Voting in primaries

or referendums, voting in general elections based on a sound bite of information or an

impression culled from newspaper headlines, voting based on nothing more than name

recognition or party label, or not voting at all (which has become the norm in the modern

era) these phenomena are quite different from voting in a small group after extensive

face-to-face discussion. The American Founders struggled to adapt the ideal of face-to-

face democracy to the large nation-state. But they thought it could be accomplished only

through a system of elected representation, where the representatives would have the

discussions and deliberations and come to decisions on behalf of the rest of us. Others,

particularly the opponents of the Constitution who have come to be known as the anti-

Federalists, wanted to place the locus of decision closer to the people, even if, for many

issues, the ideal of face-to-face discussion could not be implemented. The beginnings of

referendum democracy are built into the conflicts that arose at the founding.

Yale University Press

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III.5 Anthony King, Running Scared

(excerpted from Anthony King, Running Scared, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 279, No.

1, January 1997)

Numerous opinion polls show that millions of Americans are profoundly dissatisfied with

the functioning of their political system. Consequently, there is a widespread disposition

in the United States at all levels of society, from the grass roots to the editorial

conference and the company boardroom to want to make American democracy work

better, and concrete proposals abound for achieving this goal.

The proposed reforms can be grouped loosely under four headings. First come

those that if implemented would amount to the creation of electronic town meetings,

taking advantage of technological developments such as CD-ROM, interactive cable

systems, electronic mail, and the Internet. The Wall Street Journal referred in this general

connection to arranging a marriage of de Tocqueville and technology.

Second, and related, are proposals for promoting democratic deliberation and

citizen participation. The Kettering Foundation and the Public Agenda Foundation

already organize National Issues Forums that embrace some 3,000 educational and civic

groups across America. David Mathews, the president of the Kettering Foundation,

considers these modern forums to be directly linked to Americas ancient town meeting

tradition. Benjamin R. Barber, a political philosopher at Rutgers University, would go

further and create a nationwide network of neighborhood assemblies that could take

actual decisions on strictly local matters and also debate and lobby on broader national

questions. James S. Fishkin, a political scientist at the University of Texas, likewise seeks

to leap the modern barriers to face-to-face democracy by means of what he calls

deliberative opinion polls (which have been tried, with considerable success, in

England).

The third group of proposed reforms is equally radical but more old-fashioned.

This group seeks to complete the work of Progressive Era reformers4 by extending to the

4 The progressive era is a period in US history, roughly extending between 1900 and the end of World War I, in which a large number of initiatives political (e.g. right to vote for women,

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federal level the characteristic state-level reforms that were introduced in that period: the

referendum, the initiative, and the recall.5 The political analyst Kevin Phillips, for

example, suggests that the United States should propose and ratify an amendment to the

Constitution setting up a mechanism for holding nationwide referendums to permit the

citizenry to supplant Congress and the president in making certain categories of national

decisions. He would also like to see congressmen and senators be subject to popular

recall once they have been in office for a year.

Finally, many commentators and the majority of the American public strongly

back the newest and most fashionable item on the making democracy work better

agenda: the imposition of term limits on both state and federal elected officials, notably

members of Congress. But the great majority of those who favor term limits, true to the

American democratic tradition, are less concerned with good government and the public

interest as such than with the present generation of politicians alleged lack of

responsiveness to the mass of ordinary people. At the center of this argument is the idea

that the United States is now governed by an unresponsive, self-perpetuating, and

increasingly remote class of professional politicians, a class that ought to be replaced as

soon as possible by citizen legislators men and women who will serve the people

simply because they are the people. As one advocate of term limits puts it, ordinary

people the proposed citizen legislators of the future know things about life in

America that people who have lived as very self-important figures in Washington for

thirty years have no way of knowing or have forgotten.

Some of the items on this four-part shopping list of reforms are intrinsically

attractive, or at least a good case can be made for them. Nevertheless, taken as a whole,

the mainstream reformist agenda, with its traditional American emphasis on agency

democracy and its view of politicians as mere servants of the peoples will, rests on

extremely tenuous conceptual foundations and, more important, is almost certainly

direct election of the US senators), democratic (see following note), social (e.g. improved living conditions and education for the poor, better infrastructure), and economic (e.g. regulation of working conditions, safety measures, busting of monopolies) radically changed the face of American society. 5 These progressive reforms refer, respectively, to the right to sanction some public policies by means of a referendum, the right to advance proposals for public policies, and the right to discharge public officials before their term expires.

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inappropriate as a response to the practical needs of turn-of-the-century America.

Ame