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the Western financial crisis of 2007-08 is a crisis of liquidity. It is different in kind, and also less

critical. It sprang from two sources. One was a bout of perfectly commonplace over lending in the

American residential mortgage market. Too many mortgages were written for nearly the full value of 

houses owned by residents with too low and precarious incomes. Once house prices peaked and started

mildly to decline, many of these mortgages were no longer serviced and foreclosure involving heavy

loss, or patient waiting for better days, were the lenders' only options. However, all this was, so to

speak, in a day's work.

The second source of the crisis that, combined with the first, made an unstable mixture was

feverish financial innovation. Two devices proved particularly fragile. One was the creation of 

"collateralised debt obligations" or CDOs. They gathered essentially illiquid assets, such as residential

mortgages, into packages serving as collateral for securities of various yields, maturity dates and risk

profiles. Thus a vast potential market was opened for relatively illiquid assets rendered liquid by

presenting them as securities suitable for financial investors seeking particular yields, maturities and

risks. This was undoubtedly a sensible innovation doing good for mortgagors, mortgagees and third-

party investors alike. However, when some mortgages within the collateral package started to turn sour,the CDO would turn to poison, for nobody wanted to hold paper whose quality suddenly proved to be

quite uncertain. Lack of adequate information bred suspicion and turned hitherto liquid securities into

illiquid ones, unwanted and hard to trade.

All this was exacerbated by another innovative device, the "structured investment vehicle" or

SIV which borrows in the money market and invests the money in higher-yielding securities, including

about 55-60 per cent in CDOs. When CDOs are suspect, SIVs become suspect and so do the banks which

sponsored them or granted them borrowing facilities as a second line of defence.

At the core of this crisis, there is a relatively small dose of insolvency originating in the mortgage

market. The layered structure of a highly developed financial system magnifies the effect of a small

rotten core by what looks like a double-digit factor. Most of the damage is in the eye of the beholder. If,

under such circumstances, losses had to be cut by selling assets that have fallen under suspicion, much

damage that is now merely virtual would become real, thus exposing the banking system to needless

shock and causing an arbitrary redistribution of wealth in favour of "vultures" of all kinds.

It is, then, not "hypocrisy" nor partiality for the rich Western countries that makes central banks

try and keep interest rates low and pump unprecedented volumes of money into the banking system,

but good sense. The crisis needs to be digested, suspicions allayed, adequate information provided and

when that is all done, liquidity will be found to have been restored.

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In ceea ce ii priveste pe americani, actuala criza economica a fost comparata de multi cu cea din

perioada 1929-1933, existand chiar economisti care au sustinut si inca mai sustin ca acum va fi mai rau

decat atunci.

Pentru a ne face o imagine cat de cat corecta asupra efectelor economice generate de cele doua crize,

sa judecam lucrurile prin prisma a trei indicatori evolutia PIB, evolutia somajului si a numaruluibancilor americane cu probleme.

1. PIB in perioada 1930-1933, deci in 4 ani de criza, PIB-ul SUA s-a contractat cu 26.7% comparativ cu

valoarea din 1929, in timp ce actuala criza economica a generat doar un an de scadere, datele istorice

aici, graficul mai jos, click pentru marire.

2. Rata somajului in 1929, dupa ani de crestere economica semnificativa, rata somajului in SUA se situa

la 3.2%. Odata cu criza, numarul somerilor a crescut semnificativ, astfel ca in 1933, rata somajului a atins

un maxim de 24.9%, dupa care a inceput sa scada, datele aici.

In 1937, atunci cand programul The New Deal a incetat, rata somajului era de 14.3%, dar abia lainceputul anilor ̀ 40 s-a reintors la valorile de dinaintea crizei.

Desi rata actuala a somajului pare mica in comparatie cu cea inregistrata in 1933, americanilor le vor

trebui cel putin 5-6 ani pana sa ajunga din nou la nivelul de dinaintea crizei.

3. Sistemul bancar numarul bancilor care au intrat in faliment intre 1930 si 1933 a fost de 9146, in

1934 continuand sa existe 14146 banci ce detineau active in valoare totala de 46.4 mld dolari (~$740

mld in banii de astazi), datele aici. Pe de alta parte, actuala criza a generat falimentul a mai putin de 150

de banci, alte ~420 banci aflandu-se pe lista neagra.

Intre 1980-1994 au falimentat 2935 de banci, in timp ce pe lista neagra se aflau peste 1000,

Desi numarul mic al falimentelor bancare din ultimii 2 ani se explica si prin faptul ca acum piata este

mult mai concentrata, existand cateva banci foarte mari (to big to fail), unele dintre acestea primind si

ajutor de la statul american, este clar ca impactul actualei crize asupra sistemului bancar nu are

amploarea celei din anii ̀ 30.

Luand in considerare cifrele de mai sus, am serioase dubii ca cele doua crize sufera vreo comparatie.