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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

DOI: 10.1177/0146167299025005005

1999; 25; 596Pers Soc Psychol BullMichael D. Robinson and Carol D. Ryff

The Role of Self-Deception in Perceptions of Past, Present, and Future Happiness

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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Robinson, Ryff / SELF-DECEPTION AND HAPPINESS

The Role of Self-Deception in Perceptionsof Past, Present, and Future Happiness

Michael D. Robinson

University of Illinois at Champaign

Carol D. Ryff

University of Wisconsin at Madison

Previousresearch suggests that self-deception is maximized when(a) there is a lack of concrete information,and(b) themotivationto self-deceive is high. In applying this model to past, present,andfuture judgmentsaboutthe self, the future isunique becauseof its uncertainty, whereas the past is unique because of its lesserrelevance to current motivations. We thereforepredict thatpeoplewill be themost self-deceptivewhen thinkingabout their future, apredictionsupported in fourstudies (Ns=96,125,40,and298)using various measures of self-deception and subjective well--being. Studies 1 and 2 provide basic evidence for future self--enhancement, whereas Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that con-crete information about the future reduces this bias. Moregenerally, the findings highlight the special status of future well-being judgments as well as the flexible link between self-deception

and self-evaluation.

Self-deception, defined as thetendency to view oneselfin an unrealistically favorable light,maybe an importantcomponent of subjective well-being (Diener, Sandvik,Pavot, & Gallagher, 1991; Paulhus & Reid, 1991).Indeed, influential perspectives on optimism and self-deception view self-deception as a primary basis of goodmentaland physical health(Baumeister, 1993; Scheier&Carver, 1985; Taylor & Brown, 1988).1

Separate literatures suggest that self-deception andrelated constructs also play a role in perceptions of past,present, and future selves. In perceiving the past self,Greenwald (1980) has likened self-evaluation to a totali-tarian system in which past history is rewritten to servecurrent needs. Similarly, Ross (1989) has provided agood deal of evidence that past attitudes are largelyreconstructed on the basis of current attitudes. In per-ceiving the present self, most people consider them-selves to be above average on a wide range of positive

attributes and abilities (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Hol-zberg, 1989; Dunning, Perie, & Story, 1991). One waythis is accomplished is by giving more attention to posi-tive information about the self than to negative informa-tion (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992). In perceiving thefuture self, most of us appear to be great optimists, over-estimating the likelihood that positive events will hap-pen to us (Irwin, 1953; Langer & Roth, 1975; Weinstein,1980) as well as underestimating the likelihood thatnegative eventswill happento us(Kuiper, MacDonald, &Derry, 1983; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986).

Despite considerable evidence that self-deceptionplays a role in perceptions of past, present, and futureselves, little is known about the degree to which people

are self-deceptive across each of these temporal selves.That is, are people more unrealistically positive abouttheir futureself than about their past and present selves?In answering this question, it is useful to consider twofactors that shouldinfluencethedegreeto which peopleengage in self-deception. First, people are more likely toengage in self-deception when there is less available evi-dence or when that evidence is more ambiguous (Bau-meister, 1993; Brown,1986; Paulhus,1991). Another wayof stating this informationalprinciple is that the less self-relevant information a person has within a specificdomain, the more likely he or she is to engage in self-deception. In the context of temporal perceptions, we

know a great deal about the events and circumstancessurrounding past and present selves but comparably less

Authors Note:Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-dressed to Michael D.Robinson, PsychologyDepartment, UniversityofIllinois, 603 E. Daniel St., Champaign, IL 61820; e-mail: [email protected].

PSPB,Vol. 25 No. 5, May 1999 596-608 1999 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

596

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about the events and circumstances surrounding thefuture self. For this reason, there is more room for self-deception in perceptions of the future self than in per-ceptions of past or present selves.

A second principle is that motivational factors willplay a role in self-deception: The greater the motivation

to perceive oneself positively within a given domain, themore likely a person is to self-deceive (Steele, 1988; Tes-ser, 1988). On thebasis of this motivational principle, wecontend that people have stronger motivations for self-deception when thinking about present and futureselves than when thinking about thepast self. Why? First,a negative view of the past self can actually boost the per-ceived positivity of present and future selves (Gergen &Gergen, 1988; Ross, 1989). Second, present and futureselves may be more central to ones motivational struc-ture than is the past self (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus& Ruvolo, 1989), presumably because these selves arecurrently unfolding, or have yet to unfold. And third, we

have a greater degree of perceived control over presentand future events than over past events. To the extentthat the motivational principle affects the use of self-deception, people should be more self-deceptive abouttheir present and future selves than about their pastselves.

SELF-DECEPTION AND JUDGMENTS OF PAST,

PRESENT, AND FUTURE HAPPINESS

Self-deception is defined as an unrealistically positiveview of the self. Unlike impression management, whichrepresents an intentional self-presentation tactic, self-

deception is a nonintentional bias in perceiving the self.Considera representative item from theBalancedInven-tory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) (Paulhus, 1989):I am fully in control of my own fate. Objectively, such astatement is true of no one. Subjectively, however, it ispossible for someone to endorse this statement with theearnest belief that it is true. Self-deception biases can beseen in many subjective judgments that are associatedwith socially desirable states or attributes (Taylor &Brown, 1988). Happiness judgments are ideally suitedfor studying self-deception biases, particularly becausehappiness is among the most valued of personal attrib-utes (Diener, 1984). Previous research has in fact shown

that trait self-deception has a positive association withratings of present subjective well-being (Diener et al.,1991; Paulhus & Reid, 1991).

We also know at least two things about past, present,and future happiness judgments. First, Ryff (1991) hasshown a tendency for young and middle-aged adults tosee gains in subjective well-being from the past to thepresent to the future. Second, at a normative level, weknow that such claims of temporal gains in subjectivewell-being are unfounded by cross-sectional and longitu-

dinal investigations of happiness over the life span(Andrews & Withey, 1976; Myers & Diener, 1995),although there may be certain exceptions. For example,Helson andMoane (1987) found that a particular groupof young women experienced increases in confidence,dominance,andcopingskillsas they matured from their

college years totheageof 43.More recentresearch,how-ever, suggests that age-related changes in well-being aremore complicated,with mean gains, declines,andstabil-ity occurring on different dimensions (Ryff & Keyes,1995). Given this differentiated pattern, we maintainthat, at the normative level at least, people are deceivingthemselves when they claim that they will be much hap-pier in the future than they are in the present or were inthe past.

In the current studies, we sought to provide moredirect evidence thatperceptions of future happiness aremore vulnerable to self-deception biases than are per-ceptions of past happiness. We examined this hypothesis

in various ways. In Study 1, we predicted that trait self-deception would make a unique contribution to futurehappiness judgments (with self-esteem and impressionmanagement controlled). In Study 2, we predicted thatpeople would view the future in a less differentiated andmore positive manner than they viewed the past andpresent. In Study 3, we predicted that perceived certain-ties about the future would cause people to report lessexaggerated future happiness judgments. And in Study4, we predicted that unrealistic ideas about happiness inthe future would decline with age.

We have been explicit about our hypotheses as theyrelatetoperceptions ofpast andfuturehappiness: Onall

measures, we expected participants to be more self-deceptive about their future happiness than about theirpast happiness. As detailed above, past and future selvesare thought to differ on both the informational andmotivational factors that drive self-deception. By con-trast, the present self is believed to differ from the pastselfin terms of the motivational factorbut notin terms oftheinformationalfactor. Also, thepresent self isbelievedto differ from the future self in terms of the informationfactor but not in terms of the motivational factor. Thus,by examininghowthepresent self is viewedin relation topast and future selves, we hoped to gain an understand-

ing of whether motivational or informational factorsplay a larger role in perceptions of happiness acrosstime.

STUDY 1

Method

OVERVIEW

Participants were asked to rate their happiness in thepast, present, andfuture. Followingthis, they completed

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a self-esteem scale and a scale designed to tap the twosocial desirability dimensions of self-deception (anunconscious tendency to perceive the self in an unrealis-tically positive light) and impression management (arelatively conscious tendency to present oneself favora-bly to others). Allparticipantsmade happinessratings in

the same orderpast, present, then future.PARTICIPANTS

Participants were96 college undergraduates fromtheUniversity of California, Davis,whochose to volunteer toearn extra credit for their psychology classes.

INSTRUCTIONS AND DEPENDENT MEASURES

Participants were initially asked to rate their happi-ness in the past, present, and future, with the specifictime frames left unspecified. Each of these ratings wasmade by choosing a number from a 9-point, single-itemhappinessscale(1 = very unhappy, 9 = extremelyhappy). Par-

ticipants then completed the 10-item Rosenberg (1965)Self-Esteem Scale, which involves agreeing or disagree-ing with 10 statements characteristic of low or high self-esteem (e.g., On the whole, I am satisfied with myself).This scale has a Cronbachs of .88 and a test-retest cor-relation of .82 for a 1-week interval (Fleming & Court-ney, 1984). The validity of the scale is also well estab-lished. Scores from Rosenbergs (1965) scale correlatepositively with general self-regard (.78) and social confi-dence (.51) but negatively with self-reported anxiety(.64) and depression (.54) (Fleming & Courtney,1984).

To determine the role of social desirability responding

in self-reports of happiness, participants completed the40-itemBIDR (Version6) (Paulhus,1989). The inventoryconsists of twoseparable20-itemscales, oneofwhich mea-sures self-deception (e.g., I am fully in control of my ownfate) and the other of which measures impression man-agement (e.g., I never take things that dont belong tome).

Factor analytic results have supported the BIDR dis-tinction between self-deception and impression man-agement (Paulhus, 1991), with correlations between thetwo subscales ranging from .05 to .40. Cronbachsforthe Self-Deception scale has ranged from .68 to .80,whereas Cronbachsfor the Impression Management

scale has ranged from .75 to .86 (Paulhus, 1991). TheBIDR also displays construct validity. For example, Paul-hus has shown that manipulations involving anonymity(Paulhus, 1984) and self-presentation strategies (Paul-hus, Bruce, & Trapnell, 1995) influence impressionmanagement scores more than they influence self-deception scores. The self-deception component of theBIDR has been validated in studies showing that self-deceptiveenhancement tends to be more closely relatedto theendorsement ofpositiveattributes forthe self than

are impression management scores (Hoorens, 1995;Paulhus & Reid, 1991).

Results

OVERVIEW

We first report an analysis of happiness ratings alone.We then examine the relationship between the personal-ity measures and self-reports of happiness in the past,present, and future.

HAPPINESS RATINGS

To see whether participants happiness ratings dif-fered according to whether they were rating the past,present, or future self, we performed a univariate analy-sisof variance (ANOVA) on happiness ratings, with timeframe (3) as a within-subject repeated measure. A maineffect for time frame,F(2, 190) = 29.05,p< .001, indi-cated that happiness ratings did indeed differaccording

to whether participants were rating the past (M= 6.21),present (M= 6.33), or future (M= 7.53). Pairwise com-parisons revealed that participants felt they would bemore happy in the future than in the present,F(1, 95) =90.11,p< .001, or past,F(1, 95) = 37.91,p< .001, but thattheir happiness in thepast and present didnot differ,F .20. It therefore appears that ratingsof pasthap-piness were more closely tied to ones satisfaction withvarious areas of life than were ratings of present or futurehappiness.

We next sought to examine whether participantsviewed the future in a less differentiated manner thanthey viewedthepast or present. To examinethis issue,wefirst computed three within-subject measures of satisfac-tion rating variability, one for each of the time frames.These scores represent the extent to which participantsdifferentiatedamongthe different lifedomainsthat is,the extent to which they reported high satisfaction incertain life domains but low satisfaction in others. Sec-ond, we examined these interscale variance scores as afunction of the particular time frame that was beingrated.

A within-subject ANOVA yielded a significant main

effect for time frame on these interscale variance scores,F(2, 248) = 69.83,p< .001. As expected, pairwise com-parisons confirmed that satisfaction ratings were lessvariable when participants were rating their future self(Mvariance = 1.50) than when they were rating theirpresent (Mvariance = 3.49),F(1, 124) = 124.56,p< .001,or past selves (Mvariance = 3.25),F(1, 124) = 93.42,p .20. Fur-ther analyses indicated that these variability results were

not artifactually due to the higher mean ratings given tothe future self. Specifically, neither of the significantpairwise comparisons interacted with a trichotomizedmeasure of mean future satisfaction, bothps > .05.

We next sought to examine whether a belief that thefuture would be better than the past and present gener-

alized to the various life domains represented by the sat-isfaction scale. Rather than examining these satisfactionratings separately, we factor analyzed them to createmeaningful subscales. First,we averaged ratings foreacharea of life across past, present, and future time frames.Second, we performed a factor analysis on these meanratings by using principle components extraction andvarimax rotation.

Four factors were extracted and all 20 items loadedonto one of the factors at .30 or higher. Factor 1 (42.6%of thevariance)was termed social well-beingbecause mostof the items involved ones relationship with others:imageI project toothers (loading= .72), leisureactivi-

ties (.71), health/physical well-being (.70), groupinvolvement (.68), importance to others (.68),friendships (.66), appearance (.64), and romanticinvolvements (.36). Factor 2 (9.6% of the variance) wastermed achievement well-beingbecause all of the itemsrefer to goals or achievements: academic standing(.86), academic goals (.84), progress toward goals(.74), professional goals (.67), and work (.52). Fac-tor 3 (6.1% of the variance)was termed spiritualwell-beingbecause the highest loading items refer to personal val-ues and beliefs: efforts to further causes (.74), spiri-tual life (.65), family relationships (.56), and controlover life (.54). Factor 4 (5.7% of the variance) wastermed material well-beingbecause the items refer tofinances, possessions, or ones physical environment:financial situation (.76), geographic environment(.71), and material possessions (.68). The items load-ing onto each of the factors were then averaged to createSocial, Achievement, Spiritual, and Material Well-Beingsatisfaction subscales.

TIME FRAME EFFECTS ON THE

SATISFACTION FACTORS AND THE

OTHER DEPENDENT MEASURES

We performed time frame (3) ANOVAs on the mea-

sures of self-esteem, self-deception, impression manage-ment, andthefour satisfactionsubscales. As indicatedbythe results reported in Table 2, time frame had a maineffect on all of these measures, allps < .001. Supportingour hypothesis, participants engaged in more self-deception concerning their future self than concerningtheir past or present selves. Participants also engaged inmore self-deception concerning their present self thanconcerning their past self, suggesting that the past selfmay be viewed the most objectively. Further pairwise

600 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN



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comparisons revealed that, with one exception, thefuture self was seen as higher on all attributes than pres-ent and past selves were.

Discussion

Study 2, which varied the order of happiness ratings,

replicated Study 1 by showing that people believe thatthey will be happier in the future than in the past andpresent. Study 2 also added a number of findings sup-porting the idea that participants were more self-deceptive when perceiving their future self than whenperceiving their past self. The future was not just ratedhighest in happiness but was also rated highest in self-esteem, all four satisfaction subscales, and a five-itemmeasure of self-deception.

Additional findings support our hypotheses aboutself-perception across time. When we correlated individ-ual satisfaction items with past and future happiness rat-ings, results indicated that past happiness ratings weremore highly related to ones perceived satisfaction withvarious areas of life. This suggests that participants basedratings of past happiness more closely on an actual con-sideration of the available information. Further analysesconductedon thesatisfaction ratings suggested that par-ticipants tendedto view thefuturein a less differentiatedmanner than they viewed the past and present. That is,although one might predict that the uncertainty aboutthe future would lead to highly variable satisfaction rat-ings, our findings indicated that the opposite effectoccurred; that is, there was a marked reduction in thevariability of future satisfaction ratings. These findings

only make sense in light of peoples motivation to per-ceive the future in highly desirable terms.As in Study 1, the results involving the present self rat-

ings suggestedthat both informationaland motivationalinfluences on the use of self-deception were occurring.Supporting the informational view, present happinesswas no higher than past happiness, and similar resultswere obtained on the Social Well-Being subscale. Fur-thermore, the within-subject variance scores suggestedthat participants were viewing the present in a relativelydifferentiated manner. Supporting the motivationalview, mean self-deception was higher for the present selfthan it was for the past self. In addition, the satisfac-

tion/happiness correlations suggested that present hap-piness was less tied to an evaluation of different life cir-cumstances than was past happiness.

It is reasonable to conclude that both informationaland motivational factors influence self-perceptionacross time. The future self is always viewed more posi-tively than the past self because both motivational andinformational factors differentiate these two timeframes. The present self, by contrast, is not alignedexclusively with either the past self or the future self.

Although participants may have a strong motivation toview the present self in positive terms, such a tendencymust be partially restrained by the facts of ones life. The

future self, less constrained by these objective facts, canbe viewed in a much more positive manner.

STUDY 3

Consistent with our predictions, the young adults inStudies 1 and 2 consistently saw the future as more rosythan the past and present.One of the assumptions ofourframework is that uncertainty about the future is a keyreason for this unrealistically positive view of the futureself. This assumption is directly examined in Studies 3and 4. In study 3, we experimentally manipulated uncer-tainty about the future by randomly assigning young

adults to two groups. One group was asked to thinkabout self-generated aspects of their lives that wouldremain relatively the same over the next 5 years. A sec-ond group, by contrast, was asked to think about theaspects of their lives that would probably change quite abit over this time span. We expected that the lattergroup, relative to the former group, would spend theirtime thinking about how things would change for thebetter (rather than for the worse) and thus give higherfuture happiness ratings.

Method

PARTICIPANTS

Participants were 40 men and women (in approxi-mately equal proportion) who were recruited by postersdistributed throughout the Madison, Wisconsin, com-munity. Approximately 80% were college students seek-ing extra spending money ($6) during the summer. Theremaining 20% were young professionals (10%) andmiddle-aged adults (10%).

DESIGN, INSTRUCTIONS,

AND DEPENDENT MEASURES


TABLE 2: Time Frame Effects on Dependent Measure Means

Time Frame

Measure Past Present Future

Happiness 6.06a 6.32a 7.42bSelf-deception 3.72a 4.60b 4.83cImpression management 3.72a 4.19b 4.33bSelf-esteem 2.95a 3.18b 3.38cSatisfaction scalesSocial well-being 5.95a 6.11a 7.14bAchievement well-being 6.14a 5.55b 7.13cSpiritual well-being 5.84a 6.28b 7.32cMaterial well-being 5.93a 5.79a 6.97b

NOTE: Main effects for time frame (3) were found on all dependentmeasures, allps < .001. Means in the same row not sharing subscriptsdiffer at the .05 level.



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After taking part in an unrelated study on text com-prehension, participants were randomly assigned to cer-tainty(n= 20)or uncertainty (n= 20)questionnairecon-ditions. Differences between the certainty anduncertainty conditions are noted by italics, with theuncertainty instructions placed in parentheses:

As people make transitions through life, some thingschange quite a bit, whereas other things tend to remainthe same. We want your ideas about the aspects of yourlifeeither negative or positive or boththat are likelyto changevery little over time(quite a bit over time). Specifi-cally, when you think about yourself as you will be5 yearsfrom now, what aspects of your life are likely to be rela-tively the same(relatively different)?

To facilitate theeffectiveness of this manipulation, weasked participants to list and describe at least five thingsthat areeither unlikelyto changemuch (certainty con-dition) or likely to change to a considerable extent(uncertainty condition) in thenext 5 years.After writingtheir five statements, all participants then rated how sat-isfiedthey wouldbe with 10 different life domains 5 yearsfrom the present. All 10 domains were rated on the same9-point satisfaction scale (1 =not at all satisfiedand 9 =extremely satisfied).4

Results and Discussion

Because thereliability of the 10-item satisfaction scalewas quite high (Cronbachs = .95), we averaged overthe 10 domains to get a single future satisfaction with life

score. In support of our hypothesis, a one-way ANOVAindicated that participants in the uncertainty conditionreported that their future would be happier (M= 7.56)than did participants in the certainty condition (M=6.63),F(1, 38) = 4.25,p< .05.

An analysis of their written responses suggests why thiswas the case. When asked about things that wouldchange, participants in the uncertainty condition weremore likely to write about things that would change forthe better (Mnumber of statements = 2.95) than aboutthings that would change for the worse (M= .65),F(1, 19)= 78.42,p< .001. Although participants in the certaintycondition were also more likely to write about positive

things (M= 2.50) than about negative things (M= .95),F(1, 19) = 11.01,p< .005, these relative certainties appar-entlyprovided somecheckagainstfuture self-deception.That is, because these certainties made the future seemmore predictable (e.g., I will still be married to myspouse; I will still havemany of thesame friends), theyalso constrained visions for the future self. Participantsin theuncertainty condition, by contrast,were given freereign to imagine all sorts of life details changing for thebetter (e.g., My determination will sky-rocket; My

moral fiber will likely be stronger; Ill have a larger cir-cle of friends).

In a final analysis, we sought to determine if theeffects of theprimingmanipulationwere duetotheposi-tivity of described life aspects (either continuities or dis-continuities). We first computed a positivity ratio,

defined as the number of described positive life aspectsdivided by the total number of valenced aspects thatwere described. When this variable was used as a covari-ate in an ANCOVA, the effect of the priming manipula-tion was still significant,p< .05. This suggests that theeffectiveness of the manipulation didnot depend on thevalence of recalled information. Instead, perceived con-tinuities between the present and future, whether posi-tive or negative, served to constrain the illusion that peo-ple would be much more happy in the futurethan in thepresent.

STUDY 4

Study 3 revealed that those who were led to focus onpredictable (vs. unpredictable) aspects of the futurereported that they would be less satisfied with their futurelives. InStudy4,we sought tofinda natural analog for theexperimental manipulation. In doing so, we reasonedthat different age groups might view the future quite dif-ferently.

The participants in Studies 1, 2, and 3 were youngadults. In the future, these individuals are likely to moveto a different location, begin their careers, get married,and start a family. In a very real sense, then, the mostimportant details of their lives have yet to be actualized.

The life status of these young adults can be contrastedwith the life status of middle-aged and older adults.Middle-aged adults have already chosen their careersand have likely already started families. Nevertheless,there are certain life transitions that have yet to be expe-rienced.Peoplein this agegroup arelikely toexperiencefuture changes in work and economic status, and theyhave yet to experience retirement and the leisure timethat it brings.

By contrast to these two age groups, the future wouldseemtobe the least ambiguous for peoplewho are older.Their work, family, economic status, and livingsituationsare unlikely to change dramatically in their future years.

And, unfortunately, they can reasonably expect anincrease in health-related problems as they continue toage. These age-related expectations allow comparablyless room for self-deception about the future. In Study 4,we sought to provide support for these ideas. Allreported analyses are based on data collected by Ryff(1991), but all analyses are completely new.

Method

PARTICIPANTS




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Participants were 298 young (n= 121;Mage = 19.3),middle-aged (n=92; Mage = 46.0), and old-aged adults(n= 85; Mage = 73.4). The young participants were con-tacted through an educational institution. The middle-and old-aged participants were contacted through com-munity and civic organizations.5

DESIGN AND DEPENDENT MEASURES

Participants completed six 20-item well-being scalescreated by Ryff(1989). The scales tap self-perceptions ofautonomy, positive relations with others, personalgrowth, purpose in life, environmental mastery, andself-acceptance. Items for each of these six scales consistof statements judged to be low or high on the particularwell-being dimension. All items were rated on the same6-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 6 = stronglyagree). Cron-bachs s for the six scales range from .86 to .93, and thescales have 6-week test-retest reliabilities ranging from.81 to .88 (Ryff, 1989).

Participants were instructed to complete the scales inthe context of present, ideal, past, and future selves, inthat order. They completed the scales in the same tem-poral order because previous research (Ryff & Heincke,1983) suggested that it is difficult to evaluate past andfuture selves without first evaluating the present self.Because the data collection also included a life historyinventory, the results of which are reported in Ryff andHeidrich (1997), it wasdeemeddesirable to havepartici-pants rate their ideal self before their past and futureselves.

Instructionsto thinkabout past andfutureselves weremore specific than those used in Studies 1 and 2. Young

adults were instructed to imagine themselves as adoles-cents (past self) and as 40- to 50-year-olds (future self).Middle-aged adults were instructed to imagine them-selves as 20- to 25-year-olds (past self) and as 65- to 70-year-olds (future self). Finally, old-aged adults wereinstructed to imagine themselves as 40- to 50-year-olds(past self)and10 to 15years in thefuture (future self).

Results

FUTURE ENHANCEMENT AMONG

THREE DIFFERENT AGE GROUPS

Future enhancement scores were created by subtract-

ingpresent well-being scoreson a given dimension fromfuture well-being scores. This measure thus reflects theextent to which participantsof differentagegroupsenvi-sion themselves being happier in the future than theyare in the present. These future enhancement scoreswere examined in six ANOVAs in which age group was athree-level independent variable. As predicted, agegroup had an effect in all six ANOVAs, allps < .001.

Follow-up ANOVAs tested each of the pairwise com-parisons (young vs. middle-aged, middle-aged vs. old,

andyoung vs. old)on each of the well-being dimensions.Results indicated that all pairwise comparisons were sig-

nificant, allps < .005, and all conformed to predictions.Specifically, on all of the well-being dimensions, futureenhancement was highest among the young age groupand lowest among the old-aged group. In all analyses,furthermore, the middle-aged group fell in between theother two groups: Their future enhancement scoreswere higher than the old-aged group but lower than theyoung age group. Results, which are reported in Table 3,thus provide strong support for predictions derivedfrom the two-factor model of self-deception.

CORRELATIONS INVOLVING

IDEAL SELF RATINGS

We correlated past, present, and future self ratingswith ideal self ratings (as shown in Table 4). All pairs ofcorrelations were compared within a particular agegroup on a particular dimension (e.g., foryoungadults,the correlation of past and ideal self autonomy ratingswas compared to their correlation of future and idealself autonomy ratings).

On all six dimensions, young adults future/idealself correlations were higher than their past/ideal selfcorrelations, again supporting the idea that youngadults are quite optimistic about their future self. Thisoptimismis not limited toyoung adults. On all six ofthe

dimensions, middle-aged adults also had higherfuture/ideal selfcorrelationsthanpast/ideal selfcorre-lations. The results involving young and middle-agedadults can be contrasted quite sharply with the resultsinvolving old-aged adults. On only one of the dimen-sionsself-acceptancedid old-aged adults have ahigherfuture/ ideal self than past/ideal self correlation.The general lack of this difference among old-agedadults seems to be partly due to more modest expecta-tions for the future self.


TABLE3: FutureEnhancement AmongThreeDifferentAgeGroups

Age Group

Well-Being Dimension Young Middle-Aged Old

Autonomy .78a .32b .12cPositive relations with others .49a .25b .26cPersonal growth .19a .07b .44cPurpose in life .49a .14b .35cEnvironmental mastery .75a .16b .57cSelf-acceptance .73a .29b .11c

NOTE: Future enhancement scores were created by subtracting pres-ent well-being scores from projected future well-being scores on eachof the dimensions. Thus, positive numbers represent a belief that thefuturewillbe happierthanthe present,whereas negativenumbers rep-resent a belief that the future will be less happy than the present. Oneach of the well-being dimensions, scores within a row not sharing asubscript differ from each other atp< .005.



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Discussion

Study 4 provided consistent support for our predic-tions. Specifically, positive expectations for the futureself diminished with age.Futureenhancement was high-est among the young adults, intermediate among themiddle-aged group, and nonexistent among the old-aged group. Consistent with Study 3 findings, it appearsthat ambiguity about the future, in the form of impor-tant life transitions, is a key variable that influences thepositivity of expectations for thefutureself. Correlationsinvolving ideal self-ratings reveal a similar pattern.Among the young and middle-aged participants,

future/ideal self correlations were consistently higherthan past/ideal self correlations, whereas this patternwas not apparent among old-aged participants. It isimportant to note, however, that the old-aged partici-pants were not pessimists: Their future/ideal self corre-lations were not lower than their past/ideal self correla-tions. Instead, it is likely that motivational andinformational factors influencedself-deceptionin oppo-site directions for old-aged participants, in effect cancel-ing each others influence.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Two main findings emerge from the four studiesreported in this article. First, people tend to believe thatthey will be happier and more satisfied with variousaspects of their lives in the future than in the past andpresent. Second, concrete information about the future,

in termsof eitherperceived continuitieswith thepresent(Study3) or age-related expectations(Study4), serves toreduce this future self-enhancement bias. Results areconsistent with past findings that suggest that self-deception is greatest under conditions of informationuncertainty and high motivation.

Future Self-Enhancement

Although previous research has shown that self-enhancement biases can influence perceptions of past(Fischhoff, 1975; Greenwald, 1980; Ross, 1989), present(Alicke, 1985; Baumeister, 1993; Brown, 1986, 1990;

Dunning et al., 1989), andfutureselves (Alloy & Ahrens,1987; Psyzczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987; Weinstein,1980), no previous research has, to our knowledge,focused direct attention on comparative enhancementacross the three time frames. Our findings suggest thatperceptions of future well-being are particularly subjectto self-enhancement biases.

Why is the future rated so positively? Although thepresent andfutureare both motivationally relevant (andthus highly important to the present self), the presentand future differ in their opportunities for successfulself-enhancement. More specifically, because the futureis marked by uncertainty, and thus presents novel possi-

bilities for the self, the most desirable selves can be envi-sioned without contradicting known facts (Markus &Nurius, 1986; Weinstein, 1980).

The positivity of the future self may be critical to themaintenance of a positive self-evaluation. In contrast topredictions generated from reflexive views of self-evaluation (Mead, 1934), people tend to maintain posi-tive self-views even after receiving negative feedback(Snyder & Higgins, 1988; Tesser & Paulhus, 1983).Although various mechanisms may account for this nullresult (Brown, 1990; McFarlin & Blascovitch, 1981; Tes-ser & Paulhus, 1983), a crucial mechanism seems to bethe positivity of visions for the future self (Bandura, 1989;

Markus & Nurius, 1986; Scheier & Carver, 1985).Recent evidence, in fact, suggests that deficiencies in

future self-enhancement can have negative conse-quences for mental and physical health. For example,Alloy and Ahrens (1987) found that depressedrelative tonondepressed participants made more pessimistic pre-dictions for their future performance, even when giventhe same task-relevant information (see also Psyzczynskiet al., 1987). Indeed, hopelessness about the future maybe key in the genesis of depression (Abramson, Selig -


TABLE4: CorrelationsBetweenIdealSelfRatings andPast,Present,

and Future Self Ratings

Correlation Coefficients

Measure and Past and Present and Future and

Age Group Ideal Ideal Ideal

Autonomy

Young .07a .31b .47bMiddle-aged .25a .40b .70cOld-aged .46a .62a .54a

Positive relations with othersYoung .24a .45b .55bMiddle-aged .32ac .41ad .57bdOld-aged .50a .57a .43a

Personal growthYoung .45a .65b .60bMiddle-aged .20a .58b .59bOld-aged .43ac .69bd .55ad

Purpose in lifeYoung .29ac .41ad .52bdMiddle-aged .22a .44b .58bOld-aged .42a .72b .48a

Environmental masteryYoung .09ac .22ad .38bdMiddle-aged .21a .25a .49bOld-aged .36ac .60bd .47ad

Self-acceptanceYoung .11ac .26ad .38bd

Middle-aged .12a .39b .52bOld-aged .44a .66b .62b

NOTE: Correlations less than .21 in magnitude are nonsignificant(seven correlations). All other correlations are significant atp< .05.Across each of the rows, correlations not sharing any subscripts are sig-nificantly different from each other atp< .05.



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man, & Teasdale, 1978; Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trex-ler, 1974). By contrast, optimism about the future hasbeen linked to a variety of positive outcomes, includingbetter adjustment to the stresses of college life (Aspin-wall & Taylor, 1992; Scheier & Carver, 1985) and resil-ience in the face of major health problems (Scheier et

al., 1989; Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984; Timko &Janoff-Bulman, 1985).How do positive expectations about the future lead to

positive outcomes? According to Bandura (1989), peo-ple who expect positive outcomes set higher goals forthemselves, pursue these goals more vigorously, andare more likely to persist in the face of temporary set-backs. Similarly, Scheier and Carver (1985) havefound that dispositional optimism leads to moreproblem-focused coping (defined by attempts tochange a problematic situation) and less denial(Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). Other researchindicates that merely thinking about an event makes

the event seem more likely (Carroll, 1978; Kahneman& Tversky, 1982) and that beliefs about the future selfcan create their own reality (Aronson & Carlsmith,1962;Sherman, 1980).Takentogether, thisresearchsug-gests that future self-enhancement may be a normativetendency possessing more positive than negative conse-quences.

Limitations to Future Self-Enhancement

Although we assume that all people are motivated toenvision a positive future self, we also assume that thereare limiting conditions. Specifically, relatively concrete

information about the futurewill serve to minimize suchenhancement. Evidence for these limiting conditionswas obtained in Studies 3 and 4.

In Study 3, we manipulated a priming factor hypothe-sized to minimize future self-enhancement. Consistentwith our predictions, those asked to think about conti-nuities between the present and future reported lowersatisfactionwith futurelifedomains thandid thoseaskedto think about discontinuities. Although participants inthe change condition were free to think about how theirlives would deteriorate, we did not expect them to do so.Instead, we expected that their motivations would chan-nel their thoughts in a positive direction, a prediction

confirmed by the life changes that they described. Par-ticipants in the stability condition also tended todescribe the positive aspects of their lives, but these con-tinuitiesprovided someconcrete expectationsabout thefuture and thus restrained future self-enhancement.

These ideas were also tested in a cross-sectional inves-tigation of people from different age groups (Study 4).Reasoning that peoples life circumstances becomemore stable as they age, we expected that visions for thefuture self, and thus future self-enhancement, would

also become more constrained with age. Results weresupportive of this account. On all six of Ryffs (1989)well-being dimensions, future self-enhancement wasmost extreme among young participants, was weak tomoderate among middle-aged participants, and wasnonexistent among old-aged participants. Additional

results demonstrated that older adults tended not toview their future selves in more idealistic terms thantheir past selves, whereas this was a consistent patternamong young and middle-aged adults. The results, insum, provide clear evidence that future self -enhancement tends to diminish with age.

In a recent study of high relevance, Cross and Markus(1991) asked four age groups about their hoped for andfeared future selves. The youngest group (ages 18-24)reported hoped for selves that were extremely positiveandunrealistic.Theirhoped forselves were also theleasttied to current circumstances (e.g., being famous,marryinga Playboycenterfold).By contrast, theyoung

adults (ages 25-39) reported hoped for selves that wereless extreme and more constrained, and this tendencyonly increased across the other two age groups (ages40-59 and60+). Typically married and settled in a career,forexample, themiddle-aged group expressedthe hopethat they could perform their roles well (e.g., being agoodhusbandand father, successful at work). Finally,the hoped for selves of the oldest group were quite mod-est and realistic. Their hopes centered around fightingaging and maintaining active lives (e.g., being usefulandable to help others, beingan activeold person).

Despite the more modest goals of older people,

research indicates that they tend to be just as happy asyoung people (Myers & Diener, 1995). Gerontologistsseem to agree that modest visions for the future self areactually a critical determinant of adjustment to old age(Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Brandstdter & Greve,1994). Set-ting fewer and more modest goals allows older individu-als to make meaningful subjective progress in their lives.Hence, just as future self-enhancement may be adaptivefor young adults, a more modest vision for the future selfmay be adaptive for older adults. Age brings continuity,specifically in the form of more stablecommitments androles, and this continuity diminishes the tendencytoward future self-enhancement.

Although ratings of present well-being tend not todiminish with age (Andrews & Withey, 1976; Myers &Diener, 1995), judgmentsof futurewell-being do. In thisregard, we contend that future well-being judgmentshave an intimate connection with long-term goals in away that present well-being judgments do not. Specifi-cally, the degree to which people engage in future self-enhancement should be related to the degree to whichthey expect their lives to change. A teleological goalfocus, arguably a defining characteristic of young adult-




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hood, leads to exaggerated visions of future well-being.By contrast, a maintenance goal focus, arguably a defin-ing characteristic of old age, leads to relatively modestvisions of future well-being.

Self-Deception and Subjective Well-Being:Some Remaining Questions

Relatively little is known about future well-beingjudgments, and many questions remain. One questionis whether current life circumstances matter. On onehand, one might assume that there is a perceived conti-nuity between present and future selves and, thus, thatjudgments of future well-being would vary with currenthappiness. On the other hand, Markus and Nurius(1986) have argued that people can tolerate negativecircumstances in the present to the extent that theyhold onto positive visions of the future. Under this for-mulation, future visions of well-being can compensatefor negative circumstances in the present, and onemightexpect that current circumstanceswouldhave lit-tle influence on such judgments.

In addition, we have made a number of assumptionsabout future self-enhancement that deserve furtherscrutiny. First, we assume that future self-enhancementrepresents a construct that is distinct from present self-enhancement. Second, we assume that judgments offuture well-being are intimately tied to ones goal struc-tures (i.e., teleological vs. maintenance). Third, weassume that role commitments are the critical reasonwhy future self-enhancement diminishes with age.Fourth, we assume that future self-enhancement is func-

tional for young adults but not functional for peoplewho have settled into their life roles. Although all ofthese assumptions require scrutiny, the present studiesprovide basicevidence for future self-enhancementand,in doing so, help elucidate the relationship betweenself-deception and subjective well-being.

CONCLUSION

By considering the motivational and informationalfactors that influence self-evaluations, we have providedsupport for predictions about the circumstances underwhich self-deceptive enhancement is particularly likely

or unlikely. Specifically, we have provided evidence thatthere is a close connection between self-deception andfuture self-enhancement. Unrealistic optimism aboutthe future is particularly likely when people expect thatthe future will be different from the present. Underthese circumstances, uncertainty about the future pro-vides an ideal opportunity for envisioning the best possi-bilities for the self.

NOTES

1. There are many psychologists who share our broad view of self-deception (e.g., Baumeister, 1993; Hoorens, 1995;Paulhus, 1984). Onthe other hand, there are others who conceive of self-deception inmore restricted terms. According to Gur and Sackeim (1979), self-deceptionoccurswhen an individual simultaneously holds twocontra-dictory beliefs, is unaware of one of these beliefs, and when thisunawareness is motivated. Our results are not necessarily germane tothis more restricted view of self-deception.

2. In neither Study 1 nor Study 2 did we ask for the gender of theparticipants. Previous research indicates that gender differences inhappiness tend to be weak and inconsistent (Andrews & Robinson,1991). Both samples were drawn from a population in which therewere slightly more women than men (i.e., about 60% women).

3. We included only 10 of the Balanced Inventory of DesirableResponding (BIDR) items in Study 2 because of the number of otherdependent measures also examined in the study. We primarily limitour Study 2 conclusions concerning these measures to the followingresearch question: Do mean ratings of self-deception and impressionmanagement in the past, present, and future parallel mean ratings onthe happiness scale?

4.Thelifesatisfaction scale forStudy3 consistedof thefollowing 10items: my family relationships, my friendships, my sense of pur-pose, my control over life, my importance to others, my goals,my emotional well-being, my group activities, my basic life situa-tion, and myself.

5. The gender composition of the young (58% male) and middle-aged (55% male) adultswas comparable,butwe had less balance(29%male) in the old-aged group. One reason for the latter imbalance isthat womenlivelonger than men, andthe average ageof this group wasrelatively old (mean age = 73.4). Nevertheless, participant gender hadno main effect on any of the future enhancement scores, and interac-tions involving participant gender did not exceed the number thatwould be expected on the basis of chance.

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Received September 17, 1997Revision accepted May 3, 1998


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