RAPORTUL STIINTIFIC SI TEHNIC -etapa3 · Problema referitoare la factorii care determina...
Transcript of RAPORTUL STIINTIFIC SI TEHNIC -etapa3 · Problema referitoare la factorii care determina...
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RAPORTUL STIINTIFIC SI TEHNIC (în extenso)
RESPONSABILITATEA SOCIALA CORPORATIVA. STIMULAREA FIRMELOR ROMANESTI PENTRU CRESTEREA PERFORMANTELOR
DE MEDIU IN CONTEXTUL INTEGRARII ROMANIEI IN UNIUNEA EUROPEANA
Director proiect: prof. univ. dr. Ion STANCU
Contract 92120/01.10.2008
Membrii echipei de cercetare:
Prof. univ. dr. Ion STANCU
Lect. univ. dr. Robert SOVA
Prof. univ. dr. Irina PUGNA
Conf. univ. dr. Laurentiu FRATILA
CS III Anamaria SOVA
Conf. Univ. dr. Radu DESPA
Ec. Costica MANDRICELU
Ec. Violeta CIMPOERU
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Cuprins
A. Obiectivele generale
B. Obiectivele etapei
C. Rezumatul etapei
D. Descrierea stiintifica si tehnica, cu punerea in evidenta a rezultatelor etapei
si gradul de realizare a obiectivelor; (se vor indica rezultatele)
E. Concluzii
F. Bibliografie
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A. Obiectivele generale
Obiectivul general al acestui proiect de cercetare, desfasurat pe parcursul a
trei ani, este ca bazandu-se pe integrarea conceptelor dezvoltate in teoria
organizationala si neo-institutionala, sa se initieze unui nou cadru pentru
promovarea atat a Responsabilitati Sociale Corporative - aspectele referitoare la
protectia mediu denumita in cadrul raportului Responsabilitate Corporativa de
Mediu (RCM) cat si a Performantei Corporative de Mediu (PCM).
Indeplinirea obiectivului general se va realize prin atingerea urmatoarelor
obiective:
evaluarea comportamentului de mediu a firmelor in conditiile specifice
ale integrarii in UE, pentru a intelege mecanismele institutionale care
influenteaza semnificativ procesul de luare a deciziilor
dezvoltarea unui model conceptual a presiunii institutionale moderate
de caracteristicile firmelor pentru promovarea responsabilitatii de
mediu si a performantei de mediu.
un model econometric de analiza a factorilor care au cel mai mare
potential pentru incurajarea responsabilitatii corporative de mediu; un
instrument al modelului operational
un model econometric de analiza a factorilor cheie care motiveaza
firmele sa adopte masuri care sa aibe un impact relevant asupra
performantelor de mediu; un instrument al modelului operational
folosirea cunostintelor dobandite in proiectul de cercetare, pentru a
genera noi initiative de motivare care pot fi incorporate in politicii de
mediu
Proiectul se focalizeaza pe identificarea, analiza si initiere diferitelor politici
si motivari in domeniul protectiei mediului, si asupra rolului tuturor persoanelor
interesate autoritatilor publice, partenerii sociali, NGO, institutiile de mediu,
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intreprinderile, institutele de cercetare, in initiative avand ca scop promovarea
responsabilitatii corporative de mediu, performanta de mediu si rolul acestora in
dezvoltarea durabila.
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B. Obiectivele etapei 3 de executie;
Obiectivul etapei 3 de execuţie este de a analiza comportamentului corporativ
de mediu in România din perspectiva abordării Coaseiene si de a formula ipotezele
privind factorii care influenţează procesul decizional in domeniul protecţiei
mediului in vederea elaborarii cadrului conceptual de analiza.
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C. Rezumatul etapei (maxim 2 pagini)
Adoptării responsabilităţii sociale presupune asumarea in mod voluntar de
angajamente care depăşesc cerinţele comune convenţionale şi de reglementare, pe
care ar trebui să le respecte în orice caz. In aceste conditii, companiile depun
eforturi pentru a ridica standardele de dezvoltare socială, protecţia mediului şi
respectarea drepturilor fundamentale şi sa adopte o guvernanta corporativa
deschisa, care presupune reconcilierea intereselor diverselor părţi interesate într-o
abordare globală de calitate şi durabila. Deşi se recunoaşte importanţa tuturor
aspectelor legate de responsabilitatea sociala corporativa, această cercetare se
concentrează în principal pe responsabilităţile companiilor in domeniul
protecţiei mediului
În cadrul companiei, practicile responsabile legate de mediu se referă în
principal la gestionarea resurselor naturale utilizate în producţie si la procesele
tehnologice generatoare de reziduri.
Problema referitoare la factorii care determina organizaţiile să adopte seturi
specifice ale practicilor de management este o tema centrală a teoriei
organizaţionale. Perspectiva instituţională sugerează că firmele obţin legitimitatea
prin conformarea cu practicile dominante în cadrul domeniul lor instituţional
(DiMaggio şi Powell, 1983; Scott, 1992).
Atunci când este integrata cu caracteristici cheie ale organizaţiei, teoria
instituţională poate genera noi perspective pentru a înţelege diferenţele dintre
strategiile firmelor.
Lucrările lui Coase (1937,1960) au fost punctul de plecare în elaborarea
teoriei neo-instituţională, bazată pe analiza a costurilor de tranzacţie, drepturile
de proprietate, contracte, şi organizaţii. În abordarea neo-instituţională în
domeniul protecţiei mediului se porneşte de la premisa că guvernele acţionează ca
agenţi publici, în reglementarea poluării, utilizand diferitele instrumente de care
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dispun. Cu toate acestea, atunci când mecanismele de “reglementare formale” sunt
absente sau ineficiente, comunităţile vor căuta alte mijloacele de a-şi impune
propriile exigenţe. Lucrări ştiinţifice recente au indicat existenţa pe scară largă a
unor astfel de "reglementari informale", comunităţile fiind adesea în măsură să
negocieze sau să impună presiune asupra poluatorilor în scopul de a-şi imbunătăţii
performanţele de mediu.
In aceste conditii analiza empirica dezvoltata in cadrul acestei etape a
proiectului a avut menirea de a verifica pentru Romania, intr-o abordare holistica,
“care sunt factorii cheie care determina companii să-şi asume responsabilitatea lor
socială?” si “Care sunt aşteptările generate de un astfel de angajament?”
Pentru aceasta am realizat pentru prima data o analiza empirica pornind de la
un model de analiza calitativa.
S-au realizat 5 studii, toate bazadu-se pe date individuale la nivel de firma
furnizate de Institutul National de Statistica referitoare la investiile si cheltuielile
legate de protectia mediului.
Rezultatele sustin caracterul stimulativ al subventiilor Pigouviene asupra
comportamentului intreprinzatorului in sensul determinarii luarii deciziei de a
realiza investitii in protejarea mediului, dar releva faptul ca sistemul de taxe
Pigouviene nu are o influenta stabila asupra comportamentului responsabil fata de
mediu. Acest fapt implica realizarea unei analize calitative asupra acestui sistem
pentru a identifica punctele sale slabe, activitate ce se va desfasura in etapele
viitoare ale proiectului. De asemenea rezultatele releva faptul ca reglementarile
informale, cu exceptia presiunilor institutionale venite din piata, nu au o influenta
semnificativa asupra comportamentului responsabil fata de mediu. Referitor la
efectele asumarii responsabilitatii sociale corporative, de catre firmele romanesti,
studiul a reliefat ca ipoteza win-win nu se confirma in cazul Romaniei.
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D. Descrierea stiintifica si tehnica, cu punerea in evidenta a rezultatelor etapei si gradul de realizare a obiectivelor; (se vor indica rezultatele)
1. Responsabilitatea corporativa sociala, o abordare holistică
Astăzi un număr tot mai mare de companii europene isi promovează
strategiile lor de responsabilitate socială corporative ca un răspuns la varietatea de
presiuni legate de aspectele sociale, de mediu şi economice. Scopul lor este de a da
un semnal de preocupare diferitele părţile interesate cu care interactionează:
angajaţi, acţionari, investitori, consumatori, autorităţile publice şi organizaţiile
non-guvernamentale (ONG-uri). Procedând astfel, companiile investesc în viitorul
lor şi se aşteaptă ca angajamentele voluntare pe care le adoptă vor contribui la
creşterea profitabilităţii lor.
Încă din 1993, s-a lansat apelul către mediul de afaceri european de a se
implica in lupta împotriva excluziunii sociale. Mai târziu, in martie 2000, Consiliul
European de la Lisabona a făcut un nou apel către mediul de afaceri european de a
promova simţul responsabilităţii sociale în ceea ce priveşte cele mai bune practici
pentru învăţarea pe tot parcursul vieţii, organizarea muncii, egalitatea de şanse,
incluziunea socială şi dezvoltarea durabilă.
Prin declararea de către mediul de afaceri a adoptării responsabilităţii sociale
care presupune asumarea in mod voluntar de angajamente care depăşesc cerinţele
comune convenţionale şi de reglementare, pe care ar trebui să le respecte în orice
caz, companiile depun eforturi pentru a ridica standardele de dezvoltare socială,
protecţia mediului şi respectarea drepturilor fundamentale şi sa adopte o
guvernanta corporativa deschisa, care presupune reconcilierea intereselor
diverselor părţi interesate într-o abordare globală de calitate şi durabila. Deşi se
recunoaşte importanţa tuturor acestor aspecte, această cercetare se concentrează în
principal pe responsabilităţile companiilor in domeniul protecţiei mediului.
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Conceptul de responsabilitate socială corporativă este adoptat în principal de
marile companii, chiar dacă practicile responsabilitatii corporative sociale există în
toate tipurile de întreprinderi, publice şi private, inclusiv întreprinderile mici şi
mijlocii (IMM-uri) şi cooperative.
La nivelul Uniunii Europeane se acorda o atentie sporita responsabilitatii
sociale corporative, deoarece se considera ca aceasta poate aduce o contribuţie
semnificativa la atingerea obiectivului strategic de la Lisabona si anume: "Europa
să devină economia cea mai competitivă şi dinamică bazată pe cunoaştere din
lume, capabilă de o creştere economică durabilă, cu locuri de muncă mai multe şi
mai bune şi o mai mare coeziune socială".
Mai mulţi factori au determinat dezvoltarea conceptului de responsabilitate
socială a întreprinderilor:
noile preocupări şi aşteptările ale cetăţenilor, consumatorilor,
autorităţilor publice şi investitorilor, în contextul globalizării
criteriile sociale si de mediu influenţează din ce în ce mai mult deciziile
de investiţii ale indivizilor şi instituţiilor, atât în calitate de consumatori
şi în calitate de investitori;
preocuparea din ce in ce mai crescuta cu privire la daunele cauzate de
activitatea economică asupra calitatii mediului;
transparenţa activităţilor de afaceri datorate mass-mediei şi
tehnologiilor moderne informaţionale şi de comunicare.
Pe măsură ce companiile se confruntă cu noi provocări datorate unui mediu în
continua schimbare, în contextul globalizării şi, în special pe piaţa internă
europeana, acestea sunt din ce în ce mai conştiente de faptul că responsabilitatea
socială corporativă poate aduce valoare economică directă.
Deşi prima responsabilitate a unei companii este generarea de profituri,
companiile pot si trebuie ca în acelaşi timp sa contribuie activ la realizarea
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obiectivele sociale şi de mediu ale societăţii in general, prin integrarea
responsabilităţii sociale în strategia lor de afaceri, in instrumentele lor de
management si in operaţiunile desfăşurate.
În cazul în care responsabilitatea socială corporatistă este un proces prin care
companiile administrează relaţiile lor cu o varietate de părţi interesate care pot avea
o influenţă reală asupra funcţionarii acestora, aceasta ar trebui să fie tratată ca o
investiţie, nu ca un cost, la fel ca managementul calităţii. Astfel ele pot avea o
abordare inclusivă a aspectelor financiare, comerciale, de mediu şi sociale,
conducând la o strategie pe termen lung, care sa duca la reducerea riscurilor legate
de incertitudine.
Totuşi, responsabilitatea socială corporatistă nu ar trebui să fie văzută ca un
substitut la reglementările sau legislaţia referitoare la drepturile sociale sau
standardele de mediu.
În cadrul companiei, practicile responsabile social implică în primul rând
angajaţi şi se referă la aspecte cum ar fi investiţiile în capitalul uman, sănătate şi
siguranţă, şi gestionarea schimbării, în timp ce practicile responsabile legate de
mediu se referă în principal la gestionarea resurselor naturale utilizate în producţie
si la procesele tehnologice generatoare de reziduri. Aceste practici au deschis o
noua cale de a gestiona schimbările şi de a reconcilia dezvoltarea sociala cu
îmbunătăţirea competitivităţii.
CSR – dimensiunea intrenă
În general, reducerea consumului de resurse sau reducerea emisiilor poluante
şi a deşeurilor poate reduce impactul asupra mediului. Acesta poate fi, de
asemenea, utile afacerilor prin reducerea facturilor de energie şi de eliminare a
deşeurilor şi scăderea de costurilor de intrare (consum mai mic de resurse naturale)
şi de-poluare. Companiile au constatat că utilizarea tehnologiilor verzi conduce la
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un consum mai mic de resurse care are efecte pozitive asupra creşterii rentabilităţii
şi a competitivităţii.
În domeniul mediului, aceste investiţii de mediu sunt în mod normal asociate
oportunităţilor de tip "win-win" - bune pentru afaceri şi bune pentru mediul
înconjurător. Acest principiu a fost enunţat de Porter in anii 90 fiind recunoscut si
în cel mai recent program de acţiune de mediu al Comisiei Europene. Acesta
explică modul în care Uniunea Europeană şi guvernele statelor membre îşi pot
îndeplini rolul lor de a ajuta mediul de afaceri pentru a identifica oportunităţile de
piaţă şi să întreprindă investiţii "win-win". Acesta a stabilit o serie de alte măsuri
care vizează mediul de afaceri: stabilirea unui program de asistenţă pentru
conformitate pentru a ajuta companiile să înţeleagă cerinţele comunitare de mediu;
dezvoltare armonizata la nivel naţional a unui sistem de recompensa a performanţei
de mediu corporative care să identifice şi să recompenseze companiile cu
performante in protecţia mediului şi care sa încurajeze angajamentele şi acordurile
voluntare.
La nivel european, un bun exemplu de o abordare care permite autorităţilor
publice să conlucreze cu mediul de afaceri este „Integrated Product Policy” (IPP).
IPP se bazează pe luarea în considerare a impactului produselor pe parcursul
ciclului lor de viaţă, şi implică companiile şi alte părţi interesate în dialogul să
găsească abordarea cea mai rentabilă. În domeniul mediului, aceasta poate fi, prin
urmare, văzută ca un cadru puternic pentru promovarea responsabilităţii sociale
corporative. O altă abordare care facilitează responsabilitatea socială corporatistă
este schema Comunităţii referitoare la Eco-Management si Audit (EMAS) si
sitemul de certificare ISO 19000. Acest lucru încurajează companiile să înfiinţeze
voluntar la nivelul companiei a unui sistem de management şi audit de mediu care
să promoveze îmbunătăţirea continuă a performanţelor de mediu. Declaraţia de
mediu este publica şi este validată de către verificatori de mediu atestaţi.
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CSR – dimensiunea externa
Responsabilitatea socială corporativă se extinde dincolo de porţile companiei
în comunitatea locală şi implică în plus faţă de angajaţi şi acţionari, o gamă largă
de părţi interesate: partenerii de afaceri si furnizori, clienţi, autorităţi publice şi
ONG-urile care reprezintă comunităţile locale, precum şi cele care militeaza pentru
protecţia mediului. Într-o lume a investiţiilor multinaţionale şi a lanţurile globale
de aprovizionare, responsabilitatea socială a întreprinderilor trebuie să se extindă,
de asemenea, dincolo de frontierele statelor. Globalizarea rapidă a încurajat
dezbaterile cu privire la rolul şi dezvoltarea guvernantei globale: dezvoltarea
practicilor de RSC poate fi privită ca o contribuţie la acest deziderat.
Comunităţile locale
Responsabilitatea socială corporatistă, influenţează de asemenea, integrarea
companiilor în comunitatea locala. Pe de o parte companiile ajuta comunităţile
locale, prin oferirea de locuri de muncă, salarii şi beneficii, şi venituri fiscale. Pe
de altă parte, companiile depind de sănătate, stabilitatea şi prosperitatea
comunităţilor în care îşi desfăşoară activitatea. Acestea recrutează majoritatea
angajaţilor lor de pe pieţele forţei de muncă locale, şi prin urmare, au un interes
direct în disponibilitatea locală a competenţelor de care au nevoie. În plus, IMM-
urile adesea, au clienti stabiliti în zona in care sunt instalate. Astfel, reputaţia unei
întreprinderi în regiunea sa, imaginea sa ca angajator şi producător, cu siguranţă
influenţează competitivitatea.
Companiile de asemenea, interacţioneaza la nivel local cu mediul
inconjurator. Unele se bazează in activitatea lor pe un mediu curat necesar
proceselor de producţie – aer curat, apă curată etc. De asemenea, poate exista o
relaţie între calitatea mediul incojurator şi capacitatea companiilor de a atrage
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lucrătorilor la regiunea în care se află instalate. Pe de altă parte insa, companiile
pot fi responsabile pentru o serie de activităţi poluante: zgomot, lumina, poluarea
apei, emisiile în aer, contaminarea solului, precum şi problemele de mediu asociate
cu transportul şi eliminarea deşeurilor.
Multe companii se implica în problemele comunitatii in care dezvolta
afacerile. Dezvoltarea de relaţii pozitive cu comunitatea locală şi astfel, acumularea
de capital social este mult mai relevanta in cazul companiilor străine. Companiile
multinaţionale utilizează tot mai mult aceste relaţii pentru a sprijini integrarea
filialelor lor în diferite pieţe în care acestea sunt prezente.
Partenerii de afaceri, furnizori şi consumatori
Prin colaborarea strânsa cu partenerii de afaceri, companiile pot reduce
complexitatea activitatilor şi a costurilor şi pot asigura creşterea calităţii. Selecţia
furnizorilor nu este întotdeauna bazata exclusiv pe oferte competitive financiar. Pe
termen lung, cimentarea unor relaţii de parteneriat poate avea ca rezultat preţuri
echitabile, termenii şi aşteptări legate de calitate, împreună cu
şi termene de livrare fiabile. În adoptarea practicilor responsabile social şi faţă de
mediu, companiile trebuie să respecte si normele relevante ale UE şi ale legislaţiei
naţionale legate de concurenţă.
Marile companii sunt in acelaşi timp partenerii companiilor mai mici, in
calitate de clienţi, furnizori, subcontractori sau competitori. Companiile ar trebui să
fie conştiente de faptul că performanţele lor sociale pot fi afectate de practicile
partenerilor şi furnizorilor lor de-a lungul întregului lanţ de aprovizionare. Efectul
activităţilor de responsabilitate sociala corporativa nu va rămâne limitat la
compania în sine, dar va influenta, de asemenea, partenerii lor de afaceri. Acest
lucru apare în special în cazul companiilor mari, care au externalizat o parte a
producţie sau servicii lor şi, prin urmare, poate dobândi responsabilităţii sociale
corporative suplimentare, legate de acesti furnizorii şi personalul lor, ţinând cont
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de faptul că, uneori, bunăstarea economică a acestor furnizori depinde în principal
sau totalitate de o singură companie mare.
De asemenea companiile mari demonstrează responsabilitate socială
corporativă, si prin promovarea iniţiativelor antreprenoriale în regiunea in care
activeaza. Exemple de astfel de practici includ sisteme de mentorat oferite de
companiile mari start-up-urilor şi IMM-urilor locale, sau de asistenţă pentru
firmele mai mici privind raportarea şi comunicarea activităţilor lor de
responsabilitate socială corporativa.
O alta maniera de manifestare a responsabilitatii sociale corporative se refera
la faptul ca firmele mari pot facilita dezvoltarea de noi întreprinderi inovatoare.
Astfel aceste companii pot achizitiona un pachet minoritar de acţiuni dintr-un start-
up promiţător şi sa sprijine dezvoltarea sa. Aceasta oferă avantaje diferite ambilor
parteneri, incluzând o mai bună implicare in dezvoltarea inovatoare pentru
companiile mari şi acces mai uşor la resurse financiare şi pe piaţa pentru firmele
mici.
Ca parte a responsabilităţii lor sociale, companiile sunt de aşteptat să
furnizeze produse şi servicii de care consumatorii au nevoie şi pe care le doresc,
într-un mod eficient, etic şi ecologic. Companiile, care construiesc relaţii de durată
cu clienţii prin focalizarea asupra înţelegerii a ceea ce clienţii au nevoie şi doresc.
Astfel companiile pot răspunde acestor cerinţe prin oferirea de produse si servicii
de o calitate superioara, mult mai sigure si fiabile ceea ce implica o creştere a
profitabilităţii. De asemenea companiile trebuie sa dezvolte produse si servicii care
sa fie utilizabile de cat mai multe persoane posibil, inclusiv consumatorii cu
handicap, aceasta fiind un alt exemplu important de responsabilitate socială.
Probleme globale de mediu
Prin efectul transfrontalier al problemelor de mediu legate de afaceri si de
consumul resurselor naturale, companiile sunt de asemenea actori implicati în
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problematica globala legata de mediul. Astfel ele pot încuraja o mai bună
performanţă de mediu la nivel global prin intermediul lanţului de aprovizionare.
Dezbaterea cu privire la rolul mediului de afaceri în realizarea dezvoltării durabile
a devenit tot mai intensa si mai importantă pe scena mondială. Secretarul General
ONU a lansat o iniţiativă denumita "Global Compact", care urmăreşte să facă din
mediul de afaceri un partener în realizarea îmbunătăţirii performantelor sociale şi
de mediu la nivel global. Linii directoare pentru întreprinderile multinaţionale
lansat de OCDE, contribuie de asemenea la promovarea dezvoltării durabile.
O abordare holistica privind promovarea CSR
În timp ce companiile constientizeaza din ce în ce mai mult responsabilitatea
lor socială, multe dintre ele nu au adoptat practici de management care se reflecta
aceasta. Deaorece acestea trebuie să integreze aceste practici în managementul
operational implicand totodata si lanţul lor de aprovizionare, angajaţii companiilor
şi managerii acestora au nevoie de instruire în scopul de a dobândi aptitudinile şi
competenţa necesare. Unele companii au ales ca solutie pentru integrarea
practicilor social responsabile, diseminarea de bune practici.
În timp ce decizia de a implementa responsabilitatea socială corporativă
apartine doar companiilor însele, părţile interesate, în special angajaţii,
consumatorii şi investitorii, pot juca un rol decisiv, în interes propriu sau în numele
altor părţi interesate în domenii cum ar fi condiţiile de muncă, mediul sau alte
drepturi, în determinarea companiilor să adopte practici responsabile social. Astfel
ei pot solicita si chiar impune prin diverse mecanisme nevoie de transparenţă
efectivă cu privire la performanţa sociala şi de mediu a companiilor.
Management integrat privind Responsabilitatea socială
Modul in care companiile abordeaza responsabilităţile acestora şi relaţiile cu
părţile interesate variază în funcţie de diferenţele sectoriale şi culturale. La
începutul companiile tind să adopte o declaraţie de misiune, cod de conduită, sau
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Credo-ul prin care isi exprima scopul lor, valorile de bază, şi responsabilităţile faţă
de părţile interesate. Aceste valori trebuie apoi să fie traduse în acţiuni în cadrul
organizaţiei, de la strategii la deciziile de zi cu zi. Acest lucru implică practici, cum
ar fi adăugarea unei dimensiuni social sau de mediu în planurile şi bugetele
elaborate şi evaluarea performanţelor corporative în aceste domenii, crearea de
"comitete consultative ale comunitatii", care efectuează audituri sociale sau de
mediu şi înfiinţarea de programe de educatie continua
Atat timp cat problemele legate de responsabilitate socială corporativă au
devenit o parte integrantă a planificării strategice corporative şi a performanţelor
operaţionale, managerii şi angajaţii au obligaţia de a lua decizii legate de afaceri
bazate pe criterii suplimentare faţă de cele care au fost instruiţi în mod tradiţional.
Modelele tradiţionale de comportament organizational, management strategic şi
chiar etica în afaceri nu dau întotdeauna suficientă pregătire pentru gestionarea
companiilor în acest nou mediu.
Raportarea şi de auditarea Responsabilitatii sociale
Multe companii multinaţionale elaboreaza si publica rapoarte referitoare la
responsabilitate socială a companiei. Însa se constata ca abordările companiilor
referitoare la raportarea peformantelor sociale si de mediu sunt la fel de variate ca
abordările lor referitoare la responsabilitatea corporativa socială. Pentru ca aceste
rapoarte să fie utile, trebuie realizat un consens global referitor la tipul de
informaţii care urmează să fie publicate, la formatul de raportare şi la fiabilitatea
procedurii de evaluare şi de audit. Puţini dintre ei oferă detalii suficiente cu privire
la politicile lor şi performanţele legate de managementul resurselor umane şi
managementul mediului, cum ar fi recunoaşterea şi negociere, consultare şi
formarea personalului etc.
Astazi se constata din ce în ce mai multe iniţiative publice pentru sprijinirea
dezvoltării de raportare socială şi de mediu.
17
In acest sens, mai multe organizaţii au elaborat standarde pentru
contabilitatea, raportarea şi auditarea sociala si de mediu. Aceste standarde
urmăresc abordări variate de la standarde de procese pana la cele de performanţă,
de la standarde voluntare pana la cele obligatorii, de la o singură ediţie la standarde
pana la mai multe ediţii, şi doar un număr restrâns acoperă întregul spectru de
probleme de responsabilitate socială corporativă.
Iniţiativele majore internaţionale s-au axate pe globalizarea standardelor
sociale, transparenta publică a informaţiilor şi dezvoltarea de rapoarte sociale si de
mediu. In acest sens putem aminti Global Reporting Initiative. In ciuda acestor
iniţiative trebuie precizat ca având in vedere complexitatea creării unor standarde
globale aplicabile oricărei culturi şi ţari a creat o mulţime de controverse.
Referitor la componenta de mediu, Global Reporting Initiative este în prezent
văzută ca cele mai bune practici. Orientările prevăzute in Global Reporting
Initiative referitoarea la raportarea rezultatelor legate de dezvoltarea durabila a
companiilor permit astăzi o inter-comparabilitate. Global Reporting Initiative
include, de asemenea, orientări ambiţioasă de raportare socială.
Comunicarea Comisiei privind strategia de dezvoltare durabilă a recomandat
ca "Toate societăţile public-cotate cu cel puţin 500 de angajaţi sunt invitate să
publice în rapoartele lor anuale catre acţionari performanţele lor pe baza celor trei
criterii respectiv economice, sociale şi de mediu".
În plus, apare necesitatea de a oferi companiilor, şi în special IMM-urile,
orientări şi instrumente care să le permită să raporteze politicile, procesele şi
performanţa cu privire la responsabilitate socială corporativă în mod eficient. In
acest sens companiile mari trebuie sa ofere suportul necesar IMM-urilor, aceasta
atitutdine fiind una de tip castigator-castigator deoarece IMM-urile pot imbunatatii
performantele lor in domeniul responsabilitatii sociale, iar in calitatea lor de
18
participanti la lantul de aprovizionare a marilor companii contribuie la cresterea
performantelor acestora in acest domeniu.
Un alt aspect care trebuie mentionat se refera la credibilitatea informatiilor
publicate in raportarile companiilor legate de responsabilitatea corporativa sociala.
In acest sens verificarea de către terţe părţi independente a informaţiilor publicate
în rapoartele de responsabilitate socială este necesara pentru a evita criticile care
afirma că de fapt rapoartele sunt sisteme de relaţii publice fără substanţă. Într-
adevăr, astfel de servicii încep deja să fie oferite de o varietate de companii, care
desfasoara misiuni de certificare pe baza de standarde agreeate. Implicarea părţilor
interesate, inclusiv sindicate şi ONG-urile, ar putea îmbunătăţi calitatea de
verificare.
Etichetele eco si sociale
Sondaje au demonstrat că, consumatorii nu doresc numai produse de calitate
şi sigure, ci sunt interesati si daca acestea au fost produse într-o manieră social
responsabilă. Pentru majoritatea consumatorilor europeni angajamentul companiei
de a fi responsabililă social este important atunci când cumpără un produs sau
serviciu. Acest lucru creează oportunităţi interesante de piaţă, pentru ca un număr
semnificativ de consumatori spun ca ar fi foarte dispusi sa plateasca mai mult
pentru astfel de produse, deşi în prezent doar o minoritate procedeaza in aceasta
maniera.
Etichetele eco si sociale implică o garanţie că produsul sau serviciului a fost
aplicandus-e practicile specifice responsabilitatii sociale corporative. Spre
deosebire de etichetele referitoare la conţinutul si siguranta produselor, respectarea
practicilor responsabile social nu pot fi verificate prin testarea produsului în sine.
Pentru a fi credibile, aplicarea etichetelor sociale şi ecologice, presupune verificare
permanentă a locului de muncă si a proceselor de productie care se face pe baza
unor standarde convenite. O buna practica o constituie eticheta ecologică
19
europeană, care atesta performanţa de mediu pentru anumite produse. Numărul de
companii cu produse cu etichetă ecologică este în creştere rapidă.
Însa, numărul tot mai mare de sisteme de etichete sociale în Europa poate fi
dăunătoare pentru eficacitatea lor deoarece pot apărea confuzii în rândul
consumatorilor, datorate diversitatea de criteriile utilizate, care uneori intra chiar in
conflict, şi lipsa de claritate de sens a diferitelor etichete.
Investiţii Responsabile social si ecologic
În ultimii ani, investiţiile responsabile social au înregistrat o creştere puternică
în popularitate în rândul investitorilor. Politicile responsabile social şi ecologic
oferă investitorilor un bun indicator al bunei gestiuni interne şi externe. Ele
contribuie la minimizarea riscurilor, prin anticiparea şi prevenirea crizelor care pot
afecta reputaţia şi cauza diminuari dramatice ale preţurilor acţiunilor. Avand in
vedere cresterea tot mai accentuata de fonduri pentru investitii responsabile social
venita din partea companiilor, firmele de investiţii răspund prin alocarea de resurse
financiare in aceste companii.
Fondurile de investitii responsabile social investesc în companii care respectă
criteriile specifice sociale şi de mediu. Aceste companii trebuie sa manifeste o
atitidine proactiva privind aspectele sociale si de mediu. O altă opţiune importantă
pentru investitori este să se angajeze în mod activ in calitate de acţionari pentru a
induce in managementul companiei adoptarea de practici responsabile social.
Activismul acţionarilor este de aşteptat să crească odata cu importanţa problemelor
de guvernare corporativă cu care se confrunta companiile.
Investiţiile responsabile social constituie o piata emergenta cu multe agenţii
de monitorizare specializate (analişti nefinanciare), utilizând diferite instrumente si
metrici. Ca o consecinţă, companiile devin supraîncărcate cu cererile excesivă şi
divergente de informaţii. Datorita acestei situatii, o extindere viitoare a investiţiilor
responsabile social poate întâlni o aversiune tot mai mare şi lipsa de cooperare din
20
parte companiilor. O soluţie a acestei probleme poate veni din partea agenţiilor de
monitorizare importante care împreuna depun eforturi in direcţia standardizării
preliminare a raportării sociale. Există, totuşi, o nevoie de mai multă convergenţă
între indicatorii dezvoltaţi de către companii şi criteriile utilizate de analişti pentru
a evalua performanţa sociala şi de mediu unei companii. In plus, lipsa de
transparenţă în metodele de evaluare folosite de agenţiile de monitorizare poate de
asemenea împiedica, mari investitori sa realizeze investiţii social responsabile
semnificativ. Există, prin urmare, o nevoie suplimentară de standardizare,
armonizarea şi transparenţa în instrumentele şi metricile de monitorizare folosite
de agenţiile de monitorizare.
In cadrul proiectului autorităţile publice de la toate nivelurile, IMM-uri
precum si întreprinderile multinaţionale, parteneri sociali, ONG-urile si alte parti
interesate sunt invitate să-şi exprime opiniile cu privire la modul in care se poate
construi un parteneriat pentru dezvoltarea unei nou cadru de lucru pentru
promovarea responsabilităţii sociale a întreprinderilor, ţinând cont atât de
interesele mediului de afaceri cat şi a părţilor interesate. Întreprinderile trebuie să
lucreze împreună cu autorităţile publice pentru a găsi modalităţi inovatoare de
dezvoltare a responsabilităţii sociale corporative. Un astfel de parteneriat ar putea
avea o contribuţie semnificativă la realizarea obiectivului de a promova un model
de responsabilitate socială corporativă bazat pe valorile europene.
Propunerile referitoare la dezvoltarea noului cadru de lucru trebuie să se
bazeze pe caracterul voluntar al responsabilitatii sociale corporative şi să identifice
modul în care aceasta poate contribui la realizarea dezvoltării durabile şi la un mod
mai eficient de guvernare. Nivelul şi conţinutul unui astfel de cadru va fi clarificat
prin discuţii în timpul perioadei de consultare in activitatile viitoare ale proiectului.
Agenda discutiilor se va concentra pe urmatoarele directii:
21
Care sunt factorii cheie care determina companii să-şi asume responsabilitatea
lor socială?
Care sunt aşteptările generate de un astfel de angajament?
Pe care zone trebuie sa se focalizeze aceste angajamente?
Care este beneficiul pentru companii?
22
2. Teoria externalitătilor in abordarea Coasiana
În cartea sa “The Economics of Welfare” A. Pigou a dezvoltat conceptul de
externalitate, definit prin costurile impuse sau avantajele conferite altor agenţi
care nu au fost luaţi în considerare de către persoana care efectează acţiunea.
Tradiţia Pigouviană, criticată de Coase, este una în care există o parte
identificabilă, care generează un efect extern, si o altă parte identificabilă care este
afectată de efectul extern, oferind raţiunea pentru o intervenţie publică ca răspuns
la această externalitate negativa. In fapt, exista multe situaţii în care preţurile nu
ţine cont de efectele dăunătoare asupra mediului şi astfel preţul nu reflectă pe
deplin costurile de producţie a societăţii. Pentru a corecta această situaţie este în
mod evident necesar să se internalizeze externalităţile negative. Contribuţia lui
Pigou constă în faptul că el a propus internalizarea acestor efecte printr-o
intervenţie de natura economica, cum ar fi impunerea unei taxe de poluare a cărei
rata (în mod ideal) este egală cu costul marginal extern al poluării. O taxa
Pigouviana este o taxa perceputa pentru a corecta externalităţile negative ale unei
activităţi din piaţă si pentru a egala . Pornind de la aceasta abordare, politica de
mediu comunitară a introdus principiul "poluatorul plăteşte", care este menţionat
în Article174, alineatul 2, din Tratatul UE, şi care presupune ca toate costurile
pentru combaterea poluării şi a factorilor nocivi, în primul rând, să cadă în sarcina
poluatorului, respectiv, industriei poluante.
Mai mult decât atât, tradiţia Pigouviană se bazează pe presupunerea, oarecum
problematică, că regulatorul este capabil să discearnă forma şi nivelul de taxare
corect care are ca rol doar compensarea externalităţilor negative. Dacă autoritatea
de reglementare se înşeală cu privire la structura sau la nivelul costurilor sociale,
atunci ajustarea pieţei prin taxele Pigouviene este compromisă inducând ineficienţa
acestora. În ultimii ani, datorită problemelor din ce în ce mai grave generate de
23
poluare şi încălzirea globală, s-a constatat o revigorare a interesului pentru taxele
Pigouviene
Abordarea Pigouviană a fost unanim acceptată până în 1960, când Ronald
Coase a demonstrat că taxele şi subvenţiile nu sunt necesare în cazul în care
persoanele afectate de externalităţi şi persoanele care le generează pot cu uşurinţă
comunica şi negocia. Cu toate acestea, cei mai mulţi economişti încă pledează
pentru taxele Pigouviene ca fiind mult mai eficiente pentru reducerea poluării decât
standardele impuse de guvern.
În contrast fată de abordarea Pigouviană, cea Coasiană presupune că :
externalitatea este reciprocă, adică, atât poluatorul şi cât şi poluatul sunt
cauza aparitiei externalittilor;
normele juridice şi instituţiile ar trebui să se schimbe pentru a eficientiza
internalizarea externalităţilor;
factorii de decizie politică ar trebui să se concentreze asupra dinamicii
problemei de eliminare a externalităţiilor.
Prin încorporarea acestor aspecte în analiză, abordarea Coasiană poate ajunge
la politica optimală.
In ţările dezvoltate, ne aşteptăm ca presiunea politică şi socială cu privire la
reducerea poluării sa fie comunicată prin intermediul instituţiilor formale ale
statului şi a agenţiilor de reglementare. Însă, în ţările în curs de dezvoltare
reglementarea directă este destul de slabă, iar în aceste condiţii eforturile de
reducere a poluării în acestea ar putea avea elemente Coasiane semnificative
(reglementarea informală).
Lucrările lui Coase (1937,1960), au fost punctul de plecare în elaborarea
teoriei neo-instituţională, bazată pe analiza a costurilor de tranzacţie, drepturile
de proprietate, contracte, şi organizaţii. În abordarea neo-instituţională în
domeniul protecţiei mediului se porneşte de la premisa că guvernele acţionează ca
24
agenţi publici, în reglementarea poluării, utilizand diferitele instrumente de care
dispun. Cu toate acestea, atunci când mecanismele de reglementare formale sunt
absente sau ineficiente, comunităţile vor căuta alte mijloacele de a-şi impune
propriile exigenţe. Lucrări ştiinţifice recente au indicat existenţa pe scară largă a
unor astfel de "reglementari informale", comunităţile fiind adesea în măsură să
negocieze sau să impună presiune asupra poluatorilor în scopul de a-şi imbunătăţii
performanţele de mediu.
Mecanismele formale de reglementare includ cele două categorii de
instrumente şi anume : instrumentele de control şi comandă şi instrumentele de
piaţă. Reglementarea informală poate de asemenea, să ia mai multe forme,
respectiv cererile de despăgubire emise de către grupuri membre ale comunităţii;
manifestări de stradă; boicotarea firmei şi a produselor etc.
Există în mod clar o relaţie între conceptul de reglementare informala si
abordarea Coasiana a economiei de mediu. Ambele iau în considerare procesul
prin care externalităţilor sunt internalizate în absenţa agenţilor de reglementare şi
recunosc că externalitate poate fi reciproca atât poluatorul cat şi poluatul genereaza
externalitatea.
Cu toate acestea, soluţia tradiţională Coasian rămâne dependentă de un mediu
legal şi instituţional bine definit, chiar si atunci când agenţii de reglementare sunt
absenti. Rezultatele eficiente necesită existenta unui set de conditii cum ar fi
informaţii corecte despre problemele de poluare, delimitarea clară a drepturilor
de proprietate legate de mediu, şi instanţe care sunt capabile şi dispuse să pună în
aplicare acordurile legale.
Nu se pune la îndoială relevanţa acestor condiţii, în multe cazuri, dar punctul
nostru de vedere referitor la regulamentarea informala extinde interpretarea
Coasian în două moduri. În primul rând, presiunea comunităţii afectează în mod
clar comportamentul poluatorilor, chiar şi în cazul în care există puţine informaţii
25
corecte, nu exista niciun acord explicit cu privire la drepturile de proprietate de
mediu, şi nu exista niciun sistem judiciar capabil să se pronunţe pe aceste
probleme.
În al doilea rând, cercetarea noastră şi alte studii au sugerat că distincţia
conceptuală dintre aranjamentele Coasiene şi reglementarea tradiţională este
adesea neclară în practică. Autorităţile de reglementare trebuie să se confrunte cu
comportamentul strategic de poluatorilor şi sa renegocieze frecvent graficiele de
conformare şi sancţiunile. Presiune comunitatii poate afecta în mod semnificativ
aceste interacţiuni, creand de facto regulementari informale chiar şi în ţările în care
informaţiile sunt suficiente, reglementările oficiale sunt clar definite, şi sistemul
judiciar functioneaza eficient.
În cazul în care costul de negociere şi de obtinere a unei solutii reciproc
avantajoase este scăzut, teoria este aplicabila, controale instituţionale nefiind
necesare (Coase, 1960; Stigler, 1989). Cei care au dorinţa de a proteja mediul pot
negocia direct cu cei care il pun in pericol.
În cazul în care costul de negociere şi de obtinere a unei solutii reciproc
avantajoase este ridicat, solutia poate fi crearea unei singure structuri (firma) care
ar putea să preia controlul atât a resurselor cat şi a poluatorului potenţial pentru a
facilita un rezultat mai bun (Coase, 1937; 1960).
Când nici negocierea si nici firma de control ne sunt fezabile, atunci
guvernele pot oferi soluţii de reglementare la problemele de mediu. Cu toate
acestea, pentru multe dintre problemele de mediu, guvernele nu dispun de voinţa
sau autoritatea de a elabora o soluţie de reglementare. Poluare este un fenomen
care nu se opreşte la graniţele in care a autoritate de reglementare are jurisdicţie, o
mare parte a planetei noastre se află în afara apelor teritoriale ale oricărui popor, şi
atmosfera pământului este un bun comun tuturor. In ciuda faptului ca astăzi ne
confruntam cu o multitudine de problemele de mediu, trans-frontaliere şi globale,
26
existenta unor convenţii internaţionale care sa impună reguli stricte sunt mai
degrabă excepţia decât regula.
27
3. Abordarea Pigouviana vs. abordarea Coaesiana
Elaborarea politicilor de mediu este fundamentata pe doua teorii si anume
teoria Pigouviana si cea Coasiana.
Abordarea Pigouviana plaseaza responsabilitatea pentru externalitati exclusiv
pe generator (poluatorul) si ii impune acestuia o taxa in conformitate cu
prevederile legale. Determinarea nivelului optim al acesteia se bazeaza pe un set de
presupuneri de natura neoclasica. Cel mai important, lucru de retinut in abordarea
Pigouviana este ca aceasta nu considera externalitatile de natura reciproca si nici
nu analizeaza comportamentul de reducere a poluarii induse de fiscalitatea
Pigouviana
În contrast, abordare Coasiana presupune că externalitatea este reciproca
adica, atât poluatorul şi poluatul genereaza externalitatea, că normele juridice şi
instituţiile ar trebui să se schimba pentru a eficientiza internalizarea externalitatilor
si ca factorii de decizie politică ar trebui să se concentreze asupra dinamicii
problemei de eliminare a externalitatilor. Prin încorporarea acestor aspecte in
analiză, abordarea Coasiana poate ajunge la politica optima.
Avand in vedere faptul ca in tarile in dezvoltare, cazul Romaniei,
reglementarea directa este destul de slaba, atat din punct de vedere legal cat si
institutional, este de asteptat ca pentru elaborarea politicilor de mediu sa apeleze la
abordarea Coasiana care presupune aplicarea teoriei neo-instituţionala.
28
4. Formularea ipotezelor referitoare la factorii care determina companiile sa adopte un comportament responsabil fata de mediu
Adoptării responsabilităţii sociale presupune asumarea in mod voluntar de
angajamente care depăşesc cerinţele comune convenţionale şi de reglementare, pe
care ar trebui să le respecte în orice caz. In aceste conditii, companiile depun
eforturi pentru a ridica standardele de dezvoltare socială, protecţia mediului şi
respectarea drepturilor fundamentale şi sa adopte o guvernanta corporativa
deschisa, care presupune reconcilierea intereselor diverselor părţi interesate într-o
abordare globală de calitate şi durabila. Deşi se recunoaşte importanţa tuturor
aspectelor legate de responsabilitatea sociala corporativa, această cercetare se
concentrează în principal pe responsabilităţile companiilor in domeniul
protecţiei mediului
În cadrul companiei, practicile responsabile legate de mediu se referă în
principal la gestionarea resurselor naturale utilizate în producţie si la procesele
tehnologice generatoare de reziduri.
Problema referitoare la factorii care determina organizaţiile să adopte seturi
specifice ale practicilor de management este o tema centrală a teoriei
organizaţionale. Perspectiva instituţională sugerează că firmele obţin
legitimitatea prin conformarea cu practicile dominante în cadrul domeniul lor
instituţional (DiMaggio şi Powell, 1983; Scott, 1992). Cu toate acestea, perspectiva
instituţională, abia a început să abordeze un aspect fundamental în cercetarea din
domeniul managementului: de ce organizaţiile care actioneaza in cadrul aceluiaşi
domeniu instituţional şi astfel, se confruntă cu aceleaşi presiuni instituţionale
izomorfe, adopta diferite practici de management?
Unii cercetători au subliniat faptul că, chiar si organizaţiile care împărtăşesc
domenii comune instituţionale sunt adesea supuse la niveluri diferite de presiuni
29
instituţionale. Aceasta situaţie se poate datora pe de o parte faptului ca instituţiile
creaza presiuni diferite pe organizaţii, in funcţie de anumite criterii sau
organizaţiile resimt diferit aceeaşi presiune datorita propriilor lor caracteristici
Atunci când este integrata cu caracteristici cheie ale organizaţiei, teoria
instituţională poate genera noi perspective pentru a înţelege diferenţele dintre
strategiile firmelor. Având in vedere aceasta abordare, modelul de analiza pe care
il vom dezvolta se bazează pe ipoteza ca deşi organizaţiile care actioneaza in
cadrul aceluiaşi domeniu instituţional şi astfel, se confruntă cu aceleaşi presiuni
instituţionale izomorfe, interpretează diferit aceste presiuni datorita caracteristicilor
interne proprii legate de organizarea funcţionala si structura.
Procesele economice de bază sunt producţia şi de consumul; firmele
transforma resurselor naturale, prin intermediul procesului de producţie, în produse
de bază cerute de consumatori. Din punct de vedere fizic, această conversie nu este
niciodată perfect eficienta ceea ce presupune obtinerea de reziduri. Când rezidurile
nu au nici o valoare economică, atunci acestea pot fi considerate desuri, care pot
duce la poluare. Astfel, firmele impun un cost societatii iar aceste costuri nu sunt
complet compensate. Acesta este cazul tipic al unei externalităţii negative respectiv
costurile sunt "externe" pe piaţei. In aceste situaţii preţurile nu ţinut cont de
efectele daunatoare, ceea ce înseamnă că preţul nu a reuşit să compenseze
utilizarea mediului care este un bun al intregii societati. Pentru a corecta aceasta
formă de eşec a pieţei este în mod necesar sa se internalizeze externalitatile
negative, fapt care insa va genera o crestere a costurilor de productie. Se presupune
insa ca poluatorul ca agent economic urmareste maximizarea profitului ceea ce va
genera un comportament care sa urmareasca minimizarea costurilor de producţie.
Deoarece firmele au lipsa de motivare in internalizarea externalitatilor negative,
acestea sunt supuse unor factori mimetici, coercitivi si normativi care le afecteaza
deciziile (DiMagio and Powell 2004).
30
Izomorfismul coercitiv derivă din influenţa politică, autoritate şi probleme
de legitimitate. Acesta este rezultatul unor presiuni formale şi informale pentru a se
conforma, care sunt impuse organizaţiei de către alte organizaţii şi de cadrul
cultural (Powell & DiMaggio, 1983). Presiunea oficială includ statutul
guvernamentale, regulile şi regulamentarile, precum şi standarde ale agenţiilor de
acreditare, care sunt în general efectuate de către organizaţiile şi persoanele cu un
anumit nivel relevant de autoritatea.
Comportamentul mimetic apare în special în condiţii de incertitudine şi
ambiguitate. "Organizaţia model" poate ignora faptul că alţii o copiază iar imitarea
poate apărea în mod intenţionat sau neintenţionat. Acest comportament poate, de
exemplu, să fie rezultatul neaşteptat de transferul de personal de la o organizaţie la
alta, sau apare din cauza faptului ca personalul adopta intenţionat practicilor
descrise în literatura de specialitate sau ţine seama de sfaturile unui consultant.
Datorită dorinţei organizaţiilor de a fi perceput ca legitime în condiţii de
incertitudine, acestea au tendinţa de a se modela după modelul altor organizaţii
care sunt percepute a fi de succes şi mai legitime (Powell & DiMaggio, 1983).
Procesele normative se referă la procesele prin care o profesie urmăreşte să
menţină jurisdicţia asupra muncii, domeniilor de cunoaştere, şi a reproducerii de
acest fel. Trei aspecte ale acestor procese sunt esenţiale pentru schimbarea
izomorfa. În primul rând partajarea în comun a bazei de cunoştinţe a unei profesii.
In al doilea rând este crearea de reţele între profesionişti, care intersectează
organizaţiile şi este susţinută de către asociaţiile profesionale prin conferinţe,
buletine de ştiri şi publicaţii. În al treilea rând, este traseul carierei liderilor în
cadrul unei profesii. Traseul carierelor, tinde să fie oarecum omogenizat in cadrul
organizaţiilor şi în cadrul profesiilor.
Pentru a corecta eşecul piaţei, se impune intervenţia statului, în cadrul
acţiunilor private a firmelor. Statul, format din trei ramuri legislativ, judiciar,
31
precum şi autorităţile de reglementare, încearca să induca poluatorului să ia măsuri
sociale, care aparent nu sunt în interesul poluatorul, folosind două tipuri majore de
reglementare a mediului: “stimulente economice” şi “comandă şi control”. Insa
statul prin institutiile sale, în realitate, este supus presiunilor din ambele, atat a
cetăţenilor cat şi a poluatorilor. Astfel, reglementarea in domeniul mediului este
deosebit de sensibila la influenţa grupurilor de interese.
Determinarea nivelului "corect" de poluare, implică determinarea "daunelor
poluarii". In economia se obişnuieste să condenseze varietatea efectelor negative
ale poluarii într-o măsură unică, - disponibilitatea de a plăti pentru reducerea
poluării. În acest caz, oamenii isi manifesta dorinţa de a da ceva din resursele lor
pentru eliminarea poluării. Problema care apare se refera la cât de mult este
consumatorul dispus să plătească pentru pentru protectia mediului. Astfel,
veniturile şi standardele de viaţă devin o caracteristica importanta in aceasta
ecuatia determinarii nivelului de poluare.
De asemenea firmele, fac obiectul unor reglementari informale. Acestea pot fi
directe (presiunea directa asupra firmelor) sau indirecte (presiunea asupra
autorităţilor). În cazul în care regulamentarea formala este slaba sau percepută a fi
insuficienta de catre comunitate, acestea pot reglementa în mod informal firmele
indirect sau direct prin negociere, petiţionare şi activităţi de lobby.
Presiunea pietei poate proveni de la clienti, investitori şi firmele concurente.
Astfel acestia pot induce costuri suplimentare, de exemplu in cazul boicotului
consumatorilor, dar de asemenea, pot induce beneficii prin acceptarea in cadrul
unor retele comerciale ceea ce poate induce reducerea costurilor operaţionale, etc.
Strategiile firmei se bazeaza pe resursele şi capacităţile lor. Astfel,
caracteristicile fiecarei firme pot să influenţeze calitatea strategiilor de mediu alese.
Pornind de la analiza calitativa prezentata anterior se pot emite urmatoarele
ipoteze:
32
Ipoteza 1 – Statul prin cele trei ramuri legislativ, judiciar şi autorităţile
de reglementare influenteaza managementul companiilor in scopul
promovarii atat a Responsabilitati Sociale Corporative - aspectele referitoare
la protectia mediu denumita in cadrul raportului Responsabilitate
Corporativa de Mediu (RCM) cat si a Performantei Corporative de Mediu
(PCM).
Ipoteza 2 – Sistemul legislativ poate afecta activitatea autoritatilor de
reglementare in sensul diminuarii intensitatii presiunii institutionale, daca
raspund la activitatea de lobby desfasurata de managementul companiilor.
Ipoteza 3 - Sistemul legislativ poate afecta activitatea autoritatilor de
reglementare in sensul diminuarii/intensificarii presiunii institutionale ca
urmare a presiunilor venite din partea cetetenilor in calitatea lor de alegatori.
Ipoteza 4 – Managementul companiilor poate fi influentat cu privire la
promovarea/nepromovarea RCM si PCM de catre natura actionarilor
(straini/locali/privati/stat)
Ipoteza 5 - Managementul companiilor poate fi influentat cu privire la
promovarea/nepromovarea RCM si PCM de catre bunastarea consumatorilor
Ipoteza 6 - Managementul companiilor poate fi influentat cu privire la
promovarea/nepromovarea RCM si PCM de catre competitori
Ipoteza 7 - Managementul companiilor poate influenta comportamentul
proactiv fata de mediu al angajatilor proprii
Ipoteza 8 – Transpunerea acestor presiuni institutional in activitatea
economica depinde de caracteristicile functionale si structurale ale
organizatiilor
Ipoteza 9 – Autoritatile de reglementare pot influenta activitatea
economica a unei companii prin sistemul de amenzi pentru neconformitate
33
Ipoteza 10 - Autoritatile de reglementare pot influenta activitatea
economica a unei companii prin sistemul de taxe Pigouviene
Ipoteza 11 – Cetatenii prin boicot pot influenta pozitiv costurile de
neconformitate
Ipoteza 12 – Competitorii pot influenta pozitiv costurile de
neconformitate
Ipoteza 13 – Performanta economica este indirect proportional afectata
de costurile de neconformitate
Ipoteza 14 – Performantele de mediu scazute induc costuri variabile
mari, datorita utilizarii de tehnologii care consuma materii prime si produc si
reziduri mai multe, rata de conversie fiind mai mica
Ipoteza 15 – Performanta economica determina performanta de mediu
– ipoteza win-win
Ipoteza 16 – Performanta de mediu scade costurile de neconformitate
Ipoteza 17 – Performanta de mediu scad costurile variabile
Ipoteza 18 – Performanta de mediu scade poluarea
Ipoteza 19 – Performanta de mediu creste consumul produselor
fabricate
Pornind de la aceasta imagine de ansamblu putem concretiza relatiile
institutionale si efectele acestora in domeniul politicilor de mediu in figura
urmatoare.
34
Astăzi există o diversitate de soluţii ce pot fi aplicate pentru a asigura
implementarea politicilor de mediu. Astfel enumeram :
1. Reglementarea directa, prin stabilirea unor cerinţe legale sau prin
emiterea de licenţe, urmată de inspecţie şi măsuri coercitive;
2. Reglementarea indirectă, prin promovarea conformităţii prin intermediul
altor mijloace decat inspecţiiile şi măsurile coercitive, (de exemplu, prin difuzarea
de informaţii tehnice, prin publicarea sancţiunilor de neconformitate, oferirea de
stimulente economice şi de programe de educaţie, etc).
3. Auto-reglementarea, de corectare a comportamentului de către
comunitatea reglementată în sine, pentru că aceasta şi-a impus ca strategie acest
lucru.
Efectele politicilor de mediu sunt direct influentate de instrumentele de
implementare a acestora. Instrumentele de implementare a politicilor de mediu se
pot grupa astfel:
35
Commanda si control : Licenţele / permise; standardele de emisie;
standarde de proces; standarde de produs;
Instrumente Economice : Taxe; Impozite; permisele de emisii negociabile;
Subvenţiile de mediu; bonificatii pentru performanţă; Amenzi pentru
neconformare; preţurile resurselor
Răspunderea, Daune de compensare: norme stricte privind răspunderea;
fondurile de compensare; asigurare obligatorie pentru riscul de poluare;
responsabilitatea extinsa a producătorilor
Abordarea voluntara : Angajamente unilaterale; programe publice de
voluntariat; acorduri negociate
Educatia si informarea : Campanii de educaţie pentru publicul larg;
Difuzarea de informaţii tehnice; Publicitatea sancţiunilor aplicate pentru
nerespectarea normelor; Eticheta ecologica
Management si planificare : Sisteme de management de mediu ISO si
EMAS;
36
5. Studii empirice care abordeaza diverse aspecte al Reponsabilitatii Sociale Corporative
5.1 The pollution abatement decision in Romanian industrial sector (articol prezentat la conferinta internationala ECOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE IN A COMPETITVE ECONOMY 11-12 november 2010 si publicat in revista Quality-access to success, cotata CNCSIS B+, indexata in SCOPUS si EBSCO, ISSN 1582-2559)
THE POLLUTION ABATEMENT DECISION IN ROMANIAN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Prof. univ. dr. Ion STANCU
Academia de Studii Economice din Bucuresti E-mail: [email protected];
Lect. univ. dr. Robert Şova, Academia de Studii Economice din Bucuresti
E-mail: [email protected] Ec. dr. Anamaria Şova
Economic&Business Research Center E-mail: [email protected] Conf. univ. dr. Laurentiu Fratila
Academia de Studii Economice din Bucuresti E-mail: [email protected];
Ec. drd. Violeta Cimpoieru Economic&Business Research Center E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT Using a panel dataset, containing information from Romanian industrial sector, this paper analyse the determinants of the pollution abatement expenditure, in the context of transition economy. We consider information related to the pollution abatement expenditure at plant level, plant – specific characteristics, state and local regulatory stringency, market incentives and community characteristics. KEY WORDS: Pollution Abatement Expenditure, Manufacturing, Environmental Regulation, Market incentives, Community characteristics ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: This paper would not have been possible without the funding support from C.N.M.P. under contract no. 92-120
INTRODUCTION The basic economic processes are production and consumption; the firms transform natural resources, through the production process , into commodities demanded by the consumers. In physical terms, this conversion is never perfectly efficient: by-products (residuals) are produced.
37
When residual has no economic value then it can be thought of as waste which may lead to pollution. Thus, the firms impose a cost on other agent in society and these cost are not full compensated. This is the typical case of negative externality i.e. the cost are outside or “external” to the market. These were situations where prices did not take account of damaging effects, means that the price failed to regulate the use of the environment. The price does not reflect full production costs to society. To correct this from of market failure is necessarily to internalize the externality. Assume that the polluter is a profit-maximizing firm this behavior minimize the firm’s production cost. Thus, the firm in a unregulated system, will lack incentive to compensate the other agent in society because his welfare was affected. Thus, is a discrepancy between the private cost to the firm of dumping which approximates to zero, and the social cost to society which is positive and potentially large. Societal welfare is increased if this discrepancy is addressed by making the firm pay in same way for whatever pollution damage it is causing. To correct this market failure, involves the state intervention, in private actions of the firms. The state, consisting of three branches the legislature, the judiciary, and the regulators, try to induce a polluter to take socially desirable actions, which ostensibly are not in the best interest of the polluter, using the two major types of environmental regulation: economic incentives and command-and-control. Thus, the state intervention is necessarily to achieve the “right” level of pollution for society. But the states, in reality, receive pressures from both, citizens and polluters. Thus, environmental regulation is particularly susceptible to interest group influence. Determining the “right” amount of pollution also involve determining “damages from pollution”. Economics is accustomed to condensing the variety of the damage’s effects into a single measure – the willingness to pay to reduce pollution. If pollution is bad, people are willingness to give something oh their resources to eliminating pollution. The all environmental problems really involve a trade-off between using resources (money) for conventional goods and services and using those same resources for environmental protection i.e. how much is the consumer willing to pay for particular levels of an environmental good. Thus, income and living standard were important, not only because rich people to consume more and thus generate more pollution, but also because the environment is often take a backseat to other more pressing needs related to survival. Most generally the community characteristics can affect local environmental outcomes. The firms also perceive informal regulation. The informal regulation may be direct (directly pressure to the firms) or indirect (pressure to the authorities). Where formal regulation is weak or perceived to be insufficient the communities may informally regulate firms indirectly or directly through bargaining, petitioning and lobbying. Market pressure emanate from customer, investors and competing firms can induce costs e.g. consumers boycott but also benefits which might arise from green consumers choosing environmentally friendly products, reduced operational costs etc. The strategies of the firm are droved by their resources and capabilities. Thus, key plant-characteristics are also expected to influence the quality of environmental strategies choosing by the firms. By integrating theories of institutional and organizational dynamics we develop and test a model to explain the determinants of the Pollution Abatement Expenditure.
38
1. ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION Traditionally the business manager has held the goal of profit optimization foremost. This goal required him to make investment decisions concerning alternatives which were expected to have a positive cash inflow for his firm. Thus, his decision process was concerned with achieving an optimal trade-off between the cost of the investment and the cash or other tangible benefits of that investment among a group of investment alternatives. A serious omission in the decision process can now be seen. Social pressures and external regulations now require the manager to consider various investment alternatives which may not have a positive cash inflow and which may not optimize profit in the short run. One of these decisions, the pollution abatement decision, is the focus of inquiry for this paper. Romania, like other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, has made efforts of approximating its environmental legislation with the European Union. Thus it is probable that substantial and even fundamental changes will be required at the plant level as a result of this process. The compliance cost require that firms make efforts to adjust themselves to the norms and rules set in the regulation and so goes toward improving the environmental performance. These efforts are concretized in a two directions a capital expenditure and operating costs both associated with pollution abatement efforts. While the plants have a lack incentive to internalize the negative externality, these are subject of extern normative, coercive and mimetic factors that affect firms decisions (DiMagio and Powell 1983). This pressure can be moderate by plant-level characteristics and organizational structure as well as industry effects. While each has provided a piece of puzzle, is desirable to examine the external and internal pressure that drive plants to regulatory compliance and so, to improve their environment performance. The pollution abatement expenditure can be modeled by a parametric form, using a model of qualitative choice. The data used concern a one year period 2004, and cover a sample of 4661 plants located into the all regions of Romanian. In the framework of this article we develop an empirical model for the analysis of the determinants of the dependent variable, the plant decision to make pollution abatement expenditure. We estimate the decision by a variable proxy, the existence of the pollution abatement expenditure. In this case this variable can take two values. Therefore, the variable takes value 1 if the amount of pollution abatement expenditure is positive and it takes value 0 otherwise. The simplest statistical model to describe a binary variable is there the distribution of Bernoulli with P [y = 1] = p and P [y = 0] = 1 - p. Nevertheless it is possible that the chances of success differ between the individuals, and we are interested of modeling, in the spirit of the regression, the possible causes of these differences. Our approach will be to analyze each one within a framework general of the models of probability
39
parameters effects,relevant YProb occurs event Prob Fjj respectively
βxFxY , 1Prob
βxFxY , 1 0Prob The nonnegative discrete nature of the variable observed generates not linearity which makes the inappropriate usual linear models, because some basic assumptions like the normality and the homoscedasticity of the residuals or the adjustment linear of the data are not filled any more. The use of the linear regression with the nonnegative and discrete dependent variable will give inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). For the regression linear:
,xβxF , it results that
,ix iii yExy 1P x,
iβ measure the probability that an individual with characteristics xi will make the choice yi=1. The marginal effect of the explanatory variable j is equal to:
k ...., 3, 2,j , 1P jiji xy The binary response models can be derived from an underlying latent variable model that satisfies the classical linear model assumptions. Let y* be an unobserved, or latent variable, determined by
iji uy ,ijx0
*
Therefore, y is one if y* > 0, and y is zero if y* <= 0. We assume that ui is independent of xij and has the standard normal distribution. In either case, ui is symmetrically distributed about zero. Economists tend to favor the normality assumption for ui, which is why the Probit model is more popular than Logit in econometrics The Probit models are non-linaires and the parameters can be estimated by maximum of probability (maximum likelihood). Our binary qualitative model shows that plant decision to make the Pollution Abatement Expenditure is influenced by three variables categories formal regulation, plant-level characteristics and community characteristics. The Probit model permit to take the decision-making process into account and to examine the contribution of the various determinants to this
40
process. We found convenient to use 9 explanatory variables that characterize better the decision to make the Polution Abatement Expenditure :
Imob – plant capital size defined as amount of long-term assets, Solv – solvability is the ability of an entity to pay its debts with available cash. CA – plant activity size defined as turnover Emp – unemployement proxy for the population welfare Iso – ISO 14000 certification, proving environmental management adoption Mark – listing on Bucharest Stock Exchange proxy for the firm’s visibility Sect – dummy variable which take value 1 for the pollution sectors and 0 otherwise;
proxy for the regulatory pressure to adopt an environmental behavior Urb – percent of population in the urban area; proxy for population reactivity Tx – environmental taxes proxy for the economic incentives to adopt an environmental
behavior
The econometric specification used is the following: Deci=β0+β1*Imobi+β2*Solvi+β3*CAi+β4*Empi+β5*Isoi+β6*Marki+β7*Secti+β8*Urbi+β9*Txi+ui where: Deci represents plant decision to make the Pollution Abatement Expenditure and ui is the residual term. We first determine the qualitative influence of the explanatory variables (table 1, column 1) and then calculate the marginal effects (table 1, column 2). The numerical value of the estimated parameters reported in table 1, column 1 is not directly interpretable. The only really useful information is the sign of parameters that indicates whether the associated variable influences positively or negatively the dependent variable. To highlight the quantitative influence we carry out another estimate when the coefficients of the variables will show the level of influence of the decisions to make the Pollution Abatement Expenditure. It is important in practice to have an idea of the sensitivity of the probability of the event {y = 1} and {y = 0} compared to variations in the explanatory variables. This sensitivity is generally provided by calculation of the marginal effect. This is why we analyze the results of table 1, column 2 which reflect the marginal effect of the variables.
Table 1 Appendix
The results of the estimation indicate that all the variable coefficients have the expected signs but some variables are not statistically significant. The both community characteristics unemployment Emp and urban population Urb, and environmental taxes does not matter in the decision to make the Pollution Abatement Expenditure.
41
CONCLUSION Economic transition is a process of gradual adjustment from a non-market equilibrium to a market equilibrium. During the transition process, many variables such provision of public goods, willingness to pay, technology and capital markets and many other are in disequilibrium. The adjustment process creates both constraints and opportunities that may be unavailable to more “settled” economies. Ignoring them may lead to the misallocation of scarce resources in the provision of public goods, in pollution abatement, and in the financing of private environmental investments, or to a choice of inappropriate instruments for environmental management. Our results stress that the population’s potential for collective action in the environmental area is not significant. Also, there is not evidence that the economic incentives to adopt an environmental behavior raises the level of plant Pollution Abatement Expenditure. The most consistent results, were the indication that demands from regulators and plant characteristics are the most influential determinants in the adoption of the decision to raises the level of plant Pollution Abatement Expenditure.
REFERENCES Arora, Seema and Timothy N. Cason. “Do Community Characteristics Influence Environmental Outcomes? Evidence from the Toxic Release Inventory,” Southern Economic Journal, 65(4), 691- 716, April 1999. Becker, Randy A. “Air Pollution Abatement Costs under the Clean Air Act: Evidence from the PACE Survey,” Center for Economic Studies Discussion Paper, 01-12, November 2001. Becker, Randy A. and J. Vernon Henderson. “Effects of Air Quality Regulations on Polluting Industries,” Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), 379-421, April 2000. Cameron A. C., Trivedi P. K., „Regression Analysis of count data”, Cambridge University Press, 1998 DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW. „The iron cage revisited: institutioal isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields” American Sociological Review, no. 48, pp 147-160, 1983 Gray, Wayne B. and Ronald J. Shadbegian. “‘Optimal’ Pollution Abatement – Whose Kahn, Matthew E. “Particulate Pollution Trends in the United States,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 27(1), 87-107, February 1997. StataCorp. Stata Statistical Software: Release 7.0. College Station, TX: Stata Corporation, 2001. Wooldrige, J.H., “Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 3rd Edition”, Thomson South-Western, ISBN 0-324-28978-2.2005
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APPENDIX
Tabelul 1. Rezultatele estimarii (1) (2) Dec Dec Imob 0.000 0.001 (4.26)** (4.23)** Solv 0.556 0.521 (6.95)** (6.35)** CA 0.000 0.001 (2.96)** (2.66)** ISO 0.625 0.620 (4.88)** (4.56)** Mark 0.766 0.764 (13.55)** (12.95)** Sect 0.186 0.167 (3.61)** (3.41)** Tx 0.000 0.000 (0.73) (0.73) Emp -0.012 -0.011 (1.15) (1.12) Urb 0.073 0.073 (0.58) (0.57) Constant -2.441 -2.235 (13.02)** (12.85)** Observations 4661 4661 Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
43
5.2 Pigovian vs. Coasian Externality Theory - Framework for understanding Corporate social responsibility in Romania (articol acceptat spre publicarea in revista Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting, cotata ISI cu factor de impact, ISSN 1582-6163)
Pigovian vs. Coasian Externality Theory - Framework for Understanding Corporate social responsibility in Romania
Lect. univ. dr. Robert SOVA1, Prof. univ. dr. Ion STANCU2, Ec. drd. Anamaria SOVA3,
Christophe Rault44
Abstract
The aim of the present study is to shed some light on the framework for Understanding Environmental Policy in Romania, in contrast to the existing literature which mostly focuses on developed economies. Specifically, we use the Pigovian and Coasian Externality Theory. For the empirical analysis we use a survey data of the Romanian National Institute of Statistics and estimate Multilevel Regression Model (MRM) to investigate the determinants of environmental behaviour at plant level. Our results reveal some important differences vis-à-vis the developed countries, such as a less significant role for collective action and environmental taxes, which suggests some possible policy changes to achieve better environmental outcomes.
Keywords: Pollution Abatement Expenditure, Manufacturing, Environmental Regulation, Market incentives, Community characteristics
JEL Classification: Q52, C23 Aknowledgement: This paper was produced as part of the research project entitled “Corporate social responsibility; New incentives for improving Romanian Corporate Environmental Performance in EU context”, contract 92-120, funded by CNMP
1. Introduction
The basic economic processes are production and consumption; the firms transform natural resources, through the production process, into commodities demanded by the 1 Academy of Economic Studies of Bucharest 2 Academy of Economic Studies of Bucharest 3 Economic&Business Research Center 4 Economic&Business Research Center & LEO, University of Orléans
44
consumers. In physical terms, this conversion is never perfectly efficient: by-products (residuals) are produced. When residual has no economic value then it can be thought of as waste which may lead to pollution. Thus, the firms impose a cost on other agent in society and these cost are not full compensated. This is the typical case of negative externality i.e. the cost are outside or “external” to the market. These were situations where prices did not take account of damaging effects, means that the price failed to regulate the use of the environment. The price does not reflect full production costs to society. To correct this from of market failure is necessarily to internalize the externality. Assume that the polluter is a profit-maximizing firm this behavior minimize the firm’s production cost. Thus, the firm in a unregulated system, will lack incentive to compensate the other agent in society because his welfare was affected. Thus, is a discrepancy between the private cost to the firm of dumping which approximates to zero, and the social cost to society which is positive and potentially large. Societal welfare is increased if this discrepancy is addressed by making the firm pay in same way for whatever pollution damage it is causing.
To correct this market failure, involves the state intervention, in private actions of the firms. The state, consisting of three branches the legislature, the judiciary, and the regulators, try to induce a polluter to take socially desirable actions, which ostensibly are not in the best interest of the polluter, using the two major types of environmental regulation: economic incentives and command-and-control. Thus, the state intervention is necessarily to achieve the “right” level of pollution for society. But the states, in reality, receive pressures from both, citizens and polluters. Thus, environmental regulation is particularly susceptible to interest group influence.
While the plants have a lack incentive to internalize the negative externality, these are subject of extern normative, coercive and mimetic factors that affect firms decisions (DiMagio and Powell 1983). This pressure can be moderate by plant-level characteristics and organizational structure as well as industry effects. While each has provided a piece of puzzle, is desirable to examine the external and internal pressure that drive plants to regulatory compliance and so, to improve their environment performance.
Environment policy making is based on two theories, namely the Pigouvian and the Coaseian theory.
Pigouvian approach places responsibility for externalities solely on generator (the polluter) and impose a tax in accordance with legal provisions. This approach later became known as the "polluter pays ", and is mentioned in Article174, paragraph 2, of the EU Treaty enshrines in current policies, as operational, pigouvian paradigm. Determining the optimal level of taxes is based on a set of assumptions of neoclassical nature. Most importantly, the Pigouvian approach does not address the reciprocal nature of externalities.
In contrast, Coaseian approach implies that externalities is reciprocal, which mean that both polluter and pollutee generates externalities; that legal rules and institutions should change in order to better internalize externalities; and that policy decision-makers should focus on the dynamics of the problem of disposing the externality. By incorporating these aspects into the analysis, the Coaseian approach can reach the optimal policy
2. The formal regulation
The benefits of pollution control are usually widespread over the whole society. High transaction costs of assigning and securing property rights over most goods and environmental services make those suffering from harmful effects of pollution unable to seek full compensation
45
against emitters. This is the typical case of a negative externality, i.e. third party damages that market is not properly pricing.
If the benefits of pollution control, that is, the damages avoided, are lower than the respective private control costs, emitters will lack incentives to undertake it. So pollution control is a typical case of governmental intervention to correct a market failure. The classic paradigm for environmental policies is then based on the regulator (a principal) controlling private agents through regulation. Non-compliance with norms and rules dictated by the regulators is liable to sanctions.
The seminal work of Becker (1968) on general legal compliance stated that profit maximization would make agents equalize non-compliance and compliance costs at the margin. Compliance costs require that firms incur in expenditures to adjust themselves to the norms and rules set in the regulation. Firms also perceive compliance benefits when environmental performance is affected by market incentives, such as, reduced operational costs, increasing competitiveness in green-oriented markets or facilitated access to subsidies.
The public policy implications in the increase of firm’s environmental performance can be summarised in three-fold: Firstly, use policy instruments which increase incentives for firms to identify and act upon
environmental-commercial synergies. This includes economic instruments, but also performance-based standards. In addition to the short-run benefits, this can have long-run benefits since firms will adjust their responses (organisation structures, management systems, etc…) to regulatory pressures differently depending upon the nature of the instrument used. This may lead to better decision-making more generally.
Secondly, information-based tools can have an important role to play on both the demand-side and the supply-side. There are barriers to information for both firms and households, and such tools can help to amplify incentives for improved environmental performance, and foreshorten the responses of households and firms.
Thirdly, public authorities may have a role to play in explicitly influencing decision-making structures within the firm. This includes incentives for self-audits, environmental reporting, accounting procedures, etc. However, it is important to note that governments are not well-placed to dictate management systems within firms, and the implications of such policies should be examined closely.
It is clear that the policy framework must not only provide the right “external” incentives for the firm, but it also has a role to play in encouraging firms to recognise and act upon on environmental-commercial opportunities in a timely manner. The shift toward “softer” policy measures has been driven in large part by a desire to change decision-making processes within the firm with respect to environmental matters.
There are three broad sets of policy recommendations which emerge from our study. Firstly, and least controversially, regulators need to introduce policies which have the
effect of attaching value to the generation and use of environmental information within the firm. This has more to do with the nature of the instrument applied, than the stringency of the regulation per se. The concern, therefore is not with the magnitude of the external incentive itself, but rather with the effect that alternative (nominally equivalent) instruments have on the internal decision-making process within the firm.
Arguably, traditional environmental policy has done the opposite – attaching a low price to such information. For instance, technology-based standards give firms no incentive to “uncover” environmental-commercial synergies. Moreover, they may have also had the effect of
46
encouraging firms to have separate environmental health and safety departments which were concerned with compliance and with only weak links to the rest of the firm.
In one sense this is another argument in favour of market-based instruments – along with their benefits in terms of an efficient allocation of environmental effort across firms, and dynamic technological benefits. However, it is important to note that other instruments will also generate such effects. Indeed, any measure which gives firms flexibility in how it meets its environmental targets will do so. Thus, a performance-based standard will do so as well. This aspect of environmental policy design (its effects on the allocation of resources within a firm) has been largely ignored.
The effect that regulations have on decision-making procedures may, however, be the most important of the three criteria by which the efficiency of an instrument can be evaluated. While responsibility for abatement strategies had previously rested largely with environmental health and safety departments, in many cases this was transferred to financial vice presidents and other senior management figures once the tradable permit programme was introduced since the permit holdings were now financial assets and since the implications of the strategy adopted now extended well beyond mere compliance. Table 1: The incentive effects of alternative policy instruments
Improved Resource Allocation Within Firms
Improved Resource Allocation Across Firms
Improved Dynamic Technological Effects
Technology-Based Standard Negative Negative Negative Performance-Based Standard Positive Negative Somewhat Positive Market-Based Instrument Positive Positive Positive
Secondly, information-based tools have an important role to play in helping firms to realise commercial-environmental opportunities. For instance, many mandatory emission inventory schemes can help firms to differentiate themselves on environmental grounds in a credible manner. However, this is dependent upon the public availability of the data generated. In addition, some “voluntary” environmental programmes advertise membership in the programme on behalf of firms. Alternatively, public recognition for firms with environmental management systems can be considered. This may allow firms to differentiate their performance in a more credible manner. However, the potential for strategic behaviour must be assessed. Public authorities can also support information-sharing concerning environmental management practices amongst firms through networks and other related schemes. Gathering and disseminating information on "best practice" may overcome information cost barriers. This is thought to be particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises where access to information is often most restricted. On the demand side, eco-labelling and other related schemes can also help firms to realise commercial-environmental opportunities at the level of the product. More generally, as efforts to differentiate products on environmental grounds become more widespread, advertising law may have to be changed
Thirdly, and most controversially, public authorities can try to affect internal decision-making procedures within the firm more directly. As noted above, this is a very hazardous exercise and governments must enter into this area with some caution. However, it is clear that the basket of policy measures used by governments is increasing rapidly and, arguably, most of the new measures are concerned with internal decision-making processes within the firm. Examples include the following:
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Environmental management systems – by providing support (or incentives) for the development of environmental management systems, the government are seeking to improve environmental decision-making. This is the case in the EU, with the introduction of the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme.
Self-audit policies - the government use financial incentives, by lowering fines for non-compliance discovered through self-audits
Corporate Environmental Reporting –corporate environmental reporting is usually voluntary. In addition the Bucharest stock exchanges require corporate environmetal reports. However, it is widely felt that in order to be useful there is much room for improvement in this area, particularly with respect to the reform of corporate disclosure laws.
Personnel Incentives and Training – giving individuals within the firm the appropriate incentives to recognise and act upon environmental-commercial synergies is very important, but governments have little role in this area. However, by allowing for the possibility that individuals may be held responsible for environmental harms generated by companies, the government can influence personal incentives.
Accounting procedures – by encouraging firms to use accounting procedures which allow for the better integration of environmental costs and benefits with other aspects of the firms operations, it is hoped that firms will be better placed to recognise environmental-commercial synergies. This is not usually mandated by law, but is rather encouraged by various means such as disemmination of “best practice” guidelines. For instance, the EU has supported the Environmental Management Accounting Network. (See Welford 1999.)
Organisational structure – by seeking to affect the locus of responsibility for environmental matters within the firm the government are directly affecting organisational structure.
All of these programmes are efforts on the part of the policymaker to affect the workings of the firm. However, governments are cognisant of the fact that they are not best placed to dictate management strategies to firms. As such, this is usually done in a non-prescriptive and voluntary manner. Nonetheless, since these policies often entail the use of public financial resources and can (and should) have important consequences for firm behaviour they should be assessed and evaluated, as with any public policy.
3. The informal regulation Determining the “right” amount of pollution also involve determining “damages from
pollution”. Economics is accustomed to condensing the variety of the damage’s effects into a single measure – the willingness to pay to reduce pollution. If pollution is bad, people are willingness to give something of their resources to eliminating pollution. The all environmental problems really involve a trade-off between using resources (money) for conventional goods and services and using those same resources for environmental protection i.e. how much is the consumer willing to pay for particular levels of an environmental good. Thus, income and living standard were important, not only because rich people to consume more and thus generate more pollution, but also because the environment is often take a backseat to other more pressing needs related to survival. Most generally the community characteristics can affect local environmental outcomes.
The informal regulation may be direct (directly pressure to the firms) or indirect (pressure to the authorities). Where formal regulation is weak or perceived to be insufficient the
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communities may informally regulate firms indirectly or directly through bargaining, petitioning and lobbying.
Market pressure emanate from customer, investors and competing firms can induce costs e.g. consumers boycott but also benefits which might arise from green consumers choosing environmentally friendly products, reduced operational costs etc.
The strategies of the firm are droved by their resources and capabilities. Thus, key plant-characteristics are also expected to influence the quality of environmental strategies choosing by the firms.
By integrating theories of institutional and organizational dynamics we develop and test a model to explain the determinants of environmental behaviour at plant level.
4. Conceptual framework Based on the foregoing discussion, we can materialize Institutional Relations
and their effects on environmental policy in the following figure
Figure 1. Conceptual framework
5. ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION
In the framework of this article we develop an empirical model for the analysis of the determinants of environmental behaviour at plant level using multilevel model.
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In the statistics literature MRM is alternatively referred to as multilevel analysis, hierarchical models, random coefficients models, and variance components analysis. The common element of all of these methods is that the dependent variable is analysed as a function of predictors measured at the lowest level and of those measured at one or more higher levels.The rationale for using the multilevel model is based on the assumption that the variation in the dependent variable is a function of both lower-level and higher-level factors. This variation is not only a function of individual-level attributes, but also extra-individual factors. Besides, the relationship between lower-level and higher-level factors and the dependent variable is not assumed to be fixed or constant across space or time. Therefore, the regression coefficients in micro-level models are not fixed, and they can vary across these factors.
The econometric specification used is the following:
itit
itttititit
ititititit
uIsoEnvGuardEnvNGOUnEmpLogEnvSubEnvTxPollSect
MarkTurnoverDebtoductNCPM
1110
98765
43210
)log()log()()log()log()log()log()log()log(Pr)log(
where: NCPMit = pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t proxi for environmental behaviour at plant level Productit = plant productivity of plant i in year t Debtit = debt ratio of plant i in year t Turnoverit = turnover of plant i in year t Markit = listing on Bucharest Stock Exchange of plant i in year t Isoit = dummy variable with value=1 if plant i is certified ISO 14001 and 0 in other case UnEmpit = unemployment rate of county i in year t EnvNGOit = number of environmental non-governmental organizations of county i in year t PollSectit = dummy variable which takes value 1 if plant i becomes active in year t in pollution sectors and 0 otherwise EnvTxit = environmental taxes of plant i in year t EnvSubit = environmental subsidies of plant i in year t EnvGuardit = environmental penalties in county i in the year t uit – error term
The analysis has been carried out for Romania in the period 2002 – 2005. The data are taken from the yearly survey of plant pollution abatement effort conducted by the Romanian National Institute of Statistic which inquires about capital expenditures and operating cost associated with pollution abatement efforts.
The data consist of a panel of environmental and financial information at establishment-level and the community characteristics and regulation intensity data at the counties level for the period 2002-2005.
The econometric results from the model are reported in Table 1.
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Table 1. Estimation results
It can be seen that the signs of statistically significant variables are in general as expected. Theses results indicate that capital availability and, the large and successful firms a more
likely to adopt an environmental behavior and thus, to invest in environmental protection. The environmental incentives to adopt an environmental behavior respectively,
environmental taxes and subsidies, appears both empirically important and positively correlated with environmental behaviour but only environmental subsidies have a significant positive impact on the participation decision.
The influence of community groups, proxied by unemployment and number of environmental non-governmental organizations, has no statistically significant impact neither on plant decision to adopt an environmental behaviour. In general in the transition economies the concern for the environment is not a top priority of the community which is confronted with economical and financial problems.
The public authorities which are concerned with regulatory enforcement and monitoring are critical factor in positive influencing plant decision to undertake an environmental behavior and an increase of the environmental investments. Thus, environmental penalties have a statistically significant positive impact.
Market pressure emanated from consumer, investors and competing firms, estimated by the adoption of ISO 14001 and by the listing on Bucharest Stock Exchange has a significant positive influence.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has tested some hypotheses formulated in the environmental literature about plant environmental behaviour patterns at plant level. Its original contribution is to examine them using survey data in the case of a country such as Romania, which has undergone a process of
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economic and political transition and has been a EU member since 2007; also, we apply an appropriate econometric method, namely MRM.
Our results are generally consistent with the literature suggesting that plant characteristics, formal pressure through substantial regulatory actions and informal pressure through market incentives and community aspects may be important drivers of the level of plant environmental behaviour. However, unlike in the case of developed countries, we find that in Romania the population’s potential for collective action in the environmental area is not significant.
Whether the influence of these stakeholders on plant environmental behaviour will strengthen as Romania completes its development process remains to be seen. Also, there is no evidence that environmental taxes work as incentives to adopt an environmental behaviour at plant level. As expected, the actions of regulators (command and control and liability instruments), market pressure and plant characteristics are the most important determinants of the level of environmental behaviour.
These findings enable us to gain a better understanding of the factors increasing the plant environmental behaviour in the case of transition economies in general and Romania in particular.
They point to the need to redesign environmental taxes in order to achieve better outcomes. References Chan E S W, Wong S C K (2006) Motivations for ISO 14001 in the hotel industry. Tourism Management 27(3):481-492 Delmas M (2003) In search of ISO: an Institutional Perspective on the Adoption of International Management Standard. Standford Graduate School of Business Working Paper 1784 DiMaggio P J, Powell, W W (1983) The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review 48 (2):147-160. Ferraz C, Seroa da Motta R (2002) Regulação Mercado ou Pressão Social? Os Determinantes do Investimento Ambiental na Industria. Proceedings ANPEC- XXIX Encontro Nacional de Economia Salvador Greene WH (2002) Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall New Jersey Guler I, Guillen M F, MacPherson J M (2002) Global competition institutions and the diffusion of organizational practices: the international spread of the ISO 9000 quality certificates. Administrative Science Quarterly 47(2):207-232 Neumayer E, Perkins R (2004) What explains the uneven take-up of ISO 14001 at the global level? A panel-data analysis. Environment and Planning 36(5): 823-839 OECD (2001) The firm The environment and Public Policy Working Party on National Environmental Policy. ENV/EPOC/WPNET 31/FINAL Panayotou T, Schatzki T, Limvorapitak Q (1997) Differential industry response to formal and informal environmental regulations in newly industrializing economies: The case of Thailand Mimeo Harvard Institute for International Development Rivera J (2004) Institutional pressures and voluntary environmental behavior in developing countries: Evidence from the Costa Rican hotel industry. Society and Natural
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Resources 17(9):779-797 Rivera J, de Leon P (2004) Is greener whiter? Voluntary Environmental Performance of Western Ski Areas. Policy Studies Journal 32 (3): 417-437 Rivera J, de Leon P, Koerber C (2006) Is greener whiter yet? The sustainable slopes program after five years. Policy Studies Journal 34(2): 195-221 Sova R., Sova A.(2007) „Modeling international trade flows between CEEC and OECD countries” Applied Economics Letter, indexata in ISI - Thomson ISI Journal Citation Reports 2007, Volum 15 /2008, ISSN: 1350-4851 Seroa da Motta R (2006) Analyzing the environmental performance of the Brazilian industrial sector. Ecological Economics 57(2):269-281 Shin S (2005) The Role of the Government in Voluntary Environmental Protection Schemes: The Case of ISO 14001 in China. Issues & Studies 41(4): 141-173 Viadiu M F, Casadesús F M, Saizarbitoria M H (2006) ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 standards: An international diffusion model. International Journal of Operations and Production Management 26(1-2):141-165
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5.3 Corporate social responsibility and its Macroeconomic Implications (articol acceptat spre publicare in revista Review of International Comparative Management, cotata CNCSIS B+ si indexata in baza de date RePec, ISSN 1582-3458)
Corporate social responsibility and its Macroeconomic Implications
Lect. univ. dr. Robert SOVA5 Prof. univ. dr. Ion STANCU1,
Conf. univ. dr. Laurentiu FRATILA1, CS III. dr. Anamaria SOVA2
Abstract.
One of main concern of policy makers is pollution and hence the improvement of the environmental quality. The implementation of environment policies aims at improving life and product quality in order to replace those obtained by high polluting processes by less polluting ones. Countries having more strict environmental regulations are likely to suffer from a significant increase of their production costs. As a consequence these countries become less competitive on the international market and may lose their market share. In this context, an increasing attention was granted to the impact of environment policies on foreign trade. Our purpose in this paper is to investigate whether Corporate social responsibility introduced into Eastern European countries have led or not to a decline of exports towards the European Union (EU), and if so how much? This question is important since it is related to the preoccupation of EU new members to increase their exports and the quality of their products. Our econometric methodology based on recent developments of panel data techniques allow us to control for unobservable heterogeneity and hence to get robust empirical robust. Our results highlight a moderated impact of environmental regulations on foreign trade. Keywords: environmental regulations, trade policy, gravity equation, competitiveness JEL Classification : C23, F13, F15, Q28 Aknowledgement: This paper was produced as part of the research project entitled “Corporate social responsibility; New incentives for improving Romanian Corporate Environmental Performance in EU context”, contract 92-120, funded by CNMP
5. Academy of Economic Studies of Bucharest 2. Economic&Business Research Center
54
1. Introduction Corporate social responsibility is essentially a concept whereby companies decide to integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. Being socially responsible means not only fulfilling legislation concerning social rights or environmental standards, but also going beyond compliance and investing ‘more’ into human capital, the environment and the relations with stakeholders. Even if the prime responsibility of a company is generating profits these should nevertheless integrate corporate social responsibility as a strategic investment into their core business strategy, their management instruments and their operations. Moreover the business practices transparency due to the internet, the news media and the information revolution, means that for many companies, CSR, is no longer a luxury but a requirement. One of the factors that are driving this move towards corporate social responsibility is the increased concern from citizens, consumers, public authorities and investors in the context of globalization about the damage caused by economic activity to the environment. Even if in traditionally view, environmental protection has been considered to be “in the public interest” and external to private life, today the private sector becoming an active partner in environmental protection. An earlier emphasis on strict governmental regulations has ceded ground to corporate self-regulation and voluntary initiatives. As a result the environmental aspect of CSR is defined as the duty to cover the environmental implications of the company’s operations, products and facilities. Many governments and businesses are now realizing that implement and manage corporate environmental responsibility can increase competitiveness. In this paper we examine corporate social responsibility and investigate whether relatively strict environmental regulations introduced into Eastern European countries have led or not to a decline of competitiveness proxy by exports towards the European Union (EU), in the specifics conditions of Romanian economy as UE member country. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the main features of analyses of the environmental regulation impact on bilateral trade flows. Section 3 briefly recalls the theoretical foundations of the gravity model and the panel data methodology. Section 4 reports the empirical investigation as well as the econometric results. Section 5 finally concludes.
2. Theoretical background
The debate on the relationships between environmental regulation and competitiveness has a interesting topic of debate for long time. On the one hand, according to the classical assumption, if regulatory regimes are not able to design stringent and at same time efficient environmental regulation (e.g. historically strong emphasis on command-and-control regulation in many countries), it expected that the proportion of environmental costs to the production cost increase, and so the environmental regulations may have hardly effect on comparative advantage patterns and thus on commercial competitiveness. On the other hand the “soft” version of the “Porter hypothesis” argues that environmental progress, due the strict but efficient environmental regulations, can achieved without sacrificing competitiveness (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995).
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Furthermore, the “hard” version of this hypothesis emphasize that countries with forward-leaning environmental policies and programs, that suppose strict but efficient environmental regulations, actually will enhance their commercial competitiveness creating win-win situations. According to this hypothesis, strict environmental regulation (under the condition that it is efficient) triggers the discovery and introduction of cleaner technologies and environmental improvements, the innovation effect, making production processes and products more efficient. The cost savings that can be achieved are sufficient to overcompensate for both the compliance costs directly attributed to new regulations and the innovation costs. The pivotal issue at stake is whether domestic environmental regulation impairs the competitiveness of domestic industries, especially the pollution-intensive industries. The general conclusion emerging from the literature on this topic seems to be rather uniform. Initially, in their early comprehensive account of the empirical literature, Jaffe et al. (1995, p. 157) conclude that “… overall, there is relatively little evidence to support the hypothesis that environmental regulation has a large adverse effect on competitiveness..” Evidence from recent studies suggests this conclusion should be taken with care. Recent studies do occasionally find a negative correlation between trade and environmental stringency, although the findings do not seem to be particularly robust. Recent reviews therefore continue to be cautious: “… the costs imposed by tighter pollution regulation may not be a major determinant of trade patterns” (Copeland and Taylor, 2003, p. 220; see also Mulatu, Florax and Withagen 2003).
3. Econometric approach In the framework of this article we develop an empirical model for the analysis of the impact of formal and informal pressure on comparative advantage patterns and thus on foreign trade. We estimate this pressure by a proxy variable, the existence of important environmental pressure. In this case this variable can take two values. Therefore, the variable takes value 1 if the pressure is significant for the industry sector and it takes value 0 otherwise. It is commonly belief that the pollution-intensive industries of Romania it was the most concerned with the stringent environmental regulation. The empirical specification is inspired by the gravity framework, previously used in cross-country studies of trade in pollution-intensive activities. An advantage of the gravity model over the earlier standard factor endowment-based studies (e.g. Tobey (1990), is that it exploits the large amount of information contained in bilateral trade flows. It was first applied by van Beers and van den Bergh (1997) on a cross section of OECD countries. This initial approach has been extended in a number of directions, including the panel dimension (Harris et al (2001)), developing countries (Cagatay and Mihci (2003) and Grether and de Melo (2004)) the role of product differentiation (Jug and Mirza (2005)) or of regional free trade agreements (Kahn and Yoshino (2004)), while the endogeneity of environmental policy has been examined in Mantovani and Vancauteren (2005).
3. 1 The gravity model (overview)
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Inspired initially by the law of physics (Newton), the gravity model has become an essential tool in the simulations of international trade flows. The first applications were rather intuitive without substantial theoretical claims. These applications were the object of criticisms concerning the lack of robust theoretical foundations. Among the first studies which have used the gravity model in economic analysis we can note those by Beckerman (1956), Tinbergen (1962), Poyhonen (1963), and Linnemann (1966). Linnemann explains trade flows between countries i and j and then defines it as a combination of three basic factors: the offer of the exporter country i, the demand of the importer country j and the resistance of trade between countries i and j. The potential offer of the exporter is a positive function of the income level of the exporter country which can be interpreted as a proxy of available good varieties. The potential demand of the importer country also depends positively on the income level of the importer country. The resistance of trade was approximated by geographical distance between countries i and j (proxy for the transaction costs). Gravity models have received theoretical foundations due to the development of new international trade theories with imperfect competition. Helpman and Krugman (1985) propose a formalization of the gravity equation in which the intra-trade and inter-trade approaches are reconciled.
Bergstrand (1989) model represents an extension of Helpman and Krugman model, taking into account the offer and the demand functions in explaining trade flows. The model also includes a variable of income per capita representing the capital intensity of the exporter country and of the importer country, reflecting a relative factor endowment in terms of GDP per capita. For author, this variable is an indicator of demand sophistication. Thus, Bergstrand proposes the most complete version of the gravity model using for instance, variables like GDP, GDP per capita, distance, and monetary variables.
3.2. Econometric methodology Most studies estimating a gravity model were carried out on cross-section data6. Recently several papers have argued that standard cross-section methods lead to biased results because they do not control heterogeneous trading relationships. For instance, the impacts of historical, cultural and linguistic links in trade flows are difficult to observe and to quantify, the presence of minorities, or past memberships in a common trade area can also lead to biased estimates. Panel data regressions allow to correct such effects. The use of panel data is preferred in our analysis because it allows to control specific effects. The source of potential endogeneity bias in gravity model estimations is the unobserved individual heterogeneity. Matyas (1997) argues that the cross-section approach is affected by a problem of misspecification and consider that a correct econometric specification of gravity model is a “three – way” model with exporter, importer and time effects.
6 See Baldwin (1994), Gros and Gonciarz (1996), Wei and Frankel (1998), Sapir (2001)
57
Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) indicate that the omission of specific effects per country pair can bias the estimated coefficients. Thus, they propose “two-way” gravity model specification with time and country pairs effect when the countries are alternately importer or exporter i.e.αij ≠ αji. To control specific effects a solution is to use an estimator like in a fixed effect model (FEM) or in a random effect model (REM). However, fixed effect models (FEM) allow for unobserved or misspecified factors that simultaneously explain the trade volume between two countries and lead to unbiased and efficient results7. The choice of the method (FEM or REM) depends on two important things, its economic and econometric relevance. From an economic point of view there are unobservable time invariant random variables, difficult to be quantified, which may simultaneously influence some explanatory variables and trade volume. From an econometric point of view, in the gravity model explaining trade flows, the inclusion of fixed effects is preferable to random effects because the rejection of the null assumption of uncorrelation of the unobservable characteristics with some explanatory variables is less plausible (see Baier and Bergstrand 2005). Recently Plümper and Troeger (2004) have proposed a more efficient method called “the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD)” to accommodate time-invariant variables. Using Monte Carlo simulations they compared the performances of the FEVD method to some other existing techniques, such as the fixed effects, or random effects, or Hausman-Taylor method. Their results indicate that the most reliable technique is the FEVD if time-invariant variables and the other variables are correlated with specific effects, which is likely to be the case in our study. We now briefly present the panel data econometric methods used in our paper to estimate the possible various specifications of our models: within estimator (FEM), random effect estimator (REM), and fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD). 3.2.1. Within estimator and random estimator (FEM and REM) In the presence of correlation of the unobserved characteristics with some explanatory variables the random effect estimator leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters. To eliminate this correlation it is possible to use a traditional method called “within estimator or fixed effect estimator” which consists in transforming the data into deviations from individual means. In this case, even if a correlation between unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables exists, the within estimator may provide unbiased and consistent results. The fixed effect model can be written as
iti
K
kitkkit uxy
1
, t = 1, 2,…,T, k=1, 2,,K regressors, i=1, 2,,N individuals (2)
, where ái denotes individual effects fixed over time and uit is the disturbance terms.
)()(1
iitikitk
K
kkiit uuxxyy
(3)
7 See for instance Matyas 1997, Festoc 1997, Egger 2002, Peridy 2006, Cheng and Wall 2005, Baier and Bergstrand
(2005), Ghosh-Yamarick (2004), Carrère C. (2006), Rose (2000), Glick and Rose 2001.
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In the fixed effect transformation, the unobserved effect, ái, disappears and may lead to unbiased and consistent results. The random model has the same form as before,
Yit = â0 + â1xit1 + â2xit2 …………….. +âkxitk + ái + uit (4) , where an intercept is included so that the unobserved effect, ái, has a zero mean. Equation becomes a random effect model when we assume that the unobserved effect ái is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable:
Cov(xitk, ái) = 0, t = 1,2,…, T; j =1,2,…, k. (5) The hypothesis mentioned above is actually less plausible and the GLS estimator may lead to biased results. The Hausman (chi2) test consists in testing the null hypothesis of no correlation between unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables and allows us to make a choice between random estimator and within estimator. The within estimator has however two important limits:
- it may not estimate the time invariant variables that are eliminated by data transformation;
- the fixed effect estimator ignores variations across individuals. The individual’s specificities can be correlated or not with the explanatory variable. In traditional methods these correlated variables are replaced with instrumental variables uncorrelated to unobservable characteristics.
3.2.2. Fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD)
Plümper and. Troeger (2004) suggests an alternative to the estimation of time-invariant individual variables in the presence of unit effects. The alternative is a developed model discussed in Hsiao (2003: 52). It is known that unit fixed effects are a vector of the mean effect of omitted variables, including the effect of time-invariant variables. So, the unit effects of the FEM contain the vector of time-invariant variables. It is therefore possible to regress the unit effects on the time-invariant variables to obtain approximate estimates for invariant variables. Plümper uses a three stage estimator, where the second stage only aims at the identification of the unobserved parts of the unit effects, and then uses the unexplained part to obtain unbiased POLS estimates of the time-varying and time-invariant variables only at third stage. The unit effect vector is broken into two parts; a part explained by time-invariant variables and an error-term. The model proposed by Plümper and Troeger leads to unbiased and consistent estimates of the effect of time-varying variable and unbiased for time-invariant variables if the unexplained part of unit effects is uncorrelated with time-invariant variables. The estimates of time-invariant variables are consistent only if N is large. With N being small, the evaluation of stage 2 is inconsistent. This model adopts the robustness of fixed effect model and allows for the correlation between the time-variant explanatory variables with variables and unobserved
59
individual effects. In brief, the technique fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD) proposed by Plümper and Troeger can be summarized by the three following steps: estimation of the unit fixed effects by the FEM excluding the time – invariant
explanatory variables; regression of the fixed effect vector on the time-invariant variables of the original model
(by OLS); estimation of a pooled OLS (POLS) model by including all time-variant explanatory
variables, time-invariant variables and the unexplained part of the fixed effect vector. This stage is required to control the multicolinearity and to adjust the degrees of freedom. At least in theory this method has three obvious advantages (Plümper and Troeger, 2004):
a) the fixed effect vector decomposition does not require prior knowledge of the correlation between time-variant explanatory variables and unit specific effects,
b) the estimator relies on the robustness of the within-transformation and does not need to meet the orthogonality assumptions (for time-variant variables) of random effects,
c) FEVD estimator maintains the efficiency of OLS. The FEVD is not a perfect estimator, but one of the best available. It produces unbiased estimates of time-varying variables regardless whether they are correlated with unit effects or not and unbiased estimates of time-invariant variables that are not correlated. The estimated coefficients of the time-invariable variables correlated with unit effects, however, suffer from omitted variable bias. To summarize, the FEVD produces less biased and more efficient coefficients. The main advantages of the FEVD come from its lack of bias in estimating the coefficients of time-variant variables that are correlated with unit-effects. 4. Model specification We carry out several panel data estimations in order to compare the results across specifications and to identify the most robust one. We first make a test for individual effects and if this confirms their presence, then to control the individual effects we carry out an REM and FEM estimate. To eliminate the unobservable heterogeneity due to bilateral specific effects and avoid the potential bias of the estimators taking the invariant time variables into account it is advisable to use FEVD estimator. Hausman test indicates by the value of chi2 whether the specific effects are correlated or not with the explanatory variables. The specification retained here to characterize the trade between Romania and EU-15 countries can be written as follows:
ijtijis eeeTchrDistGDPGDPeX uPolaaijt
aij
ajt
ait
aijst
543210 (12)
where : Xijst denotes the export of country i (Romania) from industry sector s to country j at time t
with i # j (CHELEM – CEPII French data base); GDPit, GDPjt represents the Gross Domestic Product of country i and country j
(CHELEM CEPII – data base) Distij represents the distance between two countries, (CEPII data base); Tchrijt is the real exchange rate which indicates the competitiveness of price;
60
jt
itijtijt P
PTcnTchr (14)
where: Tcnijt is the real exchange rate (CHELEM CEPII data base) Pi(j) is consumer price index (WORLD BANK – World Tables) Polis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the industry sector is pollutant and so it was a
stringent environmental regulation as a consequence of Corporate social responsibility adoption and 0 otherwise;
ao is the intercept; uij individual effect; εijt is the error term.
After log linearization equation (14) becomes: Ln(Xijst) = a0 +a1ln(GDPit) +a2ln(GDPjt) +a3ln(Distij) +a4ln(Tchrijt) +a5Polis +uij+ εijt (15)
The expected signs for the estimators associated with the variables are based on traditional arguments. Theoretically, we expect a positive effect of the variables like the country size, and a negative impact of the geographical distance and of the real exchange rate and environmental regulation. The more the real exchange rate index drops the more there is a depreciation of the exporter currency with respect to the currency of his partner and export competitiveness is improved. Geographical distance has always theoretically a negative impact being a proxy of transactional cost.
Our estimates are organized in a panel with Romania as exporter, EU-15 countries8 as importers and 19 sectors (NC – combined nomenclature) and cover a 7 year period (from 1998 to 2004). The results of FEM, REM, FEVD estimations are reported in table n0.1 that summarizes the results of our estimations for the whole sample.
THE ESTIMATION RESULTS Table no : 1
FEM REM FEVD (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Xij Xij xij 2.490 1.545 2.490 GDPjt
(3.98)** (11.16)** (92.38)*** 3.507 3.569 3.507 GDPit
(8.06)** (12.31)** (12.64)*** -1.190 -0.016 -1.190 TCHRijt
(3.34)** (0.10) (33.20)*** 0.000 -1.969 -1.643 DISTij
(0.00)** (5.52)** (27.58)*** 0.000 -0.109 -0.153 POLis
(0.00)** (0.90) (-7.60)*** Constant -28.284 -17.304 -22.945 8 Belgium and Luxembourg are treated together.
61
(11.78)** (8.91)** (-15.82)*** - - 1.000 Residuals - - (91.99)***
R-squared 0.15 0.34 0.91 Observations9 1728 1728 1728 Test for presence fixed effect Prob>F
33.25 (0.00)
- -
Hausman - 17.33 (0.00)
-
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level The FEM estimator indicates the presence of individual effects. It is an unbiased estimator but it is not appropriated for our analyse because the interest variable POL is time invariant variable and so it was excluded from the estimation. On the other hand REM estimator is biased due of the correlation between the individual effect and the explanatory variables (Hausman test reject the null hypothesis Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic). In this case the FEVD is the most appropriated estimator for our analyses.
5. CONCLUSIONS This paper studied the possible impact of environmental policy as a consequence of Corporate social responsibility adoption on Romanian international competitiveness and thus on the export flows. The stringency of environmental regulations was approximated by a dummy variable which take value 1 if the pressure is significant for the industry sector and it takes value 0 otherwise. It is commonly belief that the pollution-intensive industries of Romania it was the most concerned with the stringent environmental regulation. The use of panel econometric method in empirical analysis of trade flows is convenient because it permits for controlling the individual heterogeneity to avoid biased results. As it is known, the time-series and cross-section, not controlling for heterogeneity, run the risk of obtaining biased results10. Furthermore, the fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator allows us to obtain the unbiased, consistent and efficient results. The results suggest that traditional variables of the gravity model confirm the expected results. Thus, we obtain a positive significant effect of the country size variables (attraction factors), and a negative significant impact of the geographical distance and of the real exchange rate (resistance factors). With regard to the environmental costs due the stringent environmental regulation we obtain a negative significant impact on the Romanian comparative advantage patterns and so on the export flows. The negative sign for the environmental regulation variable indicate that the Porter hypothesis is not confirmed in Romanian case. That can be explained by the relatively short period of the
9 Only 1728 observations are available from 1862 (19 sectors x 14 countries x 7 years) 10 Badi H. Baltagi (2001)
62
analyses only seven years and also by the fact that the analyses period coincide with massive industries reorganization due the economic transition period.
References
[1] Baier, L.S., Bergstrand, J.H, “Do Free Trade Agreements Actually increase Members' International Trade?”, FRB of Atlanta Working Paper No. 2005-3., 2005 [2] Baltagi B.H., “Econometric Analysis of Panel Data”, John Wiley & Sons Ltd,New York, 2nd edition.,2001 [3] Beers, C. v., and Bergh, J. van den (1997). An empirical multi-country analysis of the impact of environmental regulation on foreign trade flows. Kyklos, 50, 29–46. [4] Çagatay, S., and H. Mihçi,. “Industrial Pollution, Environmental Suffering and Policy Measures: An Index of Environmental Sensitivity Performance (IESP)”, International Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management, Vol. 5 (2). 2003 [5] Carrere C.,“Revisiting the Effects of Regional Trading Agreements on Trade Flows with Proper Specification of Gravity Model”, European Economic Review vol. 50, 223-247, 2006 [6] Cheng I.-H.,Wall, H. Controlling for heterogeneity in gravity models of trade and integration, Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis Review 87, 49-63., 2005 [7] Copeland, B., and Taylor, S. (2003). International Trade and the Environment: Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [8] DiMagio and Powwell “Environmental Management Accounting: Informational and Institutional Developments”, Springer Netherlands,2004 [9] Egger P., “A note on the Proper Econometric Specification of the Gravity Equation”, Economics Letters, Vol. 66, pp.25-31,2000 [10] Egger, P., and Pfaffermayr, M., “Structural Funds, EU Enlargement, and the Redistribution of FDI in Europe “,WIFO Working Papers, Nr. 195, 2003. [11] Festoc F., “Le potentiel de croissance du commerce des pays d’Europe Centrale et Orientale avec la France et ses principaux partenaires”, Economie et Prévision.,n°218,1997 [12] Ghosh S., Yamarik S., “Are Regional Trading Arrangements Trade Creating?: An Aplication of Extreme Bounds Analysis.”, Journal of International Economics 63, no.2: 369-395., July 2004 [13] Greene, W. (2000). Econometric Analysis (fourth ed.). Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall International. [14] Grether, J.-M. et J. de Melo, "Globalization and Dirty Industries: Do Pollution Havens Matter?", in R. Baldwin and A. Winters eds,2004 [15] Harris, M., Kònyà, L., and Màtyàs, L. (2002). Modeling the impact of environmental regulation on bilateral trade flows: OECD, 1990–1996. The World Economy, 25,387–405. [16] Helpman, E. and Krugman, P., “Market Structure and Foreign Trade. Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition, and the International Economy”, Cambridge MA/ London: MIT Pres. 1985. [17] Jug J. and Daniel Mirza : " Environmental Regulations and Trade in Europe: the Role of Differentiation" ", World Economy, Volume 28 (11) ,2005 [18] Kahn, M. and Yoshino, Y. (2004). Testing for pollution havens inside and outside of regional trading blocs. Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, 4, no. 2, Article 4. http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol4/iss2/art4
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[19] Linnemann, H., “An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows”, North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1966.
[20] Mantovani A. & M. Vancauteren, “The Harmonization of Technical Barriers to Trade, Innovation and Export Behavior: Theory with an application to EU Environmental”, Data Working Paper, 480, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna,2005
[21] Matyas, L., “Proper Econometric Specification of the Gravity Model”, The World Economie, 20 (3), 363-368, 1997 [22] Mulatu, A., Florax, R., and Withagen, C. (2003). Environmental regulation and competitiveness: an exploratory meta-analysis. In C. Boehringer and A. Loeschel (eds.), Empirical Modeling of the Economy and the Environment (ZEW Economic Studies). Heidelberg: Physica Verlag (20, 23–54). [23] Péridy. N., « La nouvelle politique de voisinage de l’Union européenne,ne estimation des potentiels de commerce’,Revue économique ,4 (Vol. 57)| ISSN 0035-2764 | ISSN numérique : en cours | ISBN : 2-7246-3037-8 | page 727 à 746, 2006 [24] Plumper, T. and V. Troeger (2004), “The Estimation of Time-Invariant Variables in Panel Analysis with Unit Fixed Effects,” Konstanz University, mimeo [25] Porter, M.E. and C. van der Linde (1995), “Towards a New Conception of the Environment- Competitiveness Relationship”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 97-118. [26] Rault C., Şova A., Şova R., „The Role of Association Agreements within European Union Enlargement to Central and Eastern European Countries” IZA Discussion Papers , Bonn, Germania, Nr. 2769/2007 [27] Rose, Andrew K. “One Money One Market,” Economic Policy 15-30, 7-46, 2000. [28] Tinbergen, J. (1962), Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York. [29] Tobey, J. (1990), “The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies and Patterns of World Trade: An Empirical Test”, Kyklos, 43, 191-209. [30] William H. Greene, “Econometric Analysis” Fifth Edition, Pearson Education, 2002 [31] Sova A., Sova, R., “Le commerce international dans les conditions de l’intégration européenne », Romanian Statistical Review, No 12. p.79-86, 2006 [32] Tobey, J. (1990). The impact of domestic environmental policy on international trade: an empirical test. Kyklos, 43, 191–209. [33] Wooldrige, J.H., “Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data 2rd Edition”: Books: The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, 2002.
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5.4 Determinants of Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure in Romania: A Multilevel Analysis (articol publicat on-line in CeSifo Working Papers, urmeaza sa fie publicat in format hartie in Working Papers Series, indexate RePEC ISSN 1617-9595)
Determinants of Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure in Romania: A Multilevel Analysis
Guglielmo Maria Caporale Christophe Rault
Robert Sova Anamaria Sova
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3255 CATEGORY 9: RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENT
ECONOMICS NOVEMBER 2010
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the RePEc website: www.RePEc.org • from the CESifo website: www.CESifo-group.org/wp
65
CESifo Working Paper No. 3255
Determinants of Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure in Romania: A Multilevel Analysis
Abstract
The transition process in Central and Eastern Europe was associated with growing environmental awareness. This paper analyses the determinants of Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure (PACE) at plant level in the case of Romania using survey data and a Multilevel Regression Model (MRM). Our findings suggest that, although Romania has improved its environmental performance, formal and informal regulation are still only partially developed due to the difficulties of economic transition, and heterogeneity across regions remains considerable.
JEL-Code: Q52, C29, C40.
Keywords: Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure, transition economy, Multilevel Regression Model (MRM).
Guglielmo Maria Caporale Centre for Empirical Finance
Brunel University London UK – West London UB8 3PH
United Kingdom [email protected]
Christophe Rault LEO / CNRS UMR 6221
University of Orleans Rue de Blois-B.P.6739
France – 45067 Orléans Cedex 2 [email protected]
Robert Sova
Academy of Economic Studies and Center of Economics Studies Paris 1
Sorbonne University 106-112 bd. de L’Hôpital
France – 75647 Paris Cedex 13 [email protected]
Anamaria Sova Economic&Business Research Center Center of Economics Studies Paris 1
Sorbonne University 106-112 bd. de L’Hôpital
France – 75647 Paris Cedex 13 [email protected]
This paper has been realised within the project 92-120 (CNMP). The authors are in alphabetic order.
66
1. Introduction
Global environmental issues have acquired crucial importance in recent years.
Pollution is responsible for decreased overall biodiversity, and the alteration of geographical
landscapes and climatic patterns, with a negative impact on the global economy. This
represents a significant challenge for policy-makers.
Romania, like other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), has been making
several efforts to comply with the environmental legislation of the European Union (EU). Its
heavy mineral and petrochemical industries being highly polluting, a new environmental law
framework was adopted in 1995 in order to achieve the transition to an environmentally
sustainable market economy. The new laws introduced a number of policy instruments,
including environmental permits, charges, subsidies, legal liabilities and other economic
incentives. Compliance has required firms to implement substantial changes at plant level. In
particular, pollution abatement efforts have had an impact on both capital expenditure and
operating costs.
Early in the transition process, Romania and the other CEE countries experienced a
decline in industrial production and a consequent decrease in pollution levels. In subsequent
stages, higher economic growth may lead to higher pollution, unless concerted action is taken
to implement more effective environmental policies. Unfortunately, environmental efforts in
Romania face the twin obstacles of severe budgetary constraints and a legacy of poor practice
in investment and project management. In this context, innovative and effective financing
strategies for environmental protection need to be developed or strengthened, and steps must
be taken to ensure that scarce financial resources are allocated efficiently to address priority
issues.
The aim of the present study is to shed some light on the factors affecting Pollution
Abatement and Control Expenditure (PACE) in Romania. Its contribution is threefold: first, it
analyses the case of a transition economy, in contrast to the existing literature which mostly
focuses on developed economies; second, it uses a database at plant level; third, it adopts a
suitable econometric method, i.e. the Multilevel Regression Model (MRM), to investigate the
determinants of environmental behaviour at plant level.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the
relevant literature on environmental performance. Section 3 reviews the theory of
environmental regulation focusing on the Pigouvian and Coasian approaches. Section 4
outlines the econometric framework and presents the empirical findings. Section 5 offers
some concluding remarks.
67
2. Literature Review
The basic economic processes are production and consumption: firms transform natural
resources, through the production process, into commodities supplied to consumers. However,
this conversion is never perfectly efficient: by-products (residuals) are produced. When such
residuals have no economic value they can be thought of as waste, which may lead to
pollution.
Thus, firms impose costs on other agents in the economy. This is a typical case of a
negative externality. As prices do not take into account the negative effects on the
environment, they do not reflect full production costs for the economy; to correct this form of
market failure it is necessary to introduce environmental regulations, as otherwise there is no
incentive for a polluting profit-maximising firm to internalise the externality (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983). When formal regulation is weak or perceived to be insufficient, communities
may informally regulate firms indirectly or directly through bargaining, petitioning and
lobbying. Clearly, determining the “right” amount of pollution requires evaluating its negative
effects - the willingness to pay to reduce pollution is an obvious measure. Environmental
issues invariably involve a trade-off between using resources for conventional goods and
services or for environmental protection instead - i.e. how much is a consumer willing to pay
for a particular level of an environmental good?
Since the Brundtland Report was published in 1987 as a result of the work of the
World Commission on Environment and Development, extensive research has been done by
economists on how to improve environmental performance through pollution abatement, in
some cases using capital expenditure as a proxy for environmental performance (Panayotou et
al., 1997; Ferraz and Seroa da Motta, 2002; OECD, 2001). Pollution abatement and control of
residuals from production processes can be achieved either using end-of-pipe technology
attached to a given production process, or by changing the process. Investment in the former
does not affect the production process itself, and the amount of pollution generated; instead, it
aims to treat pollution already generated. By contrast, investment in integrated technologies is
synonymous with reducing the amount of potential pollutants at source, reducing the
consumption of resources and energy, and recycling residues and used products.
Some research has analysed specific external factors that drive companies to improve
their environmental performance, such as regulatory regime or government support (Delmas,
2003; Chan and Wong, 2006; Rivera, 2004; Rivera and de Leon, 2004; Rivera et al., 2006;
Shin, 2005), pressure from local wealthy stakeholders, civil society, and foreign customers in
Europe and Japan (Neumayer and Perkins, 2004) and industry pressure (Guler et al., 2002;
68
Corbett and Kirsch, 2004; Viadiu et al., 2006). Other research has focused on the role of
internal organisational factors such as “organisational structure and culture.” Only a few
studies have begun integrating key organisational characteristics with institutional theory.
This approach can yield new insights into understanding differences between firms’
strategies. (Seroa da Motta, 2006; Gunningham, 1995; Hoffman, 2001).
Some other studies have analysed the implications of corruption and political
instability for firm investment in abatement technology. Their prediction is that greater
corruptibility increases the level of abatement technology investment. The strategic incentive
to under-invest in pollution control technology declines when policymakers become more
corruptible. Similarly, political instability is predicted to increase abatement technology
investment (Fredriksson et al., 2008). Fredriksson et al. (2005) analyse the relationship
between environmental lobbies and environmental policy in rich and developing countries,
and find that lobbying leads to more stringent environmental policies.
Chávez and Stranlund (2009) show that setting a uniform tax equal to the expected
marginal damage is not generally efficient under incomplete information about firms’
abatement costs and damages from pollution. The efficient emissions tax rates will vary
across firms if a regulator can use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some
information about how the firms’ marginal abatement costs vary.
A few more recent studies concerning the relationship between enforcement
mechanism and firm’s compliance behaviour highlight the fact that an increase in
enforcement efforts may provide better environmental results (Shimshack and Ward, 2008).
Even in an industry where compliance is generally high, an increase in enforcement through
fines can cause a significant reduction in discharges. Enforcement not only induces non-
compliant plants to become compliant, it also makes many typically over-compliant plants
reduce discharges even further below the permitted levels.
Almost all these empirical studies focus on the developed countries. Additional
challenges are faced by the developing economies, including the CEE countries such as
Romania, which underwent a transition process. Under central planning, the well-known bias
towards heavy industry combined with a lack of incentives to economise on inputs created
considerable waste and pollution. Thus, in the transition countries production technologies are
substantially less efficient than in the developed economies, and therefore emissions per unit
of output are higher. In addition to the environmental problems inherited from the period of
central planning, transition economies have experienced various other difficulties, including
69
financial and economic hardship. The adjustment to market equilibrium is a gradual process,
during which many variables such as provision of public goods, willingness to pay,
technology and capital markets etc. are in disequilibrium. This creates both constraints and
opportunities that may not be available to more “settled” economies.
From an econometric viewpoint, the Multilevel Regression Model (MRM) is the most
appropriate for our sample which contains hierarchical data structured in three levels (plant,
county and region). We choose this approach because it allows to combine these levels into a
single analytical framework. This is important as theory suggests that different levels are
interrelated.
3. Environmental regulation: the theoretical framework
The impact of environmental regulation on the economy should be examined both
theoretically and empirically. Economists thought of the problem of environmental
degradation as one in which the economic agents impose external costs on society as a whole
in the form of pollution. The obvious solution was seen as the introduction of a tax on the
polluting activity internalising social costs. Thus, the study of the degradation of the
environment introduces the concept of externality, which is one of the main arguments for
neoclassical interventionism. External effects have been analysed in the light of the divergent
views of Pigou and Coase respectively.
Pigou (1920) introduced the concept of external economy as a form of service or
disservice to others which is not paid or compensated, focusing on the divergence between
private and social marginal products. The presence of externalities legitimised the
intervention of the state, whose goal was to restore the equality between marginal products,
guaranteeing the maximisation of social income. The solution lies in taxing the activity
causing the disservice. Since the pioneering study of Pigou (1920) it has been recognised that
a regulatory authority can internalise external costs resulting from production (emissions) by
introducing an environmental tax based on the marginal damage resulting from the activity
(Pigouvian tax).
Coase (1960) called into question the assertion that the presence of externalities
legitimates corrective government intervention, in order to restore an optimal situation in
terms of allocation of resources. His criticism is based on demonstrating the existence of a
spontaneously negotiated solution. This argument is the heart of his well known “Coase
Theorem”. This shows that decentralised bargaining between sender and receiver of the
harmful effect for the amount of compensatory payment for the nuisance can produce a
70
situation corresponding to an optimal final allocation.
The Coasian criticism is fundamental to the neo-liberal offensive against neoclassical
interventionism. Essentially, Coase establishes the existence of a solution to pollution
problems by spontaneous negotiation between the concerned agents. This direct solution
breaks with the Pigouvian approach in two ways: the recognition of the reciprocal nature of
the harmful effects and the introduction into economic analysis of the legal concept of
property rights. However, as the hypothesis of zero transaction costs is unrealistic, the
Coasian solution has been marginalised in the field of environmental economics.
In brief, in the Pigouvian approach it is the polluter which is responsible for the
externality and the policy prescription consists in a pollution tax. By contrast, in the Coasian
approach the externality is assumed to be reciprocal (i.e., both polluter and polluted cause it),
and this implies that legal rules and institutions should change to internalise it.
Our aim is to establish whether formal (governmental) environmental regulation is
more effective than informal ones (negotiation, community pressure) in reducing pollution in
the case of Romania.
4. Econometric Analysis
4.1 Econometric method
In the statistics literature MRM is alternatively referred to as multilevel analysis,
hierarchical models, random coefficients models, and variance components analysis. The
common element of all these methods is that the dependent variable is analysed as a function
of predictors measured at the lowest level and of those measured at higher levels. The
rationale for using the multilevel model is based on the assumption that the variation in the
dependent variable is a function of both lower-level and higher-level factors - not only of
individual-level attributes, but also of extra-individual factors. Besides, the relationship
between lower- and higher-level factors and the dependent variable is not assumed to be fixed
or constant across space or time. Therefore, the regression coefficients in micro-level models
are not fixed, and they can vary across these factors.
Conceptually, the model is often viewed as a hierarchical system of regression
equations. The simplest multilevel model that can be formulated considers only two levels of
analysis5. The analysis focuses on level-1 (individuals), whilst level-2 (group) provides the
context for the level-1 units. For instance, in our case, level-1 units are the plants who are
nested in different counties (level-2 units). The dependent variable (note: in Yij , i refers to
71
p
5 For more details concerning MRM, see Greene (2002).
level-1 units and j refers to level-2 units) is measured for level-1 units, since this is the
primary level of analysis. The explanatory variables are Xij for level-1 and Zj for level-2. By
assumption, there are J groups and in each group there are Ni individuals.
Thus, there is a separate regression equation for each group.
where :
Yij = β 0 j + β1 j X ij + ε ij with (j = 1,2, …….J; i = 1,2,……N) (1)
β0 is the regression intercept;
β1 is the regression slope for the explanatory variable X;
εij is the residual term.
To model group variation (this time for the level-2 units) in regression parameters
additional equations are required, with the level-1 regression parameters as their dependent
variables. The regression includes at least a constant, one level-2 explanatory variable and a
disturbance.
Thus, a typical level-2 model consists of the following equations:
β 0 j
β ij
= µ00 + µ01 Z j + u0 j
= µ10 + µ11 Z j + u1 j
with (j = 1,2,….N) (2) with (j = 1,2,….N) (3)
After substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1), one obtains:
Yij = µ00 + µ01 Z j + µ10 X ij + µ11 X ij Z j + u1 j X ij + u0 j + ε ij
(4)
where: µ00 is the intercept; µ01 µ10 are the effect of the level-2 variable Zj on level-1 Xij ; µ11
is the cross-level interaction between the level-1 and level-2 variables. The last three terms in
equation [4] are the disturbance terms.
If there are P variables X at level-1 (lowest level) and Q variables Z at level-2 (highest
level) the equations (1→4) become:
Yij = β
P
j + ∑ β pj X ij
+ ε ij
0 (1a) p =1
72
q
q
β 0 j
Q
= µ00 + ∑ uoq Z j + u0 j
(2a)
q =1
β pj
= µ p
Q
0 + ∑ µ =
pq Z j
+ u pj
(3a)
q 1
73
P Q Q P P
Yij
= µ00 + ∑ µ p 0 X ij
+ ∑ µ0 q Z j
+ ∑∑ µ pq Z j X ij
+ ∑ u pj X ij
+ u j + ε ij
(4a)
where:
p =1
p
q =1
q
q =1 p =1
q p p 0
p =1
µ are the regression coefficients (fixed parts of the model – they do not change across
groups);
u are the residuals at the group level;
ε are the residuals at the individual level. The residuals u and ε are the random or stochastic
part of the model.
The multilevel model can be extended to more than two levels of analysis. The
parameters at the highest level are always assumed to be fixed. A multilevel model extended
to a greater number of levels produces structures that are even more complex and implies
more complex disturbance term. Recent advances in computational power and software
packages allows the analysis of at least three-level models, and even nine levels, but the
interpretation of complex multi-level models is very difficult. That is why more than two
levels should not be included unless one has a clear rationale for doing so and strong priors
about the nature of the effects.
The standard techniques for combining data of different levels often break down,
while multilevel methods allows to take into consideration their relationships and at the same
time avoid the pitfalls associated with the traditional methods of dummy variable models and
standard interactive approaches (see Jones and Steenbergen, 2002) for more details
concerning the multilevel methods).
4.2 Model specification
The econometric model used here considers four determinants of pollution
expenditure: plant characteristics, market incentives, communities’ characteristics and
regulation intensity. In our analysis we focus on the regulatory variables in order to explain
pollution abatement through the control expenditure at plant level. The dependent variable is
plant environmental pollution expenditure (PACE) defined as:
PACE = f (PLANT , MARKET , COMMUNITY , REGULATORY ) (5)
Plant - Plant characteristics,
Market – Market incentives,
Community - Community characteristics,
74
Regulatory - Regulatory intensity.
Plant characteristics included in the analysis are the competitiveness of the firm,
ownership, size, location, the technology used and external financing. Competitiveness and
profitability are important factors as they represent the willingness and ability of the firm to
abate pollution. Other relevant variables are solvency, liquidity and the debt ratio which are
indices of financial stability and can provide more information about the ability of plants to
invest in pollution abatement technology.
Regarding ownership, we consider three categories, namely enterprises with state
capital (state-owned enterprises), with private capital (privately owned enterprises) and with
mixed capital. We also distinguish between domestic and foreign enterprises.
Plant size is proxied by turnover and is a measure of the ability of the firm to invest in
order to abate pollution. The geographical location can be urban or rural. Eight regions are
considered. The technology used in the production process allows to distinguish between
intensive pollution sectors (dirty sectors) and the non-pollutant sectors (clean sectors).
It is also important to take into account other economic factors and market
characteristics of the environment where plants develop their activities. Thus, income per
capita at purchasing power parity at national and regional level are included as a measure of
the standard of living. People from regions with high income tend to be better educated, more
informed about environmental issues and more active in abating pollution.
Government’s pressure or formal regulation is included in the form of environmental
taxes and penalties, environmental subsidies and legislation on air and water pollution
abatement at regional level. As for community pressure or informal regulation, we consider
non-governmental organisations (NGO) at regional and county level which can exert
important pressure on plants to abate pollution and use cleaner technologies.
Table 1 provides a list of variable definitions and a summary of theoretical priors for their
effects on pollution abatement.
Table 1 Variable Definitions and Expected Signs
Variables Definitions Sign
Plant characteristic variables
75
Profitit Disposable profit of plant i in year t as a measure of
competitiveness and profitability;
+
Productit Plant productivity of plant i in year t as a measure of
economic performance;
+
Debtit Debt ratio of plant i in year t as a measure of a company's
financial leverage;
-
Turnoverit Turnover of plant i in year t as a measure of plant activity
size;
+
Svbit Solvency of plant i in year t as a measure of financial
performance;
+
Lqtit Liquidity of plant i in year t as a measure of financial
performance;
+
CSit Ownership of the plant i in year t. The dummy variable takes
value 1 if the plant is a state-owned enterprise and 0
otherwise;
+/-
CPit Ownership of the plant i in year t. The dummy variable takes
value 1 if the plant is a privately owned enterprise and 0
otherwise;
+/-
CMit Ownership of the plant i in year t. The dummy variable takes
value 1 if the plant has mixed capital and 0 otherwise;
+/-
Frgnit Foreign plants. The dummy variable takes value 1 for foreign
enterprises and 0 for domestic enterprises;
+/-
Locit Geographical location of the plant i in year t according to the
degree of urbanization. The dummy variable takes value 1 if
the plant is located in an urban area and 0 if is located in
rural area;
+/-
Efnit Foreign financing aid of plant i in year t. +/-
Market incentive variables
Isoit ISO 14001 certification, indicating environmental
management adoption by the plant i. The dummy variable
takes value 1 if the plant is certified ISO and 0 otherwise;
+
76
Markit Listing on Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) of plant i in
year t, proxy for the firm’s visibility. The dummy variable
takes value 1 if the plant is listed at BSE and 0 otherwise;
+
PCIkt Per capita income for each region k in the year t , a proxy for
local informal regulatory pressure, education and citizen
activism;
+
CRPt Corruption index of the country in year t; -
Community characteristics variables
UnEmpjt Unemployment rate of county j in year t as a proxy for
population welfare ;
-
RSHkt Population with university studies of region k in year t as a
proxy for population skills;
+
Regulatory intensity variables
PollSectit Pollution industry sectors as a proxy for intensity of
regulation and environmental policy instruments. Dummy
variable which takes value 1 if the production of the plant i
in year t is dirty and 0 otherwise;
+
EnvNGOjt Number of environmental non-governmental organisations of
county j in year t;
+
Locpresit The existence of the local pressure on the plant i in year t.
Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the plant i in year t
was subject to a local pressure and 0 otherwise;
+
EnvGuardkt Environmental penalties in region k in the year t, proxy for
the formal regulatory pressure to adopt an environmental
behaviour- liability environmental policy instruments;
+
EnvTxit Environmental taxes of plant i in year t , proxy for the
economic incentives to adopt an environmental behaviour –
economic environmental policy instruments;
+
EnvSubit Environmental subsidies of plant i in year t, policy
instruments to promote plant environmental behaviour-
economic environmental policy instruments;
+
Acomt Communitary aquis. Dummy variable which takes value 1 if
the country adopted the aquis in year t and 0 otherwise;
+
77
Thus, the econometric specification used is the following: (6)
log(PACEit ) = β0 + β1 log(Profitit ) + β 2 log(Productit ) + β3 log(Debtit ) + β 4 log(Turnoverit ) + + β5 log(Svbit ) + β6 Lqtit + β7 CSit + β8CPit + β9 CMit + β10 Frgnit + β11 Locit + β12 Efnit + β13 Isoit + β14 log(Markit ) + β15 log(PCIkt ) + β16 log(CRPt ) + β17 log(UnEmpjt ) + β18 PollSectit + + β19 log(EnvNGOjt ) + β 20 Locpresit + β 21 log(EnvGuardkt ) + β 22 log(EnvTxit ) + β 23 log(EnvSubit ) + β 24 Acomt + uit
where: PACEit = pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t and uit is the
error term. Some details about our sample and the data sources are provided below.
4.3 Data
The analysis has been carried out for Romania in the period 2002 – 2005. The data are
taken from the yearly survey of plant pollution abatement effort conducted by the Romanian
National Institute of Statistic which inquires about capital expenditures and operating cost
associated with pollution abatement efforts. Data in the survey are tabulated by industry.
The data are in the form of a panel providing environmental and financial information
at establishment level (on pollution abatement and control expenditure, environmental taxes
and subsidies) and community characteristics and regulation intensity data at county level for
the period 2002-2005. The sample contains plants covering almost all industrial sectors. We
selected only the plants with continuous activity over the sample period (1422 plants).
The establishment characteristics (economic and financial information) are taken from
plant financial reports. Also, we identified the firms that were traded on the capital market
and listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange, and those certified ISO 14001, using information
from the Romanian Accreditation Association. The community characteristics were obtained
from the Romanian National Institute of Statistics, except for the number of environmental
ONG which comes from the Ministry of Environment. Using the information from
Environmental Guard we constructed a proxy variable for regulation intensity (environmental
penalties levied).
4.4 Empirical results and policy implications
First, we run a regression for total environmental expenditure, and then we model the
pollution abatement effort separately for air and water. Subsequently, we also analyse
pollution abatement at the regional level, so as to highlight the different determinants for each
region.
78
4.4.1 Abatement pollution effort
The econometric results from the model are reported in Table 2. Table 2: Econometric results of determinants of abatement pollution effort
OLS OLS OLS MRM (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit 0.087 0.092 0.090 0.075 Productit
(5.19)*** (5.51)*** (5.36)*** (4.58)*** 0.032 -0.040 0.052 0.024 Svbit (0.66) (0.82) (1.08) (0.50) 0.150 0.122 0.125 0.103 Lqtit
(4.57)*** (3.70)*** (3.63)*** (3.02)*** 0.837 0.843 0.851 0.795 Turnoverit
(48.03)*** (48.06)*** (48.19)*** (4.51)*** 0.042 0.046 0.144 0.138 Profitit
(3.04)*** (3.34)*** (3.20)*** (2.79)*** 0.437 0.412 0.387 0.375 Frgnit
(5.15)*** (4.85)*** (4.57)*** (4.03)*** 0.455 0.492 0.510 0.492 ISOit
(5.23)*** (5.65)*** (5.85)*** (5.52)*** 0.858 0.831 0.826 0.800 Markit
(22.87)*** (22.12)*** (22.02)*** (20.52)*** 0.199 0.196 0.192 0.182 PollSectit
(6.64)*** (6.54)*** (6.44)*** (5.32)*** 0.295 0.294 0.294 0.293 EnvSubit
(10.45)*** (10.41)*** (10.45)*** (10.58)*** 0.393 0.390 0.382 0.320 Efnt
(6.91)*** (6.86)*** (6.75)*** (6.12)*** -0.328 -0.327 -0.325 -0.324 Debtit
(6.36)*** (6.35)*** (6.33)*** (6.00)*** -0.628 -0.587 -0.617 -0.362 CSit
(5.99)*** (5.60)*** (5.90)*** (6.38)*** 0.347 0.338 0.329 0.210 CMit
(4.91)*** (4.77)*** (4.66)*** (2.70)*** 0.324 0.328 0.336 0.377 CPit
(4.09)*** (4.14)*** (4.25)*** (4.31)*** 0.151 0.158 0.151 0.125 EnvTXit
(15.85)*** (16.42)*** (15.58)*** (4.50)*** - -0.145 -0.076 -0.014 UnEmpjt
(1.63) (0.73) (1.34) - 0.168 -0.064 -0.073 Locit
(1.67)* (1.14) (0.13) - 0.066 -0.050 0.072 EnvNGOjt
(1.49) (1.05) (1.29) - -0.061 0.203 0.126 LocPresit
(1.39) (0.11) (1.03) PCIkt - - 1.481 5.277
79
(7.71)*** (5.53)*** - - 0.085 0.020 Acomt
(2.53)** (1.61)* - - 0.035 0.255 EnvGUARDkt
(2.59)*** (6.51)*** - - -0.126 -0.069 CRPt
(2.11)** (1.20)* -3.044 -3.669 1.518 20.071 Constant
(20.29)*** (20.56)*** (2.01)** (5.39)*** Observations 5688 5688 5688 5688 R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.31 - Log restricted-likelihood - - - -34871.95 Sd_reg - - - 0.88 IC_reg - - - 0.33 Sd_jud - - - 0.75 IC_jud - - - 0.26 Sd_residual - - - 1.26 LR test vs. OLS chi2 - - - 807.22 Prob>chi2 (0.00) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: the regressions (1→3) are performed using the ordinary least squares (OLS) and 4 is performed with
multilevel regression (MRM).
Sd_reg = Standard deviation at the region level (3);
Sd_jud = Standard deviation at the county level (2);
Sd_residual = Standard deviation at the plant level (1);
IC_reg = Intraclass_ correlation (region – fiscal) = Sd
Sd _ reg
reg 2 + Sd
2 residual 2
IC_jud = Intraclass_ correlation (county – fiscal) = Sd
Sd _ jud jud 2 + Sd
2 residual 2
If the interclass correlation (IC) approaches 0 then the grouping by counties (or regions) is not of any use (one
might as well run a simple regression). If IC approaches 1 then there is no variance to explain at the individual
level, every unit being the same.
We focus in particular on the results obtained through the multilevel method (column
4). It can be seen that the signs of the statistically significant variables are in general as
expected. The large and successful firms with capital availability are more likely to adopt an
environmental behaviour and invest in environmental protection. The competitiveness
variables have a positive and significant effect. Thus, if the plants are more competitive (i.e.,
profitable) they abate pollution more aggressively, presumably because they can afford to
invest more to improve their environmental performance. Plants with good solvency and
liquidity and not too indebted can invest more in cleaner technologies. Size also matters As
80
already mentioned, this is proxied by turnover. From our results it is clear that the largest
plants are more aggressive in abating pollution.
Plant ownership also plays an important role. We find a negative correlation between
state-owned plants and abatement efforts and a positive one in the case of privately owned or
mixed capital enterprises. Most enterprises in our sample have private or mixed capital, the
state owned plants representing only 5 % of the total. After 1989, Romania privatised many
state owned enterprises. This wave of privatisation has increased the competitiveness and
efficiency of plants and thus has improved their environmental performance. Our results show
clearly that private enterprises (domestic or foreign) make more significant abatement efforts.
Concerning the relationship between geographical location and abatement efforts, our results
show that clean technologies are more common in the urban areas, whilst more pollution is
found in the rural ones. Financial or foreign aid is also positively correlated with abatement
effort.
Market pressure from consumers, investors and competing firms, estimated by the
adoption of ISO 14001 and by the listing on the Bucharest Stock Exchange, has a significant
positive impact. Good visibility of a plant and the adoption of environmental management
standards are two important determinants of abatement efforts and indicate that the
management of these plants are more responsive to environmental regulations.
There is a positive relationship between regional per capita income and abatement
effort. Our sample includes eight regions as specified in table A1 in the appendix. Regions
with a higher income are more environmentally aware and invest more in pollution
abatement. The corruption index is instead negatively correlated with abatement effort.
Community groups, proxied by unemployment and the number of environmental non-
governmental organisations, have no statistically significant impact on PACE. EnvNGOs do
not appear to have an important role either. In general, in the transition economies the concern
for the environment is not a top priority for the community, which is confronted with
economical and financial problems.
Concerning the government pressure on plants we used three proxies for formal
regulatory pressure, namely environmental penalties, taxes and subsidies. Public authorities
which are concerned with regulatory enforcement and monitoring are critical factors
influencing plants’ decisions to take an environmental approach and undertake environmental
investment. Environmental penalties and subsidies and environmental taxes are found to have
a statistically significant positive impact. These results show that, although formal regulations
81
are still only partially developed, they have measurably beneficial effects on abatement efforts
in the case of Romania.
4.4.2. Water and Air Pollution Abatement Effort
Environmental standards are typically drafted by research institutes or ministries. A
system of environmental authorisations has been created consisting of environmental
agreements and environmental permits. All environmental permits specify that enterprises are
responsible for monitoring emissions. The authorities (environmental protection agencies)
have the right to amend, suspend and revoke environmental authorisations but they prefer to
be more collaborative to obtain compliance. If an enterprise is unable to meet the discharge
levels specified in its permits, a plan is developed containing the steps that must be
undertaken within a specified time. There are penalties for exceeding permitted emission, but
these are not linked to pollution quantities and are not an effective deterrent.
Water resources in Romania are managed according to the principals of integrated
water management. Therefore, policies to promote sustainability try specifically to
incorporate linkages between water quality and water quantity. These are potentially
important, because excessive usage can lower underground and surface water levels and
increase concentration of contaminants.
Water charges exist in Romania, both for direct consumption or use and for
discharges. Their aim is to encourage the sustainable use of this resource and to generate
revenues to finance water supply and sewage treatment and disposal. They were introduced at
the beginning of 1991 and rates are indexed quarterly. There are separate national prices for
each category and user of raw water, with the industry sector paying more than agriculture,
and agriculture paying more than households.
Penalties are levied on twenty substances divided into two general categories. The first
contains substances such as chlorine, sulphates, nitrates, detergents for which allowable levels
are established to meet concentrations standards. The second group contains substances such
as mercury, pesticides, radioactive residues for which no discharges are permitted.
Next, we estimate separate regressions for water and air pollution abatement effort. The
variables are generally the same as in the previous regression, but there are a few additional
ones specific to water and air respectively. Thus, the econometric specifications are the
following:
82
• for water pollution abatement (7)
log(PACEwit ) = β0 + β1 log(Profitit ) + β 2 log(Productit ) + β3 log(Debtit ) + β 4 log(Turnoverit ) + + β5 log(Svbit ) + β6 Lqtit + β7 CSit + β8CPit + β9 CMit + β10 Frgnit + β11 Efnwit + β12 Isoit + + β13 log(Markit ) + β14 log(PCIkt ) + β15 log(UnEmpjt ) + β16 PollSectwit + β17 log(EnvNGOjt ) + β18 log(EnvGuardkt ) + β19 log(EnvTxwit ) + β20 log(EnvSubwit ) + β21 LWwt + uit
where : PACEwit = water pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t;
EnvTxwit = environmental taxes incurred by plant i in year t for water pollution abatement;
EnvSubwit = environmental subsidies received by plant i in year t for water pollution
abatement; Efnwit = foreign financing aid received by plant i in year t for water pollution
abatement; LWwt = number of laws adopted concerning water pollution in year t and uit –
error term.
• for air pollution abatement (8)
log(PACEait ) = β0 + β1 log(Profitit ) + β 2 log(Productit ) + β3 log(Debtit ) + β 4 log(Turnoverit ) + β5 log(Svbit ) + β6 Lqtit + β7 CSit + β8 CPit + β9 CMit + β10 Frgnit + β11 Efnait + β12 Isoit + + β13 log(Markit ) + β14 log(PCIkt ) + β15 log(UnEmpjt ) + β16 PollSectait + β17 log(EnvNGOjt ) β18 log(EnvGuardkt ) + β19 log(EnvTxait ) + β 20 log(EnvSubait ) + β 21LWat + uit
where : PACEait = air pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t for air ;
EnvTxait = environmental taxes incurred by plant i in year t for air pollution abatement;
EnvSubait = environmental subsidies received by plant i in year t for air pollution abatement;
Efnait = foreign financing aid received by plant i in year t for air pollution abatement; LWat =
number of laws adopted concerning air pollution in year t and uit – error term.
The econometric results are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Econometric results for air and water pollution abatement effort
AIR ABATEMENT EFFORT (MRM)
WATER ABATEMENT EFFORT (MRM)
Variables Coefficient z Coefficient z Productit 0.078 ( -4.69)*** 0.081 (-4.85)*** Svbit 0.016 ( -0.32) 0.009 (-0.19) Lqtit 0.108 ( -3.13)*** 0.095 ( -2.73)*** Turnoverit 0.772 ( 41.37)*** 0.811 ( 43.04)*** Profitit 0.037 ( 2.92)*** 0.041 ( 2.95)*** Frgnit 0.331 ( -3.51)*** 0.349 (-3.64)*** ISOit 0.489 ( 5.42)*** 0.556 ( 6.12)*** Markit 0.858 ( 19.27)*** 0.936 ( 20.66)*** Debtit -0.336 ( -6.15)*** -0.335 (-6.06)***
83
CSit -0.762 ( 6.29)*** -0.908 (7.37)*** CMit 0.172 ( 2.18)** 0.246 (3.07)*** CPit 0.363 ( -4.10)*** 0.346 ( -3.82)*** EnvTXwit - - 0.004 (-0.26) PollSectwit - - 0.148 ( 4.50)*** EnvSubwit - - 0.292 (7.29)*** Efnwit - - 0.341 ( 4.56)*** LWwt - - 0.211 (3.27)*** EnvTXait 0.285 (16.26)*** - - PollSectait 0.215 ( 5.46)*** - - EnvSubait 0.244 ( 5.70)*** - - Efnait 0.370 ( 3.92)*** - - LWat 0.322 (6.72)*** - - PCIkt 3.542 ( -3.46)*** 4.358 ( -4.22)*** UnEmpjt -0.611 (-1.21) -0.819 (1.61)* EnvNGOjt 0.007 ( -0.61) 0.089 (-1.16) EnvGUARDkt 0.301 ( 6.61)*** 0.345 (7.54)*** Constant 2.687 (-0.61) 5.426 (-1.22) R-squared 0.67 - 0.78 - Observations 5688 - 5688 - Log restricted-likelihood -32175.62 - -30117.35 - Sd_reg 0.89 - 0.91 - IS_reg 0.33 - 0.30 - Sd_jud 0.63 - 0.73 - IS_jud 0.16 - 0.21 - Sd_residual 1.41 - 1.39 -
906.13 - 786.34 - LR test vs. OLS chi2 Prob>chi2 (0.00) - (0.00) - Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
One can see that the determinants of air and water pollution abatement effort are
approximately the same and have the same signs as before. Environmental taxes seem to be
more important for the former, indicating that formal regulation plays a bigger role in the case
of air pollution abatement effort, while for the latter environmental taxes becomes
insignificant. For both the effects of informal regulation are weak.
4.4.3 Abatement effort at the regional level
Next, we estimate the following equation at the regional level, still carrying out multilevel
analysis (MRM): (9) log(PACEit ) = β0 + β1 log(Profitit ) + β 2 log(Productit ) + β3 log(Debtit ) + β 4 log(Turnoverit ) + + β5 log(Svbit ) + β6 Lqtit + β7 CSit + β8 CPit + β9 CMit + β10 Frgnit + β11 Locit + β12 Efnit + β13
84
Isoit + + β14 log(Markit ) + β15 log(PCIkt ) + β16 log(UnEmpjt ) + β17 PollSectit + β18 log(EnvNGOjt ) + + β19 Locpresit + β 20 log(EnvGuardkt ) + β 21 log(EnvTxit ) + β 22 log(EnvSubit ) + β 23log(RSHkt ) + uit
The variable added RSH is a proxy for human resource quality. The results are displayed
in Table 4.
85
Table 4. Econometric results of the abatement pollution effort at the regional level (eight regions) by multilevel regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Variables
PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit 0.122 0.179 0.140 0.130 0.071 0.096 0.021 0.053 Productit
(2.86)*** (4.54)*** (3.31)*** (2.15)** (1.67)* (2.52)** (0.51) (1.28) -0.098 -0.008 0.036 -0.038 -0.064 -0.037 -0.143 0.163 Svbit (0.81) (0.07) (0.34) (0.26) (0.56) (0.32) (1.19) (1.30) 0.142 0.034 0.136 0.045 0.025 0.146 0.015 0.188 Lqtit
(1.65)* (0.42) (1.71)* (0.41) (0.30) (1.88)* (0.18) (2.02)** 0.755 0.672 0.578 0.551 0.390 0.611 0.706 0.573 Turnoverit
(16.74)*** (15.00)*** (14.36)*** (10.30)*** (9.69)*** (14.62)*** (14.45)*** (11.52)*** 0.043 0.097 0.074 0.114 0.046 0.074 0.022 0.112 Profitit (1.25) (2.92)*** (2.14)** (2.37)** (1.31) (2.28)** (0.64) (0.34) 0.214 0.443 0.010 0.486 0.111 0.610 0.407 0.121 Frgnit (0.77) (2.07)** (0.05) (1.75)* (0.49) (3.41)*** (2.13)** (0.59) 0.046 0.214 0.185 0.228 0.507 0.434 -0.058 0.203 ISOit (0.20) (0.90) (0.99) (1.01) (2.06)** (1.86)* (0.24) (1.11) 0.552 0.345 0.461 0.690 0.643 0.465 0.654 0.384 Markit
(6.59)*** (3.70)*** (5.63)*** (6.42)*** (5.50)*** (5.54)*** (6.74)*** (3.84)*** 0.004 0.153 0.029 0.009 0.104 0.150 0.042 0.044 PollSectit (0.06) (2.16)** (0.42) (0.09) (1.39) (2.34)** (0.59) (0.54) -0.035 0.217 0.042 0.124 0.026 0.076 0.066 0.081 EnvSubit (0.52) (2.48)** (0.50) (1.51) (0.36) (0.91) (0.96) (1.54) 0.041 0.097 0.153 0.210 0.001 0.195 0.125 0.015 Efnit (0.43) (0.62) (0.42) (0.97) (0.78.) (1.66)* (0.85) (0.15) 0.012 -0.022 0.147 0.015 0.123 0.031 0.026 0.057 EnvTXit (0.51) (0.97) (6.24)*** (0.45) (4.45)*** (2.32)** (1.71)* (2.13)** -0.343 0.050 -0.305 -0.072 -0.253 -0.295 -0.145 -0.482 Debtit
(2.46)** (0.48) (2.93)*** (0.38) (1.84)* (2.62)*** (1.05) (3.62)*** -1.028 -0.272 -0.677 -0.020 0.408 -0.121 -0.367 -0.253 CSit
(3.15)*** (1.11) (2.84)*** (0.07) (1.48) (0.50) (1.59) (0.91)
86
0.316 0.348 0.192 -0.082 -0.383 0.057 0.293 0.416 CMit (1.49) (1.78)* (1.15) (0.32) (2.38)** (0.34) (1.73)* (2.59)*** 0.061 0.332 0.063 0.688 0.438 0.561 0.292 0.157 CPit (0.24) (1.84)* (0.34) (2.82)*** (1.97)** (3.63)*** (1.74)* (0.74) -2.000 -2.546 -1.378 -0.751 2.900 -0.330 -1.809 -2.722 Unempjt
(2.68)*** (5.41)*** (3.25)*** (0.70) (4.79)*** (0.98) (3.92)*** (1.57) -1.388 -2.476 0.764 -5.483 -2.707 -2.896 -6.880 -7.175 Locit
(6.91)*** (9.43)*** (1.41) (4.19)*** (2.67)*** (3.96)*** (11.04)*** (2.50)** 0.017 0.072 0.067 0.032 0.148 1.096 2.241 6.431 EnvNGOjt (1.30) (0.65) (1.20) (0.44) (2.64)*** (2.13)** (3.72)*** (6.42)*** 0.010 0.0178 0.106 0.154 0.102 0.094 0.131 0.197 Locpresit (0.09) (0.30) (1.00) (0.94) (1.90)* (2.01)* (2.43)** (2.10)** 7.673 11.869 10.529 -7.470 17.110 13.651 20.128 23.993 PCIkt
(2.78)*** (1.73)* (1.42) (1.59) (3.02)*** (2.82)*** (4.16)*** (1.76)* 0.758 0.213 0.683 0.229 0.846 1.010 5.005 0.638 EnvGUARDkt (1.31) (0.70) (1.43) (0.48) (3.50)*** (3.55)*** (4.24)*** (5.46)*** 0.091 0.101 0.113 0.107 0.187 0.162 0.178 0.253 RSHkt (1.31) (1.87)* (1.43) (1.98)* (2.12)** (1.73)* (1.82)* (2.48)***
-67.230 37.000 22.931 22.278 -73.277 97.973 -354.923 125.385 Constant (2.26)** (1.40) (1.07) (1.08) (3.98)*** (3.71)*** (4.72)*** (1.91)*
Observations 816 632 760 508 568 748 936 720 R-squared 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.42 Log restricted-likelihood -30245.12 -32175.62 -29413.21 -26625.67 -34215.54 -34414.13 -29313.25 -31442.46 Sd_reg 0.79 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.79 0.88 0.90 IS_reg 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.36 0.30 0.28 0.33 Sd_residual 1.41 1.32 1.27 1.35 1.19 1.22 1.40 1.28
806.18 779.21 675.32 917.45 825.30 715.89 698.74 914.38 LR test vs. OLS chi2 Prob>chi2 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: 1 = North – East; 2 = South – East; 3 = South; 4 = South – West; 5 = West; 6 = North – West; 7 = Center 8 = Bucharest – Ilfov.
87
As expected, in the regions with high income (West, Centre and Bucharest-Ilfov)
informal pressure is more important and the population more reactive. Thus, local pressure and
ONGs have a significant impact on pollution abatement. In contrast, in the poorer regions
(North-East, South -West) informal pressure is weak, the population being less educated and
having limited access to information.
Besides, formal regulations have a different impact on the eight regions. Specifically,
environmental taxes and penalties are statistically insignificant for the low-income regions and
become significant for the regions with high income per capita. Bucharest-Ilfov has the highest
income per capita, the North-East region the lowest. Bucharest-Ilfov is also characterised by
the availability of qualified human resources, and the presence of an important number of
environmental ONG. Moreover, almost all plants in this region are clean (see table A2). In
contrast, the poorest region is characterised by a high unemployment rate, a low percentage of
skilled population and a low number of environmental non-governmental organisations. Plants
polluting more are located in poorer regions (see table A1 and A3).
Overall, although Romania has improved its environmental performance considerably,
formal and informal regulations are still only partially developed due to the difficulties of
economic transition, and heterogeneity across regions remains considerable.
5. Conclusions
This paper has tested some hypotheses formulated in the environmental literature about
PACE patterns at plant level. Its original contribution is to examine them using survey data in
the case of a country such as Romania, which has undergone a process of economic and
political transition and has been a EU member since 2007; also, we apply an appropriate
econometric method, namely MRM.
Our results are generally consistent with the literature suggesting that plant
characteristics, formal pressure through substantial regulatory actions and informal pressure
through market incentives and community aspects may be important drivers of the level of
plant PACE. However, unlike in the case of developed countries, we find that in Romania the
potential for collective action in the environmental area is not significant. Whether the
influence of stakeholders on PACE will strengthen as Romania completes its development
process remains to be seen. Also, there is no evidence that environmental taxes work as
incentives to adopt an environmental behaviour at plant level. As expected, the actions of
regulators (command and control and liability instruments), market pressure and plant
characteristics are the most important determinants of the level of PACE. Thus, the largest,
88
most competitive and profitable private owned enterprises have made more efforts to reduce pollution.
These findings enable us to gain a better understanding of the factors affecting the level
of plant PACE in the case of transition economies in general and Romania in particular. Even
partially developed formal and informal regulations appear to increase abatement efforts. An
increase in income per capita also increases local pressure on intensive pollution plants. From a
policy perspective, this evidence points to the need to redesign environmental taxes in order to
achieve better outcomes. Further, measures to increase environmental awareness would also be
useful in this respect.
89
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Table A1: Characteristics of the regions - 2005
APPENDIX
Regions Per capita
GDP (RON/year)
Unemployment
rate (%)
Population
Density of Population (Hab/km2)
Surface (Km2)
Population with
university studies (%)
1 North- East 8907,6 7.6 3737246 101 36850 9.4 2 South - East 11541,7 6.4 2841362 79 35762 10.4 3 South 11068,5 6.8 3325576 97 34453 8.9 4 South - West 10371,1 7.0 2305913 79 29212 11.1 5 West 15064,7 5.3 1931759 60 32034 13.2 6 North - West 12538,6 3.9 2728967 80 34159 10.7 7 Center 13097,6 6.8 2536211 74 34100 12.1 8 Bucharest- Ilfov 29572,6 2.7 2205393 1211 1821 30.2
Source: Romanian National Institute of Statistics (INSSE) – Statistical Yearbook 2008
Table A2: Distribution of plants by region and ownership - 2005 Region Total
Plants Dirty Plants
Domestic Plants
Foreign Plants
Air Pollution
Plants
Water Pollution
Plants
Air and Water
Pollution Plants
Others Pollution
Plants
1 North - East 618 409 380 29 66 204 84 55 2 South - East 530 351 327 24 38 181 79 53 3 South 608 397 344 53 48 204 90 55 4 South -West 391 259 233 26 32 141 51 35 5 West 476 304 240 64 37 165 61 41 6 North -West 654 424 365 59 64 203 96 61 7 Center 669 444 390 54 63 202 108 71 8 Bucharest - Ilfov 520 275 205 70 33 128 75 39
Total 4466 2863 2484 379 381 1428 644 410 Source: environmental survey
92
Regions
ONG / million Habitant
ONG /
region
1 North- East 5 17 2 South - East 7 21 3 South 2 5 4 South - West 5 11 5 West 5 10 6 North - West 8 21 7 Center 9 24 8 Bucharest- Ilfov 16 35
Table A3: Number of environmental non-governmental organisations (2005)
Source: Ministry of Environment
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D I
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A P
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S
E R
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5.5 Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness: Evidence from Romania (articol publicat in IZA Working paper, idexata RePec, si aflat in process de evaluare, faza de revizuire in revista Ecological Economics, editata de Elsevier, Cotata ISI cu factor impact 2.422, ISSN 0921-8009)
IZA DP No. 5029
Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness: Evidence from Romania
Guglielmo Maria Caporale Christophe Rault Robert Sova Anamaria Sova
June 2010
94
Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness:
Evidence from Romania
Guglielmo Maria Caporale Brunel University, CESifo and DIW Berlin
Christophe Rault Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orléans (LEO), CESifo, WDI and IZA
Robert Sova CES, Sorbonne University, A.S.E. and E.B.R.C
Anamaria Sova CES, Sorbonne University and E.B.R.C
Discussion Paper No. 5029 June 2010
IZA
P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn
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Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180
E-mail: [email protected]
95
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96
IZA Discussion Paper No. 5029 June 2010
ABSTRACT
Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness: Evidence from Romania*
According to the pollution haven hypotheses differences in environmental regulation affect trade flows and plant location. Specifically, environmental stringency should decrease exports and increase imports of “dirty” goods. This paper estimates a gravity model to establish whether the implementation of more stringent regulations in Romania has indeed affected its competitiveness and decreased exports towards its European trading partners. Our findings do not provide empirical support to the pollution haven hypothesis, i.e. environmental stringency is not found to affect significantly total trade, or its components (pollution intensive trade and pollution intensive trade related to non-resource-based trade).
JEL Classification: F14, Q28
Keywords: environmental stringency, competiveness, gravity model
Corresponding author:
Christophe Rault CNRS UMR 6221 University of Orleans Rue de Blois-B.P.6739 45067 Orléans Cedex 2 France E-mail: [email protected]
* This paper has been realised within the project 92-120 (CNMP).
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IZA Discussion Paper No. 5029 June 2010
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The transition process in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has brought about significant changes in their economic structure. It has also been associated with growing environmental awareness: rising pollution levels due to the development of heavy industries have increased the interest in cost-effective regulation. Romania in particular has embarked on a radical course of environmental reform, and the accession into the European Union has created a new policy focus for appropriate action. An important topic in this context is the relationship between environment and international trade, which has recently been analysed in various empirical studies investigating the effects of environmental regulation on trade flows and export competitiveness. The issue is whether more stringent regulations might increase production costs and make pollution-intensive industries less competitive in international markets, thereby affecting the development strategies of the countries concerned. Further, according to the so-called “pollution haven” hypothesis, differences between countries in terms of environmental standards lead to a reallocation of polluting industries from those with strict environmental regulations to those with less strict policies. Thus, countries with weak environmental policies (generally with low income) become a pollution haven for those with environmental stringency, exporting the “dirty” goods and importing the “clean” ones. In contrast, the developed (high income) countries improve the quality of their environment by developing a comparative advantage in the clean goods. Typical empirical issues encountered in this type of analysis are limited data availability, measuring environmental stringency and the endogeneity of this variable. The present study focuses on the effect of environment regulation on trade flows (exports and imports) in the case of Romania, using a gravity equation. It examines empirically whether more stringent domestic environmental policies reduce international competitiveness (more specifically, exports of the pollution-intensive products), and their general impact on trade patterns. In most cases the environmental stringency variable in exporting countries is found to have a positive and significant effect, in contrast with the haven hypothesis which implies that stricter environmental regulation decreases exports and increases imports. However, there is no evidence of such an effect in the case of “dirty” trade, possibly because of a comparative advantage such that stricter environmental policies do not affect competitiveness significantly. Other factors, such a labour costs, presumably play a much more important role, environmental costs representing a very small percentage of total production costs.
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1. Introduction
The transition process in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has brought
about significant changes in their economic structure. It has also been associated with growing
environmental awareness: rising pollution levels due to the development of heavy industries have
increased the interest in cost-effective regulation. Romania in particular has embarked on a
radical course of environmental reform, and the accession into the European Union has created a
new policy focus for appropriate action.
An important topic in this context is the relationship between environment and
international trade, which has recently been analysed in various empirical studies investigating
the effects of environmental regulation on trade flows and export competitiveness. The issue is
whether more stringent regulations might increase production costs and make pollution-intensive
industries less competitive in international markets, thereby affecting the development strategies
of the countries concerned. Further, according to the so-called “pollution haven” hypothesis,
differences between countries in terms of environmental standards lead to a reallocation of
polluting industries from those with strict environmental regulations to those with less strict
policies. Thus, countries with weak environmental policies (generally with low income) become
a pollution haven for those with environmental stringency, exporting the “dirty” goods and
importing the “clean” ones. In contrast, the developed (high income) countries improve the
quality of their environment by developing a comparative advantage in the clean goods. Typical
empirical issues encountered in this type of analysis are limited data availability, measuring
environmental stringency and the endogeneity of this variable.
The present study focuses on the effect of environment regulation on trade flows (exports
and imports) in the case of Romania, using a gravity equation. It examines empirically whether
more stringent domestic environmental policies reduce international competitiveness (more
specifically, exports of the pollution-intensive products), and their general impact on trade
patterns. The layout of paper is as follows. Section 2 and 3 provide a brief review of the existing
empirical and theoretical literature respectively. Section 4 describes the econometric framework
used for the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 offers some concluding
remarks.
4
99
2. Empirical studies
The empirical evidence on the environment-trade nexus is mixed. The most common
finding is that strict environmental regulations do not affect trade flows and international
competitiveness (Tobey, 1990; Harris and al., 2002). Only a few studies conclude that they lead
to a loss of competiveness for pollution-intensive goods (Van Beers and van den Bergh, 1997).
However, even if more stringent regulations initially mean lower competitiveness and smaller
market shares reflecting higher production costs, they might also stimulate innovation, improve
productivity and increase exports in the long run (this is the so-called Porter hypothesis – see
Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
Tobey (1990) used a cross-section Heekscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model of international
trade and found that the introduction of stringent environmental measures had not caused trade
patterns to deviate from the HOV predictions. Van Beers and van den Bergh (1997) estimated an
equation for bilateral trade flows introducing two variables for environmental stringency (a broad
one and a narrow one based on the energy intensity) in a gravity model. The results, using a
sample of 21 OECD countries, indicate that the impact of stricter regulations on export and
import flows is negative. Van Beers and van den Bergh (2000) revisited the analysis of Tobey
(1990) using more disaggregated data and partly confirmed his results. Xu (2000) also estimated
a gravity model, finding evidence that new trade barriers emerge to offset the effects of more
stringent environmental regulations, and that the trade pattern of environmentally sensitive goods
remain unchanged. Harris et al. (2002) used a triple indexed fixed effects model (import, export
and time effects), and showed that, once these effects are taken into consideration, the impact of
environmental stringency on international trade becomes statistically insignificant.
Jug and Mirza (2005) proposed an alternative explanation for the low and insignificant
effect of strict environmental policies on trade flows which is not related to environmental
features but rather to the degree of product differentiation. They showed that stringency matters
less in the case of trade in highly differentiated products due to their lower price elasticity.
Ederington and Minier (2003) investigated the hypothesis that environmental policy has
been used as a secondary trade barrier, and estimated the impact of environmental regulation on
trade flows when environmental policy is modelled endogenously, finding that its estimated
5
100
effect on trade flows is significantly higher than reported in previous studies affected by
endogeneity bias.
Levinson and Taylor (2008) showed how unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity and
aggregation issues generate biases when estimating the relationship between regulatory costs and
trade. They used data on US regulations and net trade flows between the US, Canada and Mexico
for 130 manufacturing industries from 1977 to 1986, and reported that the estimated effects of
pollution costs on net imports are positive and statistically significant. Also, the 2SLS estimates
are larger than the fixed-effects ones.
3. Theory
In the theoretical literature there are two major hypotheses linking the environment and
trade flows, more precisely the pollution haven and the factor endowments ones. The former
predicts that countries where environmental policy (regulation) is relatively weak will tend to
specialise in pollution intensive (or “dirty”) industries. Generally, countries with lax
environmental regulations are low-income countries. By contrast, the latter predicts that
differences in factor endowments determine trade patterns and environmental policy has only a
minor effect. Thus, this hypothesis suggests that countries with abundant capital will specialise
in and export capital intensive goods, and countries with abundant labour will export labour
intensive good, regardless of environmental regulations5 .
Let us consider the haven pollution theory using a model with production –generated pollution.
The model assumes that there are two goods, X and Y, where X is the dirty good (which
generates pollution during the production) and Y is the clean good (which does not pollute).
The production function for good Y using the two factors capital and labour takes the following
form:
Y= F(K, L) (1)
5 In this paper we will only focus on the haven hypothesis and will not test empirically the factor endowment hypothesis.
6
101
and for good X:
X = (1-θ)G(K, L) (2)
where: θ represents the abatement effort and lies in the interval between 0 and 1 (0< θ<1): if θ
=0, there is no abatement effort and pollution rises with the output of the dirty good (X); if θ
rises, this leads to an increase in the abatement effort and a decrease in the production of X and
implicitly pollution. If it is assumed that X produces emissions and these are generated in the production process,
then total emissions are given by E=eX, where e represents emission intensity. The model also
assumes that there are two countries, one rich (A - high income) and the other poor (B - low
income). A simple supply and demand analysis is used to determine the price under autarchy in
the two countries. The pollution haven model assumes that trading countries are identical with the exception of the
differences in emission intensity. Therefore their supply curves will also differ, being a function
of the price (p), emission intensity (e), capital/labour (K/L) and taking the following form:
RS ( p, e, K / L) X ( p, e, K / L) Y ( p, e, K / L)
(3)
When the price and emission intensity increase, the supply of good X relative to good Y
increases. In contrast, the demand curve is the same for the two countries because preferences over goods
are supposed to be homothetic. Specifically, the demand curve for good X relative to good Y is a
function of the prices in the two countries:
RDX / Y ( p) bx ( p) b y ( p)
(4)
If countries are identical, their supply curve (RS) is the same and so are prices, implying that
there is no trade. If emission intensity differs and is higher in the low-income country, then weak
7
102
environmental regulation will lead to more production of the dirty good in this country (B) and to
a decline in the production of the clean good due to the reallocation of resources from Y to X. The pollution haven hypothesis can be illustrated as in the figure below:
Source: Copeland and Taylor (2003) The price of the dirty good (X) in the developed country is higher then in the developing country
(PA >PA*)6 due to the fact that in the former pollution taxes are higher, and therefore the price of
X under autarchy is higher. Consequently, the production of X declines in the developed country
but increases in the developing country. Thus, the relative supply of the country with weak
environmental regulations will shift out to the right (RS*). Hence, the high income country will
produce and export more of the clean good Y and will import the dirty good X from the low
income country, whilst the low income country will export X. The pollution level will increase in
the developing countries with weak pollution policy and will decrease in the developed countries
with stringent pollution policy, and the former will provide pollution havens for dirty industries.
6 We use the asterisk for the developing country variables.
8
103
'
The differences in pollution policy could lead to the migration of the pollution intensive
industries from developed to developing economies in the presence of less stringent
environmental regulations, low wages and resource abundance in the latter. Then, an increase in
the stringency of environmental regulations will imply a loss of competitiveness for dirty
industries and lower exports of dirty goods. Clearly, if the effects of changes in pollution
regulations (pollution abatement costs) are modest, then it becomes difficult to maintain the
pollution haven hypothesis.
4. The econometric framework
The gravity model is extensively used in the empirical literature on international trade.
The first studies estimating it were those of Linnemann (1966) and Tinbergen (1962). Its
theoretical foundations were developed later by Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985) and
Helpman and Krugman (1985). This model is also used to test the link between the
environmental stringency and trade flows (Van Beers and Van den Bergh, 1997, Harris et al.
2002; Jug and Mirza, 2005). The standard equation takes the following form:
Tijt 0 1 S ijt X uijt (5) where Tijt represents trade flows between trading partners (i and j), Sijt is a measure of
environmental stringency, X1 stands for other variables which differ across countries, β0 is the
constant and uijt is the error term which captures the measurement errors and is assumed to be independently identically distributed.
To examine the impact of environmental regulations on trade flows (export and imports),
we follow Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), whose model takes into account multilateral trade
resistance (MTR) unlike the "classic version" of the gravity model. As they argue, it is essential
to analyse not only bilateral resistance to trade (trade barriers between two countries i and j) but
also multilateral resistance, i.e. trade barriers between each country i or j and all its partners.
Intuitively, a country has more incentives to trade with a partner when its trade resistance with
all other partners is higher. This results in price differences between countries, ignoring which
may bias the estimates of all the other variables in the gravity equation.
9
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X
1
4.1 The Anderson and van Wincoop model
The Anderson and van Wincoop model (2003) is based on assumptions such as constant
elasticity of substitution, differentiation of goods by origin and country specialisation in their
variety. Exports costs (transport costs, information costs, differences in legislation, etc.) are
borne by the importer and are symmetrical. The model introduces multilateral resistance to trade
in addition to the bilateral one. The former represents the average cost of imports whatever their
origin, while the latter concerns import costs between a pair of countries. The modified gravity
equation has the following form:
Y Y T 1 ij w P P
(6)
t j ij
Y i j where Xij represents exports of country i towards country j ; Yt, Yj stand for income of country i
and j respectively and Y w
K
Yk
is total income; Tij represents bilateral resistance (import
k 1
costs between country i and j); Pi, Pj are the price index of country i and j respectively and
represent multilateral resistance for the two countries ; σ is the demand elasticity which is
assumed to be greater than unity.
Bilateral trade resistance (Tij) is a vector of observable variables affecting bilateral trade
costs between country i and country j such as geographical distance (Dij), common border
(FRTij), common language (LANGij), existence of colonial relations (RLij) and membership of
trade agreements (ACRij).
Tij (Dij ) e 2 RLij 3 FRTij 3 LANGij 4 ACRij (7)
Bilateral resistence (Tij) represents the price of the foreign variety relative to the local
variety and it is assumed to be symmetric (Tij =Tji). The price indices for consumption (Pi, Pj) for
country i and j are defined as follows:
10
105
1
N
Pi
j p j t ij
1 (1 ) Pj
N 1
i p i t ij
1 (1
)
(8) j 1 i 1
where
1 i ( j )
j (i )
Y j (i )
Y w
is the share of country j (i) in total income. Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) interpret Pi and Pj as multilateral trade resistance since each is a function of all
bilateral resistance variables (e.g., Pi for country I is the average of Tij)
Thus, the gravity equation used to control for the effects of multilateral resistance takes the
following form:
log(X ijt ) a0 a1 log(GDPit ) a2 log(GDPjt ) a3 log(DISTij ) a4 BRDij a5 ETNij uij t ijt (9)
where :
Xijt = exports from country i towards country j, in year t ; millions of dollars,
(database : COMTRADE) ;
GDPit (jt) = Gross domestic product of countries i and j, in year t, at purchasing power parity
(PPP); millions of dollars, (database : Chelem-CEPII) ;
DISTij = geographical distance between the capitals of country i and country j respectively;
kilometers, (Chelem-CEPII) ;
BRDij = dummy variable for common border ; FRT = 1 if i and j have a common border and
0 otherwise ;
ETNij = dummy variable for the existence of a common minority group; ETNij = 1 if the two
countries i and j have a common minority group and 0 otherwise ;
uij = couple fixed effects for controlling multilateral resistance;
λt = time fixed effects;
εijt : error term
The expected signs for the coefficients of the variables included in the model are based on
theory. For instance, we expect a positive effect on trade flows of variables such as the size of a
country, common border and common minority group and a negative impact of geographic
11
106
distance (which is a proxy for transport costs, tariffs, non-tariff barriers and informal barriers).
Supply of exports and demand for imports are a positive function of the income level in the
partner countries. As for the coefficient of environmental stringency for exporter and importer,
STi and SCj are expected to have a negative and positive effect respectively on the basis of the
pollution haven hypothesis.
4.2 Data
Our panel spans over a period of 9 years (1999-2007) and includes 20 countries, namely
Germany, Austria, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Finland,
Sweden, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Cyprus.
As data for environmental stringency are not generally available, proxies are normally
used in empirical studies, for instance an index based on energy intensity (Harris et al., 2002), an
index developed by the World Bank (Xu, 2000), PACE as a fraction of value added (Levinson
and Taylor, 2008) or an index developed by Eurostat ( Jug and Mirza, 2005). We use data from
Eurostat which provides environmental data for the European Union countries (EU-27). Total
current expenditure, which represents expenditure for environmental protection activities, is the
chosen proxy for environmental stringency and a measure of abatement costs. We exclude from
our sample some countries such as France, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic
and Greece due to data constraints. Data on bilateral trade (exports and imports) are extracted
from the COMTRADE database at total level and by sectors. The GDP data are obtained from
the IMF, while distance, common border come from CEPII database.
We consider the following pollution intensive sectors (“dirty” sectors): (251) pulp and
waste paper, (334) petroleum products, (335) residual petroleum products, (51) organic
chemicals, (52) inorganic chemicals, (562) fertilizers, (59) chemical materials, (634) veneers,
plywood, (635) wood manufactures; (64) paper paperboard, (68) non-ferrous metals; (661) lime,
cement, construction materials, (67) iron and steel, (69) metal manufactures (we use the
classification of dirty industries of Low, 1992). For the pollution intensive trade related to non-
resource-based trade (footloose sectors) we include the following sectors: (59) chemical
materials, (661) lime, cement, construction materials and (69) metals manufactures. 12
107
An important econometric issue is the potential endogeneity of the
environmental stringency variable. Some studies try to deal with it by using the 2SLS method
(Ederington and Minier, 2003, Levinson and Taylor, 2008) or a three –way fixed effect model
which allows for exporter, importer and time specific effects (Harris and al. 2002). In the
present study, we shall use instead the fixed effect vector decomposition method (FEVD)
proposed by Plümper and Tröeger (2004). This estimator controls for the potential
endogeneity of all right-hand-side variables, including environmental stringency, thereby
removing this possible bias source, and also yields more efficient estimates. Also, the
presence of fixed effects allows to take into account multilateral resistance. Further, it has
desirable finite-sample properties.
5. Empirical results
In order to analyse the impact of environmental stringency on the trade flows we
estimate models for total trade flows (exports and imports) as well as trade of the pollution
intensive sectors only; we also distinguish between pollution intensive sectors and non-
resource-based sectors (footloose). The results for total trade (exports and imports) are reported
in Table 1.
Table 1: Estimation results of the impact of environmental stringency on total trade
Variables
Total trade (FEVD)
Export (FEVD)
Import (FEVD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt
1.216 1.056 0.751 0.621 2.297 1.900 GDPit (62.09)*** (10.02)*** (1.93)* (2.31)** (67.47)*** (9.43)***
2.739 2.746 1.961 1.803 1.837 2.119 GDPjt (84.13)*** (25.41)*** (23.87)*** (20.14)*** (14.62)*** (12.05)***
-1.048 -1.098 -1.620 -1.508 -1.265 -1.605 DISTij (39.57)*** (36.06)*** (54.05)*** (31.04)*** (28.36)*** (25.78)***
0.072 0.107 0.242 0.216 0.206 0.134 BRDij (2.31)** (17.84)*** (34.92)*** (39.91)*** (5.59)*** (11.76)***
0.237 0.219 0.046 0.032 0.386 0.322 ETNit (8.12)*** (42.39)*** (51.88)*** (49.20)*** (11.57)*** (44.16)***
- 0.239 - 0.021 - 0.344 STit - (18.05)*** - (0.46) - (30.43)*** - 0.059 - 0.083 - -0.140 STjt - (4.45)*** - (9.03)*** - (0.96)
108
λt yes Yes yes yes yes yes 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Residuals
(49.90)*** (29.99)*** (63.15)*** (60.14)*** (29.18)*** (54.78)*** -0.302 -0.409 7.167 6.807 0.037 -1.674 Constant
(2.01)** (42.06)*** (89.45)*** (69.83)*** (0.10) (24.13)*** Observations 342 342 171 171 171 171 R-squared 0.81 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.92 0.98 t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method.
As can be seen, the estimated coefficients are almost always significant and have the
expected theoretical signs. The size variable of the exporting country and the partner country
appear to be two of the main determinants of trade flows between Romania and the EU-27.
The proxy for environmental stringency in the exporter country has a positive impact on trade
flows in all cases, implying that the hypothesis that stricter environmental regulation decreases
exports and affects competiveness can be rejected. Besides, this variable becomes
insignificant when exports of Romania towards its trading partners in the EU-27 are
considered. Presumably there are more important factors affecting trade, such as low
wages, regardless of environmental regulations. Environmental costs appear to play a
marginal role and do not affect trade flows significantly. Environmental stringency in the
importer country has a positive and significant effect on trade flows and exports, but a
negative and insignificant one on imports. As for the other variables, their estimated effects
are consistent with the predictions of the gravity model.
Geographical distance has a negative impact on trade volume, whilst common border or common
minority group have a positive one.
Next, we focus our attention on the impact of environmental stringency on the pollution
intensive sectors. Following the classification of the “dirty” industries of Low (1992) we
consider the 14 “dirty” sectors. Both the sample and the econometric methods used are the same
as before. The results are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Estimation results of the impact of environmental stringency on the “dirty” trade
Total trade (FEVD)
Export (FEVD)
Import (FEVD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
xijt xijt Xijt xijt xijt xijt
109
1.217 1.257 1.665 1.846 0.580 0.546 GDPit (48.88)*** (49.33)*** (12.23)*** (11.42)*** (21.83)*** (20.13)***
0.798 0.832 0.269 0.281 1.294 1.287 GDPjt (34.69)*** (35.94)*** (11.73)*** (11.77)*** (9.03)*** (7.17)***
-1.491 -1.286 -0.445 -0.399 -1.126 -1.077 DISTij (25.34)*** (23.91)*** (5.55)*** (4.46)*** (13.29)*** (11.38)***
0.321 0.254 0.308 0.297 0.402 0.368 BRDij (17.13)*** (17.53)*** (8.58)*** (7.69)*** (8.43)*** (8.16)***
0.005 0.017 0.228 0.211 0.246 0.269 ETNij (0.16) (0.49) (4.95)*** (4.37)*** (5.38)*** (5.12)***
- 0.115 - 0.284 - 0.076 STit - (2.53)*** - (2.16)** - (0.24)
- 0.037 - 0.112 - -0.053 STjt - (0.78) - (1.80)* - (0.34)
λt yes yes Yes yes yes yes 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Residuals
(110.84)*** (106.62)*** (75.31)*** (74.92)*** (68.92)*** (68.71)*** 0.558 0.441 -2.246 -2.964 -0.589 -0.650 Constant
(3.25)*** (2.48)** (5.75)*** (6.41)*** (1.43) (1.34) Observations 4788 4788 2394 2394 2394 2394 R-squared 0.74 0.79 0.73 0.80 0.79 0.84 t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method.
As before, size, common border and common minority group have a positive effect,
whilst geographical distance has a negative one. Concerning the impact of environmental
stringency, it is estimated to be positive in the case of the exporting countries, perhaps because
these have a comparative advantage for dirty exports such that stricter environmental policies do
not affect their competitiveness. The sign is the same for importing countries. No statistically
significant effect on “dirty” imports is found.
Finally, we estimated the model for “dirty” and footloose sectors separately. From the
former we selected those with a sizeable weight in total trade, namely for exports iron and steel
(67), petroleum products (334) and non-ferrous metals (68), and for imports metals manufactures
(69), sectors iron and steel (67) and paper paperboard (64). The footloose sectors are chemical
materials, lime, cement, construction materials and metals manufactures. These sectors are
supposed to respond significantly to changes in the stringency of environmental regulations.
The results are shown in Table 3 and 4 respectively. In the case of “dirty” trade, environmental
110
regulations in exporting and importing countries have a positive and significant effect on exports of
each sector but no effect on imports. As for the footloose sectors, the coefficients are not
statistically significant, indicating that environmental costs do not have an impact on such trade
flows between Romania and its European partners.
Table 3: Estimation results of the impact of environmental stringency on “dirty” exports
and imports
Export (FEVD)
Import (FEVD)
67 334 68 69 67 64
Sectors Variables
xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt GDPit 1.079 1.210 0.819 0.964 2.028 1.091
(2.54)*** (4.30)*** (9.17)*** (10.42)*** (13.29)*** (4.70)*** GDPjt 1.186 1.343 1.105 1.172 1.039 1.633
(10.21)*** (9.31)*** (10.16)*** (11.75)*** (1.87)* (3.11)*** STit 1.292 1.159 0.885 -0.045 0.019 -0.077
(2.54)** (3.17)*** (2.65)*** (0.36) (0.11) (0.44) STjt 0.185 0.314 0.278 0.381 -0.116 0.402
(0.75) (2.20)** (1.13) (1.00) (0.21) (0.76) DISTij -1.907 -1.232 -1.455 -0.302 -1.264 -1.373
(12.70)*** (5.36)*** (5.79)*** (1.81)* (11.74)*** (4.34)*** BRDij 0.149 0.207 0.126 0.573 0.621 0.478
(12.45)*** (4.37)*** (3.87)*** (5.65)*** (7.10)*** (6.80)*** ETNij 0.169 0.153 0.117 0.051 0.208 0.194
(2.81)*** (3.49)*** (3.13)*** (0.42) (1.96)* (1.15) Residuals 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(17.61)*** (10.85)*** (14.84)*** (32.79)*** (21.33)*** (22.17)*** Constant 2.550 -2.064 -1.518 -2.399 4.185 -0.055
(3.44)*** (0.98) (0.70) (8.03)*** (2.94)*** (0.03) Observations 171 171 171 171 171 171 R-squared 0.73 0.62 0.69 0.91 0.78 0.80 t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method.
111
17
112
Table 4: Estimation results of the environmental stringency impact on the export and
import non resources based sectors
Total trade (FEVD)
Export (FEVD)
Import (FEVD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt 0.768 0.821 1.439 1.307 1.973 2.053 GDPit
(18.12)*** (19.69)*** (5.93)*** (4.76)*** (21.13)*** (19.04)*** 1.982 2.020 0.415 0.477 1.501 1.474 GDPjt
(40.30)*** (39.58)*** (9.25)*** (7.33)*** (6.40)*** (5.93)*** -1.781 -1.629 -0.791 -0.612 -2.383 -2.131 DISTij
(17.21)*** (16.33)*** (5.25)*** (5.82)*** (16.49)*** (15.91)*** 0.235 0.219 0.194 0.163 1.172 1.695 BRDij
(11.95)*** (12.05)*** (5.30)*** (5.65)*** (10.87)*** (10.93)*** 0.049 0.038 0.203 0.221 0.123 -0.115 ETNij (0.83) (0.63) (2.31)** (2.76)** (1.56) (1.04)
- 0.287 0.510 -0.048 STit - (3.52)*** (0.83) (0.58)
- -0.113 0.057 -0.037 STjt - (1.35) (0.60) (0.15)
λt yes yes yes yes yes yes 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Residuals
(68.88)*** (65.97)*** (41.96)*** (40.82)*** (49.38)*** (48.86)*** -0.035 -0.195 -1.104 -1.576 -0.018 0.182 Constant (0.12) (0.61) (1.49) (1.85)* (0.03) (0.24)
Observations 1026 1026 513 513 513 513 R-squared 0.80 0.83 0.71 0.75 0.82 0.87 t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method.
6. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to analyse the relationship between environmental regulation
and trade flows, more precisely whether the implementation of more stringent
regulations has affected international competitiveness and decreased the exports of Romania
towards its trading
partners in the EU-27. We estimated gravity models to investigate separately the effects of
environmental stringency on total trade (exports and imports), on pollution intensive trade and on
113
pollution intensive trade related to non-resource-based trade.
In most cases the environmental stringency variable in exporting countries is found to have a
positive and significant effect, in contrast with the haven hypothesis which implies that stricter
environmental regulation decreases exports and increases imports. However, there is no evidence
of such an effect in the case of “dirty” trade, possibly because of a comparative advantage such
that stricter environmental policies do not affect competitiveness significantly. Other factors,
such a labour costs, presumably play a much more important role, environmental costs
representing a very small percentage of total production costs.
114
References
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116
E. Concluzii generale (se prezinta punctual)
Elaborarea politicilor de mediu este fundamentata pe doua teorii si anume
teoria Pigouviana si cea Coasiana.
Abordarea Pigouviana plaseaza responsabilitatea pentru externalitati exclusiv
pe generator (poluatorul) si ii impune acestuia o taxa in conformitate cu
prevederile legale. Determinarea nivelului optim al acesteia se bazeaza pe un set de
presupuneri de natura neoclasica. Cel mai important, lucru de retinut in abordarea
Pigouviana este ca aceasta nu considera externalitatile de natura reciproca si nici
nu analizeaza comportamentul de reducere a poluarii induse de fiscalitatea
Pigouviana
În contrast, abordare Coasiana presupune că externalitatea este reciproca
adica, atât poluatorul şi poluatul genereaza externalitatea, că normele juridice şi
instituţiile ar trebui să se schimba pentru a eficientiza internalizarea externalitatilor
si ca factorii de decizie politică ar trebui să se concentreze asupra dinamicii
problemei de eliminare a externalitatilor. Prin încorporarea acestor aspecte in
analiză, abordarea Coasiana poate ajunge la politica optima.
Avand in vedere faptul ca in tarile in dezvoltare, cazul Romaniei,
reglementarea directa este destul de slaba, atat din punct de vedere legal cat si
institutional, este de asteptat ca pentru elaborarea politicilor de mediu sa se apeleze
la abordarea Coasiana care presupune aplicarea teoriei neo-instituţionala.
Optimizarea politicilor de mediu ramane inca un deziderat, avand in vedere ca
atat ipotezele Pigouviene cat si cele Coasiene nu se regasesc in realitatea
economica si sociala. In aceste conditii, opinia noastra este ca in studiile empirice
trebuie sa exite o abordare holistica a celor doua problematici abordate in cadrul
proiectului respectiv RCM si PCM, imbinand abordarile existente in cadrul celor
doua teorii. Pornind de la aceasta abordare, in cadrul acestei etape, bazandu-ne pe
117
cercetarea calitativa am definit o serie de ipoteze care vor fi testate ulterior prin
cele doua instrumente care vor fi realizate. Pornind de la acest set de ipoteze in
urmatoarea etapa se va defini cadrul conceptual de analiza.
Analiza empirica dezvoltata in cadrul acestei etape a proiectului a avut
menirea de a verifica pentru Romania, intr-o abordare holistica, “care sunt factorii
cheie care determina companii să-şi asume responsabilitatea lor socială?” si “Care
sunt aşteptările generate de un astfel de angajament?”
S-au realizat 5 studii, toate bazadu-se pe date individuale la nivel de firma
furnizate de Institutul National de Statistica referitoare la investitiile si cheltuielile
legate de protectia mediului.
Rezultatele sustin caracterul stimulativ al subventiilor Pigouviene asupra
comportamentului intreprinzatorului in sensul determinarii luarii deciziei de a
realiza investitii in protejarea mediului, dar releva faptul ca sistemul de taxe
Pigouviene nu are o influenta stabila asupra comportamentului responsabil fata de
mediu. Acest fapt implica realizarea unei analize calitative asupra acestui sistem
pentru a identifica punctele sale slabe, activitate ce se va desfasura in etapele
viitoare ale proiectului. De asemenea rezultatele releva faptul ca reglementarile
informale, cu exceptia presiunilor institutionale venite din piata, nu au o influenta
semnificativa asupra comportamentului responsabil fata de mediu. Referitor la
efectele asumarii responsabilitatii sociale corporative, de catre firmele romanesti,
studiul a reliefat ca ipoteza win-win nu se confirma in cazul Romaniei.
Avand in vedere cele prezentate in prezentul raport de cercetare putem
concluziona ca obiectivul etapei a fost realizat.
118
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Indicatorii de rezultat generali si specifici pentru etapa raportata ________________________________________________________________________ | Indicatori de | Denumirea indicatorilor | UM | | rezultat | | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 1. Număr de produse şi tehnologii rezultate din | Nr. | | | activitatea de cercetare, bazate pe brevete, | | | | omologări sau inovaţii proprii. | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 2. Număr de cereri de brevete depuse în urma | Nr. | | | proiectelor | | | | din care: | | | | a) Naţionale | | | | b) EPO (Europa) | | | | c) USPTO (SUA) | | | | d) Triadice (Europa, SUA, Japonia) | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 3. Număr de cereri de brevete acordate (în urma | Nr. | | | proiectelor) | | | | din care: | | | | a) Naţionale | | | | b) EPO | | | | c) USPTO | | | | d) Triadice | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 4. Număr de articole publicate în urma | Nr. | | | proiectelor, | | | | din care: | | | | a) în reviste indexate ISI | | | | b) în reviste indexate în alte baze de date | 3 | | | internaţionale recunoscute | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 5. Număr de articole acceptate spre publicare în| Nr. | | | urma proiectelor, | | | | din care: | | | | a) în reviste indexate ISI | 1 | | | b) în reviste indexate în alte baze de date | 1 | | | internaţionale recunoscute | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 6. Număr de produse transferabile | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 7. Număr de studii de necesitate publică | Nr. | | | din care: | | | | a) de interes naţional | 1 | | | b) de interes regional | | | | c) de interes local | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 8. Număr de IMM participante | % | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 9. Ponderea contribuţiei financiare private pe | % | | | proiecte din care contribuţie financiară directă| | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 10. Numărul mediu de poziţii echivalente cu | Nr. | | | normă întreagă pe proiect, din care: | 8 | | | a) doctoranzi | 2 | | | b) postdoctorat | 6 | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 11. Mobilităţi |1 Lună | | | din care internaţionale | 1-om | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 12. Valoarea investiţiilor în echipamente |Mii RON| | | pentru proiecte | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 13. Rata de succes în depunerile de proiecte | % | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 14. Număr reţele de cercetare susţinute | Nr. | |____________________|_________________________________________________|_______|
Cod: PO-04-Ed3-R1-F5
123
Indicatorii specifici fiecarei directii de cercetare:
Domeniul de cercetare
Denumirea indicatorului Numarul Informatii despre indicator
DC 1 Tehnologiile societăţii informaţionale
Nr. de tehnologii IT performante Nr. tehnologii suport pentru comunicatii; Nr. metode/sisteme de inteligenta
artificiala; Nr. produse nanoelectronice si fotonice; Nr.nano- si microsisteme
DC 2: Energie
Nr.concepte de utilizare de noi surse energetice Nr. de tehnologii de reducere a pretului
in domeniul energetic Nr. de tehnologii/produse in domeniul
securitatii energetice
DC 3: Mediu
Nr. de sisteme şi tehnologii energetice durabile Nr. de tehnologii curate de produs si
proces pentru reducerea poluării mediului (green chemistry) Din care: in transporturi Nr.de tehnologii eco-eficiente de
valorificare a deseurilor; Nr.concepte si tehnologii de consolidare
a diversitatii biologice si ecologice; Nr. de metode si solutii tehnice in domeniul amenajarii teritoriului
DC 4:Sănătate
Nr.concepte/studii ale mecanismelor de adaptare ale organismului; Nr. metode pe baze moderne de
investigatie in medicina; Nr. terapii moderne;
Nr. de metode de preventie si interventionale la nivel naţional, arondate la spaţiul european de operare
DC 5: Agricultura, securitatea şi siguranţa alimentară
Nr. de produse corespunzătoare principiilor dezvoltării durabile şi securităţii alimentare, inclusiv alimente funcţionale; Nr. de metodologii de detectare a
reziduurilor şi contaminanţilor din întreg lanţul alimentar
DC 6: Biotehnologii
Nr.de medicamente noi; Nr.protocoale de diagnostic şi
tratamente medicale; Nr.de tehnologii pentru producţia de
alimente cu siguranţă maximă asupra sănătăţii umane; Nr.de tehnologii avansate in domeniul
produselor farmaceutice;
grupurilor biocatalitice;
124
noi enzime şi microorganisme
Nr. de sisteme bioinformatice DC 7: Materiale, procese şi produse inovative
Nr. de materiale avansate Nr.de tehnologii de reciclare a
materialelor avansate Nr. de tehnologii avansate de conducere
a proceselor industriale Nr. de tehnologii şi produse mecanice de
înaltă precizie şi sisteme mecatronice Nr. de tehnologii nucleare Nr. de produse şi tehnologii inovative
destinate transporturilor şi producţiei de automobile
DC 8:Spaţiu şi securitate
Nr. de aplicaţii spaţiale integrate Nr. de tehnici aeronautice Nr. de tehnologii aerospaţiale Nr. de tehnici pentru securitate
DC 9:Cercetări socio-economice şi umaniste
Nr. de noi metode manageriale, de marketing şi dezvoltare antreprenorială; Nr. de studii referitoare la calitatea
educatiei si a ocuparii; Nr. de studii referitoare la capitalul
uman, cultural şi social; Nr. de tehnici de conservare a
patrimoniului
1
Nota: La completarea acestor indicatori se va tine seama de domeniul de cercetare si de obiectivele proiectului. Acesti indicatori se vor completa acolo unde este cazul.
125
Procesele verbale de avizare si receptie a lucrarilor
In cazul ultimei etape pentru sectiunea stiintifica si tehnica se vor prezenta documente ca si pentru raportarea intermediara, si, in plus:
o Raportul final de activitate (conform modelului) o Rezumatul publicabil in romana si in engleza (maxim 3 pagini), din
care sa rezulte gradul de noutate si elementele de dezvoltare economica ale intregului proiect
Scurt raport despre deplasarea (deplasarile) in strainatate privind activitatea de diseminare si/sau formare profesionala (se vor prezenta informatiireferitoare la simpozion/congres: denumire, perioada desfasurare, locul de desfasurare, programul evenimentului, titlul lucrarii care s-a prezentat, autorii, perspective de colaborare, noutati pentru proiect