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Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I: Accusations, Allegations, and Slander

Claire Taylor

Greece & Rome, 2nd Ser., Vol. 48, No. 1. (Apr., 2001), pp. 53-66.

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Greece Rome Vol.

48

No. 1 April 2001

B RI BE RY I N A T H E N I A N P O L I T I C S P A R T I :

A C C U S A T I O N S , A L L E G A T I O N S , A N D

SLANDER*

By

C L A I R E T A Y L O R

Corruption, intrigue, treachery, all common elements in the darker side

of Athenian politics, and if many sources are to be believed, part of the

essential make-up of the democracy.' The impression gained from the

evidence is that Athenian leaders were well known for their profiteering,

and the demos consistently supported their behaviour by electing them to

positions of responsibility and following their advice. The simple truth

was that money ruled in Athens: it got things done. Every level of

Athenian politics was riddled with corruption, from the most important

orators to the smallest deme election. The opportunities for self-

enrichment were seemingly endless. Bribery could influence magis-

trates, ambassadors, decisions in the Assembly, issues discussed in the

Boule, elections, and in the courts. However, is this an accurate

reflection of Athenian politics? Was corruption really so prevalent?

There are numerous extant accusations and allegations of venality,

some more believable than others, and this enables a picture to be

built of the extent to which bribery was tolerated in the political arena

and the cultural context of accusations.

The Greek word most commonly used for 'bribery' is dorodokein,

which simply means 'to receive a

gift'.2 It is a neutral word without any

moral connotations attached to it: dora is not a euphemistic term, but

actually means both 'gifts' and 'bribes'. Although dorodokia is not the

only word used for briber^ ^ it is the most frequent, and the most readily

applied to political bribery. If dora are both gifts and bribes, bribery has

close connections to the institutionalized social practice of gift-giving,

and it is in the context of mutual obligations and reciprocity that political

payments should be analysed. Moral assumptions should therefore be

avoided, or at least pushed to the ba~kground.~

In this article it is necessary to consider bribery as distinct from

embezzlement: bribery is giving something to influence someone else to

behave in a certain way or make a certain decision, and embezzlement is

the misappropriation of public funds. The two are often coupled


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5 B R I BE R Y I N A T H E N I A N P O L I T I C S P A R T I

together and are closely connected: politicians often grew rich through

their political activities and questions were often asked if, particularly

poorer men, accumulated too much money. The sources often delib-

erately confuse the two allegations to imply that the accused is especially

~ o r r u p t . ~aking money from office was to some extent legitimized and

this enabled the line between acceptable profit and unacceptable reward

to be easily blurred.

This article also distinguishes bribery from ~ ~ k o p h a n c y ~lackmail

arising from the threat of legal action. Sykophancy can be described as a

form of bribery (paying money to someone to avoid a court appear-

ance), but I have not discussed accusations of sykophancy as forms of

bribery here for the following reason^ ^ Th e term sykophant does not

necessarily denote corrupt motives and is often applied to any prose-

cutor without a good case, or a case which is based on assumptions

rather than evidence. It is also not necessary for the alleged

sykophant

to

make money out of his intended prosecutions, although this is fre-

quently what actually happens. Sykophancy can be interpreted as an

important mechanism in the upholding of the democracy in Athens,

insofar as it prevented wealthy men withdrawing from public life by

refusing to fulfil their duty that was participation in the life of the polis.

In other words,

sykophancy

was arguably an essential feature of the

Athenian democracy which sought to include all citizens in polis life and

it only receives a bad press because it sought to forcibly include those

men who had the resources to complain. These are the people of which

we hear the most. However, it is difficult to interpret bribery in an

advantageous way. Bribery did not seek to strengthen the democracy,

only to harm the state through skewed obligations and venal transac-

tions.

ources and their problems

Accusations of bribery were common in Athens, and they are preserved

mainly in oratory and comedy. The corpus of fourth-century law court

speeches is the main medium of preservation and there are many

references to bribery therein. These include references which led to a

real trial, and those which are clearly unfounded slander. Trials could be

brought about by the discovery of a venal transaction (such as the trial of

a magistrate in Lysias

21 , but were commonly combined with other

charges to form a more serious accusation of treason. In these cases it is


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B R IB E R Y I N A T H E N I A N P O L I T I C S P A R T I

often difficult to know to what extent the accusation of bribery was

tacked onto other charges, and not the main subject of the trial. Also,

there is no way of knowing how many of the references in law court

speeches were simply popular charges, even rumours, not brought to

trial in any formal way, or whether they referred to actual legal decisions.

Many accusations may be exaggerated or distorted in order to furnish

the speaker s argument further. The golden rule in reading law court

speeches is: if a statement does not add anythmg to the argument it is

probably true, otherwise question it. A cynical approach maybe, but it

must be remembered that the speakers were only trying to win the votes

of the jury, not trying to establish the truth of the matter that came

before them. It is, therefore, crucial to remember that no accusation can

be accepted without question.

The other main source for bribery allegations is comic drama: a

medium where politicians frequently endured severe personal abuse,

including accusations of corrupt activities. Allegations against a poli-

tician ranged from insults about his family background to his sexual

preferences and his motives for his political actions. Although these

insults must shed some light on how the Athenians viewed individual,

prominent men they should not be taken too much out of context: they

were designed to make the audience laugh. Aristophanes was telling

jokes. His plays were written in order to win a drama competition and

not to pursue an anti-sleaze political campaign. This said, in order to be

a successful comic poet, the accusations must have had at least some

basis in reality, otherwise the Athenian audience would have not found it

funny, indeed they would not have had a clue what he was talking about.

There are, therefore, limitations in the acceptance of many bribery

accusations. The seriousness of many of these accusations can be called

into question, even outright disputed, and they should not always be

seen as true reflections of the political climate.

Accusations and allegations

In all the Greek states not in some of them but in every one of them it chanced that

there had sprung up the most abundant crop of traitorous, venal and profligate

politicians ever known within memory of manlund. (Dem. 18.61)

Bribery accusations, both general and specific, were numerous in

ancient Athens and although it is impossible to tell the extent of bribery


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56 B R IB E RY I N T H E N I N P O L I T I C S P R T I

in political life, or the extent to which it was ignored, politicians very

frequently took the opportunity to hit each other with allegations and

tried to prosecute their opponents in the law courts. Included is a table

of some of the most important incidences of bribery from Athens 58

61).

It is not a definitive list, nor is it meant to be, but it is included

simply to give some indication of the range of incidences of bribery in

Athens as the sources give them. Throughout the article the numbers in

bold)

denote the catalogue numbers as they appear in the table.9

A glance at the table demonstrates that bribery accusations were

widespread in Athenian politics. Th e table shows that large numbers of

strategoi (9, 11 28), ambassadors (19, 26, 29), and other important

politicians (27, 30) were at risk from allegations, and that some of these

were unfounded (5) or relied on little evidence (30). Also evident is the

attempt to bribe large numbers of people in juries (13, 23). However,

there are no examples of electoral bribery and little evidence for bribery

in the lower levels of political life (32).1 Many of the accusations that

came to trial employed the procedure of eisangelia (5, 17, 20, 22, 25,

27, 28, 29, 31, 33), a procedure reserved for very serious crimes

against the state, which demonstrates the gravity of bribery accusations

in Athenian politics. Other accusations use different procedures of

prosecution, such as the euthyne (16). It is also apparent that large

numbers of accusations and trials resulted from defeats in battle (8, 9,

11

14, 28). The main accusers in many cases are political rivals (5, 28,

29, 30, 31, 34): men who would benefit the most from their opponent s

conviction.

The table shows that all categories of important political figures

seem, at one time or another, to have been at risk of allegations of

corruption: strategoi, if they were unsuccessful in a military operation;

ambassadors, if they were successful in bringing about a peace

settlement; orators, if they proposed controversial decrees. The natural

rivalries of Athenian political life, combined with the vast opportunities

for self-enrichment and the need for the demos to hold its politicians to

account ensured a situation where allegations were very frequently

made. It was not just in the Assembly where accusations were made:

the law courts served as an arena for political battles and sometimes the

stakes were so high that corruption of a jury was an attractive, if

expensive, prospect (13, 23). The Athenians worked hard to prevent

law court bribery in particular and were fairly successful. The daily

selection of dikasts and the stiff penalties awarded to anyone found

either giving or taking bribes firmly told potential bribers to stay away.


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B R IB E R Y I N A T H E N I A N P O L I T I C S P A R T I 7

However, attempts were still made to bribe large numbers of men and

were, in at least one case, successful

(13).

Why did the Athenians take bribes

Combine the potential for economic advancement with opportunity and

the essential motivation behind most cases of

dorodoki

can be

explained. It is widely accepted that most magistrates, after the

oligarchic revolution of 41 1, did not receive any financial compensation

for their time in 0ffice.l This lack of remuneration realistically enabled

only rich men to participate fully in the democracy at the highest level. It

was these men who ran for the higher offices of state and who controlled

Athens through regular public

spealung in the Assembly.12 The tempta-

tion to increase income through illegal means must have been too great

for some to bear. Financial profit was to some extent acceptable and it

was a recognized part of politics, if not entirely approved of. There was,

however, a widely held perception that poorer men were more at risk of

temptation than their wealthy counterparts and that they were more

susceptible to bribes. Rich men should not have felt the need to

supplement their income with theft from the state or the acceptance

of gifts which would sway their opinions.13 Demades is the classic

example of a poor man turned bad by bribery, but this is no more

than an assumption.14 It is not necessary to follow the Athenian

prejudice and believe that Demades was poor: he could not have been

as poor as he is often portrayed since he had sufficient resources to start

a political career. Accusations of poverty should not always be taken

seriously. fivals regularly accused each other of low birth and link this

with bribe taking: Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of escape from

poverty through the acceptance of gifts from Philip of Macedon. The

purpose of this accusation comes not from a desire to attack corruption

in Athenian politics, but from the need to portray Aeschines as a beggar

who has become wealthy through venality:

You were raised from servitude to freedom, and from beggary to opulence, by the

favour of your fellow citizens, and ye t. you take the pay of their enemies and conduct

political intrigues to their detriment. (Dem. 18.13

1)

l 6

It is perhaps better, therefore, to see these views as the prejudices of the

Athenian political elite and consider them in this light rather than simply

take them at face value.


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58

Cat no.

1.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10.

B R I BE R Y I N A T H E N I A N P O L I T I C S P A R T I

Table 1. Accusations Of Bribery In The Sources

Source(s)

Ath Pol 19.4

Hdt. 5.5

Hdt. 9.2

Nepos, Milt 7

Nepos, Cim 1

Hdt. 6.132-6

Plut. Cim 4.3

Dem. 26.6

Diod. 10.29

Plut. Them 23

Nepos, Them 8.2

Diod. 11.54.4

Ath Pol 27.1

Plut.

Per

10.5

Plut. Cim 14.4

Nepos, Milt 7.5

Dem. 19.273-5

Thuc. 6.60

Thuc. 2.21.1

Thuc. 5.16.3

Eph. fr. Hist. 70, F193

Diod. 13.106

Plut. Per 22

Plut. Nik 28

Ar.

Wasps 960-1

240-2

894-7

Thuc. 4.65.3 4

Philochorus fr. 127

Ar

Peace 18

Description

The Alcmaeonids bribe the Delphic Oracle to

ensure Spartan support, before 50817.

Thebes tells Persia an invasion of Greece is

unnecessary due to the power of bribery in Greek

diplomacy, 490.

Miltiades accused of accepting bribes from

Persia to withdraw from Paros, 489. Probably

fined 50 talents.

Sparta bribes Themistocles' opponents in Athens.

Eisangelia of Cimon for allegedly receiving bribes

not to invade Macedon, 463. Probably a false

accusation.

Possible eisangelia of Callias for accepting bribes

from Persia to bring about the 'Peace of Callias',

c.449. Fourth century fabrication?

Pericles allegedly bribes Spartan

strategoi

Pleistoanax and Cleandrides to retreat from

Athens, 431.

Strategos Laches is accused by Cleon of bribery

and embezzlement after his return from Sicily,

425. Probably acquitted.

(Probable) eisangelia of strategoi Sophocles,

Eurymedon, and Pythodorus accused of accepting

bribes to withdraw from Sicily, 424. Sophocles

and Pythodorus exiled. Eurymedon fined.

Athens bribes Sparta to agree to 'Peace of

Nicias', 421


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Cat no.

11

12

13.

14.

15

16

17

18.

19.

20

21

BRIBERY

Source s)

Thuc . 7.48.4

Lys. 25.25

Ath. Pol. 27.5

Isoc. 18.23

Diod. 13.64.6

Xen. Hell. 2.1.32

Lys. 14.8

Plut. Alk. 37

Paus. 4.17.3

Paus. 10.9.1 1

Lys. 12.9

Lys. 21.21-2

Lys. 30.2, 9, 23

Xen. Hell. 3.5.1

Hell. Oxy. 7.2-5

Paus. 3.9.8

Lys. 27.3-4

Dem. 19.277-9

Andoc. 3

Lys. 27.14

IN ATHENIAN POLITICS PART I

59

Description

Strategoi in charge of the Sicilian Expedition

refuse to return to Athens due to fear of

prosecution for bribery, 4 13.

Epigenes, Demophanes, Cleigenes sykophants)

accused of taking bribes to drop prosecutions,

409.

Anytos successfully bribes a jury to acquit

him

after failing to keep Pylos out of the hands of the

Spartans, 409.

Adimantus accused of accepting bribes to betray

the Athenian fleet at the Battle of Aegospotamoi

he was the only commander the Spartans did

not execute), 405.

Willingness of the regime of the Thirty to accept

bribes Lysias offers Peison money to ensure his

safety, 403.

Unnamed magistrate charged at euthyne with

taking bribes, 40312.

Eisangelia of Nicomachus for taking bribes and

attempting to overthrow the democracy. Death

penalty proposed, outcome unknown, 399.

Persia sends Timocrates to Athens to distribute

bribes. Epicrates and Cephalus accept money,

395.

Epicrates, Onomasas, and colleagues on embassy

to Persia, 39413 or 39312. Epicrates acquitted,

Onomasas convicted.

Eisangelia of Epicrates, Andocides, Eubulides,

and Cratinos for accepting bribes on embassy to

Sparta. Sentenced to death in absentia, 39211.

Epicrates and fellow envoys attempt to bribe

prosecution to drop case. Possibly connected

with no. 20, but more likely a separate

prosecution for embezzlement, 39211.


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60 BRIBERY IN ATHENIAN POLITICS PART I

Cat no.

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

Source(s)

Lys. 28.3

Lys. 29.5

Lys. 30.2

Dem. 19.180

Lys. 29.1 1

Dem. 24.134

Ar

Wealth

174

Lys. 26.24

Xen. Hell. 5.1.26

Dem. 24.134

Xen. Hell. 7.1.33-40

Plut. Pel. 30-1

Dem. 19.137

Hyp. 3.1-2

Din. 1.14-17

Din. 3.17

Diod. 16.21.4

Aes. 2.6

Aes. 3.79-81

Dem. 19.116

Din. 1.28

Hyp. 4.29

Aes. 1

Aes. 1

Dem. 19

Plut. Dem. 15

Table 1

cont.)

Description

Eisangelia of Ergocles for taking bribes and

embezzlement. Convicted and executed, 389.

Apographe against Philocrates after execution of

Ergocles. Officially accused of complicity in

Ergocles offence, but also accused of taking

bribes and attempting to bribe the jurors (1 100

men) in Ergocles trial, 38918.

Philepsios accused of financial irregularities,

probably bribery, 388.

Eisangelia of Thrasybulus of Collytus for

demanding a bribe of 30 rninae from Athenian

POWs to arrange their release, 38817.

Leon accuses Timagoras of accepting bribes

from Persia on embassy for King s Peace.

Sentenced to death, 367.

Eisangelia of Callistratus accused of accepting

bribes to propose decrees against the interests of

the people in the Assembly, 36110.

Eisangelia of Timotheus, Iphicrates, and

Menestheus for accepting bribes from Chios and

Rhodes after losing the Battle of Embata, 35615.

Eisangelia of Philocrates for accepting bribes

from Philip for the Peace of Philocrates. Fled

before verdict and condemned to death in

absentia,

34613.

Aeschines accused of taking bribes. Never came

to trial (due to Aeschines prosecution of

Timarchus for a sexual offence), 346.

Eisangelia of Aeschines for accepting bribes from

Philip on Second Embassy to Macedon in 346.

Demosthenes prosecutes and loses by 30 votes,

343.


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61RIBERY IN ATHENIAN POLITICS PART I

Cat no. Source(s)

Description

32

Hyp. 3.3

Eisangelia

of Agasikles for bribing the

Din. fr. 16 Halimousioi to enroll him as a citizen when he

was a public slave. Outcome unknown, 3361324.

33

HYP. 3

Eisangelia

of Euxenippos for accepting bribes to

make a report against the interests of the people.

Also charged with being pro-Macedonian and

other crimes. Death penalty proposed, outcome

unknown, 330-24.

34

Din. 1

Apophasis

against Demosthenes for accepting 20

HYP.

talents from Harpalus. Nine others also accused.

Diod. 17.108 Demosthenes convicted and exiled, 32413.

The opportunity, and the temptation that goes with it, was undoubtedly

present in the Athenian political system. Financial gain was a legitimate

reward of office, and although some restrictions were placed on

politicians through accountability measures such as the euthyne, strategoi

were allowed to gain wealth through, for example, booty gained in war.

Rhetores could increase their income through speech writing, as did

Demosthenes. Once a politician had a high profile his regular business

dealings must have had the potential to improve. Such legitimate

methods of profit were complemented by illegitimate ways of making

money through the acceptance of gifts and filching state finances. In a

society of supposed political equals, there were still certain inequalities:

wealth bestowed influence in the democracy as it had done in archaic

aristocratic societies, and the acquisition of wealth, by any means,

increased the power a person had over

others.18

Slander and personal vendetta

It is clear, therefore, that Athenian politicians had the means, the

mechanism, and the opportunity to be involved in bribery, and also to

allow the wealth of allegations and accusations against opponents to

flow. The role of politico-personal relationships was important to this

process and a closer look at many accusations suggests an ulterior

motive on the part of the accuser. Many trials were enacted by the

defendant s arch-rival 26, 28 30, 31, 33, 34), and the majority of

allegations, of any sort, naturally come from the accused s political


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6

B R I BE R Y I N T H E N I N P O L I T I C S P R T I

enemies. In the context of these personal vendettas there is often an

allegation of bribery, and it has been suggested that many accusations

were little more than rhetorical discrediting tactics along the same lines

as your father was a slave , or your mother was a whore , and should

not be taken too seriously (17).19 It was thus common to prosecute a

rival out of sheer malevolence. Demosthenes suggests that Aeschines

motives for prosecution over the receipt of the gold crown were far from

legitimate: the chosen line of the present trial, he complains, contains

the spite of personal enmity, insult, slander and mud-slinging in equal

measure (Dem.

18.12).

This is difficult to disagree with, since

Aeschines motivation definitely seems to be deeply rooted in his intense

rivalry with Demosthenes and a large section of his speech is devoted to

an attack on Demosthenes political career.20

This personal vendetta and feuding can be seen in many trials

involving bribery allegations. The accused was often a victim of

undisguised political manoeuvrings, for example the trials of Cimon

(5), Aeschines (30, 31), and Demosthenes (34). Slanderous accusations

served to reaffirm political opposition, disguised the shady actions of

accusing politicians, and removed rivals from power. These three

examples show how bribery allegations were heavily indebted to the

political atmosphere of the time, and serve as a caution to the reader to

be wary of the political circumstance in which an accusation was made.

Cimon was accused of receiving bribes not to invade Macedonia in 463

by Pericles and Ephialtes (5). Sealey describes the trial as a prelude to

the great rivalry between Cimon and Pericles, signifying the beginning

of Athenian opposition to Cimon, which eventually led to his ostracism.

The young Pericles part in the trial sought to propel

him

onto the

political stage. Pericles is accused of prevarication in the trial and

making a deal with Cimon, which sought to further Pericles career

whilst saving C i m ~ n s . ~ hatever the circumstances, Cimon was

acquitted of an almost certainly false charge which was not pursued

by his opponents. This accusation, therefore, can be categorized as a

fabrication, designed to attack a political rival, and was merely a

symbolic attempt at opposition to the political dominance of Cimon.

Political wranglings can also be detected in the trial of Aeschnes for

receiving bribes from Philip on the Second Embassy to Macedon in 346

(31). Th e trial, in which Demosthenes accused Aeschines of accepting

Philip s gifts, took place in the aftermath of the failure of the Peace of

Philocrates, and Philocrates conviction for taking bribes from Philip on

the same embassy (29). The prosecution of Aeschines should not merely


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B R I B E R Y I N T H E N I N P O L I T I C S P R T I

63

be seen in the context of an attack by Demosthenes on his rival an

attack not supported by any evidence of misdeeds but also as Demos-

thenes need to justify hls own behaviour concerning the Peace. Demos-

thenes had originally supported the treaty, but after Philocrates

conviction for bribery he needed to distance himself from it and the

methods by which it was allegedly obtained. This he did by accusing his

fellow envoy of accepting bribes to give false reports to the Assembly.

The trial, and Aeschines near conviction, came about due to the

political circumstances and needs of the day. Philocrates trial and the

rejection of the Peace by the Assembly had made speaking for alliance

almost a treasonable offence in itself: popular feeling was incredibly

hostile to Philip. Demosthenes, who had been in favour of alliance

originally, now needed to attack before he himself was attacked.22

The trial of Demosthenes resulting from the Harpalus affair should

also perhaps be seen in the wider political context 34). The Areopagus

delay in publishing its findings suggests not so much procrastination,

but an attempt to make full political capital from the decision. It is likely

that the publication of the report coincided with the news that Demos-

thenes embassy to Alexander on the question of the Exiles Decree had

failed,23 so the Areopagus accused Demosthenes to placate Alexander.

Internal politics ensured that Demosthenes was prosecuted, and his new

rival Hypereides now controlled the foreign policy of the city. No piece

of firm evidence was offered at the trial (in both surviving speeches), and

of the nine others accused, at least three were acquitted.24This has led

some to believe that Demosthenes was the victim of a plot to remove

him from active politics due to his anti-Macedonian beliefs.25Unfortu-

nately there is simply not enough surviving evidence to be able to say

that Demosthenes was innocent of the charges his behaviour during

the affair suggests a certain degree of guilt26 however the background

to the trial demonstrates that political manoeuvrings had a decisive effect

on the outcome.

All three examples show that bribery accusations were not neces-

sarily based on firm evidence that the accused had taken bribes. In

most cases it is impossible to tell whether the accused was guilty or

not, but it is evident that bribery allegations were used as political

weapons against rivals. This is also demonstrated by the numerous

cases where

dorodoki

is not the main charge, but an add-on offence

(20, 22, 23), and the high number of unsubstantiated accusations.

Accusing opponents of accepting

dor

was a tactical ploy in the

political game. Since slanderous personal attacks were so common in


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64 B R I BE R Y I N A T H E N I A N P O L I T I C S P A R T I

Athenian politics, and accusations were so impossible to substantiate,

politicians could easily mobilize support against a rival by accusing

him

of accepting bribes.

Dora

were probably frequently offered and

equally frequently accepted, and the Athenian public seems to have

accepted this situation so long as the politicians did not betray the

interests of the Political circumstances generated suspicion

between politicians, but also allowed them to exploit their differences

through bribery accusations. The upshot: it was ridiculously easy to

slander an opponent.

( to be continued)

NOTES

A version of this article was written for submission as my undergraduate dissertation. My

deepest thanks goes to John Salmon for his advice and encouragement. For its failings, however, the

author bears sole responsibility.

1. e.g., Dem. 25.15-16; Hyp. 1.24-5; P1. Rep. 359B-60D.

2. For discussion of the vocabulary of bribery see F. D. Harvey, Dona Ferentes: Some Aspects

of Bribery in Greek Politics in P. A. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (edd.), Cru x: Essays Presented to

G . E . M . de Ste Croix on his 75th Birthday (Exeter, 1985), 82-9. Also see G. Herman, Ritualised

Friendship and the Greek City

(Cambridge, 1987), 75ff.

3. Chremata money , misthos rewards or pay are also used. Dekazein Yenning is most

often used for bribing a jury. See Harvey, op. cit., 88-9, D. M. Macdowell, Athenian Laws About

Bribery , R I D A 30 (1983), 63 ff.

4. For the importance of reciprocity in Athenian society see A. Missiou in C. Gill,

N. Postlethwaite, and R. Seaford (edd.), Reciprocity in Ancient Greece (Oxford, 1988), 188-91;

M. Schofield in P. Cartledge, P. Millett, and S . von Reden (edd.) , Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict

and Com mun ity in Classical Athens

(Cambridge, 1998), 37-51; S. von Reden,

Exchange in Ancient

Greece (London, 1995), 93-5; T. W. Gallant, Risk and S urv ival in Ancient Greece: Reconstructing the

Domestic Economy (Cambridge, 199I), 143-69.

5. e.g., Demades. See J.K Davies, Athenian Propertied Families (Oxford, 1971), no. 3230, 100-

1 (hereafter A P F ) .

6. For discussion of the relationship between bribery and embezzlement see Harvey, op. cit.,

79-80.

7. I have followed Todd s spelling of 'sykophancy' (habitual prosecutor) as distinct from the

English sycophancy (flatterer) to avoid confusion. See S. C. Todd, The Shape ofAthenian Law

(Oxford, 1993), 92-3.

8. For discussions of sykophancy see the articles by R. Osbourne and

F.

D. Harvey in P. A.

Cartledge, P. Millett, and S. C. Todd (edd.), Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law Politics and Society

(Cambridge, 1990); also D. M. Macdowell, Law

in ClassicalAthens

(London, 1978), 62-6, Todd ,

op. cit., 92-4, R. J Bonner and

G.

Smith, The Administration ofJustice from Homer to Aristotle, Vol.

II (Chicago, 1938), 39-74.

9. T he table will also be referred to throughout my companion article, Bribery in Athenian

Politics Part 11 , G R (Oct. 2001).

10. For electoral bribery in the Roman Republic see M. Jehne in M . Jehne (ed.),

Demokratie in

Rom ? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der romischen Republik (Stuttgart, 1995), 51 ff., P. Nadig,

Ardet Ambitus (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), E. A. Bauerle, Procuring an Election: Amb itus in the

Roman Republic (Univ. Of Michigan Diss. 1990), A. Lintott, J H S 80 (1990), 1 ff., L. R. Taylor,

Par ty Politics in the Age of C aesar (Berkeley, 1949), 67 ff.

11. Ps-Xen. 1.3 implies that high offices were not paid by saying that the demos only hold offices


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which involve the receipt of money where there is a chance of making a person profit ,

distinguishing these offices with those of

strategos

or cavalry commander. See also M . H . Hansen,

The Athen ian Democracy in the Age ofDem osthenes

(Oxford, 199l ), 240-1, R. K. Sinclair,

Democracy

and P articipation i n Classical Athe ns

(Cambridge, 1988), 110. The restoration of the democracy in

403 saw the reintroduction of state pay for jurors, the Boule, and (the introduction of pay in) the

Assembly, but not for magistracies (except archons). See

Ath . Pol.

62, 41.3.

12. For arguments of the sovereignty of the Athenian law courts as opposed to that of the

Assembly see Hansen, op. cit. (n. 1I), 12, 179ff. and

The Sovereignty of the People s Court in Athens

(Odense, 1974), 17. For the reverse view see Sinclair, op. cit., 78,

J

Ober,

Mass and Elite in

Democratic Athens

(Princeton, 1990), 146ff.

13. Ober, op. cit., 238 describes the Athenian viewpoint succinctly: the possession of wealth did

not ensure incorruptibility, but the Athenians felt that it

should

do so. For another view on the

relationship between poverty and bribery see Sinclair, op. cit., 185: men of wealth presumably did

not require such perks to commit themselves more or less to full-time public life, but that does not

mean that they declined such perks.

14. Din. 1.89, 104, 2.15, Diod. 17.15.3, Hyp. 5.25 all accuse him of bribery, and attribute it to

poverty. However it simply shows that these type of accusations were common Athenian insults.

A. Andrewes,

The Greek Tyrants

(London, 1956), 57 acknowledges this in a different context: the

ingrained Greek habit of attributing low birth to a political opponent.

15.

A P F

3230, 100-1; the very fact that he is included in this book demonstrates his wealth.

Davies is perhaps too ready to attribute his wealth to the receipt of bribes. See also Sinclair, op.

cit., 45.

16. See R. Kulesza,

Die Bestechung im politischen Leben Athe ns i m

5.

und J h v . Chr .

(Konstanz,

1995), 74: Sein Ziel war, den Beweis herbeizufuhren, daO Aischines durch verbrecherische

Tatigkeit vom Bettler zum reichen Mann geworden sei.

17. Iphicrates was supposedly a self-made cobbler s son ,

O C D 3 , A P F

7737, 248-50. The

generals of the Corinthian War greatly increased their wealth through booty. See

J

K. Davies,

Wealth and the Power of Wealth in ClassicalAthen s

(New York, 1981), 66 ff. However, he comments:

reliable (i.e. unprejudiced) quantified information is almost impossible to come by.

18. For the connection of wealth and power see Arist.

Pol.

1284a19-22 who sees it as a reason

for the use of ostracism in democratic cities: the

demos

pass a sentence of ostracism on those

whom they regard as having too much influence owing to their wealth. See also Sinclair, op.

cit., 186.

19. Some accusations include personal insults such as in

17):

Nicomachus was accused of being

bribed to record certain laws, but the prosecution also accuse him of being the son of a public slave,

of being taken in late to a phratry, and of being employed as an under-clerk to a magistrate.

Accusations in comedy also have a ring of personal attack about them, instead of being a firm

accusation. See the numerous accusations made against Cleon in

Ar. Eq in particular. For the use

of bribery allegations as a discrediting tactic see H. Wankel in W. Schuller (ed.),

Korruption in

Altertum

(Munich and Vienna, 1982), 32 ff.

20. See especially Aes. 3.49ff.

21. For Pericles motives in prosecuting Cimon see R. Sealey,

Hermes

84 (1956), 234-7.

22. See E. M. Harris,

Aeschines and Athenian Politics

(Oxford, 1995), 116-18; J B. Bury and

R. Meiggs,

A History of Greece

4th ed. (London, 1975), 433 ff.

23. The Exiles Decree meant that all exiles in Greece would have to return to their country of

origin. This was an unfavourable measure for Athens since it would effectively mean the restoration

of Samos to the returning Samians. Another result of the embassy was that Demosthenes changed

his mind and accepted Alexander s demands for his deification, which put suspicion on him. See

I. Worthington,

A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth

Century Athens

(Michigan, 1992), 59.

24. Aristogeiton, Hagnonides, and Polyeuctus of Sphettus were acquitted. Demosthenes,

Demades, and Philocles were condemned. Demades fled before the trial and was condemned

in

absentia.

It is unknown what happened to the three other accused men. See Worthington, op.

cit., 52.

25. See Worthington, op. cit., 58-65: the verdict of Demosthenes guilt was politics, designed to

remove him from active participation in politics. See also E. Badian,

J H S

81 (1961), 16-43.

26. He changed his story: first he denied outright taking any money, proposing the

apophasis

and


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the death penalty for those found guilty, then admitting that he took the money as a loan for the

Theoric Fund after the Areopagus published its findings.

27. Hyp. 1.24-5. See Harvey, op. cit., 106-7, B. Strauss, ncient

orld

11 1985), 71,

C

Taylor,

G R

Oct. 2001).

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