ORADEA AFECTE-COGNITIE

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PERSPECTIVE ASUPRA DEZVOLTRII INDIVIDUALE:CORELAII EXISTENTE NTRE AFECTIVITATE I COGNIIE

PERSPECTIVES ON INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT:

EXISTING CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AFFECT AND COGNITION

cercet.dr. Marinela Rusu

Academia Romn, Filiala Iai,Institutul Gh. Zane

Abstract:This paper is a short review of some of the investigators addressing cognition and affect issues in

personal development. The issues addressed, deal with the primacy of affect and/or cognition as instigators

of behavior, the facilitative ordisruptive role of affect on cognition, the control functions of cognition

relative to affective expression, and the relative significance of cognition/affects as predictors to behavior.

We describe here the basic elements of Piaget's model of intelligence and affectivity. ResearcherSantostefano provides a comprehensive model drawing on philosophical (metaphors), psychological

(cognitive control), and social (context) concepts to generate a holistic model of cognition-emotion

binomial. We also present the emotional development approach as a function of cognitive development

(Kagan) and Izard's conception, claiming that affects and cognition can be addressed as two distinct areas.

Lastly, it is impossible to find behavior arising from affectivity alone without any cognitive elements.

It is equally impossible to find behavior composed only of cognitive elements. Nevertheless, cognitive

functions, from perception and sensorimotor schemes to abstract intelligence with formal operations will be

distinguished from affective functions. This seems necessary because, although cognitive and affective

factors are indissociable in an individual's concrete behavior, they appear different in nature. Similarly, for

the individual, feelings and thoughts can be conceptualized as moving in a unified space where the space is

indissociable. The space is this cognitive-affective schema. Key-words: affectivity, cognition, holistictheories, metaphor.

This paper is seeking to contribute with some ideas to a critical problem in psychology: how

structure and function of intelligence are related to affection. Although it is a fundamental question in

psychology, it was often ignored in different periods of history. With the maturation of cognitive science in

recent decades, today we have a resurgence of interest in the ways in which emotions affect cognition. New

cognitive psychology is a reaction against the sterility of behavioral science that was originally based on the

principles of associative conditioning.

Piaget's perspective on intelligence and affection. Piaget rejects the dualism that is often projected

between intelligence and emotion as two distinct but similar behavior means, acting one upon the other.Instead, intelligence and emotions are inseparable from each other and are co-constructed by a constant

interaction between them.

Structures and energies. Piaget sees the relationship between intelligence and emotion as having

two behavioral components, structural and energetic. Affective behavior reflects energetics, including

subjective interests, efforts and feelings, while reflecting their organization and structure of intelligence is

not reducible or causal one to the other ("understanding is not the cause of emotion but affection is the cause

of understanding", Piaget, 1970, p.25). Thus, for Piaget, the dichotomy between intellect and emotion was

created artificially by the analytical abstractions, to serve as a tool to facilitate axiomatic presentation, while,

in reality, none of them can not work without the other. After Piaget, developmental relationship between

intelligence and emotion can only be explained by a theoretical perspective where both modes are subsumed

by a common system of mental structures. Such a position is entirely consistent with the theoretical coreand empirical claims of Piaget's model of psychological development, in which all mental processes,


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including thinking, language, perception and memory are organized by a universal joint and a set of

correspondences and morphisms, of internalized transformations and coordinates (Piaget, 1970).

Emotions, will and conflict trends. Although he dropped a causal relationship between intelligence

and affectivity, when one or other prevails, Piaget states that they are structurally parallel and represent the

sequential stage of their correspondent development, being the small chariot between intelligence and

affection. This is ontogenesis reversible operations that become internalized and coordinated with other

operations, to form the cognitive schemas (which themselves are reversible) that define and explain the

appearance of mature forms of intelligence. They also define and explain the emotional development of the

individual. In other words, affective operations are isomorphic, in terms of explaining the development of

cognitive intelligence operations. Their only difference, as Piaget (1951) say is that "emotional process ... is

based only on the conservation and the coordination of values and the reversal in values, while intellectual

operations are based on coordination and checks, to preserve the relationship" ( p.143).

The will is the emotional equivalent of intellectual operations. Just as there are physical relation

conservations (number, weight, volume) there exists also, the conservation of values. In both areas, the

remarkable size of stimuli in the environment is treated as a prior context of balanced schemes. A radical

distinction, however, between emotional and intellectual operations is that values conservation in contrast to

physical relations is related to cultural contextual constraints, instead of being universal. So, values are not

verifiable by an extension of mathematical logic or empirical evidence. This explanation of affectivity in

terms of coordination and conservation of values will not be confused with the "intellectualization" ofaffectivity. Affective processess do not produce cognitive representations.

There are two types of theories guiding the research on the relationship between emotion and

cognition. I will refer here to the first level of the cognitive theory because these kind of theories conceive

cognition as primary mental process and also as a cause of emotion. The other type of theory refers to a

dynamic theory such as theories regarding emotion as a primary mental process, being the primary cause or

motivation for cognition. Although these descriptions suggest that these positions are in total disagreement

at all levels, they still do not conflict. Recent studies have led many investigators to important contributions

to cognitive theory of emotional development.

Emotional development as a function of cognitive development. Kagan (1978) considers emotional

development as a function of cognition. Kagan as Piaget agrees with the idea of inseparability between

affect and cognition. He sees emotion as a cognitive construction, its intensity being determined by theperceived level of self-stimulation and quality through evaluative processes. Thus, the Kagans study of

emotional development is the study of two seemingly parallel processes: the autonomous-visceral and

cognitive development - whose interaction produces emotion. Development of evaluative perception is seen

as being performed in the same manner as the concept - perception of objects and space-time. Kagan thinks

that the study of automatic perception development is especially important for understanding the seemingly

automatic emotional response.

Kagan (1978) made a larger statement about emotion in human development. His position is similar

to that of Piaget in some respects. The same, he believes that assessment plays a crucial role in determining

the quality of emotion that is experienced. But he thinks the affective tone can change, even if not detected

and therefore labeled. After Kagan, affective tone detection is of paramount importance for future emotional

state. Is in apparent agreement with Piaget and differential emotions theory, that stated: "perceived statuschanges can be seen as motivational and predictive of changes in thinking and action" (1978, p. 6-7). Kagan

differs from both, Piaget and differential emotions theory because considers emotions as transient. This

however leads to the idea that emotions can be reduced to minor roles in the development process. A

distinctive feature in Kagan's theory is the recognition that attaches the two types of emotion and emphasis

to the difference between emotional tone undetected (unconscious) - biological defined processes and

resulting emotional tone of evaluative processes, being also detected. He believes that the two psychological

states definitely deserve different names. Feelings that are important for Kagan are detected, the following

being thecognitive evaluations or judgments. The development of such experiences is explained in terms of

cognitive and emotional skills, generally defined as cognitive skills. This approach seems to be correct in

some respects as when he notes that a child can not protest the loss of an object until it detects its absence.

He is certainly right that less anger and frustration involves cognitive ability to relate events in a stimulatingmental schema.


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We can talk about merits of Kagan's theory, especially in addressing certain emotions. His system

provides maximum incentive specificity to bind events, feelings and behaviors. Can be a problem however,

to derive a complete network of associations for a given emotion and reaching a general description. Joy can

be associated with a variety of events and, to paraphrase an old adagio, a person s joy may mean to upset

another. And if we agree with Piaget, that interest in emotion and differential emotions theory, that virtually

anyone can become completely uninterested, we expect to appoint Kagan's system event-interest

associations to produce a very long list.

There are no ratings stimulating cognitive feelings or internal feelings during the first 4 to 6 months

of life, Kagan believes. Conversely, differential emotions theory gives newborns specific emotional facial

expressions congruent with discrete coding it (Izard, Huebner, Risser, McGinnes, & Dougherty, 1980).

Empirical research based on this controversial is just in the beginning. Relevant here is Bearison's

study (1981,1983) showing that keeping a babys hand tightly bring different facial expression and behave

differently, suggesting differences in their emotional states/motivation at ages 2-4 and 7 months of life. Even

if Kagan (1978) is right or not, saying that emotional development is essentially an epiphenomenon, a

function of cognitive development, he opened interesting discussion on some plausible cognition-emotion

sequences in the individual development. Some of his examples are as these: the object permanence is

possible due to the anxiety of the unknown (unfamiliar) in children of 8 months. Ability to remember the old

image of the mother, relates this image to the current situation and retain this information in mind a few

seconds, allowing the child to separate emotion. Cognitive ability to recognize that someone has a chance,allow reaction of guilt in children of 4 years. Ability to feel the relation self-others allows children 6-7 years

to experience pride and humility.

Emotional experience as a function of the attribution process. A different approach to the study of

emotional development was developed by Lewis and Michalson (1983). Their perspective is that ofsocial

cognitive psychology with a primary interest to attributional processes. They focus on the main emotions

that it consider intrinsic to social motivation - anger, guilt, pity and pride. They argue that such emotions are

generally related consequences of causal attributions. This means that how people feel about social events

depends on the interpretation they attach to their causes. Although this appears to be similar to stimulation,

the cognitive model of emotional activation is quite different. Any sense of pride after a successful award,

gives no feeling of gratitude because the success is attributed to voluntary aid of others, so, the supposedly

state of stimulation is interpreted before experiencing the emotion. Such emotions are apparentlyindependent of the stimulus, according to this aproach.

To understand social emotions, we need to understand causal attributions. Lewis and Michalson

(1983) argue that certain situations trigger a causal search, especially those where a result is expected

(success or failure) or a wish that was not met (an interactional rejection). The taxonomy of causes can be

described in three dimensions - locus control (internal-external), stability (relative tolerance), and

controllability (the actor has a choice). Although they argue that emotions are guided by causal perceptions

he recognizes that emotions vary in the extent to which they are cognitively mediated. Some emotions, such

as joy or sadness are seen together as a direct function of the results of actions or events. Emotion,

dependent on a particular result is generally intense and short-lived. A higher frequency of such emotions in

children of 6 years is combined with the notion that in early age, children are more emotionally unstable.

The adds of cognitive knowledge enriches the emotional life, bringing the experience of some new, specificemotions.

Emotions of pity, anger and guilt are also correlated with differential locusu's size, stability and

controllability and these links shows the development trends. Locus of causality is important assignment

locus of pride and this pride changes over time, with age. Although some children of 6 years assigns pride to

some internal causes of actions initiated by himself, we find here a significant increase in the percentage

assignment with increasing of age. Lewis and Michalson (1983) assumed that the size of this locus may be

one that develops the earliest, following the development of children's ability to distinguish the self from the

non-self. After the development of this level, they can mediate the cognitive processes related to pride or

other emotions. The next dimension that is passed is the dimension stability, which precedes feelings of

optimism, pessimism and depressive affects. That which develops the last is the controllability dimension

and associated principles of justice and that "should be" is also a history of guilt feelings. The developmentof emotions is considered to be a dependent cognitive development sphere. Their focus is on the emotional


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response. These features of the theory of the primacy of cognition tend to give emotion a minor role in

individual development.

Emotions as organizers and motivators of adaptation processes. Research on emotion-cognition

interface should be exhausted faster if we did not mess with the notion of cognition which must precede all

changes in emotional states. Piaget, as Cicchetti and Hesse (1982) along with other theorists (Izard, 1977;

Zajonc, 1984) as they believe that emotion can be a function of sensory input does not turn. Comparison of

perceived images and stories that lead to appropriate generally positive emotions while the gap may lead to

either positive or negative emotions, depending on their size and context. Complex processes of evaluation

that reach beyond the physical attributes of stimuli also activate emotion, as does the memory, anticipation

and motor acts. It is important to remember, however, that for Piaget and differential emotions theory, it is

not rendered emotion activation problem concerned with emotions as a trigger for the conscience, but does

not influence the intensity or quality of any change of emotions that would occur, because a certain emotion

is always present in consciousness.

In marked contrast to the theories discussed so far, are those theories that consider emotions as an

important influence and continuous development. Two such theories aredifferential emotions theory (Izard,

1971, 1977, 1978) and organizational theory (Heider, 1958). Moreover, Campos and Barrett (1983),

Ciccheti and Hesse (1982), Lewis and Michalson (1983) and others have contributed to the development and

expansion of these theories, both at a conceptual and empirical level. Theoretical positions of these

researchers differ in certain aspects. Those who identify differential emotions theory focus closer oncontributions of biological/genetic factors to the emotional development, rather than cognition, social signal

value of discrete emotional expressions in the first year of life, the correlation between these being early

expressions of specific emotions and emotions experienced, and the motivational functions of these

emotions.

In view of Izard (1977) affects and cognition are conceptualized as two distinct areas. For him,

emotion is a nonspecific general term that includes motivational states and processes. He notes, that "a

structure or cognitive-affective orientation is a strong connection or association of one affect (or a pattern of

emotions) with images, words, thoughts and ideas" (p.65, 1977). It is clear here that Izard make categorical

distinctions between cognition and affection. This view seems to be consistent with a logical positivist

vision and an heuristic orientation. Of particular importance is Izard's claim that "emotions are the primary

motivation for the human being" (p.3, 1977). For him affectivity is a controlling category and emotion asubset, which is "a complex phenomenon that has neurophysiological motor and expressive, experiential

components" (p.64). If we look in terms of hierarchy, emotions are at a concrete level with physiological

substrates, but affectivity is seen as a higher level, more abstract.

Zajonc (1980) argues for distinctions between cognition and emotion: a series of experimental results

on preferences, attitudes, forming impressions and making decisions as clinical phenomena, suggest that

judgments may be independent of, or prior to the time the types of perceptual and cognitive operations

assumed to be the basis of these affective judgments, take place. It is concluded that emotions and cognition

are under the control of separate and partially independent systems that can influence each other in different

ways. (p.151).

Lazarus (1982), which disagrees with Zajonc on the primacy of emotions and cognition in

determining liability, claims that the two are found merged. He writes that whether emotions and cognitionare usually merged, there are also conditions when they are separable: cognitive processes we use in the

valuation process, for appreciation. The essence of Lazarus's statements as follows: "Cognitive activity is a

necessary and sufficient condition of emotion. (p.1019). The task of psychology, Lazarus notes, is to

formulate rules that generate cognitive processes, influences and forms the emotional response in each

species that reacts with emotion, in any social group that shares emotions, commitments and beliefs in any

individual member of the human race" (p.1024). Lazarus's admirable effort is shaked by the logical

problems of its formulation. If something is merged, a physical metaphor, why he argues that this merger is

destroyed by the action (energy) of emotions or by the diffusion of a function of intense cognitive

judgments? If the merger cognition-emotion is different in kind, why are they separated?

Santostefano's model. He organizes his model around three fundamental concepts: cognitive

control, metaphor andcontext and each one of them contribute to a whole. Let's look at the emergence ofthese items in terms of history. The Santostefanos cognitive control concept is developed as "mechanisms


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that have changed in response to changing incentives, responding to task stimuli, simultaneously associating

fantasy and affect from an inner world" (p.178). Although they made several experiments, Gardner and

Moriarty (1968) addresses cognitive control as applied to a similar control, complementary to a study on

preadolescent children. From the perspective of the authors, affection is not entirely under cognitive control;

cognitive control rather is interpretated as a defense to overcome anxiety. The relationship between

cognition and emotion, appears as "affectivity is more fundamental and of greater causal significance in the

behavior" (Gardner & Moriarty, 1968, p 305).

Cognitive or dynamic? Clarifying the roles and relationships between cognition and emotion has

theoretical and practical importance. Theoretical importance is to understand human functioning because

cognition and emotions are labels denoting two sets of fundamental human actions. With this understanding

we will be able to improve our theoretical and practical approach to human development. On this basis we

can develop practical procedures (clinical and/or educational) that would help individuals to work

effectively, especially keeping thoughts and emotions working in harmony.

Even the psychoanalytic theory accepted such ideas. They write that "emotional states and

individuality in the organization of the emotional states must, in part, related to the nature and interaction of

a variety of behavioral structures, including defense behaviors, cognitive control, intellectual abilities, motor

behavior - less explored, and others"(Gardner & Moriarty, 1968, p. 305). For these authors of psychoanalytic

orientation thus, the affect is identifiable and is a fundamental reactive system which influence the adaptive

functioning.The beginnings of researches made by Gardner R., Holzman P. S., Klein G. S., Linton H. and Spence

D. P. (1959) were very promising. Because cognitive control was regarded as a "form of cognition which is

considered to be dynamically linked with impulse control issues and expression of emotions" (Zimiles,

1981, p 57), they seemed able to give the organizational constructs for a parsimonious conceptualization of

cognition-emotion relationship. Organization of cognitive control constructs is under investigation as

follows: "The body will not bring only needs, impulses and desires in continues harmony; it must also deal

with many independent requirements of the reality" (Gardner et.al., 1959, p.3). Thus, cognitive control

consists of adaptive mechanisms that help the individual to overcome anxiety.

Santostefano's control construct is presented, using a developmental model, reflecting a structural-

functional conceptualization. Five types of control are identified and defined as mobile structures that can

change their interrelationship as a function of environmental conditions. An essential mode in which thecognitive control seems to work in favor of adaptation is to coordinate or mediate between inner fantasies

and emotions, and environmental variables (external). Cognitive control is defined as a number of

mechanisms which:

govern and determine the amount and organization of subjects information, becomingavailable to the receiver.

are enabled by the individuals intentions to use and adapt information. varies wherever they operate in the individual's cognitive functioning. evolves as a function of maturity and life experience and become autonomously towards their

developmental origin.

mediating the influence of personality and motivation in the individual's cognitive meetingswith the environment.

becomes appearance of tolerance in cognitive functioning or adaptive style and thus givingfuture modeling of his individual experiences (Santostefano, 1984,176).

Cognitive control maintains a balance of internal forces such as feelings, fantasies and external

influences. Cognitive control mechanisms operate in order to maintain the balance between emotions and

knowledge and that is why, "are seen as encouraging adaptation, psychological development and learning"

(Santostefano, 1984, p. 78). Each of the five quality control mechanisms evolve with the passing years. At

first glance cognitive control appears to be volitional and reflexive, beliefs that serve as means to adapt

various tests and fluctuations of life.

Cognitive control mechanisms and their definitions. Although at first sight the construct of

cognitive control seems to be reconciled with cognition-emotion dichotomy, it avoids to face discussion

whether cognitive control is conducted either by cognitive or emotional factors. Santostefano's researchsuggests that it is driven by emotional factors, whereas emotional control change events in contexts that are


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loaded with anxiety and fear. For example, to subjects task in the the parachute study, was to make

judgments - a cognitive task. Even if the subjects answer and the task, requires to generate judgments, these

beliefs appear to be driven by emotion, that is, that individuals experience anxiety while waiting to jump

with parachute.

Metaphor. In his system Santostefano, metaphor is a critical construct, a secondary theme which

reflects the content and issues that individuals engage in organizing their personal experiences. He writes

about a metaphor that rotates - like a spiral - a plane to another and taking a new structure with an intrinsic

emergence of new coding capacities of the child. He uses the metaphor concept to incorporate piagetiene

transitions development, as well as changes attributable to psychosexual development. The primary role of

the metaphor is attractive. It allows maximum flexibility in defining its references, facilitates

communication, and allows to define those aspects of the human condition that are difficult to identify in

everyday language. However, the use of metaphor by Santostefano put some conceptual and analytical

problems. He uses the metaphor definition proposed by Schn (1979), who argues that metaphor works as a

mediator between the inner and outer forces or between the self and others.

The distinction between inner experience of metaphor and its expression suggests that metaphorical

understanding can be ambiguous because it is what Polanyi (1967) refers to as tacit dimension. This is

essentially "we can know more than we can tell" (p.4). We often use metaphors to capture and communicate

because we have difficulty in saying what we know. Poetry, art, and music used metaphors exactly for these

reasons. Metaphors may create realities for us. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Theseactions, of course, will fit the metaphor. In turn, the action will revive the power of metaphor to make

experience coherent. In this sense, the metaphor can activate the fulfillment of prophecy (self-fulfilling

prophecies) (p.151). "

Metaphors are symbols, said Santostefano. Symbols, however, have a particular function, designating

cognitive-affective correlations. "Metaphor is a symbol, because there is a relationship ... which does not

result from the social conventions but is directly experienced by the individual mind," writes Piaget (1951,

p.169). Focusing on the symbolic definition of metaphor, bring closer the construct and facilitate relations

with other conceptualizations. Metaphor characterizes much of our conceptual thinking. Santostefano's

cognitive control is a metaphor. Piaget's structuralism is a metaphor. It is obvious as is the observation that

the value emphasize the degree to which we organize our social realities in ways that are not necessarily

physical patterns of social reality but of our built experience. However, there are those who take an objectiveposition without realizing the fact that they also use metaphors.

In conclusion of the Santostefano's theory discussion we can say that cognitive control, metaphor and

the context form a triumvirate as a whole (overall) which helps to explain how cognition and emotions

interact. One can say that this perspective requires a deeper developmental approach in the future, it is

necessary to integrate cognitive-affective model in an explicit model. Theories discussed so far, deals with

the primacy of cognition or affects as facilitator triggers - stimuli of behaviors or blocking emotions and

cognition, by control functions in relation to cognition and emotion expression, with relative significance of

predictors of cognitive/affective behavior. Santostefano provides a comprehensive model that elaborates,

based on the philosophical (metaphor), psychological (cognitive control) and social concepts (context) to

generate a holistic model. Santostefano's multidisciplinary approach has a psychoanalytic base. However,

there are enough and impressive overlapping themes which suggest that while there will be a greater near by,future investigations. In fact, the proposed model was stimulated by Santostefano. His concepts of metaphor,

control, and context will be included in future research.

A unified view of cognition-emotion relationship. It is impossible to detect a behavior resulting from

affectivity separated of any cognitive element. It is equally impossible to find a behavior which consists only

of cognitive aspects. However, cognitive functions, from sensory-motor schemas in perception and abstract

intelligence with formal operations are distinct from affective functions. This seems to be necessary,

although the cognitive and affective factors are inseparable in the actual conduct of an individual, they

appear to be different in nature. The same is true for individual feelings and knowledge, which can be

conceptualized as moving in an area where space is inseparably united. Space itself is the schema.

Bearison (1981) proposes two sentences based on his statements:

cognition (and we refer to processes such as thinking, reasoning, judgment) and emotions (emotionsand feelings) organized in schemas and


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componentsofcognitive-affective schema that are, by definition, a configuration in which emotionsand cognition work together and yet as distinct elements that can be identified.

Affective-cognitive schema appears in one's personal experience as an actor and the actor is used in

the sense of being active, as described Bearison (1983). Scheme serves to adjust individual action, an

activity in pursuit of a goal. For example, an individuals effort strives to solve a math problem. The work

required involves using mathematical schemes containing skills (knowledge) and affective aspects,

simultaneous, assimilated during that mathematical scheme development. This statement is based on the

premise that knowledge is never assimilated without any intervention of affection. Intensity level can vary

from minimum to maximum and can have a positive or negative valence. Regardless of the intensity or their

directionality, there is no neutrality. Emotion and cognition serve as regulator functions, as major sources of

influence, as determining the quality and direction of activities designed to achieve a particular purpose. A

second factor isthe quality of the link between person and task. In the example of math, the individual is

positively involved (affective) in an effort to solve the problem but believes that the problem is difficult.

In conclusion, cognition and emotions are in schemes that are not only cognitive but "contain" and

emotional elements. Fundamentally, any scheme created so far, can not exclude the cognitive-affective

components. The individual experiences bring active components which in turn activates the others,

depending on the case in question. Cognition and affectivity are functioning in tandem, none of them work

independently. Knowledge involves emotion and affects interact with cognition. Hiatuses in this schedule

may occur when the balanced relationship cognition-affect in the scheme is disturbed. Cognitive control, assuggested Sanstefano influences cognition-emotion balance in a unified space. Effectiveness of control

depends on the level of skills in child development. If there is already a schema cognitive/affective which is

functioning as a whole, then why would we still need emotional and cognitive categories?

We agree with Piaget in this regard that although cognition and affects are parts of a whole, each part

has characteristics that can be distinguished and labeled with high credibility. As for example, the distinctive

features of a coin (heads/tails), forming together the whole coin. Two other factors interact with

cognitiv/emotional schemes: one is the controland the other is the consciousness. Control refers to the

conscious or unconscious emotional inhibition (as Santostefano says). Awareness refers to understanding the

development, the fact that individuals have feelings (understood as empathy) and that one's personal feelings

are correlated with both internal and external conditions. In psychoanalytic terms, awareness and control can

be conceived as functions of the ego. Balanced pattern of development of cognition-emotion relationshipproposed by Bearison will be seen in a wider context of the development of the ego, because the ego

construct incorporate concepts of memory described above.

Working for integration, balanced model incorporates some of the ideas of Santostefano, especially

those of context, control and metaphor, which over time will provide a model that takes into account the

holistic and integrative nature of the relationship between cognition and emotion.

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