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Georgian Membership in NATO: Policy Implications of the BucharestSummitTravis L. Bounds a;Ryan C. Hendrickson aa Eastern Illinois University,

To cite this Article Bounds, Travis L. andHendrickson, Ryan C.(2009) 'Georgian Membership in NATO: Policy Implicationsof the Bucharest Summit', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22: 1, 20 30

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Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22:2030, 2009Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1351-8046 print/1556-3006 onlineDOI: 10.1080/13518040802695233

FSLV1351-80461556-3006Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, Jan 2009: pp. 00Journal of Slavic Military Studies

Georgian Membership in NATO: PolicyImplications of the Bucharest Summit

Georgian Membership in NATOT. L. Bounds and R. C. Hendrickson

TRAVIS L. BOUNDS and RYAN C. HENDRICKSONEastern Illinois University

This article examines Georgias efforts to gain NATO membership,

focusing primarily on how closely Georgia meets NATOs politicaland military standards for applicant states as suggested in NATOs

1995Study on Enlargement. In addition, this article assesses thetransatlantic debate over enlargement at NATOs 2008 BucharestSummit, and provides updated analysis of Georgias military capa-

bilities after its conflict with Russia over South Ossetia. The findingsindicate that Georgia falls short of NATOs requested baseline mea-

sures for democratization and military modernization, and that

the recent war in Georgia raises additional complications in Geor-gias ambitions for alliance membership.

As was clear at the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) recent summitin Bucharest, Romania, NATOs open-door membership policy remains aliveand well. The twenty-six NATO allies extended new membership invitationsto Albania and Croatia, and also indicated their support for Macedonias entryupon the resolution of the dispute over its formal name with Greece. Inaddition to these developments, Georgia and Ukraine received considerableattention at the summit, as some of the allies pushed aggressively for NATO to

extend membership offers to these states to participate in NATOs MembershipAction Plan (MAP). At the summit, the allies agreed that these two states willeventually become NATO members, but at the same time, hesitated on

Travis L. Bounds earned his M.A. in political science at Eastern Illinois University in 2008.Ryan C. Hendrickson is professor of political science at Eastern Illinois University. He is

author ofDiplomacy and War at NATO. The Secretary General and Military Action after the ColdWar, and The Clinton Wars.

Address correspondence to Ryan C. Hendrickson, Professor of Political Science, EasternIllinois University, 600 Lincoln Avenue, Department of Political Science, Charleston, IL 61920-3099.

E-mail: [email protected]


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Georgian Membership in NATO 21

offering a formal invitation to join the MAP.1 Since the summit, Georgianmembership in NATO has taken on heightened attention due to its militaryconflict with Russia in August 2008.

While much has been written on the policies and impact of NATO

expansion, including some assessments of recently admitted members tothe alliance, very little analysis exists specifically on the history of Georgiasrelationship with NATO and its current efforts to gain admission into thealliance. This research fills that void by offering an analysis of this relation-ship, and provides an assessment of its current political and military reformefforts. In addition, this article provides some analysis on the intra-alliancediplomacy that shaped the Bucharest Summit, especially with regard toGeorgias membership ambitions. We find that Georgia has made importantprogress in its military and political reforms, yet still has serious domesticproblems that run directly counter to the initial conditions set forth for aspir-

ing members in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement. Given Georgiasneed for considerable political reforms, the politics of the Bucharest Summitdemonstrate another element of the Bush administrations unilateral tenden-cies, but also indicates how peripheral NATOs admission standards havebecome in the current enlargement process.

The recent war in Georgia now complicates Georgias ambitions to jointhe alliance, and at a minimum produced considerable damage to Georgiasmilitary infrastructure and raises further questions about the potential problemswith full membership. We begin with a short literature review of NATO expan-sion, and follow with an analysis of Georgias aspirations to join the alliance.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Since NATO initiated its post-cold war reform efforts, much research hasbeen devoted to the alliances membership enlargement. In the first expansionround at the Madrid Summit in 1997, membership offers were extended tothe Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Much of the analysis of thisexpansion round focused on American leadership in guiding the enlargement

process and the eventual decision.2

In the aftermath of the Madrid Summit, much analysis turned to thepolitical impact of NATOs open-door policy and significance of thisexpansion decision. A number of studies noted that these new states hadfailed to continue with meaningful defense reforms, and simultaneously

1 NATO Press Release(2008) 049, Bucharest Summit Declaration (April 2, 2008) at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html2 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATOs Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York:

Columbia University Press. 2003) and James M. Goldgeier,Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to

Enlarge NATO(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 1999).


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22 T. L. Bounds and R. C. Hendrickson

raised serious policy qualms with another round of expansion.3 Despite therather limited military capabilities, and ongoing challenges in civil-militaryrelations across nearly all of the applicant states, NATO moved forward atthe Prague Summit in November 2002 with membership offers to seven

Central and East European states.4

Since this time, while many studies con-tinue to note the rather small military capabilities of the Prague invitees,much research points to the positive impact NATO expansion has had onpromoting democratic civil-military relations, and to some extent on theimplementation of much needed defense reforms.5

More recently, as NATO again began to consider another round of mem-bership expansion, other research examined the defense reform efforts imple-mented by Albania and Croatia. This research found that NATO has continuedto be a catalyst for meaningful democratic reforms and military modernization,yet at the same time these aspiring member states still suffer in significant ways

when measured against NATOs 1995 Study on Enlargement.6 Nonetheless,NATO moved forward with its expansion plans at the Bucharest Summit inApril 2008, which raises new questions about the policy impact of this decision.

One of the more interesting developments in the days leading up to theSummit was the willingness of U.S. President George W. Bush, along with afew other allies, to push the alliance to offer Georgia and Ukraine invitationsto join the Membership Action Plan, which was created at NATOs 1999Washington Summit and is viewed as a significant step toward eventual mem-bership. Within the current scholarship on NATO expansion, no analysisexists on Georgias efforts to join the alliance, specifically when measuredagainst the political and military reforms all applicant states are expected toimplement.7 Although some research exists on its foreign policy ambitions tojoin the alliance, the research presented here fills an important void in the

3 Celeste A. Wallander, NATOs Price: Shape Up or Ship Out,Foreign Affairs(November/December, 2002)pp. 28; Thomas S. Szayna,NATO Enlargement, 20002015(Washington, D.C.: RAND 2000); Dan Reiter, Why

NATO Enlargement Does not Spread Democracy,International Security25 (Spring 2001) pp. 4167.4 These states include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. For exam-ple, see Natalie L Mychajlyszyn and Harald von Reikhoff, eds. The Evolution in Civil-Military Relations in

East-Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Westport, CT: Praeger 2004). See also Marybeth Peterson

Ulrich, Developing Mature National Security Systems in Post-Communist States: The Czech Republic andSlovakia,Armed Forces & Society28 (May 2002) pp. 40325.5 Alexandra Gheciu,NATO in the New Europe(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press 2005);Rachel A. Epstein, NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations, SecurityStudies14 (Autumn 2005) pp. 5998; Timothy Edmunds, NATO and Its New Members, Survival45(Autumn 2003); Zoltan Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion (London: Cambridge University Press 2003).6 Ryan C. Hendrickson, Jonathan Campbell, and Nicholas Mullikin, Albania and NATOs Open-DoorPolicy: Alliance Enlargement and Military Transformation,Journal of Slavic Military Studies19 (June

2006) pp. 24357, and Ryan C. Hendrickson and Ryan P. Smith, Croatia and NATO: Moving TowardAlliance Membership, Comparative Strategy25, 4 (2006) pp. 297306.7 Some previous research exists on Ukrainian civil-military relations within the context of NATO

expansion. See Natalie L Mychajlyszyn, The Euro-Atlantic Strategic Culture, Democratic Civil-Military

Relations, and Ukraine, in Natalie L Mychajlyszyn and Harald von Reikhoff, eds. The Evolution in Civil-

Military Relations in East-Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Westport, CT: Praeger 2004).


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scholarship on alliance expansion, just as Georgia membership aspirationsheighten and NATO seems set to expand beyond Albania and Croatia.8

GEORGIA AND NATO

Georgia formally began diplomatic relations with NATO in 1992 when itjoined NATOs Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In 1994, Georgia took thenext step and joined NATOs Partnership for Peace program.9 Since thattime, Georgia has maintained a close military partnership with the UnitedStates, which arguably culminated at the Bucharest Summit when the UnitedStates pushed for Georgias inclusion in the Membership Action Plan,despite considerable opposition raised by a number of allies, and certainlyRussia. In the days leading up the Summit, it was clear that a number of

allies, most notably, Germany and France, opposed discussion of Georgiaand Ukraine as future members. Yet when the summit began, the Bushadministration continued to push for both of these aspiring states to beconsidered as future allies. Others at the summit, including Italy, Hungary,Belgium, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands similarly sided with GermanChancellor Angela Merkel, who was most public in her opposition to theAmerican position.10 Nonetheless, Bush stated, Georgia and Ukraine is avery difficult issue for some nations here. Its not for me. I think that thesenations are qualified nations to apply for membership application.11 In theUnited States Senate, in the aftermath of the Summit, bipartisan support alsoexisted for the general direction of the Bush administration, which culmi-nated in the Biden/Lugar Resolution, which expressed its general supportfor building closer ties between Ukraine, Georgia, and NATO.12

Apart from the United States, several other NATO members supportedGeorgias endeavors, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania,Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia.13 Even though it is not a member ofthe alliance, Sweden also supported Georgian membership. Yet at the summit,and up until the August 2008 conflict, no other member of the alliance,

8 David Gudiashvili, NATO Membership as Georgias Foreign Policy Priority, Central Asia and the

Caucasus4 (2003) pp. 2432.9 See aspects of Georgias NATO policy implementation record at http://www.nato.int/isues/nato-

georgia/index.html10 Steven Erlanger and Steven Lee Myers, Bush Effort Jolts Allies in NATO, New York Times(3 April

2008) p. A6.11 Office of the Press Secretary, White House, President Bush Meets with NATO Secretary General

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (2 April 2008).12 Press Release from Senator Richard Lugar, Biden/Lugar Resolution Supporting Ukraine and GeorgiaAdmission to NATO Unanimously Passes the Senate (29 April 2008) at http://lugar.senate.gov/press/

record.cfm?id=29693613 BBC Monitoring Europe, Regional Club Supporting Georgias NATO Bid to Meet in Poland on June

25 (24 June 2008).


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including Canada, The Netherlands, or the United Kingdom openly sup-ported the American position.14 Although the geo-strategic issues haveevolved considerably since the Summit, the question remains over howclosely Georgia actually meets the general standards for NATO membership,

which may also give some insight on why the American positionreceived such little support at Bucharest. For this assessment, we employtwo broad measures of analysis: democratic political reforms and elec-toral development, and military modernization/professionalization.These two measures were highlighted in NATOs 1995 Study on Enlarge-ment, and have been used by others in assessing NATO applicantstates.15 We begin with an analysis of Georgias trends in democraticreform and modernization.

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REFORMS

The Soviet Unions breakup caused political turmoil across much of theTranscaucus region, and accordingly, Georgia has faced several politicalcrises in the short time it has been a sovereign state. Among its chal-lenges, the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the large ethnicRussian minority in those regions as well as in Georgia proper havebeen most prominent. In this regard, Georgia and Ukraine have someanalogiesthe politics within both states have developed along similarlines. Much like Ukraine, two diametrically opposed ideologies exist inGeorgia: the Pro-Western ideology of the current and recently re-electedPresident Mikheil Saakashvili under the United National Movement, andthe pro-nationalist sentiments espoused by Davit Gamqrelidze under theNew Right Party.16

Since 1992 there has been an Organization for the Security and Cooper-ation in Europe (OSCE) observer mission in Tbilisi. The OSCE mission hasmonitored every election that has taken place in the Republic and has sinceexpanded to observe the situation in the breakaway republics as part of thebroader mandate.17 Since that time while Georgian officials have made

progress towards having free and fair democratic elections, they have yet tomeet the criteria set out by most election observation organizations. However,much progress has been made since its first elections since the Soviet

14 Colin Brown, EU Allies Unite Against Bush over NATO Membership for Georgia and Ukraine, The

Independent (London) (3 April 2008).15 See Thomas S. Szaynas,NATO Enlargement 20002015: Determinants and Implication for Defense

Planning and Shaping(Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2001).16 For information on Georgian political parties see the Georgian Electoral Commission http://cec.gov.ge/

?que=eng/elections-2008/home17 Ibid.


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Unions fall, albeit incrementally they have gone from cronyism and farcicalreturns to competition with somewhat lopsided results.18

In 2008, Georgia had two national elections; the president and parlia-ment were elected in two contests. The presidential election occurred on

5 January, and the Parliamentary election took placed on 21 May.19

As ithad done before, the OSCE observed both elections with several other orga-nizations, including observers from the European Union. The OSCE statedthat while the January presidential election was the most democratic in thecountrys history, there were still several problems. The problems high-lighted by the OSCE included that the Central Election Commission (CEC)acted in an unprofessional and partisan manner, and there were severalreports of voter intimidation via the threat to eliminate social welfare pro-grams based upon how one voted in the election; people feared that theirpension claims could either get a boost or would simply disappear depending

on how one pledged to vote.In the parliamentary elections that followed, similar problems were

again identified, although some improvements were noted. Observersnoticed an overall decrease in intimidation and malicious balloting. The larg-est single problem, however, was that the government changed the electorallaw at the last minute. This change was from a scheme that was in accor-dance with Western standards to one in which the main opposition arguedthat the implemented change favored the ruling party.20 The main changewas literally the date of the election itself that the CEC had only loosely set afew weeks in advance of when polling was supposed to take place.21

Other indicators of democratic development are evident in FreedomHouse rating scores, who downgraded Georgias political rights and human lib-erties score from a 3 to a 4 in 2008 due to protests in the latter part of 2007. Yetin comparison to other countries in the caucuses Georgia fares better than oth-ers. The only other state in the region that is classified as partial free is Armeniawith a political score of 5 and a human liberties score of 4. As compared toother members of NATO Georgia falls towards the bottom of the list, fallingslightly behind Turkey and Albania, both with scores of 3.22

18 For more information on the history of Georgian elections see the Office for Democratic Institutions

and Human RightsElections, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Election Documentsat http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/documents.html19 Information on the recent Georgian elections can be found at http://www.results.cec.gov.ge/index.php?lang=eng20 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Georgian Election in Essence Consistentwith Most Commitments but Challenges Must Be Addressed Urgently, (January 6, 2008) and Organiza-

tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Despite Efforts to Conduct Election in Line with Standards,Observers Identify Problems (22 May 2008).21 C. J. Chivers, Georgian Presidents Party Has Wide Lead in Voting,New York Times(23 May 2008)

p. A16; Andrew E. Kramer, Georgias President Narrowly Wins Vote,New York Times(7 January 2008): p. A8.22 Freedom Houses 2008 report on Georgia can be found at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.

cfm?page=22&year=2008&country=7398


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The U.S. State Department annual report on human rights also gavemixed results for Georgia in 2007. There was some progress made in thejudiciary, such as the legislature banning inappropriate communicationbetween judges and political parties on ongoing litigation. The legislature

also passed a general code of ethics for judges. Conversely, there weresome negative developments. There was at least one reported instance of adeath from police brutality and some evidence of general torture and mis-treatment of detainees, as well as an inability for some citizens to availthemselves of defense attorneys during trial.23 Also, there was a generalworsening of political freedoms during the latter half of 2007, such as addi-tional restrictions on freedom of assembly and speech and general corruptionin the government. Perhaps most troublesome is that despite governmentefforts there still remains a problem with human trafficking.24

Finally, the problem of breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia prior to the war also highlights Georgias problems in its inabilityto democratically resolve these secessionist movements. Prior to the war,both regions had immense Russian support and backing, and in manyrespects functioned as de facto independent states, albeit with the pres-ence of Russian peacekeepers. Prior to the war, in an attempt to alleviatemounting pressure and the ever-increasing chance of open warfare, theUnited States proposed an international peacekeeping force in an attemptto stave off potential war, all of which highlighted the real potential forongoing instability and conflict.25

When considered in total, Georgia has made important steps to democ-ratize over the last decade, but at the same time still has considerable hurdlesto overcome in order to meet the standards of western democratization andliberalism. Its downward slide in 2008 raises additional doubts about itsdemocratization trends, and prior to the 2008 war with Russia, it was clearthat South Ossetia and Abkhazia remained serious sources of potential con-flict that had been unresolved in a democratic fashion.

At the same time, a number of current and forthcoming NATO memberssimilarly score poorly on some democratization measures. For example,while Turkey generally faired better in the political-democratization arena

than Georgia, there were marked problems with torture beatings and abuseby its general security forces in 2007. While the security forces did not par-take in any politically motivated murders, there were several reporteddeaths via Turkish security forces. Similar to Georgia, Turkey also has aproblem with human trafficking and Albania similarly suffers from considerable

23 For more on the reports of police brutality, see Amnesty International at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/georgian-government-urged-introduce-police-id-2008031324 See U.S. State Department Annual report on human rights at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/

2007/100560.htm25 Associated Press, Abkhazia Rejects US-Proposed International Force (8 July 2008).


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levels of corruption, so it is not as if NATOs current and forthcoming mem-bers are immune to these democratic challenges.26 Nonetheless, it is stillclear that Georgia has important challenges to overcome before it will beviewed as a fully democratized state.

GEORGIAS MILITARY REFORMS

Georgia has inherited several legacies from the Soviet Union including thelarge military structures that are endemic of the former Soviet Republics.Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that the Georgian government hasbegun the process of implementing meaningful reforms to bring the GeorgianArmed Forces (GAF) more closely into compliance with NATO standards.Prior to its 2008 conflict with Russia, the modernization process was set to

be implemented over three phases. Phase one begins with a general assess-ment of existing capabilities, which was to be completed in 2008. Phase twois dissemination of the information gathered from phase one and is slated tobe finished around 2010. Phase three is contingent on developing near,mid- and long-term force structures and will determine the total cost andfeasibility of implementing these reforms. This phase is not slated to becompleted for at least a decade.27

Presently, the GAF consists of the Georgian Land, Air, Naval, and SpecialForces along with the National Guard. Currently the total size of the GAF is28,666 forces. The modernization goal is to reduce that size to 18,755 by 2015.Perhaps most interesting is the reorganization process that is currently under-way. The modernization process has seen some radical changes occur withinthe structure of the armed forces, going from a large stationary Soviet-modeledmilitary towards smaller, more state of the art and maneuverable armed forces.28

In addition to these reforms, Georgia also plans to examine how theMinistry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) dealwith their responsibilities to evaluate the potential for any institutional over-lap. In its own internal reports, Georgia notes that interoperability problemsstill exist, chiefly among them is the relative lack of English language train-

ing for Georgian troops and personnel, as well as the absence of a standingLand Forces headquarters and a human resources management system.29

Yet despite these problems, Georgia has played a unique role in theworld with regard to its military deployments, and certainly is much different

26 The U.S. State Department Annual Report on Human Rights for Turkey can be found at http://

www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100589.htm. See also Hendrickson et al., op. cit., note 6.27 See Georgian Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review: Final Report 2007(English version).28 Ibid.29 Ibid: For analyses of the challenges of interoperability and English language training in previous

enlargement rounds, see David M. Glantz, Accomplishments, Strengths and Weaknesses of the U.S. Military

(Security) Assistance Program, 11, 4Journal of Slavic Military Studies(1998) pp. 171.


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from the rest of the former Soviet Republics. First, it must be highlighted thatGeorgia has a long-standing and close relationship with the United States,which only grew closer during the recent Bush administration. In 2002, theUnited States initiated a $64 million training program to train and equip four

specialized battalions. The United States Department of Defense stated that themodernization effort is being done not only to aid in interoperability efforts butat the time, to also combat terrorism, as intelligence at the time indicated thatterrorist forces were hiding in Georgias Pankisi Gorge, which is located in thenorth part of the country and borders along Chechnya.30 It is also clear that inthe aftermath of the 2008 conflict, both NATO and the United States continueto remain interested in rebuilding and assisting the Georgian Armed Forces.31

Georgia has also increasingly gained troop deployment experience.Georgia has played an important role in European, NATO and Americanmilitary endeavors, which has included the deployment of peacekeeping

forces to the Balkans in 1990s, including 184 troops in the NATO KosovoProtection Force.32 In Iraq, Georgia has provided up to 2,000 troops to assistthe United States, which has made them the third largest contributor to theoperation; most of its troops are deployed near the Iranian border. Thiscooperation is especially noteworthy given that many states have reducedor completely left Iraq, although Georgia significantly reduced its presencein August 2008, literally closing out operations in Iraq in response to Russianmilitary maneuvers in South Ossetia.

In contrast, however, in Afghanistan, which NATO has repeatedlyemphasized is its number one priority, Georgia currently has only onetroop. In this respect, where NATO is engaged in sustained military combatabroad, Georgia has clearly preferred to support the American operation inIraq, rather than NATO.33 Nonetheless, Georgia sees its military commit-ments abroad as a route to NATO membership. Its deployment in Iraq hasallowed the Ministry of Defense to highlight its military modernization andWestern training. Georgians argue that the combination of their rapidlymodernizing military and their strategic location in the Caucusus make thema prime candidate for NATO membership.34

30 U.S. Department of Defense http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43997 American

Troops, Training; Equipping Georgian Military Kathleen T. Rhem (2002 May 30). See also Ken Stier, A$64-Million US Training Program for Georgian Troops Begins This Month, Christian Science Monitor(17

May 2002). See also S. Neil MacFarlane, Russia, NATO Enlargement and the Strengthening of Democ-racy in the European Space, in Aurel Braun, ed. NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century

(New York: Routledge 2008) p. 47, and Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Russia, in Aurel Braun,ed.NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century(New York: Routledge 2008) p. 105, note 39.31 Headquarters, United States European Command, See EUCOM Commander Assesses GeorgianNeeds, (22 August 2008) at http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=180132 See http://mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=12133 Collin Matthew Georgia to Double Troops in IraqBBC News(March 9, 2007).International Security

Assistance Force(1 September 2008) at http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf34 Neil Arun, op. cit.


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Apart from its military deployments, another sign of its modernizationefforts, at least in the days prior to the 2008 conflict with Russia, is thatGeorgia possessed approximately 40 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),which the Georgian Ministry of Defense purchased from Israel. Prior to the

war with Russia, Georgia employed these UAVs in the breakaway regions todo surveillance and counterinsurgency operations.35

The conflict with Russia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia providedadditional insight on Georgian military capabilities. The Georgian airdefenses were able to shoot down at least six Russian aircraft, which indi-cates some air defense capabilities, although Russia was flying its Sukhoi-25,which is quite dated as a ground attack aircraft. Georgia was also depen-dent upon American air transport to get 2000 of its combat forces backhome from Iraq, which clearly indicates its inability to have national aircrafttroop projection capabilities, even at a time of national emergency. In this

regard, Georgia would be able to contribute little to the wider allianceneeds in the event that a rapid military response was required.

In addition, Russian troops did considerable damage to much of Georgiasmilitary infrastructure, which included the seizure of a base in Senaki thatwas well beyond the Abkhazia and South Ossetia borders. This base wasconstructed with American military assistance and was intended to comportwith NATO standards. Moreover, in actual combat operations it appears thatGeorgian military forces suffered from internal communication problems.36

In addition, Russian troops captured American Humvee vehicles,destroyed coast guard vessels, and destroyed Georgia air defenses and radars.Other journalistic information indicates that Russia captured Georgia tanksand other weapons and munitions.37 Thus, while the American-Georgian mil-itary relationship has grown, especially since 2002, and its deploymentexperience is unique compared to other NATO applicant states, it is alsoclear that the Georgian Armed Forces offer limited benefits to the wideralliance, especially in the aftermath of the war. While Georgia had beenmaking progress in terms of its military modernization plans, its ongoingdeficiencies were highlighted quite profoundly in the 2008 conflict.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GEORGIA AND NATO EXPANSION

Our analysis indicates that Georgia fails to meet the 1995 alliance member-ship standards across a number of political and military measures. The

35 BBC News, Press Summary for Georgias Breakaway Region of Abkhazia (13 June 2008).36 Thom Shanker, Russians Melded Old-School Blitz with Modern Military Tactics,New York Times

(August 17, 2008) p. A8; Peter Finn, Russia Pushes into Georgia; In Undisputed Area, Troops Seize

Town and Military Base, Washington Post(12 August 2008) p. A1.37 Jan Cienski, Tbilisi Admits It Miscalculated Russian Reaction,Financial Times(22 August 2008) p. 7.


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United States support for Georgia at the Bucharest Summit also exposeshow little the 1995 measures apply to current American foreign policy. Thisis not the first time that the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement has beenostensibly disregarded, but the American position on Georgia highlights the

studys irrelevance in new ways. It is certainly obvious that Georgia hasmade impressive strides in military modernization, and that importantadvances in democratization have occurred as well, yet its electoral difficultiesin 2008 and the recent conflict with Russia indicate just how far Georgia hasto go before it could be considered a security producer rather than asecurity consumer for the allies. Moreover, given the ostensibly close dip-lomatic and military relationship between the United States and Georgia,and Georgias repeated and unanswered calls for American, European, andNATO military assistance during the 2008 conflict, it does not appear thatthe NATO allies are willing, at least at this time, to provide a meaningful

promise of collective defenseall of which raises doubts over the wisdomof further NATO expansion to Georgia.

It is difficult to gauge the long-term impact of Georgias war with Russiaon NATO enlargement decisions. On 19 August 2008, NATOs North AtlanticCouncil agreed to the creation of a NATO-Georgia Commission that wouldassess the damage done in the war, and work to assist Georgia in its recoveryefforts. At the same time, the diplomatic response across Europe remainedmixed to Russias military strikes. While a consensus existed across Europethat Russian military actions against Georgia must end, many in EasternEurope were far more critical of Russia than other European states.38 Whatseems clear is that if Georgia is invited to join the alliance, this decision willbe made without a meaningful application of NATOs political and militarymetrics for expansion.

38 John Thornhill and Daniel Dombey, NATO in Display of Unity over Georgia,Financial Times

(August 18 2008);NATO Press Release, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Foreign

Ministers Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 19 August 2008 (August 19, 2008) at http://

www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-104e.html

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