Conferinta Internationala de Dreptul Concurentei

8/10/2019 Conferinta Internationala de Dreptul Concurentei

1/6


2/6

- levy for the issuers not for the acquirers , as it was considered that

the issuers were free-riders.

- The commission considered that this was a restriction by object

(2007) 17 October

-

Opinion of Wahl AG: the consequences - that conduct constitutesa restriction by object. Agreements that have potential effects

of infringing competition

Conclusions:

Court has restated and clarified the concept of restriction by object

Limited to conduct that can be presumed to have a negative impact on

competition

Restriction by object is determined by reference to the nature of the

conduct.

Context does not mean effects, it means just looking at the economic

context.

2) Dr. Nagy - Allianz case (mainly)

Anti-competitive by object

Fundamental global conceptUS: per se rule of reason

EU and MSs: object effect

Utmost relevance

Competition law has only few clear-cut rules (automatic

condemnation, safe harbors).

Competition authorities focus on hardcore agreements

The highest fines are imposed in hardcore cases

- Box approach An agreement that is anticompetitive by nature,

irrespective of the circumstances. Automatic condemnation (with

the exception of the Art. 101(3) TFEU). Even a rudimentary lawyer

should see that a certain agreement is anti-competitive.

- US antitrust law always or almost always that agreement should

be anticompetitive

Allianz case:

-

Perverted case that entail perverse judgments


3/6

- Insurance brokers are your guys who help you choose the best

insurance company. BUT they are paid from the banks fee.

Biased? Even more: the insurance brokers were receiving bonuses

for suggesting Allianz.

-

If you sell a lot of Allianz products you will get a certain hourly fee,but if you repair with Allianz products you will receive more

reparation shop.

- The court from Hungary said that this is anticompetitive by object

(automatic prohibited irrespective of anything was the usual

judgment) - it said you also had to analyze the effects (but

partially).

-

In the competition law effects-analysis is the principle and

automatic condemnation is the exception. Allianz puts this upside

down.

- What is anticompetitive by nature?

3) David / Aplicarea art. 101 si 102 din TFUE

-

s-a invocat deseori cazuistica UE in fata instantelor noastre si

inainte de 2007

- Consiliul Concurentei delegarea de la Comisie.

-

Instantele tind sa considere ca piata romaneasca este o piatasemnificativa 1 a UE si ca va putea afecta comertul intra-

comunitar. Participantii uneori chiar sunt parte a unor grupuri

international, iar materiile prime erau aduse si in alte MS

- Au existat si situatii inverse cand s-a considerat ca un judet e o

piata prea mica/nesemnificativa ca sa se ia in considerare

competenta art. 101 si 102

- Dreptul la aparare drepturile partilor trebuie respectate la

standardele de proba din dr. Penal. Standard de exercitare si de

protectie a lui este foarte ridicat.- Trebuie sa demonstrezi dincolo de orice indoiala rezonabila ca o

crestere simultana de preturi intr-o perioada anume nu era ceva

anti-concurential

- Prezumtia de nevinovatie trebuie sa functioneze si aceasta

prezumtie e importanta oricum in raport cu TFUE, orice indoiala

trebuind sa fie interepretata in favoarea intreprinderii respective

1A 7-a piata comerciala din UE


4/6

- Prezumtia la partciparea intelegerilor orizontale daca un

participant nu s-a distantat public de la acele intelegeri atunci

prezumtia functioneaza impotriva lui

- In ce masura durata excesiva a procedurilor in fata CCR poate

afecta dreptul la aparare (faza de ancheta). Durata mai mare de 5ani a investigatiei care nu se finalizase inca , avand in vedere si

proprotiile cazului instanta a obligat CCR sa se pronunte in 6 luni

- Restrictionarea concurentei prin obiect instantele nu considera

ca trebuie sa demontrezi efectele pentru a demonstra existenta

faptei per se. Instantele par a nu fi legate de ceea ce spune CCR

(care aplica conceptele aproape mecanic). Fixarile de pret

element foarte grav.

- Intelgerile cu multiple parti

-

Abuzul de pozitie dominant jurisrpudenta putin in Romania

gravitate medie sau mare a faptelor. Dificultatea instatelor de a

proba faptele. Forteaza instantele sa apeleze la expertiza

(economica, tehnica, etc). Expertiza este saraca in aceasta

materie in Romania though.

-

Stabilirea amenzilor : CApel Bucuresti Instantele ar trebui sa se

uite si la modalitatea de stabilire a amenzilor in UE, nu doar pe

teritoriul tarii.

14.4516.15

1) Peter Wehlan (University of Leeds) - Cartel criminalization and

regulation 1/2003: avoiding potential problems

-

Cartel law enforcement is generally not punished by

imprisonment. Should it be? OECD competition committee did

not suggest that in the EU

-

UK, Sweden, Denmark introduced imprisonment sanctions- The literature has ignored the issue how Regulation 1/2003 has

influenced the problem of cartels at a national level. Is it actually a

negative impact? Yes, because it might relate to art. 103 TFUE

and thus render economical evidence not usable.

- How we could avoid this negative impact. IF a states criminals

sanctions regarding cartels are only applicable to individuals2

2Rule applicable to undertakers or individuals? distinction


5/6

then the Regulation does not have ta superseding power over this

matter. (interpretare stricto sensu)

- But if we make an interpretation lato sensu it is very hard to

escape the effects of Regulation 1

-

Article 101 if we look at the type of law involved does not refer tothe invalidity of an agreement

- Regulation 1/2003 detailed the powers of the Commission,

clarify what is the power of the EU and of the MS regarding the

competition law, decentralization. Different problematic articles

from the regulation.

-

Art. 3 (1) Do you have to enforceEU competition law when you

enforce national competition law?

-

The UK did not want evidence to be shown when dealing with

these issues. Connection between 101 and 103 TFUE

- There are cartels that we want to protect though

- Art. 11(6) power of the commission to withdraw a case from an

NCA in case the Regulation is applicable nationally in each MS,

which it is

2) Anna Gerbrandy (Faculty of Utrecht) - Establishing truth and

economic proof

- In competition and regulatory law de factor more ewauel.

Economic assesments as part of decision. Sometimes: criminal

law context. But it is still de iure unequal.

- Sometimes, when the court steps in, the administrative body/ the

agency has already issued an opinion very different from the

other litigations (civil ones for example)

- theories of truth (correspondence, coherence narrative). Courts

starting point: truth as a regulative idea. Correspondence

primarily, coherence secondary!

- In Romania the Courts look also for the substantive truth

- Economic proof related to the economy and using an economic

method.


6/6

- The court reviews looks at the proof (facts), looks at the law and

at the mixed questions of law and fact (assessment). Full review

of the proof!3

- Economic proof relates to complex facts (e.g. what is the

economic market, entailing the concepts of the substitution ofdemand and supply), the relevant models and theories. Models

and theories are facts?

- Economic proof and standard of review the administrative

agency has a margin of appreciation when reviewing the facts

and law

- Merger control: prospective evidence

- How to review expert evidence when you have 2 experts saying

2 completely different things. It becomes an almost procedural

review which takes us further and further away from the truth

3) Almasan The arbitrability of articles 101 and 102 TFEU

- the disputes in the field of competition are arbitrable. Most times in

stake are problems regarding property issues.

3In civil law if both of the parties say that the coat is red, when actually the coat is

green it has to agree with them. In administrative law - it cannot! It has to say that

it is green.

Conferinta Internationala de Dreptul Concurentei

Documents

Transcript of Conferinta Internationala de Dreptul Concurentei