A Response to Penta By Michael Smith

In “Discipline: A Theoretical Perspective”’ Gerard C. Penta suggests a new approach to the discipline problem via an analysis of two “seemingly unrelated use(@ of the term ‘discipline.’ ” (p. 137) He considers its use in the phrase “the discipline problem” and its use in the phrase “the academic disciplines.” I take it that his argument may be put very briefly as follows: disciplinary action must not introduce the student to a discipline other than that during which he misbehaved; thus the “cook book’ a p proach to discipline which involves rewards or punishment extrinsic to the discipline being studied is misguided. This is because what is being learned, i.e., the end to which the student’s behavior is thus purposely adjusted, is not the discipline being studied. Penta goes so far as to claim that via the “cook book’ approach to discipline the student learns the

. . .discipline of authoritarianism (which) is the discipline of totalitarianism. To the extent that it inhibits the student’s future learning and teaches the blind following of those in authority, it is mis-educative and an anathema to a democratic society. (p. 140)

Penta notes that others have reached similar conclusions “though not usually under the rubric of discipline.” (p. 140) I shall argue that this is because his argument does not lead to the conclusions he claims it does. I shall argue further that the teacher must have the discretion to punish the misbehaving student, and that Penta’s leap to the conclusion that this is authoritarian is unjustified.

Consider this situation: A student misbehaves during a history lesson. The teacher assigns him to thirty minutes in the detention hall. This is because his behavior is not disciplined in terms of the actions required to learn about history. Penta suggests that the student’s actions may be quite disciplined in terms of the ends he desires; e.g., relieving boredom. But by assigning him to thirty minutes in the detention hall the “teacher is introducing the boy to a discipline that is not the discipline of history.” (p. 140) Penta apparently thinks that any disciplinary action in the instance must be solely in terms of the discipline of history. But on his own argument this is impossible. For the student does not desire to learn about history, and so it follows that his behaviorcannot be disciplined in terms of the discipline of history. In order that his behavior be so disciplined, it is necessary to get the student to desire to learn about history. Perhaps to do this the teacher should explain how history is a means to other student goals. Penta indirectly suggests this is so. (p. 137) But these goals may be positive (e.g., to become rational, to get on in life, to get a reward), or negative (e.g.. to avoid punishment). In either case the end is external to the discipline of history, and is necessarily so. Consequently, Penta’s own model is on the same logical footing as the “cook book” approach to discipline insofar as both introduce the student to ends extrinsic to the discipline which was being studied when the student misbehaved.

What is more, even a weak version which entails that the student must be disci- plined in terms of the discipline of history (i.e., omitting “solely”) is unacceptable. For Penta’s reasoning seems to be this: the student misbehaves and so does not desire to learn about history. So get the student to desire to learn about history by couching the disciplinary action in terms of the discipline of history. However, while it is true that if a student misbehaves during history so he does not desire to learn about history, it does not follow that the student‘s lack of a desire, simpliciter, explains his misbehavior. For it may not be that the student needs extra motivation, but rather that his lack of a desire is itself explained by problems at home or bad teaching etc. As such it would be futile to discipline the student in terms of the discipline of history. To get the student to desire to

Michael Smirh is a post-graduate student in the Philosophy Department at Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia.

1. Gerard C. Pente. “Discipline: A Theoretical Perspective,” Educational Theory 27 (Spring 1977): 137-40.

SPRING 1978 154

RESPONSE TO PENTA 155

learn about history effectively any action must get at the cause of the misbehavior. But the cause of misbehavior may as well be external to the student as lack of desire through ignorance etc. The upshot of this is that it may not be appropriate to discipline every misbehaving student. Of course the question remains whether those that it is appropriate to discipline should be disciplined in terms of the discipline which was being studied when they misbehaved, and this to theexclusion of their being punished.

Penta’s argument does tend towards this conclusion, but I believe that it is mistak- en. For it presupposes that the student will respond to a rational argument to the conclusion that it is in his best interests to study the discipline during which he misbehaved. If he does accept the conclusion, then he may well desire to learn and behave himself. The point is that if the student does not respond to such an argument, or if he accepts the conclusion and continues to misbehave through weakness of the will, the educator must have the option to force the student to do what is in his best interests. Is this “an anathema to a democratic society”?

Penta thinks so, for he claims that the boy who is given twenty minutes in the detention hall is introduced to the discipline of authoritarianism. (p. 140) What he fails to note is that there is a difference between authoritarianism and paternalism. And thus, there is a difference between what the authorities dictate is in the student’s best interests, what is in the student’s best interests, and what the student thinks is in his best interests. Particularly as regards young children, educators are right not to put too much weight on the last of these. And insofar as the educator acts in the student‘s best interests as against what the student thinks is in his best interests, he acts paternalisti- cally. Consider then the boy in the detention hall, I agree with Penta that unless some effort has been made to make the subject interesting for the student prior to punishing him, he will regard the act as authoritarian. And what is more, I agree with Penta that some such effort should be made. But I think it would be a mistake to infer that just because a student at the time regarded an action as authoritarian so he shall always regard it as authoritarian. For i f he comes to believe that that action was in fact in his best interests, and was done because it was in his best interests, so he will come to regard it as paternalistic. And this is not in any obvious sense an anathema to a democratic society.

I have argued that Penta’s argument is invalid and misguided on several counts. However I agree with him that refining an approach to discipline couched in terms of punishments and rewards is totally misguided. Its fault lies in the general application of a last resort measure. However I think it only realistic to admit that students will not always agree that what is in their best interests is in their best interests, and to this extent educators must have the option to force the issue: e.g., via a threat to punish the student if he does not behave. But on the other hand lack of a desire to learn has many causes and educators must be alert to treat the cause and not just the symptom, i.e., not just the misbehavior.