GNDIRE FARA CUVINTE: PREZENTARE PENTRU ETICA ANIMALELOR * Jos Luis Bermdez n gndirea fr cuvinte, mi dezvolt un cadru filosofic pentru tratarea (cel puin unele) animale i sugari umane ca "gnditori autentic". 1 Un gnditor autentic, eu-l ia, este o creatur care se comport n moduri care reflect gndurile sale cu privire la mediul nconjurtor - i, prin urmare, o creatur a crui comportament trebuie s fie explicate n termeni psihologici. C multe animale sunt gnditori autentic este luate pentru acordate de cercetare mult n etologie cognitive, dar oamenii de tiin i filozofi au de multe ori a fost sceptic de ceea ce au nevoie pentru a fi dovezi anecdotice i antropomorfism tacit. Obiectivele cartea mea sunt s stabileasc criterii clare pentru identificarea cnd explicaii psihologice sunt necesare pentru creaturi non-lingvistice s arate modul n gnduri precise i determinate poate fi atribuit creaturi non-lingvistice pentru a arta modul n care explicaiile psihologice pe care le dau de animale i a comportamentului copilului sunt continue cu explicaiile psihologice pe care le dau de limbaj folosesc creaturi s exploreze diferenele dintre gndirea fr cuvinte i gndire bazate pe limb. Aceast lucrare evideniaz aspecte ale acestui cont, care sunt de cea mai mare relevan pentru cei care lucreaz n animale etic. Exist o gam de diferite nivele de sofisticare cognitive n diferite de animale specii, n plus fa de limite la tipurile de gndire disponibile pentru creaturi non-lingvistice, i-l poate fi important pentru moralitii animale s ia n considerare acest lucru n explorarea problemelor de moral semnificaie i obligaiile pe care am putea sau nu ar putea avea la animalele non-umane. Comentariu: Exist unele poziii care acest nu este cazul, cred, deci pot fi, probabil, este explicaii better.Psychological i non-psihologice ale comportamentului explicaiile psihologice intra n joc atunci cnd forme non-psihologic de explicaie furnizeaz insuficiente explicative i predictive de prghie. Tipice forme non-psihologic de explicaie apel la mecanisme de condiionare asociative i ceea ce sunt cunoscute ca innascute eliberarea mecanisme. condiionat sau pavlovian clasic apare atunci cnd o asociere este consolidat ntre o stimul necondiionat (alimente de exemplu, sau durere) i un stimul condiionat (de exemplu, sunetul unui clopot). Stimulul neconditionat genereaza de obicei un rspuns necondiionat (de exemplu, salivaie). Ca o Rezultatul de condiionare a rspuns necondiionat este generat de stimul condiionat.Multe forme de instruire animale sunt bazate pe condiionrii clasice. Este condiionrii clasice care face clicurile i fluiere eficiente recompense pentru cini i delfini. n instrumentale (sau operand) condiionat procesul de consolidare (sau pedeaps) se aplic aciunilor, mai degrab dect rspunsuri fiziologice. Potrivit modele behaviorist a comportamentului animal, toate comportamentul animalelor este produsul de

fie condiionat clasic sau instrumental, i condiionat este cu siguran tipul de animal nvare cel mai frecvent studiate n laborator. Etologi, cu toate acestea, au, de asemenea, apel la nnscut eliberarea mecanisme pentru a explica comportamentul n slbticie. 2 mecanismele de eliberare sunt Innate secvene fixe i instinctiv de micri. De exemplu, atunci cnd nou-eclozat hering pescrui stimuli ntlni potrivire adult hering cioc pescru n culoare, lungime, i micarea ei rspunde prin ciugulesc. mecanisme Innate eliberarea au urmtoarele caracteristici. 3 Acestea sunt declanate de stimuli specifice. Ei au ntotdeauna s aib aceeai form. Ei manifesta la toti membrii din speciile n cauz. 2 A se vedea, de exemplu, N. Tinbergen, Studiul de Instinct (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 3 SEG Lea, Instinct, Mediu, si a comportamentului. (Londra: Methuen, 1984) Apariia lor este n mare msur independent de istorie creatura individului. Dup ce a lansat acestea nu pot fi variat. Ei au doar o singur funcie. mecanisme Innate eliberarea condiionat i rspunsurile sunt att rspunsurile invariante la stimuli. n cazul n care animalul inregistreaza stimul relevante rezultatele corespunztoare de rspuns ntr-un mod care pot fi, n general, pe deplin neles, a explicat i a prezis fr apel la o intermediar ntre stimul i rspuns. 4 explicaiile psihologice ale comportamentului numai devin necesare atunci cnd nu link-uri invariante astfel de intrri-ieiri pot fi identificate.Esena unei explicaie psihologic este c explic comportamentul n ceea ce privete modul n care creatura n cauz reprezint mediul su, mai degrab dect pur i simplu n termeni de stimuli care le detecteaz. Psihologic explicaii face de obicei referire la modul n care organismul percepe mediul su, la ceea ce crede despre mediul nconjurtor, i la ceea ce dorete s realizeze. Aceste credinte, dorinte, i percepiile permit organismelor s rspund cu flexibilitate i plastic pentru mediile lor - la fel situaii pot permite aciuni diferite n cazul n care o creatur aduce credine diferite i dorete s-l, sau percepe aceasta n moduri diferite. Cum suntem noi pentru a determina care animalele conta ca gnditori autentic? Prin identificarea speciilor ai crei membri se comport n moduri care nu par a fi explicabil n termeni non-psihologic. Orice astfel de hotrre este provizoriu i care poate fi anulat, deoarece s-ar putea ntoarce ntotdeauna faptul c am fost

insuficient imaginativ n gndire cu privire la posibilitile non-psihologic. Ceea ce nu este provizorii i defeasible, cu toate acestea, este hotrrea pe care multe specii se va dovedi a conine gnditori autentic. Greutatea probelor puncte puternic la imposibilitatea de a caracterizeaz toate comportamentul animal n ceea ce privete non-psihologic. 4 Dar a se vedea A. Dickinson i B. Balleine, "Aciuni i rspunsuri: psihologie dual de comportamentul "n N. Eilan, B. Brewer, McCarthy i R. (Eds.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993) pentru pentru exemple de tipuri de rspuns condiionat care nu par a necesita o explanationThere psihologic este o distincie de baz, apoi, ntre creaturi care se comport n moduri care necesit explicaie psihologic i cele care nu. Acest lucru poate marca un punct de vedere moral semnificativ mprirea linie. Este de remarcat, totui, c sensibilitate pare a fi necesare pentru unele forme asociative de nvare. n cazul n care stimul necondiionat este placere sau durere, sau ceva al cror statut ca recompensa / pedeapsa este o funcie de caracterul su fenomenale, apoi doar fiine sensibile sunt capabile de nvare prin condiionat. Dac sensibilitate este ceea ce conteaz pentru semnificaie moral, atunci este deja construit n unele modele non-psihologic de explicaie. Cu toate acestea, este greu s imagina c semnificaia moral nu este o chestiune de grad - i chiar dac aceasta nu este o chestiune de grad vom avea nevoie n continuare de a face judeci morale de semnificaie relativ.Oricum, distincia ntre "pur i simplu sensibile" creaturi i creaturi gndire este probabil s fie relevante. Propoziiilor i gndire non-propoziional n creaturi non-lingvistice S-ar putea fi acceptat c animalele de o anumit specie, la un anumit stadiu de dezvoltare sunt gnditori, n sensul c ele se comport (cel puin o parte din timp), n moduri care necesit explicaie psihologic. Dar exist diferite tipuri de gndire la nivel non-lingvistice. distincie de baz este ntre gndire propoziional i non-propoziiilor. Potrivit lui Michael Dummett, tipurile de gndire disponibile pentru animale sunt doar un subset al tipurile central de gndire disponibile pentru limba-folosind creaturi. 5 Dummett accept c exist pot fi gnduri non-lingvistice, care poate fi avut att de animale i de limb-utiliznd creaturi, dar el i numete "proto-gnduri". Aceste proto-gnduri "nu au structura de verbal i-a exprimat gndurile ", ele nu sunt" gnduri cu drepturi depline ", ele" nu poate pluti [liber a ] De mediu, dar poate avea loc numai astfel cum este integrat cu activitatea curent ", iar vehiculul de gndire non-lingvistice este" imagini suprapuse spaiale asupra percepiilor spaiale ". Nu poate fi non5 M. Dummett, Originile filosofiei analitice (Londra: Duckworth, 1993). gnduri lingvistice, dar acestea nu sunt "exact exprimabile n limbaj".

6 Aceasta este ceea ce eu numesc concepie minimalist de gndire non-lingvistice. n conformitate cu abordarea minimalist toate gndire non-lingvistice este context, legat n esen pragmatic i dinamic vehicled prin imagini suprapuse spaiale asupra percepiilor spaiale nestructurate Proto-gnduri interpreteaz astfel conta ca instane de gndire-how-ului, mai degrab dect gndire (care a trage o analogie cu distincie bine-cunoscut Gilbert Ryle, ntre ti-how-ul i knowingthat).Dummett le asimileaz n mod explicit la competene complexe comportamentale.Scopul lor este n esen, de control de rspunsuri la mediu, mai degrab dect obinerea de informaii despre asta. Ei nu au un coninut determinat care pot fi puse n cuvinte. n toate aceste privine acestea sunt fundamental diferite de credinte, dorinte, atitudini i alte propoziiilor. Una dintre promisiunile centrale ale gndirii fara cuvinte este c concepia minimalist nu poate fie un cont complet de gndire non-lingvistice. gndire non-lingvistice merge dincolo de percepie, pentru c exist forme de comportament de animale pe care le putem explica doar prin gndire de creaturi efectuarea acestor aciuni ca fiind convingerile cu drepturi depline i dorine. Prin aceasta vreau s spun c acestea sunt convingeri i dorine care reprezint lumea n moduri care pot fi raportate corect n propoziii de ceva nu prea diferite fa de limba englez -, dar nu identice cu limba englez, deoarece vom avea nevoie de vocabular care reflect diferenele dintre modul n care ne "sculpta up" n lumea obiectelor i modului n care mediul este perceput de ctre diferite tipuri de animale. explicaiile psihologice ale acestei tip sunt explicaii propoziiilor atitudine. Tipurile de comportament care, evident, cele mai ridic probleme pentru conceperea minimalist sunt cei care merg dincolo de "aici i acum". Atunci cnd animalele reprezint neprevzute ntre aciunile 6 Toate citate din Dummett, Origins pp. 122-123.and rezultatele, poate n gndire despre cum s mijloace adaptate la scopuri, ele sunt dincolo de scheme senzorimotoare avute n vedere de concepie minimalist. n mod similar, atunci cnd se angajeaz n utilizarea de scule i alte forme de planificare pe termen lung. cimpanzeii Wild, de exemplu, face dou diferite tipuri de baghete pentru scufundare n cuiburi de furnici i termite din diferite tipuri de sucursale. 7 Ei fac baghete pentru scufundare n roiuri de furnici prin luarea un b cativa metri lungime i demontarea frunze partea stem i frunze. Pentru scufundare n cuiburi de termite, pe de alt parte, le

folosesc baghete fcut de vi de vie sau ramurele mai flexibile, care sunt considerabil mai scurt i care au un scop mucat, spre deosebire de furnica baghetele. Desigur, ca cu determinarea iniial dac avem de a face cu gnditori, la toate, munc atent experimentale este necesar de a identifica atunci cnd explicaii propoziiilor sunt necesare. Aceasta este probabil zona cea mai intens studiat i controversat al cogniiei animale.Este, de asemenea potenial zona de mai mare interes pentru etic animale. Aceasta este, de asemenea, zona cea mai n cazul n care lucrare de filozofie este obligat s explice adevrul, condiiile de gndurile atribuite creaturi non-lingvistice i cum s mearg despre atribuirea astfel de gnduri. 8 n cazul n care se susine c semnificaia moral depinde de capacitatea de gndire autentic, atunci este natural (dar nu, desigur, obligatorii) s cred c exist grade de semnificaie moral corelat cu grade de sofisticare cognitive. Linia de demarcaie ntre gndirea natur minimalist i gndire de tipul celor propoziionale poate fi bine important. Limitele de gndire non-lingvistice: ascensiunea intenionate i ascensiunea semantice n ceea ce privete etica animal este n cauz, ceea ce animalele nu pot face este probabil s fie la fel de important ca ce animale pot face. Multe dintre discuiile semnificaie moral face condiionat special tipuri de realizare cognitive. Unele dintre aceste realizri cognitive ar putea fi implicate n 7 A se vedea RW Byrne, Ape Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 8 Vezi Capitolele 4 i 5 din Bermdez, gndire i fr cuvinte, pentru o imagine de ansamblu mai scurte, JL Bermdez, "gndurile care atribuie creaturi non-lingvistice", Facta Philosophica 5, 313 334. tipuri de gndire non-lingvistice, am discutat deja. S presupunem, de exemplu, c moral semnificaie s-au gandit sa se limiteze la creaturi capabile de o preocupare pentru propriul viitor. S-ar putea s ia capacitatea de a se angaja n anumite tipuri de planificare raz lung de aciune care urmeaz s fie dovezi pentru astfel de preocupare. Exist o serie de modaliti de gndire despre considerability morale, totui, c nu poate, n principiu se aplic creaturi non-lingvistice - sau, cel puin, nu dac unul dintre argumentele centrale ale Gndirea fara cuvinte este solid. Din Cap. 8 I susin c crezut c de nivel superior (gndire despre gndire) este dependente de limb. n aceast seciune voi prezenta o versiune revizuit a argumentului de baz. n urmtoarele seciuni am trage unele din limitrile faptul c indisponibilitatea de ordin superior gnduri pe cunoatere animale. Printr-un ordin superior crezut c vreau s spun un gnd care ia un alt gnd ca obiect.Gnduri despre strile mentale altuia conta ca gnduri de ordin superior, de exemplu, la fel ca i

reflecia asupra propriilor stri mentale. Quine a descris odat ascensiune semantic ca "trecerea de la vorb la anumii termeni pentru a vorbi despre ei ". 9 Prin analogie, putem caracteriza ca ascensiunea intenionat trecerea de la gndirea n anumite moduri de gndire cu privire la aceste moduri de gndire. Meu argument, n efect, este acela c ascensiunea intenionat necesit o ascensiune semantice - care ne putem gndi numai despre gndurile prin gndire despre cuvinte. Noi ar trebui s disting de ordinul nti gnduri int din gndurile de ordin superior care ar putea fi ndreptate la ei. Convingerea mea c p este o int gnd. Acesta este obiectul de credinta mea de ordin superior, care Eu cred c p. gnduri int trebuie s fie reprezentate s fie obiecte de gnduri de ordin superior. Exist tot felul de lucruri se ntmpl sub pragul de contiin atunci cnd ne gndim (Probabil gndire implic manipularea propoziii ntr-o limb subpersonal de gndire, pentru de exemplu). Dar aceste evenimente subpersonal nu sunt ceea ce credem noi despre cand ne gandim la propriile noastre 9 WVO Quine, Word i Object (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960) p. 271. Clare Palmer Clare Palmer Comentariu: Structura de acest lucru nu este foarte buna. M ntreb dac ai putea stabili asta mai bine la nceput prin a fi mai explicit i mai uor detaliate despre modul n care moralitii animal, utilizarea afirmatiile despre cunoatere animale pentru a sprijini lor argumente despre starea moral? Apoi felul in care ai scris acest lucru ar putea decurge mai lin. Comentariu: Exist ceva amuzant despre acest tez? Sau este "noi", dup p. nceputul unei propoziie noi? gnduri. Exist o diferen ntre gndirea despre gndurile i gndirea despre maini de gndire. Deci, ntrebarea este: Cum trebuie s vizeze gndurile s fie reprezentate n pentru ca acestea s fie obiecte de gnduri de ordin superior? Exist dou posibiliti. Pe de o reprezentare de o parte ar putea fi asigurate simbolic prin simboluri complex a unui limbaj natural. A crezut c ar fi reprezentat, prin urmare, , prin intermediul expresiei sale lingvistice i ar aprea ca un obiect potenial de qua gndire lingvistice entitate. Pe de alt parte, reprezentarea ar putea fi asigurate ntr-un mod analog, printr-un fel de model picturale. Pe aceast concepie ale vehiculelor de gndire, pe care le gsim dezvoltate n moduri diferite n teorie mentale modele n psihologie de raionament, i n concepia de hri mentale invocate de Braddon-Mitchell i Jackson, vehiculul de un gnd este un

pictorial reprezentare a strii de lucruri s fie gndit. 10 Argumentul n favoarea pedepselor limbaj publice i mpotriva modele pictural se bazeaz pe considerente de structura i rolul inferentiale. Sunt presupunnd c gndurile sunt individualizate la cel puin n parte, prin rolul lor inferenial. Ce face un anumit gnd gndul c p este parial o materie de relaii infereniale n care este evident alte gnduri. Unele dintre aceste relaii sunt relaiile implicaia (gndurile care presupun p i c p implic gnduri), dar au, de asemenea, includ relaiile probant (gndurile a cror exploataie adevrat ar fi dovezi bune pentru gndire c p este adevrat, i gndurile care ar fi judecat mai probabil s fie adevrat dac p ar fi adevrat). Orice gnditor capabil de o gndire de ordin superior crezut regizat la un gnd int trebuie, aproape de definiie, au unele prindei dintre condiiile de individualizare int gndire. El trebuie s aib unele neles a ceea ce este c el se gandeste. Nu este nimic ciudat aici pentru a de ordin superior gnduri. Aceasta este doar o aplicare a cerinei foarte general care s se gndeasc la nimic 10 Teoria modele mentale a fost propus pentru prima dat n K. Craik, Natura Explicaie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943) i este cel mai complet dezvoltat n P. Johnson-Laird, modele mentale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).Pentru hri mentale a se vedea D. Braddon-Mitchell i F. Jackson, filosofia minii i Cognitie (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). trebuie sa ai un fel de "acces cognitive", care permite o pentru a alege asta lucru. Rezult c un gnditor de ordin superior trebuie s aib un fel de a nelege implicaia i relaiile probatorie n care obiectivul crezut standuri. 11 Cel puin unele dintre aceste implicaia i relaii de prob sunt n funcie de structura crezut c p. Pentru a nelege rolul inferenial unui gnd avem nevoie pentru a putea pentru a putea vizualiza ca alctuit din componente distincte care pot fi integrate n alte gnduri i, n plus, am nevoie pentru a putea vizualiza ca alctuit din acele componente ntr-un mod care determin semantic sale Valoarea (captarea astfel diferena dintre Bogot gnd adevrat este de capital din Columbia i gndul fals Columbia este capitala Bogota). Am putea spune, prin urmare, c structura a crezut c trebuie s fie limpede n reprezentarea constient accesibile, c este inta mai mare de ordin gndire. Ultimul pas n argumentul este c structura de un gnd nu poate fi limpede n fel dreptul de modul n gnduri care sunt reprezentate ntr-un mod pictural. calificare este important, deoarece reprezentarea pictural n hri mentale i modele

mentale nu depind de o noiune de izomorfism structurale dintre modelele / hri i ceea ce ei reprezint. Relaiile exploataie ntre elemente ale modelului mental / Harta poate fi mapate pe relaiile dintre obiecte n exploataia de stat reprezentat de lucruri. Acest lucru vine n foarte n mod clar n urmtorul pasaj din Braddon-Mitchell i Jackson. Nu exist nici o modalitate naturala de mprirea o hart la adevar sa-evaluabile reprezentationale articulaiilor. Fiecare parte dintr-o hart contribuie la coninutul de reprezentare a ntregului hart, n sensul c a avut acea parte a hrii fost diferite, de reprezentare coninutul ntregului ar fi fost diferite. Modificarea pic de harta a Statele Unite ale Americii ntre New York i Boston, i ai schimba sistematic ceea ce harta spune. Aceasta este parte din ceea ce face este adevrat c harta este structurat.Cu toate acestea, nu exist nici o modalitate preferat de mprirea hrii n uniti de baz de reprezentare. Acolo sunt multe puzzle-uri jigsaw s-ar putea face din harta, dar nimeni nu ar fi singur au o cerere de a avea piese care au fost toi i numai unitile cele mai de baz. 12 11 Gnditorul care crede c doar astfel de gnduri (spre deosebire de gndire despre ei) nu nu trebuie s profite de aceste relaii implicaia i probatorie. Ei pur i simplu trebuie s te gndeti n moduri care le respecta. 12 Braddon-Mitchell i Jackson, filosofia minii i cunoatere, p. 171. Jose Bermudez 3/30/06 09:32 ters: Am putea luciu aceasta, dup cum urmeaz. reprezentri vizuale care nu au o structur canonic. Lor structur poate fi analizat n mai multe moduri diferite (corespunztoare Jigsaw puzzle-uri pe care o se poate construi din ea), dar nici unul dintre acestea pot fi descrise corect ca da structura stare de fapt. Cu toate acestea, n scopul de a nelege rolul inferenial unui gnd o face trebuie s neleag structura canonic de acel gnd (ceea ce este denumit adesea forma sa logic).Aceast structur canonic este limpede, dei nu ntotdeauna perfect limpede, atunci cnd gndurile sunt exprimate n public limba propoziii. Acesta este motivul pentru care gndire de ordin superior depinde de limb. Numai fraze public limb poate face structura canonic a unui obiectiv gndire la dispoziia gnditori ntr-un mod care le permite s neleag rolul infereniale obiectivului gndire. ncheierea de argument, apoi, este c gndirea despre gndire este disponibil numai pentru creaturi languageusing. Ce argument nu arat: Sentience i gnduri de ordin superior Unii filosofi au propus de ordin superior teorii gndit de constiinta (Rosenthal, 1986). Conform acestor teorii o stare mental este contient dac, i numai dac, este obiectul unui gndire de ordin superior. Avnd n vedere c doar sensibilitate este capacitatea de a

avea experiene contiente, de ordin superior teorii gndit de constiinta restriciona sensibilitate la creaturi capabile de gndire de ordin superior gnduri. Orice astfel de concluzie este potenial foarte important pentru etica animal, date fiind greutatea, care este standard si pus pe suferinta animalelor n gndirea cu privire la obligaiile noastre de a animale non-umane. Trebuie subliniat, totui, c aceast concluzie nu n orice sens rezult din argument de la Ascent intenionat a ascensiunii semantice. Argumentul presupune o teorie a constiinta. Acesta nu a propus s ofere o i este perfect compatibil cu ideea c animalele non-umane nu poate avea doar experiene contient (i astfel nct s fie contiente), dar au, de asemenea convingeri contient i dorine. Obiectul unei convingeri contient este o stare de lucruri din lume (sau, n cazul unei credinte false doar posibil o stare de lucruri) i argumentul din intenionate Ascensiunea pe ascensiune semantic se aplic numai gnduri care au gnduri i alte obiecte lor. Ca astfel ea nu ofer suport direct la argumentele care animalele nu pot fi simitoare, deoarece acestea nu sunt capabile de a avea gnduri de ordin superior. 13 Ascent intenionat i nelegerea altor minti Este posibil pentru creaturi non-lingvistice s participe la practici de atribuirea psihologic statele s animale congenere lor sau ntr-adevr, la orice alte creaturi? n lumina precedent discuie nu este greu de vzut de ce o clas foarte larg de atribuii psihologice ar trebui s fie indisponibil pentru creaturi non-lingvistice. Pentru a atribui o credinta, de exemplu, la un alt creatura este n esen, pentru a vedea c creatura ca n picioare ntr-un raport special la un gnd relaia de creznd gndul de a fi adevrat. n mod evident, prin urmare, atribuirea unei convingeri necesit o gndire despre un gnd. Este o forma canonic a ascensiunii intenionate, care necesit a fi capabil s "dein o gnd n minte ". Acest lucru are implicaii potenial de etica animal, n orice caz c link-uri semnificaie moral pentru a capacitatea de a se angaja n anumite tipuri de reflecie cu privire la strile mentale de celelalte porcine - sau de a capacitatea de a se angaja n tipurile de comportament (probabil comportament ngrijirea), care presupune i implic astfel de reflecie. Este important s se recunoasc, totui, c argumentul din intenionate Ascensiunea pe ascensiune semantic nu las creaturi non-lingvistic complet "minteorb". Acolo sunt tipuri de stare mental, care poate fi neleas i atribuite de ctre creaturi nonlingvistice. 13

Se poate oferi un sprijin indirect, cu toate acestea, pe unele modaliti de dezvoltare de ordin superior teorii ale contiinei. Autori, cum ar fi Carruthers au susinut c tipul de gnduri de ordin superior necesare pentru constiinta sunt disponibile numai pentru creaturi posed o "teorie a mintii", i aa cum vom vedea mai n detaliu n seciunea urmtoare, argument de la Ascent intenionat a ascensiunii semantice nu exclude teoriile din mintea la non-lingvistice nivel. Vezi p. Carruthers, "teoriile fizice de constiinta", European Jurnalul de Filosofie 6, 203-222. Clare Palmer Comentariu: M ntreb dac ai putea reformula nota de subsol de a spune ceva de genul "dac unul a avut o vedere, cum ar fi Carruther lui, argumentnd c tipul de gnduri de ordin superior necesare pentru contiina (i, prin urmare, sensibilitate) sunt disponibile numai pentru creaturi care posed o teorie a mintii ... ". La momentul n care modul n care se sugereaz c fraza dvs. argument ofer sprijin indirect la toate provocrile sensibilitate de animale, dar de fapt este doar la acele idei de sensibilitate, care s neleag n contiina does.To Carruthers mod de "a explica mai departe, avem nevoie s distingem dou moduri de gndire despre dorina. 14 Se poate doresc un anumit lucru, sau se poate dorina ca o anumit stare de lucruri fi cazul. Acest lucru este distincie ntre obiectiv-dorinele i-dorintele situaie. La nivel de gndire verbalizable, a distincie poate fi marcat n termeni de dou moduri diferite de a completa "dorinelor X -" teza. O propoziie atribui un obiectiv-dorin este completat de numele unui obiect sau de numele de tipul celor de chestii ("alimente" de ex). Dar atunci cnd o propoziie atribuie o situaie-dorinta, aceasta este completat de un "care-" clauz n care gol este umplut de o propoziie complet specificnd starea de lucruri n ntrebare. Goal-dorinele sunt mai mult de situaia de baz-dorine. Contrastul este efectiv ntre dorin interpretat ca o atitudine propoziional (n situaia-dorinele, care i sunt atribuite prin care-clauzele alegerea n crezut c este obiectul dorinei) i mai fundamental obiectivul-dorinte care sunt ndreptate nu la gnduri, ci mai degrab la obiecte sau caracteristici. Nu exist nici un motiv non-lingvistice creaturi nu ar trebui s poat atribui un scop dorete s ali ageni. Argumentul de la Ascent intenionat nu pot obine un grip, dat fiind c scopul-dorinele sunt relaiile dintre un subiect i un obiect / caracteristic, mai degrab dect ntre un subiect i o propunere. Abilitatea de a atribui un scop dorinele merge mn n mn cu o nelegere de baz a intenionat, adic directionat spre un scop, comportament. Dei, desigur, vor fi diferite grade de complexitate n comportamentul directionat spre un scop, n funcie de bogia de dorine i convingeri prin care este condus, o creatur capabil de a atribui obiectiv-dorintele va fi capabil s fac

distincie de baz ntre comportamente intenionate, pe de o parte, i micrile aleatorii i reacii instinctive pe de alt parte. O aciune scop este o aciune pentru care o goaldesire motivant poate fi identificat. Goal-dorinte nu pot fi singurele state mentale care pot fi identificate i atribuite de ctre creaturi non-lingvistice. Este greu de a vedea, de exemplu, modul n care un obiectivdorinta pot fi atribuite la o creatur 14 A se vedea Bermdez, gndire fr cuvinte, pp. 48-9. fr dovezi unele dintre informaiile de care creatura dispune cu privire la mediul su. La minimul aceste informaii vor fi de percepie. Pentru a ti ce scop dorina de-ar putea fi motivant o creatur la un moment dat o creatur trebuie s tie, n primul rnd, ce scop se desfoar i, pe de alt parte, cum s-ar putea atepta n mod rezonabil n acest scop s fie realizat prin comportamentul su actual. Ambele din aceste necesit cunoaterea la care caracteristici ale mediului su creatura este perceptual sensibil. n cazul n care, prin urmare, o creatur non-lingvistice este de a fi n msur s-atribut obiectiv dorete s o creatura coleg ea trebuie s fie n msur s formuleze ipoteze despre ce creatur este percepe. Aici putem distinge dou moduri de gndire despre a vedea urmnd Dretske n distincie ntre simplu s vad i epistemic vedea. Potrivit Dretske, ceea ce vedem n simple vznd (sau ceea ce el numete non-epistemice a vedea) "este o funcie numai de ceea ce exist este de a vedea i ceea ce, avnd n vedere aparatul nostru vizual, precum i condiiile n care l folosesc, suntem capabili de de difereniere vizual ". 15 n schimb, vznd epistemice implic n picioare ntr-o legtur cu un propoziia (un gnd). Epistemice vznd implic vznd c ceva este cazul. Argumentul din ascensiune intenionate arat c creaturi non-lingvistice nu sunt capabile de nelegere epistemic vedea, deoarece acest lucru implic gndire despre relaia percepe la un gndire. Dar acest lucru este perfect compatibil cu creaturi non-lingvistice fiind capabil de a gndi despre relaiile directe perceptuale n care alte creaturi stau la obiecte. Acest lucru permite creaturi non-lingvistice de a se angaja ntr-o form primitiv de explicaie psihologic. O creatur care tie ce dorete ntre petii congeneri, sau prdtor i are un sentiment de sensibilitate sale perceptuale aspectul de mediu (precum i o nelegere a capacitilor sale motor) se pot atepta s fie capabil s prezic comportamentul su cu un oarecare succes. Aceast interpretare restrictiv a "mintea-lectur" abilitati ale unor creaturi non-lingvistice este compatibil cu cercetrile recente mult n msura n care primatele non-umane poate n mod corespunztor fi descris ca avnd o "teorie a mintii". Nu sunt bine documentate exemple de 15 Dretske F., Vznd i tiind (Londra: Routledge, 1969) p. comportament 76.primate c unii elevi proeminente ale comportamentului animal s-au gndit poate fi doar

interpretat ca exemple de nelciune interpersonale. 16 Dar avizul consens ntre primatologi este faptul c o interpretare mai zgrcit din aceste comportamente este de preferat. 17 Multe exemple a ceea ce a ajuns s fie numit nelciune tactice poate fi neleas ca manipulare, nu de atitudini propoziionale altuia, ci pur i simplu din punctul lor de vedere vizual. Aici este un exemplu de nelciune tactice ntr-o trupa de babuini din Etiopia, care se preteaz la un astfel de interpretare: O femela adulta, a petrecut 20 de minute n schimbarea treptat ntr-o poziie aezat pe o distan de aproximativ 2 milioane de la un loc n spatele o stnc de aproximativ 50 cm nlime n cazul n care ea a nceput s mire adept the subadult masculin al grupului - o interaciune nu este tolerat de ctre aduli de sex masculin. Aa cum am fost observarea de pe o stnc uor mai sus [animalele] am putut judeca c liderul aduli de sex masculin ar putea, din poziia sa de repaus, a se vedea coada, spate i cretetul capului femelei, dar nu ei fa, brae i fa: masculul subadult sttea n o poziie aplecat fiind n acelai timp ngrijit, i a fost, de asemenea, invizibil pentru lider.Liderul ar putea astfel vedea c ea a fost prezent, dar probabil c ea nu ngrijit. 18 Comportamentul de babuin de sex feminin, presupunnd c aceasta este ntr-adevr, pentru a conta ca o instan a tactice nelciune, nu pare s solicite reprezint credinele mascul alfa. Ce este ea face profit de o nelegere a mascul alfa vizual "ia" cu privire la situaia de a scpa detectare. The babuin femeie are nevoie doar de a aprecia linia de mascul alfa de vedere i faptul c el ar fi mpiedicat de la a vedea de sex masculin subadult de rock interveniente.Aceasta pare ferm la nivelul de a vedea, mai degrab dect simple epistemic vad. Acest exemplu (i discuia de origine animal "minte-lectur", mai general), arat c argument de la Ascent intenionate la urcare semantic este compatibil cu luarea nonlingvistice animalele s aib abiliti cognitive destul de sofisticate. Argumentul cere teoreticieni s se gndeasc 16 A se vedea, de exemplu, lucrri n RW Byrne i albi A. (eds.), machiavelice Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); D. Premack i G. Woodruff. "Are cimpanzeu au o teorie a minii?", Comportamentale i tiine Brain 1, 515 526; i F. de Waal, Politica Himera: Putere i Sex Printre Apes (Londra: Jonathan Cape, 1982). 17 De exemplu, D. Povinelli, "Himera teorie a minii" n P. Carruthers i Smith PK (Eds.), Teorii de teorie a mintii (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) i MD Hauser, Minds Wild: Ce Animale Chiar crezi (Londra: Penguin Books, 2000). 18 Raport de Kummer Hans citat n Byrne Ape Thinking, p. 106critically despre unele de

cercetare contemporane n cunoatere animale. Plaseaz limite conceptuale abiliti care pot fi atribuite creaturi non-lingvistice, dar n astfel deschide noi modaliti de interpretarea comportamentelor revelat prin observare i experiment. Raionament, raionalitate, i de gndire logic comportamentul animalelor Explicarea n termeni psihologici, ne oblig s ia n considerare problemele de raionalitate i raionament. explicaiile psihologice de munc, deoarece acestea identific credinele i dorinele n lumina care a aciunii fiind explicat logic din perspectiva agentului. Pentru a spune c o aciune are sens n funcie de convingerile unui agent i dorinele este s spun c acesta este un lucru raional a face (sau, cel puin, un lucru raional pentru a face), avnd n vedere acele convingeri i dorine. i asta nseamn la rndul ei c, cel puin n unele cazuri, o creatur ar putea motiv drumul ei de la aceste convingeri i dorete s care acioneaz n mod relevant. Raionament i raionalitatea sunt noiuni corelative.Cum ar trebui s facem sentiment de aceste noiuni la nivel non-lingvistice? Aici este o modalitate n care nu putem face sens din ele. Argumentul din intenionate ascensiune standuri fi n mod de tratare a animalelor ca gndire logic. Putem ilustra acest cu forma cea mai de baz a gndirii logice - sub form de gndire codificat n propoziionale calcul i implicarea conectorii de baz logic, cum ar fi disjuncie ("sau"), coroborat ("i"), iar materialul condiionat ("daca... Apoi..."). Luai n considerare un gnd condiionat de sortare care ar putea fi exprimat n propoziie "dac A, atunci B". Pentru a distra o astfel de gndire este de a nelege c dou gnduri sunt legate ntr-un anumit fel - i anume, c gnd al doilea nu poate fi fals dac primul gnd este adevrat. Dar aceasta nseamn c nelegerea gndurile-adevr funcional compus este un form de ascensiune intenionate. Nu se poate gndi despre adevrul-valorile de gnduri fr a se gndi despre gnduri i acest lucru, prin argumentul anterior, necesit o ascensiune semantic. Gndire logic depinde de limba, prin urmare, pentru c presupune capacitatea de a Ascent intenionat, care la rndul su, depinde de ascensiune semantic. Aceasta reprezint o provocare evident pentru modul n care ne gndim la raionamentul la animale. Provocarea este de a identifica forme de raionament la nivel non-lingvistice i apoi, fr a le explica presupunnd c animalul (sau prelingvistice sugari) este implementarea conceptelor logice elementare. Voi ilustra modul n care aceast provocare poate fi ndeplinit pentru o form foarte baz de raionament. Acest raionament este simpl condiionat de tipul formalizat ca modus ponens - raionament, care este standard si gandit pentru a exploata de valabilitate a inferen de la "dac A, atunci B" i "A" la "B". Detectarea de modele de comportament este strns legat de posibilitatea de raionament condiionat. O creatur care tie c, dac gazele a se vedea leu vor fugi i recunoate c (probabil pe baza nelegerii sale de perspectiva gazelele "vizual), care leul va fi detectat la scurt timp de ctre gazele, este ntr-o msur s prevad c gazele va avea n curnd de zbor.

n gndire, fr cuvinte, propunem cutarea surselor de raionamentul condiionate ntr-un forma primitiva de raionament de cauzalitate. ntruct raionamentul condiionat (n sensul codificate n propoziiilor calcul) exploateaz relaia adevr-funcional ntre gnduri complete, de cauzalitate exploateaza raionament condiiile deinerea de cauzalitate ntre stri de lucruri.Deoarece relaii cauzale nu dein ntre gnduri complete, o nelegere de cauzalitate presupune nici o intenie Ascent, i, prin urmare nu are nevoie de limbaj. S-ar putea atepta pe ambele motive experimentale, observaionale, precum i evolutive c unele capacitate de cunoatere de cauzalitate este foarte larg rspndit n rndul animalelor i sunt disponibile ntr-un stadiu foarte timpuriu n dezvoltarea uman. 19 Capacitatea de a detecta anumite tipuri de regularitatea de cauzalitate i s se fac distincia relaii de cauzalitate real de la conjuncii accidental are o valoare de supravieuire evidente. Cauzal relaiile de dependen sunt observabile direct, foarte proeminente i pragmatic semnificative ntr-un mod c nu sunt alte relaii de dependen. 19 A se vedea n eseuri D. Sperber (Ed.), Cognition cauzale (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Cum ar putea fi cauzalitatea de neles de ctre animalele non-lingvistice?Se pare plauzibil c nucleul de nelegere a legturii de cauzalitate la nivel non-lingvistice este sensibilitatea la regulariti n distal de mediu. O sensibilitate de baz la regulariti de mediu trebuie s fac parte din innascute dotarea de orice creatur capabile de a nva despre mediul nconjurtor, i s-ar putea atepta orice creatur s fie deosebit de sensibili la regulariti ntre aciunile sale i modificrile care decurg n mediul su imediat (care este motivul pentru care condiionat instrumental funcioneaz precum o face). De Desigur, ca teoriile regularitatea legturii de cauzalitate au fost nevoite s recunoasc, exist multe legitile care nu sunt de cauzalitate, i este n capacitatea de a distinge regulariti cu adevrat de cauzalitate de la legitile accidentale care s-ar putea atepta diferene ntre diferite specii de creaturi non-lingvistice i, pentru care conteaz, diferite stadii de dezvoltare n orice specie dat. Regulariti n care creaturi non-lingvistice sunt sensibile (spre deosebire de cele de obicei, a subliniat n analize regularitatea legturii de cauzalitate) nu trebuie exceptionless. Nici o creatura care a acionat numai pe legitile exceptionless ar tarif bine n sustragerea de animale de prad i obinerea produselor alimentare. Proto-cauzale piese nelegere relaii, care pot fi deterministe sau probabilistice, ntre stri de lucruri. Acest lucru face posibil o nelegere (primitive) de cauzalitate la

non-lingvistice nivel. De asemenea, explic de ce versiuni primitive de inferenta fundamentale anumitor Formularele sunt disponibile la nivel non-lingvistice. Putem termen lung acest raionament proto-condiionat. n loc de tratarea animalelor ca exploatarea condiionale cu drepturi depline (adic acei compui-adevr funcional de gnduri) ne putem gndi la ele ca de urmrire relaii cauzale ntre stri de lucruri. Eu numesc aceste proto-condiionale. raionament condiionale n animale poate fi neleas n termenii unei protoconditional mpreun cu o nelegere, care poate lua forma de o percepie sau o amintire, c deine antecedente. n consecin va fi direct detaat. Vedem, aadar, c argumentul iniial pentru limba-dependena de gndire logic nu exclude posibilitatea de a raionamentului non-lingvistice. Nu putem, desigur, s neleag raionament non-lingvistice ca implicnd concepte logice (sau orice alt form de urcare intenionate). Dar noi pot identifica la nivel forme non-lingvistice ale considere c sunt analogii de forme canonice inferenta logic i care pot fi implementate n practic fr nici un raionament stpnirea de logic concepte sau de capacitate de gndire de ordin superior. Concluzie Studiul de cunoatere animale ofer un domeniu bogat de teoreticieni de etic animale.Exist continuiti semnificative ntre viaa cognitive de unele animale non-lingvistice i cognitive de via a animalelor umane. Unele specii de animale sunt gnditori reale n mare parte acelai fel n care oamenii conta ca gnditori autentice. Asta este, ei se comport n moduri care s reflecte dorinele lor i convingeri despre mediul nconjurtor. Altele sunt gnditori autentice ntr-un sens mai slab - n sensul caracterizate prin ceea ce am numit concepia minimalist de gndire non-lingvistice.Chiar i la nivelul minimalist avem de-a face cu forme de comportament care nu poate fi explicat doar n termeni de condiionare sau de mecanisme nnscute eliberare. Moralitii care cred c moral semnificaie de animale este o funcie de nivelul lor de sofisticare cognitive va trebui s ia cont de gradaii subtile ntre diferitele tipuri de gndire, fr cuvinte. De asemenea, vor necesitatea de a lua la bord limitele de gndire non-lingvistice impuse de argumentul din intenionat ascensiune. Exist consecine serioase pentru a face semnificaie moral de animale depinde de capacitatea de gndire de nivel superior (gndire despre gndire - sau metarepresentation)! Cu toate acestea, tipurile de activiti cognitive care sunt excluse n virtutea argument de la Ascent intenionate sunt mai limitate dect s-ar putea s apar imediat.Aa cum am adus afar cu referire la non-lingvistice "minte-lectur" i raionament non-lingvistice, nonlingvistice animalele pot obine un drum lung fr a se gndi despre gndire!

THINKING WITHOUT WORDS: AN OVERVIEW FOR ANIMAL ETHICS * Jos Luis Bermdez In Thinking without Words I develop a philosophical framework for treating (at least some) animals and human infants as "genuine thinkers". 1 A genuine thinker, I take it, is a creature that behaves in ways that reflect its thoughts about the environment and hence a creature whose behavior needs to be explained in psychological terms. That many animals are genuine thinkers is taken for granted by much research in cognitive ethology, but scientists and philosophers have often been skeptical of what they take to be anecdotal evidence and tacit anthropomorphism. The aims of my book are to set out clear criteria for identifying when psychological explanations are required for non-linguistic creatures to show how precise and determinate thoughts can be attributed to nonlinguistic creatures to show how the psychological explanations that we give of animal and infant behavior are continuous with the psychological explanations that we give of language-using creatures to explore the differences between thinking without words and language-based thinking. This paper outlines the aspects of this account that are of most relevance to those working in animal ethics. There is a range of different levels of cognitive sophistication in different animal species, in addition to limits to the types of thought available to non-linguistic creatures, and it may be important for animal ethicists to take this into account in exploring issues of moral significance and the obligations that we might or might not have to non-human animals. * I am grateful for comments on an earlier version from Robert Francescotti and Clare Palmer. 1 J. L. Bermdez, Thinking without Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Clare Palmer Comment: There are some positions of which this isn't the case, I suppose, so may be is probably better.Psychological and non-psychological explanations of behavior Psychological explanations come into play when non-psychological forms of explanation provide insufficient explanatory and predictive leverage. Typical non-psychological forms of explanation appeal to mechanisms of associative conditioning and what are known as innate releasing mechanisms. Pavlovian or classical conditioning occurs when an association is reinforced between an unconditioned stimulus (e.g. food, or pain) and a conditioned stimulus (e.g. the sound of a bell). The unconditioned stimulus typically generates an unconditioned response (e. g. salivation). As a result of conditioning the unconditioned response is generated by the conditioned stimulus. Many forms of animal training are based on classical conditioning. It is classical conditioning that makes clicks and whistles effective rewards for dogs and dolphins. In instrumental (or operant) conditioning the process of reinforcement (or punishment) applies to actions rather than physiological responses. According to behaviorist models of animal behavior, all animal behavior is the product of either classical or instrumental conditioning, and conditioning is certainly the type of animal learning most frequently studied in the laboratory. Ethologists, however, have also appealed to innate releasing mechanisms to explain behavior in the wild. 2

Innate releasing mechanisms are fixed and instinctive sequences of movements. For example, when newly hatched herring gulls encounter stimuli matching the adult herring gull beak in color, length, and movement they respond by pecking. Innate releasing mechanisms have the following characteristics. 3 They are triggered by specific stimuli. They always take the same form. They occur in all members of the relevant species. 2 See, for example, N. Tinbergen, The Study of Instinct (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 3 S. E. G. Lea, Instinct, Environment, and Behavior (London: Methuen, 1984). Their occurrence is largely independent of the individual creature's history. Once launched they cannot be varied. They have only one function. Innate releasing mechanisms and conditioned responses are both invariant responses to stimuli. When the animal registers the relevant stimulus the appropriate response results in a way that can in general be fully understood, explained and predicted without any appeal to an intermediary between stimulus and response. 4 Psychological explanations of behavior only become necessary when no such invariant input-output links can be identified. The essence of a psychological explanation is that it explains behavior in terms of how the creature in question represents its environment, rather than simply in terms of the stimuli that it detects. Psychological explanations typically make reference to how the organism perceives its environment, to what it believes about the environment, and to what it desires to achieve. These beliefs, desires, and perceptions allow organisms to respond flexibly and plastically to their environments the same situations can afford different actions if a creature brings different beliefs and desires to it, or perceives it in different ways. How are we to determine which animals count as genuine thinkers? By identifying species whose members behave in ways that do not seem to be explicable in non-psychological terms. Any such judgment is provisional and defeasible, since it might always turn out that we have been insufficiently imaginative in thinking about the non-psychological possibilities. What is not provisional and defeasible, however, is the judgment that many species will prove to contain genuine thinkers. The weight of the evidence points strongly to the impossibility of characterizing all animal behavior in non-psychological terms. 4 But see A. Dickinson and B. Balleine, Actions and responses: The dual psychology of behavior in N. Eilan, B. Brewer, and R. McCarthy (Eds.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993) for for examples of types of conditioned response that do seem to require a psychological explanationThere is a basic distinction, then, between creatures that behave in ways that require psychological explanation and those that do not. This may mark a morally significant dividing line. It is worth noting, however, that sentience seems to be required for some forms of associative learning. If the unconditioned stimulus is pleasure or pain, or anything whose status as reward/punishment is a function of its phenomenal character, then only sentient creatures are capable of learning through conditioning. If sentience is what matters for moral significance then it is already built into some non-psychological models of explanation. Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine that moral significance is not a matter of degree and even if it is not a matter of degree

we will still need to make judgments of relative moral significance. Either way the distinction between merely sentient creatures and thinking creatures is likely to be relevant. Propositional and non-propositional thinking in non-linguistic creatures It might be accepted that animals of a certain species at a certain stage of development are thinkers, in the sense that they behave (at least some of the time) in ways that require psychological explanation. But there are different types of thinking at the non-linguistic level. The basic distinction is between propositional and non-propositional thought. According to Michael Dummett, the types of thinking available to animals are just a subset of the central types of thinking available to language-using creatures. 5 Dummett accepts that there can be non-linguistic thoughts, which can be had both by animals and by language-using creatures, but he calls them proto-thoughts. These proto-thoughts "do not have the structure of verbally expressed thoughts"; they are not "full-fledged thoughts"; they "cannot float free [of the environment], but can occur only as integrated with current activity"; and the vehicle of nonlinguistic thought is spatial images superimposed on spatial perceptions". There can be non5 M. Dummett, The Origins of Analytical Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1993). linguistic thoughts, but these are not "accurately expressible in language". 6 This is what I call the minimalist conception of non-linguistic thought. According to the minimalist approach all non-linguistic thinking is context-bound essentially pragmatic and dynamic vehicled by spatial images superimposed on spatial perceptions unstructured Proto-thoughts thus construed count as instances of thinking-how rather than thinking-that (to draw an analogy with Gilbert Ryles well-known distinction between knowing-how and knowingthat). Dummett explicitly assimilates them to complex behavioral skills. Their purpose is essentially the control of responses to the environment, rather than the acquisition of information about it. They do not have a determinate content that can be put into words. In all these respects they are fundamentally different from beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes. One of the central claims of Thinking without Words is that the minimalist conception cannot be a complete account of non-linguistic thought. Non-linguistic thought goes beyond perception, because there are forms of animal behavior that we can only explain by thinking of the creatures performing those actions as having full-fledged beliefs and desires. By this I mean that these are beliefs and desires that represent the world in ways that can be accurately reported in sentences of something not too dissimilar to English but not identical to English, since we will need a vocabulary that reflects the differences between how we carve up the world into objects and how the environment is perceived by different types of animal. Psychological explanations of this type are propositional attitude explanations. The types of behavior that most obviously pose problems for the minimalist conception are those that go beyond the here and now. When animals represent contingencies between actions 6 All quotes from Dummett, Origins pp. 122-123.and outcomes, perhaps in thinking about how to tailor means to ends, they are going beyond the sensorimotor schemas envisaged by the minimalist conception. Similarly, when they engage in tool use and other forms of long-range planning. Wild chimpanzees, for example, make two different types of wands for dipping into ant and termite nests from different types of branches.

7 They make wands for dipping into ant swarms by taking a stick several feet long and stripping the side leaves and leafy stem. For dipping into termite nests, on the other hand, they use wands made from vines or more flexible twigs that are considerably shorter and that have a bitten end, unlike the ant wands. Of course, as with the initial determination of whether we are dealing with thinkers at all, careful experimental work is required to identify when propositional explanations are required. This is probably the most intensively studied and controversial area of animal cognition. It is also potentially the area of most interest to animal ethics. This is also the area where most philosophical work is required to explain the truth-conditions of the thoughts ascribed to nonlinguistic creatures and how to go about attributing such thoughts. 8 If it is argued that moral significance depends upon the capacity for genuine thought, then it is natural (but not, of course, compulsory) to think that there are degrees of moral significance correlated with degrees of cognitive sophistication. The dividing line between thinking of the minimalist kind and thinking of the propositional kind may well be important. The limits of non-linguistic thought: Intentional ascent and semantic ascent As far as animal ethics is concerned, what animals cannot do is likely to be just as important as what animals can do. Many discussions of moral significance make it contingent upon particular types of cognitive achievement. Some of these cognitive achievements could be implicated in the 7 See R. W. Byrne, The Thinking Ape (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 8 See Chs 4 and 5 of Bermdez, Thinking without Words and, for a shorter overview, J. L. Bermdez, Ascribing thoughts to non-linguistic creatures, Facta Philosophica 5, 313334. types of non-linguistic thinking we have already discussed. Suppose, for example, that moral significance were thought to be restricted to creatures capable of a concern for their own future. One might take the ability to engage in certain types of long-range planning to be evidence for such concern. There is a number of ways of thinking about moral considerability, however, that cannot in principle be applied to non-linguistic creatures or, at least, not if one of the central arguments of Thinking without Words is sound. In Ch. 8 I argue that higher-order thought (thinking about thinking) is language-dependent. In this section I present a revised version of the basic argument. In the following sections I draw out some of the limitations that the unavailability of higher-order thoughts upon animal cognition. By a higher-order thought I mean a thought that takes another thought as its object. Thoughts about anothers mental states count as higher-order thoughts, for example, as does reflection on ones own mental states. Quine once described semantic ascent as the shift from talking in certain terms to talking about them. 9 By analogy we can characterize intentional ascent as the shift from thinking in certain ways to thinking about those ways of thinking. My argument, in effect, is that intentional ascent requires semantic ascent that we can only think about thoughts through thinking about words. We should distinguish first-order target thoughts from the higher-order thoughts that might be directed at them. My belief that p is a target thought. It is the object of my higher-order belief that I believe that p. Target thoughts must be represented to be the objects of higher-order thoughts. There are all sorts of things going on below the threshold of consciousness when we think (perhaps thinking involves manipulating sentences in a subpersonal language of thought, for example). But these subpersonal events are not what we think about when we think about our own

9 W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge MA: Harvard University press, 1960) p. 271. Clare Palmer Clare Palmer Comment: The structure of this isn't very smooth. I wonder whether you could set this up better at the beginning by being more explicit and slightly more detailed about the ways in which animal ethicists use claims about animal cognition to underpin their arguments about moral status? Then the way you've written this might flow more smoothly. Comment: Is there something funny about this sentence? Or is the "we" after p. the beginning of a new sentence?thoughts. There is a difference between thinking about thoughts and thinking about the machinery of thinking. So the question is: How must target thoughts be represented in order for them to be the objects of higher-order thoughts? There are two possibilities. On the one hand representation might be secured symbolically through the complex symbols of a natural language. A thought would be represented, therefore, through its linguistic expression and would appear as a potential object of thought qua linguistic entity. On the other hand representation might be secured in an analog manner, through some kind of pictorial model. On this conception of the vehicles of thought, which we find developed in different ways in mental models theory in the psychology of reasoning, and in the conception of mental maps put forward by Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, the vehicle of a thought is a pictorial representation of the state of affairs being thought about. 10 The argument in favor of public language sentences and against pictorial models rests upon considerations of structure and inferential role. I am assuming that thoughts are individuated at least in part by their inferential role. What makes a given thought the thought that p is partly a matter of the inferential relations in which it stands to other thoughts. Some of these relations are entailment relations (the thoughts that entail p and the thoughts that p entails), but they also include evidential relations (the thoughts whose holding true would be good evidence for thinking that p holds true, and the thoughts that would be judged more likely to be true if p were true). Any thinker capable of thinking a higher-order thought directed at a target thought must, almost by definition, have some grasp of the individuation conditions of the target thought. He must have some grasp of what it is that he is thinking about. There is nothing peculiar here to higher-order thoughts. This is just an application of the very general requirement that to think about anything 10 The theory of mental models was first proposed in K. Craik, The Nature of Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943) and is most comprehensively developed in P. Johnson-Laird, Mental Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For mental maps see D. Braddon-Mitchell and F. Jackson, The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). one must have some sort of cognitive access that enables one to pick that thing out. It follows that a higher-order thinker must have some sort of grasp of the entailment and evidential relations in which the target thought stands. 11 At least some of these entailment and evidential relations are a function of the structure of the thought that p. In order to understand the inferential role of a thought we need to be able to view it as made up of distinguishable components that can feature in further thoughts and, moreover, we

need to be able to view it as made up from those components in a way that determines its semantic value (thereby capturing the difference between the true thought Bogot is the capital of Colombia and the false thought Colombia is the capital of Bogot). We may say, therefore, that the structure of the thought must be perspicuous in the consciously accessible representation that is the target of the higher-order thought. The final step in the argument is that the structure of a thought cannot be perspicuous in the right sort of way in thoughts that are represented in a pictorial manner. The qualification is important, since pictorial representation in mental maps and mental models does depend upon a notion of structural isomorphism between the models/maps and what they represent. The relations holding between elements of the mental model/map can be mapped onto the relations holding between objects in the represented state of affairs. This comes across very clearly in the following passage from Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson. There is no natural way of dividing a map at its truth-assessable representational joints. Each part of a map contributes to the representational content of the whole map, in the sense that had that part of the map been different, the representational content of the whole would have been different. Change the bit of the map of the United States between New York and Boston, and you change systematically what the map says. This is part of what makes it true that the map is structured. However, there is no preferred way of dividing the map into basic representational units. There are many jigsaw puzzles you might make out of the map, but no single one would have a claim to have pieces that were all and only the most basic units. 12 11 The thinker who merely thinks such thoughts (as opposed to thinking about them) does not have to grasp these entailment and evidential relations. They simply have to think in ways that respect them. 12 Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, p. 171. Jose Bermudez 3/30/06 9:32 AM Deleted: We might gloss this as follows. Pictorial representations do not have a canonical structure. Their structure can be analyzed in many different ways (corresponding to the jigsaw puzzles that one can construct from it), but none of these can properly be described as giving the structure of the state of affairs. Yet, in order to understand the inferential role of a thought one does need to understand the canonical structure of that thought (what is often termed its logical form). This canonical structure is perspicuous, although not always perfectly perspicuous, when thoughts are expressed in public language sentences. It is because of this that higher-order thought is language-dependent. Only public language sentences can make the canonical structure of a target thought available to thinkers in a way that allows them to grasp the inferential role of the target thought. The conclusion of the argument, then, is that thinking about thinking is only available to languageusing creatures. What the argument does not show: Sentience and higher-order thoughts Some philosophers have proposed higher-order thought theories of consciousness (Rosenthal, 1986). According to these theories a mental state is conscious if, and only if, it is the object of a higher-order thought. Given that sentience just is the capacity to have conscious experiences, higher-order thought theories of consciousness restrict sentience to creatures capable of thinking higher-order thoughts. Any such conclusion is potentially very important for animal ethics, given the weight that is standardly put on animal suffering in thinking about our obligations to nonhuman animals. It should be stressed, however, that this conclusion does not in any sense follow from the argument from intentional ascent to semantic ascent. The argument presupposes a theory of

consciousness. It does not set out to provide one and it is perfectly compatible with the view that nonhuman animals can not only have conscious experiences (and so be sentient) but also have conscious beliefs and desires. The object of a conscious belief is a state of affairs in the world (or, in the case of a false belief a merely possible state of affairs) and the argument from intentional ascent to semantic ascent applies only to thoughts that have other thoughts as their objects. As such it offers no direct support to arguments that animals cannot be sentient because they are not capable of having higher-order thoughts. 13 Intentional ascent and understanding other minds Is it possible for non-linguistic creatures to participate in practices of attributing psychological states to their conspecifics or indeed to any other creatures? In the light of the preceding discussion it is not hard to see why a very broad class of psychological attributions should be unavailable to non-linguistic creatures. To attribute a belief, for example, to another creature is essentially to view that creature as standing in a particular relation to a thought the relation of believing the thought to be true. Clearly, therefore, the attribution of a belief requires thinking about a thought. It is a canonical form of intentional ascent that requires being able to hold a thought in mind. This has potential implications for animal ethics, on any view that links moral significance to the capacity to engage in certain types of reflection about the mental states of conspecifics or to the capacity to engage in types of behavior (perhaps caring behavior) that presupposes and involves such reflection. It is important to recognize, however, that the argument from intentional ascent to semantic ascent does not leave non-linguistic creatures completely mind-blind. There are types of mental state that can be comprehended and attributed by non-linguistic creatures. 13 It may provide indirect support, however, on some ways of developing higher-order theories of consciousness. Authors such as Carruthers have argued that the type of higher-order thoughts required for consciousness are only available to creatures possessing a theory of mind and as we will see in more detail in the next section, the argument from intentional ascent to semantic ascent does rule out theories of mind at the non-linguistic level. See p. Carruthers, Natural theories of consciousness, European Journal of Philosophy 6, 203-222. Clare Palmer Comment: I wonder whether you might rephrase the footnote to say something like "if one took a view such as Carruther's, arguing that the type of higher order thoughts required for consciousness (and therefore sentience) are only available to creatures possessing a theory of mind". At the moment the way you phrase it suggests that your argument offers indirect support to all challenges to animal sentience, but in fact it is only to those ideas of sentience that understand consciousness in the way Carruthers' does.To explain this further, we need to distinguish two ways of thinking about desire. 14 One can desire a particular thing, or one can desire that a particular state of affairs be the case. This is the distinction between goal-desires and situation-desires. At the level of verbalizable thought, the distinction can be marked in terms of two different ways of completing the sentence 'X desires '. A sentence ascribing a goal-desire is completed by the name of an object or by the name of a kind of stuff (e.g. 'food'). But when a sentence ascribes a situation-desire, it is completed by a 'that'

clause in which the blank is filled by a complete sentence specifying the state of affairs in question. Goal-desires are more basic than situation-desires. The contrast is effectively between desire construed as a propositional attitude (in situation-desires, which are attributed via that-clauses picking out the thought that is the object of desire) and the more fundamental goal-desires that are directed not at thoughts but rather at objects or features. There is no reason why non-linguistic creatures should not be able to attribute goal-desires to other agents. The argument from intentional ascent cannot get a grip, since goal-desires are relations between a subject and an object/feature, rather than between a subject and a proposition. The ability to attribute goal-desires goes hand in hand with a basic understanding of intentional, that is to say goal-directed, behavior. Although of course there will be many different degrees of complexity in goal-directed behavior, depending on the richness of the desires and beliefs by which it is driven, a creature capable of attributing goal-desires will be able to make the basic distinction between purposeful behaviors, on the one hand, and random movements and instinctive reactions on the other. A purposive action is an action for which a motivating goaldesire can be identified. Goal-desires cannot be the only mental states that can be identified and attributed by nonlinguistic creatures. It is hard to see, for example, how a goal-desire can be attributed to a creature 14 See Bermdez, Thinking without Words, pp. 48-9. without some evidence of the information that the creature possesses about its environment. At the bare minimum this information will be perceptual. To know what goal-desire might be motivating a creature at a given moment a creature needs to know, first, what end it is pursuing and, second, how it might reasonably expect that end to be realized by its current behavior. Both of these require knowing to which features of its environment the creature is perceptually sensitive. If, therefore, a non-linguistic creature is to be able to attribute goal-desires to a fellow creature it must be able to formulate hypotheses about what that creature is perceiving. Here too we can distinguish two ways of thinking about seeing by following Dretske in the distinction between simple seeing and epistemic seeing. According to Dretske, what we see in simple seeing (or what he calls non-epistemic seeing) is a function solely of what there is to see and what, given our visual apparatus and the conditions in which we employ it, we are capable of visually differentiating. 15 In contrast, epistemic seeing involves standing in a relation to a proposition (a thought). Epistemic seeing involves seeing that something is the case. The argument from intentional ascent shows that non-linguistic creatures are not capable of understanding epistemic seeing, since this involves thinking about the perceivers relation to a thought. But this is perfectly compatible with non-linguistic creatures being capable of thinking about the direct perceptual relations in which other creatures stand to objects. This allows nonlinguistic creatures to engage in a primitive form of psychological explanation. A creature that knows what a conspecific or predator desires and has some sense of its perceptual sensitivity to the environmental layout (as well as an understanding of its motor capabilities) can expect to be able to predict its behavior with some success. This restrictive interpretation of the mind-reading abilities of some non-linguistic creatures is compatible with much recent research into the extent to which non-human primates can properly be described as possessing a theory of mind. There are well-documented examples of 15 F. Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (London: Routledge, 1969) p. 76.primate behavior that some prominent students of animal behavior have thought can only be interpreted as examples of interpersonal deception.

16 But the consensus opinion among primatologists is that a more parsimonious interpretation of these behaviors is to be preferred. 17 Many examples of what has come to be termed tactical deception can be understood as the manipulation, not of anothers propositional attitudes, but simply of their visual perspective. Here is an example of a tactical deception in a troupe of baboons in Ethiopia that lends itself to such an interpretation: An adult female spent 20 min in gradually shifting in a seated position over a distance of about 2m to a place behind a rock about 50 cm high where she began to groom the subadult male follower of the group an interaction not tolerated by the adult male. As I was observing from a cliff slightly above [the animals] I could judge that the adult male leader could, from his resting position, see the tail, back and crown of the females head, but not her front, arms and face: the subadult male sat in a bent position while being groomed, and was also invisible to the leader. The leader could thus see that she was present, but probably not that she groomed. 18 The behavior of the female baboon, assuming that it is indeed to count as an instance of tactical deception, does not seem to require representing the beliefs of the alpha male. What she is doing is profiting from an understanding of the alpha males visual take on the situation to escape detection. The female baboon needs only to appreciate the alpha males line of sight and the fact that he would be prevented from seeing the subadult male by the intervening rock. This seems firmly at the level of simple seeing rather than epistemic seeing. This example (and the discussion of animal mind-reading more generally) shows that the argument from intentional ascent to semantic ascent is compatible with taking nonlinguistic animals to have fairly sophisticated cognitive abilities. The argument requires theorists to think 16 See, for example, the papers in R. W. Byrne and A. Whiten (Eds.), Machiavellian Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); D. Premack and G. Woodruff. Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1, 515526; and F. de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982). 17 E.g. D. Povinelli, Chimpanzee theory of mind in P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith (Eds.), Theories of Theory of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and M. D. Hauser, Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think (London: Penguin Books, 2000). 18 Report by Hans Kummer quoted in Byrne The Thinking Ape, p. 106critically about some contemporary research in animal cognition. It places limits on the conceptual abilities that can be attributed to nonlinguistic creatures, but in so doing opens up new ways of interpreting the behaviors revealed by observation and experiment. Reasoning, rationality, and logical thinking Explaining animal behavior in psychological terms forces us to consider questions of rationality and reasoning. Psychological explanations work because they identify beliefs and desires in the light of which the action being explained makes sense from the agents perspective. To say that an action makes sense in the light of an agents beliefs and desires is to say that it is the rational thing to do (or, at least, a rational thing to do) given those beliefs and desires. And that in turn means that, in at least some cases, a creature might reason her way from those beliefs and desires to acting in the relevant way. Reasoning and rationality are correlative notions. How should we make sense of those notions at the nonlinguistic level? Here is one way in which we cannot make sense of them. The argument from intentional

ascent stands squarely in the way of treating animals as thinking logically. We can illustrate this with the most basic form of logical thinking the form of thinking codified in the propositional calculus and involving the basic logical connectives, such as disjunction (or), conjunction (and), and the material conditional (if . . . then. . .). Consider a conditional thought of the sort that might be expressed in the sentence if A then B. To entertain such a thought is to understand that two thoughts are related in a certain way namely, that the second thought cannot be false if the first thought is true. But this means that understanding truth-functional compound thoughts is a form of intentional ascent. One cannot think about the truth-values of thoughts without thinking about thoughts and this, by the earlier argument, requires semantic ascent. Logical thinking depends upon language, therefore, because it presupposes the capacity for intentional ascent, which in turn depends upon semantic ascent. This poses an obvious challenge for how we think about reasoning in animals. The challenge is to identify forms of reasoning at the non-linguistic level and then explain them without assuming that the animal (or prelinguistic infant) is deploying elementary logical concepts. I will illustrate how this challenge can be met for a very basic form of reasoning. This is straightforward conditional reasoning of the type formalized as modus ponens reasoning that is standardly thought to exploit the validity of the inference from if A then B and A to B. The detection of patterns of behavior is closely bound up with the possibility of conditional reasoning. A creature that knows that if the gazelles see the lion they will run away and that recognizes (perhaps on the basis of its understanding of the gazelles visual perspective) that the lion will shortly be detected by the gazelles, is in a position to predict that the gazelles will soon take flight. In Thinking without Words I propose looking for the sources of conditional reasoning in a primitive form of causal reasoning. Whereas conditional reasoning (in the sense codified in the propositional calculus) exploits truth-functional relation between complete thoughts, causal reasoning exploits causal conditions holding between states of affairs. Since causal relationships do not hold between complete thoughts, an understanding of causality presupposes no intentional ascent, and hence does not require language. One might expect on both experimental, observational, and evolutionary grounds that some capacity for causal cognition is very widespread among animals and available at a very early stage in human development. 19 The ability to detect certain types of causal regularity and to distinguish genuine causal relations from accidental conjunctions has obvious survival value. Causal dependence relations are directly observable, highly salient and pragmatically significant in a way that no other dependence relations are. 19 See the essays in D. Sperber (Ed.), Causal Cognition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). How might causality be understood by non-linguistic animals? It seems plausible that the core of the understanding of causation at the non-linguistic level is sensitivity to regularities in the distal environment. A basic sensitivity to environmental regularities must be part of the innate endowment of any creature capable of learning about the environment, and one might expect any creature to be peculiarly sensitive to regularities between its own actions and ensuing changes in its immediate environment (which is why instrumental conditioning works as well as it does). Of course, as regularity theories of causation have been forced to acknowledge, there are many regularities that are not causal, and it is in the capacity to distinguish genuinely causal regularities from accidental regularities that one might expect differences between different species of nonlinguistic creature and, for that matter, different stages of development within any given species. The regularities to which non-linguistic creatures are sensitive (unlike those usually stressed in regularity analyses of causation) need not be exceptionless. No creature that only acted on exceptionless regularities would fare well in evading predators and obtaining food.

Proto-causal understanding tracks relationships, which can be either deterministic or probabilistic, between states of affairs. This makes possible a (primitive) grasp of causation at the non-linguistic level. It also explains why primitive versions of certain fundamental inference forms are available at the non-linguistic level. We can term this proto-conditional reasoning. Instead of treating animals as exploiting full-fledged conditionals (i.e. truth-functional compounds of thoughts) we can think of them as tracking causal relations between states of affairs. I call these proto-conditionals. Conditional reasoning in animals can be understood in terms of a protoconditional together with an understanding, which may take the form of a perception or a memory, that the antecedent holds. The consequent will straightforwardly be detached. We see, therefore, that the initial argument for the language-dependence of logical thinking does not rule out the possibility of non-linguistic reasoning. We cannot, of course, understand non-linguistic reasoning as involving logical concepts (or any form of intentional ascent). But we can identify at the non-linguistic level forms of inference that are analogues of canonical logical inference forms and that can be deployed in practical reasoning without any mastery of logical concepts or capacity for higher-order thinking. Conclusion The study of animal cognition offers a rich field for theorists of animal ethics. There are significant continuities between the cognitive life of some nonlinguistic animals and the cognitive life of human animals. Some species of animal are genuine thinkers in much the same way that humans count as genuine thinkers. That is, they behave in ways that reflect their desires and their beliefs about the environment. Others are genuine thinkers in a weaker sense the sense characterized by what I have called the minimalist conception of nonlinguistic thought. Even at the minimalist level we are dealing with forms of behavior that cannot be explained purely in terms of conditioning or innate releasing mechanisms. Ethicists who think that the moral significance of animals is a function of their level of cognitive sophistication will need to take account of the subtle gradations between different types of thinking without words. They will also need to take on board the limits to non-linguistic thought imposed by the argument from intentional ascent. There are serious consequences to making the moral significance of animals depend upon the capacity for higher-order thought (thinking about thinking or metarepresentation)! Nonetheless, the types of cognitive activity that are ruled out by the argument from intentional ascent are more limited than might immediately appear. As I brought out with reference to non-linguistic mind-reading and non-linguistic reasoning, non-linguistic animals can get a long way without thinking about thinking!