CONFRUNTAREA UE – SUA PRIVIND DOSARUL AGRICOL: O … · multilaterale, teoria jocurilor...

CONFRUNTAREA UE – SUA PRIVIND DOSARUL AGRICOL: O ANALIZ√

A NEGOCIERILOR OMC DINPERSPECTIVA TEORIEI JOCURILOR

THE EU-US CONFRONTATIONON THE AGRICULTURE DOSSIER: A LOOK AT WTO NEGOTIATIONS

THROUGH GAME-THEORETICAL LENSES

(EDIfiIE BILINGV√BILINGUAL EDITION)

Institutul European din Rom‚nia

Bd. Regina Elisabeta nr. 7-9 Bucure∫ti, sector 3, Rom‚nia

Tel: (+4021) 314 26 97Fax: (+4021) 314 26 66

E-mail:[email protected] site: www.ier.ro

Editor:Mihai Moia

ISSN: 1582-4993

© Institutul European din Rom‚nia, 2006

Opiniile prezentate aici apar˛in autorilor ∫i nu implic„ Ón niciun felinstitu˛iile pe care ace∫tia le reprezint„.

Institutul European din Rom‚nia

Confruntarea UE – SUA privind Dosarul Agricol:

O analiz„ a negocierilor OMC din perspectiva Teoriei Jocurilor

Autori:Valentin COJANU

Irina ENE

Bucure∫ti, septembrie 2006 Colec˛ia de studii IER, nr. 17

Cuprins

Rezumat........................................................................................................ 7Introducere................................................................................................... 7Probleme cheie Ón cadrul negocierilor privind agricultura Ón OMC ..... 8Actori importan˛i ai negocierilor DDA Ón cadrul OMC.......................... 11O perspectiv„ teoretic„ prin prisma teoriei jocurilor a negocierilormultilaterale privind agricultura............................................................... 13Jocuri strategice ale negocierilor multilaterale privind liberalizarea comer˛ului .................................................................................................... 15Interac˛iuni strategice Óntre UE ∫i SUA .................................................... 19Concluzii....................................................................................................... 25Bibliografie................................................................................................... 26Anexe ............................................................................................................ 27

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Rezumat

Aceast„ lucrare Ó∫i propune s„ analizezesubiectul c‚∫tigurilor preconizate cu ocazianegocierilor Uniunii Europene Ón domeniulagriculturii Ón cadrul Organiza˛ii Mondiale deComer˛. Se construiesc jocuri strategice alenegocierilor multilaterale privind liberalizareacomer˛ului agricol, un subiect de actualitate Ónagenda OMC. Aceste jocuri presupun 2juc„tori, Uniunea European„ ∫i Statele Uniteale Americii, ∫i 2 strategii, îAcord“ ∫iîDezacord“ privind propunerile f„cute pentru areduce sprijinul fermierilor ∫i al exportatorilor.

Prima parte a simul„rii Ó∫i propune s„evalueze c‚∫tigurile cardinale utiliz‚nd ofunc˛ie a c‚∫tigurilor politice ∫i un modelstatic, determinist, cu echilibru par˛ial elaboratde UNCTAD folosit Ón cadrul negocierilorcomerciale multilaterale. A doua parte asimul„rii aduce Ón prim plan detaliilecontextuale ale negocierilor. Œn cadrul acestei

teme, acestea ar putea s„ se refere, de exemplu,la motiva˛ia actorilor de a finaliza negocierileÓn urma unui impas de lung„ durat„; lainfluen˛ele politice pe care fiecare partener leconfrunt„ pe plan intern; sau la echilibru defor˛e Óntre negociatori.

Aceast„ lucrare ajunge la concluzia c„ oanaliz„ bazat„ pe c‚∫tigurile ordinaleprevizionate ofer„ o imagine mai fidel„ anegocierilor actuale dec‚t o analiz„ bazat„ pefunc˛iile c‚∫tigurilor ob˛inute din comer˛.Predic˛ia ofer„ o mare not„ de Óncredere prinaccentuarea unui continuu echilibru Óntreîacord“ ∫i îdezacord“, ceea ce reprezint„ defapt o potrivire perfect„ cu mersul curent allucrurilor.

Cuvinte cheie: Organiza˛ia Mondial„ deComer˛, comer˛ul agricol, negocierimultilaterale, teoria jocurilor

Introducere

Œn urma impasului continu„rii RundeiDoha (RD) desf„∫urate Ón cadrul Organiza˛ieiMondiale de Comer˛ Ón iulie 2006, ob˛inereaunei liberaliz„ri substan˛iale a comer˛uluiridic„ din ce Ón ce mai multe probleme.Agricultura este din nou la baza controverselorÓn cadrul negocierilor comerciale interna˛ionale.A determinat Ónt‚rzieri importante la sf‚r∫itulanilor ’80 ∫i Ón anii ’90 Ón cadrul RundeiUruguay ∫i pare a fi din nou o piedic„ major„Ón cadrul negocierilor comerciale multilateraleale OMC.

Negocierile implic„ dezbaterea maimultor situa˛ii pentru a se ob˛ine un echilibru.Acest proces poate fi interpretat ca un jocdinamic. Propunerile ini˛iale rareori conduc la

un echilibru unic sau la echilibrul final, care nueste Óntotdeauna ∫i un optimum social(strategiile diferite pot conduce la maximizareasumei c‚∫tigurilor juc„torilor per ansamblu,dar nu ∫i la maximizarea c‚∫tigurilorindividuale).

Acest proces strategic poate fi perceputca opozi˛ia Óntre interesele juc„torilor Ón cadrulunui proces interdependent al c„rui rezultatpoate s„ implice sau nu o situa˛ie de conflict.Nu conflictul descrie Ón mod exclusiv naturastrategic„ a interac˛iunii; Óntreaga varietate aevenimentelor anticipate asociate func˛iilor dec‚∫tig Ón cadrul abord„rii teoretice prin prismajocurilor, a c„ror apari˛ie depinde de deciziaceluilalt juc„tor, reprezint„ descrierea adecvat„

a unei interac˛iuni strategice. In cadrul acestuistudiu, un joc se refer„ la negocieri strategiceÓn cadrul procesului de liberalizare aagriculturii.

Studiul debuteaz„ cu schi˛area evolu˛ieiRD ∫i eviden˛ierea fazelor diferite deliberalizare a agriculturii ∫i actorii principalicare determin„ rezultatul negocierilor. A douaparte a studiului prezint„ o abordare dual„ astudiilor privind analiza comer˛uluiinterna˛ional. Abordarea teoretic„ prezint„ oanaliz„ mai general„ a rela˛iilor interna˛ionale,dar ∫i o analiz„ specific„ privind comer˛ulagricol interna˛ional. A doua abordare aduce Ón

prim plan utilizarea modelelor cantitative Ónanaliza rela˛iilor interna˛ionale.

A treia parte introduce o abordare prinprisma teoriei jocurilor a interac˛iunilor dincadrul OMC Óntre Uniunea European„( UE) ∫iStatele Unite ale Americii (SUA). Studiulrealizeaz„ o analiz„ a interac˛iunilor strategicecu dou„ tipuri de c‚∫tiguri: cardinale ∫iordinale. Estimarea c‚∫tigurilor cardinale sebazeaz„ pe rezultatele simul„rilor realizate cuATPSM (Agricultural Trade Policy SimulationModel), un model destinat analizei comer˛uluiinterna˛ional elaborat de UNCTAD.

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Probleme cheie Ón cadrul negocierilor privind agricultura Ón OMC

Agricultura r„m‚ne sectorul cel maidistorsionat al economiei mondiale.Œn˛elegerile stabilite cu ocazia Rundei Uruguayau reprezentat un important pas Ónainte Ónreforma comer˛ului cu produse agricole.Astfel, produsele agricole au fost supuse maimultor reguli multilaterale, dar succesul Óndeschiderea sectorului agricol competi˛ieiinterna˛ionale a fost limitat. Drept urmare,liberalizarea sectorului agricol reprezint„ unadintre priorit„˛ile cele mai importante alenegocierilor Doha.

In 2001, membrii OMC au c„zut de acordla Doha de a lansa o nou„ rund„ de negociericare urma s„ cuprind„ negocierile din sectorulagricol deja Óncepute Ón 2000. Acordul privindAgricultura din 1994, Óncheiat Ón cadrul rundeiUruguay, concepea angajamentele privindagricultura Ón func˛ie de trei domenii care urmaus„ reprezinte ∫i baza unui nou acord:

• Condi˛ii de acces pe pia˛„, cuprinz‚ndlimite maxime ale tarifelor(îbindings“) ∫i angajamente luate Ónprivin˛a liberaliz„rii referitoare la

reduceri tarifare ∫i cote limit„ aletarifelor;

• Ajutorul pe plan intern care includesubven˛iile ∫i alte programe guverna-mentale;

• Competi˛ia privind exporturile,limitat„ in mod tradi˛ional lasubven˛iile de export, dar care Ón nouarund„ urma s„ se refere ∫i la creditepentru export, garan˛ii ∫i asigur„ri,ajutorul Ón produse alimentare,Óntreprinderile de stat exportatoare,restric˛iile privind exportul ∫i taxele.

Fiecare dintre cele trei domenii includeaclauze privind îtratamentul special ∫idiferen˛ial“ pentru statele Ón dezvoltare,precum dispense pentru anumite acorduri,reduceri tarifare inferioare ∫i perioade mailungi pentru implementarea acestor reduceri.

Negociatorii au ratat termenul de 31martie 2003 pentru a determinaîmodalit„˛ile“(i.e. ˛inte numerice ∫i formule)

privind angajamentele ˛„rilor ∫i Ónt‚lnireaministerial„ a OMC de la Cancun dinseptembrie 2003 a e∫uat.

Œnainte ∫i dup„ Cancun, ˛„rile ∫i-auexprimat dezam„girea fa˛„ de textul ministerialde la Cancun1. Membrii dezvolta˛i ai GrupuluiCairns doreau o rund„ mai pu˛in flexibil„ ∫imai ambi˛ioas„ Ón timp ce ˛„ri precum Japonia,Norvegia ∫i Elve˛ia doreau mai mult„flexibilitate mai ales privind articolele ce nu serefereau la comer˛. Cele mai multe ˛„ri Óndezvoltare doreau ca ˛„rile dezvoltate s„liberalizeze, dar nu erau Ónc„ preg„tite la aceststagiu pentru a-∫i deschide propriile pie˛e fiindpreocupate de problema dezvolt„rii rurale ∫i deriscurile ata∫ate sectorului alimentar. Unele˛„ri dezvoltate precum Uniunea European„ nudoreau Ónc„ s„ elimine subven˛iile pentruexport cu toate c„ acestea reprezentau unuldintre intrumentele cele mai distorsionante alefluxurilor comerciale. In esen˛„, pozi˛iileadoptate de ˛„ri depindeau de nivelul deambi˛ie ∫i importan˛a tratamentului special ∫idiferen˛ial. Figura 1 ilustreaz„ pozi˛iilemembrilor OMC. O problem„ a ˛„rilor Óndezvoltare era faptul c„ nu erau un grupomogen cu interese comune. Unele erauimportatoare de produse agricole, alteleexportatoare, Ón timp ce altele erau preocupatede accesul preferen˛ial.

Pre∫edintele comitetului pentruagricultur„, Harbinson, a pus Ón circula˛ie Ónmartie 2003 o versiune revizuit„ a primei saleschi˛e asupra modalit„˛ilor referitoare laangajamentele viitoare, schi˛„ supus„discu˛iilor Ón februarie 2003. Numero∫imembri cu interese diverse Ón problemaliberaliz„rii comer˛ului agricol au consideratinadecvat schi˛a revizuit„ a lui Harbison.Negocierile au fost blocate mai multe luni ∫inu s-au Ónregistrat progrese semnificative.

Primul termen pentru definitivarea uneiÓn˛elegeri asupra modalit„˛ilor, stabilit laDoha, a fost dep„∫it. La jum„tatea lunii august2003, UE si SUA au propus o variant„ comun„a cadrului de lucru pentru reforme viitoare Ónagricultur„. Mai multe ˛„ri Ón curs dedezvoltare ∫i-au exprimat dezacordul fa˛„ deaceast„ propunere. Totu∫i, ini˛iativa UE-SUAa revigorat procesul astfel Ónc‚t c‚teva ˛„ri ∫igrupuri de ˛„ri au elaborat documentealternative care au modificat schi˛a UE-SUA.Printre aceste documente s-a aflat ∫i o contra-propunere semnat„ de 16 ˛„ri Ón curs dedezvoltare, care au ob˛inut Ónainte deÓnt‚lnirea ministerial„ de la Cancun(septembrie 2003) colaborarea a Ónc„ 4 ˛„ri Óncurs de dezvoltare. P‚n„ la sf‚r∫itul luniiaugust 2003 s-a vehiculat un text revizuit alschi˛ei documentului ministerial de la Cancunelaborat de Consiliul General al OMC. Schi˛adocumentului Cancun acoper„ cele trei aspectefundamentale ale Acordului asupraAgriculturii: accesul pe pia˛„, ajutorul pe planintern ∫i competi˛ia exportatorilor. Con˛ineformule, reguli ∫i specificarea tratamentuluispecial ∫i diferen˛iat pentru cele trei aspectefundamentale f„r„ a specifica Óns„ nivelelenormate ale modific„rilor propuse. Acestdocument nu specific„ intervale de varia˛iepentru reducerile aplicate, l„s‚nd multeaspecte de rezolvat pe parcursul negocierilorulterioare. De asemenea, exist„ o sec˛iune deprobleme diverse Ón care se precizeaz„ faptulc„ varianta preliminar„ revizuit„ adocumentului Harbinson va constitui cadrulde referin˛„.

Dup„ Cancun, s-a Óncercat s„ se reiacursul negocierilor ∫i al programului ini˛ialstabilit. Rezultatul a fost Acordul-CadruÓncheiat la sf‚r∫itul lunii iulie (a∫a numitulîPachetul Iulie“) care ducea mai departeRunda Doha de negocieri.

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1 Peters Ralf H. ∫i David Vanzetti, îShifting sands: searching for a compromise in the WTO negotiations onagriculture.“

In ceea ce prive∫te ajutorul intern,îPachetul Iulie“ con˛inea norme exacte dereducere a ajutorului intern integral („amberbox“, îblue box“ ∫i îde minimis“ ) preciz‚ndc„ nivelurile maximale ale îblue box“ - îcutieialbastre“ s„ aib„ limit„ superioar„, Ón timp cepentru îcutia verde“ nu era impus„ nici olimit„ superioar„, m„sur„ propus„ de ˛„rile Óndezvoltare. Reducerea urma s„ se calculeze cuajutorul unei formule specifice care diferen˛iatrei niveluri valorice ale ajutorului intern,reducerea fiind realizat„ progresiv – reducerilecele mai importante fiind aplicate nivelurilorcele mai ridicate. In acela∫i timp se lua unangajament de a se reduce îamber box“ cuminim 20% Ón primul an de implementare. Inprivin˛a competi˛iei exporturilor, mandatulDoha impunea reduceri Ón direc˛ia elimin„riitotale a oric„rei forme de subven˛ie pentruexport. In Pachetul Iulie, statele membre aufost de acord s„ stabileasc„ modalit„˛i detaliatepentru a implementa eliminarea tuturorformelor de subven˛ii pentru export ∫i acelorlalte m„suri cu efect echivalent p‚n„ la unanumit termen final credibil.

Dintre cele trei domenii supusenegocierii, accesul pe pia˛„ a ridicat cele maimari probleme. Mandatul Doha impunemembrilor OMC de a îÓmbun„t„˛i considerabilaccesul pe pia˛„“. Conform Pachetului Iulie,tarifele din sectorul agricol vor fi mic∫orate Ónfunc˛ie de o formul„ diferit„ Ón func˛ie denivelul tarifului: cu c‚t acesta este mai mare,cu at‚t reducerea este mai important„. Cu toateacestea, Acordul precizeaz„ preocuparea˛„rilor dezvoltate privind anumite produseîsensibile“ ∫i a ˛„rilor Ón dezvoltare de abeneficia de un tratament special, diferen˛ial cade exemplu reduceri inferioare ale tarifelorpentru deschiderea pie˛ei pentru a∫a numiteleîproduse speciale“.

Œnt‚lnirile care au avut loc Óncep‚nd dinaugust 2004 au confirmat existen˛„ unor p„reridiferite Ón privin˛a formulei de reducere atarifelor. Unele ˛„ri doresc o formul„ nonliniar„, îelve˛ian„“, care s„ fie aplicat„ pefiecare band„ a abord„rii pe niveluri valorice.Aceast„ propunere este refuzat„ de alte ˛„ricare doresc reduceri medii liniare (Ón stilulRundei Uruguay) pentru fiecare band„. 2

De asemenea, formula cu nivelurivalorice necesit„ calcularea tarifelor specificeechivalente îad valorem“ (AVE) pentru a leputea compara, cerin˛„ care a devenit oproblem„ sensibil„ ∫i des men˛ionat„. De abiala Ónt‚lnirea ministerial„ de la Paris Ón mai2005, a∫a numitele îCele 5 grupuri interesate“(Australia, Brazilia, UE, India ∫i SUA) auc„zut de acord asupra metodologiei de acalcula AVE.

Œnainte de Ónt‚lnirea ministerial„ de laHong Kong, au fost redactate mai multepropuneri din partea grup„rilor interesate3.Cele patru propuneri importante privindmodalit„˛ile Ón sectorul agricol au apar˛inutSUA, UE, G-20 ∫i G-10. Fiecare propuneredifer„ Ón func˛ie de detaliile privind cele treidomenii supuse negocierii. Negocierile privindcompeti˛ia exportatorilor au fost facilitate deangajamentul UE din iulie 2005 de a eliminasubven˛iile (sub condi˛ia unui tratamentsimilar pentru alte forme de subven˛ii pentruexport). Domeniul ajutorului intern depinde Ónprincipal de angajamentele pe care le vorasuma cele trei state – UE, SUA ∫i Japonia. Inschimb, accesul pe pia˛„ a fost cel mai dificilsubiect, Ón special pentru UE ∫i G-10, dar ∫ipentru G-20.

Pe 18 decembrie 2005, la Hong Kong,statele membre OMC au c„zut de acord asupraunor obiective ale negocierilor, de a liberaliza

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2 îThe Road Ahead: Agricultural Policy Reform in the WTO—Summary Report U.S.“ Department of Agriculture3 îWTO Doha Round: Agricultural negotiating proposals“ CRS Report for Congress, November 2005

comer˛ul agricol mondial, industriaprelucr„toare ∫i serviciile Ón Runda Doha.4

Œn agricultur„, s-a realizat un anumitprogres Ón toate cele trei domenii. In privin˛aaccesului la pia˛„, textul ministerial revizuitformalizeaz„ îipotezele de lucru“ care s„structureze reducerile tarifelor statelor Ón 4benzi, cu reduceri mai mari pentru tarifele mairidicate. In privin˛a ajutorului pe plan intern,textul confirm„ îipotezele de lucru“ caremen˛ioneaz„ clasificarea Ón trei benzi aM„surilor Agregate de Suport. UE va fi Ónbanda superioar„, fiind supus„ celor maiimportante reduceri, SUA ∫i Japonia vor fi Ónbanda de mijloc ∫i restul ˛„rilor Ón banda

inferioar„. Textul precizeaz„ de asemenea c„reducerile Ón ansamblu ale ajutorului interntrebuie s„ fie cel pu˛in egale sau maiimportante dec‚t suma reducerilor pentruîCutia Maro“, îCutia Albastr„“ ∫i subven˛iileîde minimis“. Astfel ar trebui s„ fie mai dificilpentru ˛„ri de a reclasifica subven˛iile pentru aevita angajamentele luate fa˛„ de OMC. Inprivin˛a competi˛iei Ón domeniul exporturilor,textul prevede îeliminarea tuturor formelor desubven˛ii de export ∫i altor m„suri privindexportul cu efect echivalent“ p‚n„ la sf‚r∫itulanului 2013, o parte substan˛ial„ a reducerilorurm‚nd a fi realizat„ Ón prima jum„tate aperioadei de implementare.

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Actori importan˛i ai negocierilor DDA Ón cadrul OMC

Abordarea prin prisma economieipolitice a fost utilizat„ Ón mod extensiv Ónanaliza negocierilor OMC. Unele studii s-auaxat asupra interac˛iunilor strategice ∫iformarea coali˛iilor de negociere care s-audovedit a fi actori cheie Ón runda actual„ denegocieri.5

C‚teva ˛„ri joac„ un rol important Ónrunda actual„ de negocieri (vezi Tabel 1).Acestea pot fi clasificate conform urmatoareitipologii:

1) Grupuri structurale, a c„ror reunire sebazeaz„ pe rela˛ii comerciale precum zone deliber schimb (ex.: ASEAN, NAFTA,MERCOSUR, etc.) sau alte interese economicesau similarit„˛i geografice (ex.: ˛„rile Cel MaiSlab Dezvoltate sau ˛„rile Importatoare Net deProduse Agricole). Aceste ˛„ri nu fac neap„ratpropuneri specifice, dar sunt des men˛ionate Óntimpul negocierilor.

2) Grupuri reprezentative, care suntconstituite av‚nd ca obiectiv reprezentarea uneivariet„˛i largi de interese na˛ionale pentru a sedep„∫i dificult„˛ile survenite Ón timpulnegocierilor. Membrii acestor grupuri suntselecta˛i dintre actorii politici ∫i economici cheieai negocierilor comerciale, presupun‚ndu-se c„o propunere comun„ venind din partea acestoraar putea fi acceptat„ de to˛i ceilal˛i membriOMC. Exemple de grupuri (mai mult sau maipu˛in) reprezentative ar fi parteneriatul SUA ∫iUE prin emiterea unor propuneri comune (cums-a Ónt‚mplat Ónainte de Cancun), a∫a numitulQuad (Quadrilateral) format din Canada, UE,Japonia ∫i SUA sau grupul mai recent îCeleCinci Grupuri Interesate“(FIP). Alte grup„rireprezentative îinformale“ sunt formate de˛„rile care particip„ la a∫a numitele Ónt‚lniriîmini ministeriale“ unde sunt discutate subiectespecifice cu scopul de a g„si un punct de vederecomun pentru a fi prezentat la sesiunile plenare.

4 The declaration of the WTO’s Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, [the Hong Kong (HK) declaration]http://www.wto.org/english/ thewto_e/ minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.pdf.5 Costantini, Valeria Riccardo Crescenzi îBargaining coalitions in the agricultural negotiations of the Doha Round:similarity of interests or strategic choices˛ An empirical assessment“

3) Coali˛iile pentru negocieri, Ón care ungrup de ˛„ri cad de acord asupra unui consenspreliminar privind o propunere comun„ av‚ndca scop cre∫terea puterii de negociere colectiv„.Grupul Cairns, G-10, G-20, G-33 sunt exemplede astfel de coali˛ii care elaboreaz„ propuneriprivind subiecte specifice, c‚t ∫i privindÓntreaga agend„ de negocieri.

Dup„ Ónt‚lnirea ministerial„ de laCancun, cei mai mul˛i anali∫ti au fost de acordasupra rolului inovativ jucat de ˛„rile Óndezvoltare prin compara˛ie cu Runda Uruguay,d‚nd dovad„ de o mare capacitate decoordonare a pozi˛iilor adoptate. S-a remarcatÓn mod deosebit un nou grup reprezentativ al˛„rilor Ón dezvoltare, G-20, av‚nd Ón centruBrazilia, India, China ∫i Africa de Sud. Acestgrup a fost Ónfiin˛at chiar Ónainte de Ónt‚lnireaministerial„ de la Cancun, pentru a coordonapresiunea asupra UE ∫i SUA de a-∫i reducetarifele de import, subven˛iile pentru export ∫iajutorul pe plan intern. In general, Ón cadrulnegocierilor actuale, se pot distinge dou„ maricategorii de ˛„ri Ón dezvoltare: cele maiîofensive“, care urm„resc s„ ob˛in„ o cre∫terea cotei de pia˛„ ∫i prin urmare dorescliberalizarea substan˛ial„ a comer˛ului ∫i celeîdefensive“, care doresc p„strarea unui anumitnivel de protec˛ie a propriilor pie˛e agricole.

Printre ˛„rile cu o atitudine îofensiv„“ seÓnscriu Brazilia, Argentina, Chile, Uruaguy,Tailanda ∫i mai recent, Pakistan. ˛„rile cu oatitudine defensiv„ formeaz„ majoritatea˛„rilor Ón dezvoltare, inclusiv India, China,Indonezia (liderul grupului G-33), Filipine,˛„rile din Caraibe ∫i America Central„. Mareamajoritate a ˛„rilor G-90 (o mare coali˛ieformat„ din Uniunea African„, ˛„rile Cel MaiSlab Dezvoltate ∫i Blocul African, Caraibean∫i Pacific) au de asemenea interese defensive ∫icu excep˛ia Ónt‚lnirilor ministeriale (Doha ∫iCancun) au func˛ionat ca grup„ri separate Óncadrul OMC. O alt„ coali˛ie format„ pentrunegocieri cu o atitudine dintre cele maidefensive este G-33, grup format Ón principaldin ˛„ri Ón dezvoltare net importatoare de

produse agricole Óngrijorate de efectele uneiliberaliz„ri premature a propriilor economii.

In alte cazuri, coali˛iile existente suntgrupuri mixte care reunesc ̨ „ri av‚nd o atitudineat‚t defensiv„, c‚t ∫i ofensiv„. In cazul G-20,Brazilia si India joac„ un rol crucial Ón unireacelor doua grup„ri cu interese divergente.

O alt„ coali˛ie care reune∫te ˛„ri aparenteterogene este Grupul Cairns. Acesta a fost fondatÓn 1986 chiar Ónainte de Runda Uruguay pentru aface presiuni Ón direc˛ia liberaliz„rii comer˛uluiagricol. Membrii acestuia sunt diver∫i, incluz‚ndat‚t ̨ „ri dezvoltate, c‚t ∫i Ón dezvoltare, dar care auun obiectiv comun – liberalizarea comer˛uluiagricol – ∫i care nu au resursele necesare de a intraÓn competi˛ie cu ˛„ri mai mari prin subven˛iilepentru export ∫i pe plan intern.

Œn sf‚r∫it, ˛„rile care ader„ la Grupul G-10 doresc o abordare mai conservativ„, fiindorientate c„tre men˛inerea unui nivel c‚t mairidicat de protec˛ie pentru propriile pie˛eagricole.

Cu toate c„ se poate considera c„succesul rundei DDA depinde de Óncheiereaunei Ón˛elegeri Óntre SUA ∫i UE, trebuieprecizat c„ motorul real al negocierilor a fosta∫a numitul Noul Quad format din SUA, UE,India ∫i Brazilia care uneori se transform„ ÓnCele Cinci Grup„ri Interesate (FIPs), careinclude ∫i Australia – aceasta grupare fiind ∫icea care a determinat elaborarea AcorduluiCadru din Iulie 2004, care a revigorat RundaDoha. ∫i c‚teodat„, FIPs se extinde Ón GrupulG6 prin includerea Japoniei.

Una dintre dinamicele interesante aleÓnt‚lnirii de la Hong Kong a fost interesulafi∫at de G20 de a c„dea de acord cu G90pentru a sus˛ine interesele ˛„rilor Ón dezvoltare.

Aceast„ complexitate ∫i diversitate dince Ón ce mai important„ ar putea s„ fi contribuitla stagnarea negocierilor Ónainte de HongKong, c‚t ∫i Ón timpul acestei Ónt‚lniriministeriale.

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Teoria jocurilor este utilizat„ ca oalternativ„ a metodelor neoclasice pentru amodela situa˛ii care implic„ interac˛iuni degrup. Teoria jocurilor este utilizat„ Ón cazulsitua˛iilor Ón care cei care iau deciziile suntinfluen˛a˛i de interac˛iunile Óntre comporta-mentul celorlal˛i ∫i propriul comportament.Astfel de situa˛ii reprezint„ o component„important„ a rela˛iilor interna˛ionale astfelÓnc‚t domeniul rela˛iilor interna˛ionale arap„rea adecvat aplica˛iilor teoriei jocurilor.

Sectorul agricol ridic„ unele dintre celemai mari dificult„˛i negocierilor privindcomer˛ul interna˛ional, at‚t Ón cadrul structuriimultiregionale, c‚t ∫i regionale. RundaUruguay a durat 7 ani Ón mare parte datorit„dificult„˛ii de a Óncheia un acord privindproblemele agricole. Articolul 20 al URAAdin 1994 prevede baza negocierilor sectorialeprivind agricultura. Cu toate c„ negocierisectoriale au avut loc Óncep‚nd din martie2000, Declara˛ia Ministerial„ Doha din 2001le-a incorporat Óntr-o rund„ comprehensiv„ denegocieri comerciale multilaterale ∫i a stabilitun mandat pentru negocierile privindagricultura.

Unul dintre cele mai complete studii Ónacest domeniu apar˛ine lui Abbot ∫i Kallio careelaboreaz„ un model al comer˛ului mondial cugr‚u utilizat pentru a ilustra sub diferitestructuri de joc nivelul subven˛iilor pentruexport (sau al taxelor), exporturile nete ∫ica∫tigurile politice pentru patru regiuni (saujuc„tori): SUA, UE, CAIRNS ∫i ˛„rileImportatoare. Dat fiind faptul c„ GATT acondus la o solu˛ie de cooperare Óntre UE ∫iSUA, nu ne poate surprinde faptul c„subven˛iile de export reprezint„ Ónc„ omodalitate de a-∫i exersa puterea pe pia˛„.Simul„rile realizate de ace∫tia sus˛in faptul c„

adev„ratul rezultat al GATT prin caresubven˛iile pentru export ale SUA ∫i UE aufost supuse unor reguli restrictive, dar nueliminate, domin„ rezultatul (status quo) Óncare regulile restrictive nu sunt aplicate,precum ∫i comer˛ul liber. Astfel, Ón opiniaautorilor, dilema cu care se confrunt„politicienii ar fi determinarea regulilorrestrictive Ón condi˛iile in care tendin˛a deredistribuire c„tre produc„tori este Ón declin.

Acela∫i interes pentru subiectulnegocierilor privind agricultura Ón cadrulGATT/OMC este reg„sit ∫i Ón lucr„rile luiBagwell ∫i Staiger. Autorii se concentreaz„asupra unui aspect diferit al interac˛iunilor Óncadrul OMC ∫i anume disputele privindcomer˛ul agricol care sunt analizate prinprisma teoriei comer˛ului strategic. Autoriisus˛in faptul c„ scopul politicii strategicepentru export este mai complex dec‚t s-arcrede deoarece dep„∫e∫te cadrul pie˛eloroligopolistice ∫i implic„ ∫i pie˛eleconcuren˛iale. Autorii consider„ manieraGATT/OMC de tratare a subven˛iilorambigu„. Ace∫tia dau ca exemplu articolulXVI GATT care precizeaz„ condi˛iile sub caresubven˛iile pentru export sunt interzise pentruprodusele industriale; cu toate acestea, se facimportante excep˛ii pentru produse primareprecum produsele agricole cu condi˛ia casubven˛ia primit„ s„ nu determine Ónlocuireaexporturilor unui alt stat membru ∫i astfel sa Óipermit„ receptorului de a beneficia de o cot„important„ pe pia˛a mondial„ a exporturilorrespectivului produs. Se induce astfel ideea c„aceast„ ambiguitate conduce c„tre dispute Óntrestatele membre. Œn procesul reduceriisubven˛iilor, SUA ∫i-a exprimat dorin˛a de aelimina complet subven˛iile. Acest punct devedere a fost sus˛inut ∫i de un consor˛iu de ˛„riimportante exportatoare de produse agricole

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O perspectiv„ teoretic„ prin prisma teoriei jocurilor a negocierilormultilaterale privind agricultura

cunoscut ca Grupul CAIRNS. Œn acela∫i timp,UE a fost de acord cu o reducere progresiv„ asuportului, dar nu a acceptat interzicereaimediat„ a subven˛iilor pentru export pentruprodusele agricole. De asemenea, un grup de˛„ri africane importatoare nete de produseagricole se simt amenin˛ate de consecin˛elereducerii subeven˛iilor de export pentruprodusele agricole. Cu toate c„ au fost dateanumite dispozi˛ii privind nivelul acceptat alsubven˛iilor de la formarea OMC, procesulnegocierilor este Ón continu„ derulare.

Tot Ón acest articol, autorii sintetizeaz„principalele caracteristice ale disputelor dindomeniul agricol. Œn primul r‚nd, cei care seconfrunt„ utilizeaz„ subven˛iile pentru exportpentru a concura pe pie˛ele de export ale ˛„rilorÓn dezvoltare. Aceasta pare a fi Ón contrast cudisputele familiare privind tarifele de import Óncadrul c„rora discu˛ia este centrat„ asupraconcuren˛ei pentru pia˛a partenerului decomer˛. Œn al doilea r‚nd, guverneleexportatoare, au Óncercat s„ coopereze,hot„r‚nd o anumit„ reducere a subven˛iilorpentru export pentru produsele agricole, cutoate c„ existau p„reri diferite Ón r‚ndulmembrilor GATT privind nivelul reducerii. Œnal treilea r‚nd, spre deosebire de alte disputeprivind subven˛iile (de exemplu privindindustria aeronautic„), disputa din sectorulagricol ia na∫tere plec‚nd de la o pia˛„ cucaracteristici concuren˛iale. Œn sf‚r∫it,problemele legate de economia politic„ au oimportan˛„ deosebit„ deoarece subven˛iileagricole sunt atribuite de multe ori celor careexercit„ un puternic lobby, ace∫tia din urm„sus˛in‚nd c„ agricultura are nevoie de unsprijin special prin faptul c„ acesta ar promovaauto-suficien˛a pe plan na˛ional, ar acopeririscurile excep˛ionale (precum vremea) cu care

se confrunt„ fermierii ∫i ar prezerva stilul ruralde via˛„.

Un alt studiu (Piermartini ∫i The)prezint„ cele mai importante modele deechilibru par˛ial care au fost elaborate pentru asimula schimb„ri de politic„ privind comer˛ulinterna˛ional. Acestea includ Modelul ATPSM(Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model)elaborat de UNCTAD, Modelul SWOPSIM(Static World Policy Simulation Model)elaborat de Departamentul AgriculturiiStatelor Unite ∫i Modelul SMART parteintegrant„ a sistemului WITS (WorldIntegrated Trade Solutions).6

Sunt cel pu˛in cinci surse de diferen˛„Óntre rezultatele modelelor. Acestea se refer„ ladatele ini˛iale ∫i nivelul de protec˛ie, naturamodelului (dac„ presupune sau nu economii descar„), gradul de liberalizare (total„ sau numaipar˛ial„), dac„ modelele sunt statice saudinamice ∫i scopul liberaliz„rii (dac„ serviciile∫i facilitarea comer˛ului sunt incluse sau nu).Studiul insist„ de asemenea ∫i asupra diferen˛eiÓntre rezultatele simul„rilor privind reformacomer˛ului Ón sectorul agricol. Unele lucr„riob˛in Ón urma simul„rilor o diminuare abun„st„rii prin liberalizarea sectorului agricol.O alt„ lucrare arat„ c„ reforma comer˛uluipoate avea efecte diferite pentru stateledezvoltate ∫i cele Ón dezvoltare. Cu toateacestea, Ón cadrul a alte trei lucr„ri, agriculturaeste sectorul prin liberalizarea c„ruia se ob˛incele mai importante c‚∫tiguri Ón termeni debun„stare. Aceste rezultate indic„ faptul c„diferen˛ele Óntre presupunerile ini˛iale privindstructura pie˛ei ∫i prezen˛a economiilor descar„ sunt esen˛iale Ón a determina dac„ seob˛in sau nu c‚∫tiguri din liberalizareaagriculturii. Similar unor rezultate ob˛inuteprin simul„ri CGE (Computable General

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6 WITS este un software dezvoltat de Banca Mondial„, Ón colaborare str‚ns„ cu UNCTAD. WITS ofer„ acces la bazelede date principale privind taxele vamale ∫i comer˛ul: COMTRADE men˛inut„ de UNSD, TRAINS men˛inut„ deUNCTAD ∫i bazele de date IDB ∫i CTS men˛inute de OMC. WITS este un software care permite consultarea datelor∫i extragerea lor ∫i de˛ine capabilit„˛i de simulare.

Equilibrium) ale Rundei Uruguay, ˛„rile netimportatoare de produse agricole sunt sensibileÓn fa˛„ unei deterior„ri a balan˛ei comercialeexterne dac„ pre˛urile pentru produseleagricole cresc pe pie˛ele mondiale paralel cureducerea subven˛iilor Ón ˛„rile industriale.

Dac„ num„rul studiilor care cuantific„impactul unor politici diferite privind comer˛uleste impresionant, un num„r considerabil destudii se preocup„ de asemenea de limitelepreviziunilor CGE. Studiul arat„ c„previzion„rile modelelor CGE sunt mult maimodeste dec‚t Ón urm„ cu c‚˛iva ani.Beneficiile estimate sunt limitate nu numai lanivel agregat, dar sunt ∫i preponderentÓnclinate c„tre cazul ˛„rilor dezvoltate;contribu˛ia prev„zut„ a liberaliz„rii comer˛uluila dezvoltarea economic„ ∫i u∫urarea s„r„cieieste extrem de limitat„. Calculele pentruc‚∫tigurile prev„zute Ón cazul liberaliz„riiserviciilor, a facilit„rii comer˛ului ∫i c‚stigurile

pe termen lung provenite dintr-o productivitatesuperioar„ r„m‚n problematice ∫i/sauspeculative. Œn ceea ce prive∫te limiteleempirice ale simul„rilor CGE, studiulconsider„ c„ acestea se bazeaz„ pe limiteteoretice mai complexe: Ón ciuda complexit„˛iisale, procedeul teoretic implic„ arbitrariul,simplific„ri nedorite Óncep‚nd cu elasticit„˛ileArmington ∫i rigidit„˛ile analizei statice p‚n„la defectul principal de a ignora structuralefectele produse de pia˛a muncii. Deasemenea, sunt ilustrate c‚∫tigurile consu-matorilor Ón urma reducerii tarifelor Ón timp ceimpactul politicilor asupra produc„torilor suntneclare datorit„ presupunerilor existenteÓnainte de construirea ∫i aplicarea modelelor.Autorul mai men˛ioneaz„ c„ noile modele careÓncep s„ apar„ au o baz„ teoretic„ mai adecvat„(de exemplu, ˛in‚nd cont de pia˛a muncii) ∫ivor reda o imagine complet diferit„ a efectelorliberaliz„rii comer˛ului.

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Jocuri strategice ale negocierilor multilaterale privind liberalizareacomer˛ului

De cele mai multe ori Ón rela˛iileinterna˛ionale, juc„torii opereaz„ Ón situa˛ii deinterdependen˛„. Aceea∫i situa˛ie se reg„se∫teÓn cazul negocierilor Ón cadrul OMC. Teoriajocurilor ofer„ o metod„ comprehensiv„ carefaciliteaz„ o explorare Ón am„nunt ainterac˛iunilor dintre actori. Teoria jocurilorface supozi˛ii privind preferin˛ele actorilor ∫imediul strategic ca apoi s„ ajute Ón a ob˛inemaniera Ón care actorii clasific„ op˛iunile depolitic„ care le sunt valabile ∫i s„ permit„determinarea rezultatului probabil alinterac˛iunii dintr-o palet„ de variante posibile.

O interac˛iune strategic„ transpus„ Óntr-unjoc con˛ine: juc„torii, strategiile, rezultatele ∫iordinea preferin˛elor pentru fiecare rezultat.Strategiile reprezint„ cursurile posibile deac˛iune cu condi˛ia de a putea reduce de o

manier„ credibil„ op˛iunile valabile juc„torilorla o politic„ de îcooperare“ (C) sauînecooperare“ (D).

Juc„torii: {X, Y}

Strategiile: S ={C, D}, C- cooperare; D-necooperare

Func˛ia rezultatului: ux(Sx,Sy) –rezultatul ob˛inut de juc„torul X depinde depropria strategie c‚t ∫i de strategia juc„torului Y.

Un proces de explorare a interac˛iunilorde baz„ a fost dezvoltat Ón lucr„rile luiAggarwal ∫i Allen (AA), Conybeare (C) ∫iBrams ∫i Kilgour (BK). Acest studiu folose∫teun model de interac˛iune strategic„ adaptatnegocierilor privind sectorul agricol. Œn

Figura 2 este prezentat„ matricea simetric„ dejoc a unei interac˛iuni strategice cu doi juc„tori.

Setul rezultatelor posibile ale joculuisunt ob˛inute prin luarea Ón considerare atuturor combina˛iilor de strategie pe carejuc„torii pe pot alege. Patru rezultate posibilepot s„ apar„; din perspectiva juc„torului de pelinie acestea sunt: CC (consens); DD(dezacord); CD (c‚∫tigul celuilalt juc„tor) ∫iDC (c‚∫tig).

Setul preferin˛elor precizeaz„ c‚t de bunsau c‚t de prost este fiecare rezultat pentrufiecare juc„tor. Modul Ón care deducempreferin˛ele este fundamental pentru a aflarezultatul anticipat al negocierilor sub formaunuia dintre cele patru rezultate posibile. Estedificil de a g„si reguli generale deoareceacestea sunt acceptate de unii autori ∫i renegatede al˛ii. De exemplu, m„surile cardinale suntconsiderate mai informative, dar Ón acela∫itimp Ón mare parte irelevante Ón cazul teorieijocurilor aplicate rela˛iilor interna˛ionale.

O scal„ ordinal„ a preferin˛elor ofer„ deobicei un nivel minim de validare a matricei dejoc. De exemplu, Vinod K. Aggarwal, PierreAllan ∫i Maxwell Cameron m„soar„ diferitestrategii ale actorilor cu ajutorul func˛iilor deutilitate, ca apoi s„ transforme rezultatelecardinale Óntr-o serie ordinal„ prin analizaempiric„. Scara de utilitate ilustreaz„ o ordinea preferin˛elor pentru fiecare juc„tor, Ón cadrulc„reia rezultatele sunt clasate de la cel mai bun(4) la cel mai prost (1).

Œn studiile lor privind maniera dereprogramare a datoriei Óntre state si b„ncileinterna˛ionale, Aggarwal ∫i Cameronconsider„ trei nivele de interac˛iune –dependen˛„, independen˛„ ∫i interdependen˛„ –∫i reunesc capacit„˛ile strategice ale fiec„ruijuc„tor Óntr-un context teoretic al teorieijocurilor cu ajutorul a trei variabile: stabilitateinstitu˛ional„, putere global„ ∫i putere de

negociere privind domeniul luat Ón calcul.Analiza acestor factori indic„ puterea denegociere ∫i determinan˛ii interac˛iuniistrategice. Cojanu (2005) a demonstrat c„ oanaliz„ similar„ poate fi aplicat„ procesului denegociere Óntre ˛„ri ∫i grupuri de ˛„ri Ón diferitecontexte interna˛ionale. Prin combinarea celortrei variabile, fiecare la un nivel diferit, putemconstrui jocuri strategice 2x2 ∫i interpretarezultatele utiliz‚nd conceptul echilibrului luiNash.

O parte semnificativ„ a situa˛iilorstructurale de conflict ∫i cooperare in care sepot reg„si statele pot fi analizate cu ajutorulurmatorului set de jocuri: PD, Chicken, Stag,Assurance, ∫i Deadlock. Majesky prezint„sintetic ordinea preferin˛elor pentru cele patrurezultate ale fiec„rui joc, echilibrul Nashpentru fiecare caz Ón parte, diferen˛ele majoreprivind ordinea preferin˛elor pentru rezultateleposibile ∫i rezulatele propriu-zise utilizate Ónanaliza simul„rilor.

Se fac urm„toarele presupuneri privindrela˛ia Óntre preferin˛ele fiec„rui juc„tor pentrurezultatele posibile ˛in‚nd cont de cele treivariabile men˛ionate anterior. O serie deargumente din literatur„ prezentate succintulterior explic„ alegerea f„cut„ Ón cadrulfiec„rui model. Structurile corespunz„toareinterac˛iunilor strategice sunt prezentate ÓnFigurile 3 ∫i 4.

a) Stabilitatea institu˛ional„

a1: fiecare juc„tor prefer„ consensulmutual c‚nd este stabil institu˛ional (CC > DD)AA

a2: fiecare juc„tor prefer„ lipsaconsensului (dec‚t consensul) c‚nd esteinstabil institu˛ional (DD > CC) AA

Calitatea institu˛iilor na˛ionale este unbun indicator privind tendin˛a statelor de aevita sau accepta o rela˛ie conflictual„ Ón

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cadrul negocierilor, de exemplu acceptarea luiîCC“ Ón loc de îDD“. Un climat stabil esteconsiderat a oferi un spa˛iu mai mare demi∫care ∫i cre∫te dorin˛a de a se ajunge lasolu˛ii avantajoase pentru ambii juc„tori. Cutoate acestea, institu˛iile nu ofer„ suficienteinforma˛ii pentru a putea prevedeacomportamentul unui stat privind capacitateaacestuia de a prevala asupra cerin˛ei celuilaltjuc„tor.

b) Puterea global„

b1: fiecare juc„tor alege de a nu cooperadec‚t ca cel„lalt s„ c‚∫tige c‚nd puterea esteputernic„ (DD> CD) AA

b2: fiecare juc„tor prefer„ ca cel„lalt s„c‚∫tige dec‚t s„ se ajung„ la necooperare c‚ndputerea este slab„ (CD> DD) AA

O rela˛ie pur asimetric„ favorabil„ unuijuc„tor determin„ preferarea cre∫teriiconflictului (DD). O pozi˛ie puternic„ permitealocarea unor resurse superioare pentru a facefa˛„ conflictului. Din contr„, un grad mare dedependen˛„ determin„ ca cea mai bun„ op˛iunes„ fie indulgen˛a (CD). Se presupune c„ unjuc„tor slab percepe conflictul ca o op˛iunedestructiv„.

c) Puterea de negociere Óntr-un anumitdomeniu

c1: fiecare juc„tor prefer„ s„ c‚∫tigec‚nd puterea este puternic„ (DC este cea maibun„ variant„) AA+ BK

c2: fiecare juc„tor prefer„ s„ c‚∫tigedec‚t s„ cad„ la un consens sau prefer„ cacel„lalt s„ c‚∫tige dac„ puterea este slab„(DC>DD sau CD) AA

Domina˛ia negocierilor, adic„ ob˛in‚ndrezultatul ini˛ial prev„zut este probabilsingurul obiectiv comun pentru juc„toriindiferent de constr‚ngerile privind fiecare

domeniu. Diferen˛a apare atunci c‚nd juc„torulcu putere mare de negociere nu percepe alt„alternativ„. Pentru juc„torul cu o putere slab„de negociere, preferin˛ele sunt supuseconstr‚ngerilor ∫i astfel ar trebui s„ permit„solu˛ii mutual avantajoase ca fiind cel mai bunrezultat.

d) Efectul interac˛iunii Óntre putereaglobal„ ∫i puterea de negociere Óntr-un anumitdomeniu

d1: fiecare juc„tor prefer„ s„ c‚∫tigedec‚t sa cad„ la un consens atunci c‚nd putereaglobal„ ∫i cea de negociere sunt puternice(DC>CC) BK+C

d2: fiecare juc„tor prefer„ ca cel„lalt s„c‚∫tige dec‚t s„ cad„ la un consens atunci c‚ndat‚t puterea global„ c‚t ∫i puterea de negocieresunt slabe (CD>CC) C

Prin compara˛ie cu modelul luiAggarwal ∫i Allan care au consacrat aceast„abordare, Cojanu a considerat mai adecvat de apermite efectului combinat al capacit„˛ilorgenerale ∫i specifice de a juca un rol importantÓn timpul interac˛iunii Ón loc de a integraefectele puterii globale ∫i a stabilit„˛ii. Autoruladuce Ón prim plan dou„ argumente pentru avalida acest ra˛ionament. Œn primul r‚nd,stabilitatea institu˛ional„ este o variabil„ maigeneral„, independent„. Influen˛a ei esteperceput„ mai degrab„ Ón mod direct dec‚t princombina˛ii. Œn al doilea r‚nd, utilizarea puteriiÓn cadrul interac˛iunii este perceput„ mai bineprintr-o influen˛„ dubl„ at‚t la nivel general c‚t∫i specific. Cel pu˛in Ón termeni economici,datorit„ intereselor divergente, ar fi pu˛inpractic de a determina impactul fiec„ruideterminant.

O pozi˛ie puternic„ Ón negocieristimuleaz„ evaluarea escalad„rii conflictuluimai favorabil dec‚t p‚n„ ∫i ob˛inereaconsensului. Aceast„ pozi˛ie asigur„ cea mai

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mare probabilitate de a domina oponentul.Dimpotriv„, o pozi˛ie slab„ implic„ uncompromis defavorabil: acceptarea cereriiceluilalt doar pentru a ob˛ine un compromis.

ATPSM (Agricultural Trade PolicySimulation Model) este utilizat Ón estimareaimpactului poten˛ial al propunerilor de reform„a sectorului comercial agricol, presupun‚nd c„implementarea acestora se realizeaz„ cum esteini˛ial prev„zut.7 Modelul – care este un modelstatic, global, cu echilibru par˛ial – permiteestimarea efectelor economice ale schimb„riicotei de tarif, a tarifelor aplicate, celor deimport, a subven˛iilor de export ∫i a ajutoruluiintern pentru produc˛ie, a consumului,pre˛urilor, fluxurilor comerciale, veniturilordin export, rentelor, surplusului produc„torului∫i consumatorului ∫i a bun„st„rii.

Œn lucrarea lor, Ralf ∫i Vanzetti detaliaz„cazurile de utilizare a modelului,caracteristicile acestuia ∫i limitele sale. Astfel,modelul este format dintr-o sistem de ecua˛iicare reprezint„ cererea, oferta ∫i fluxurilecomerciale privind o serie de produse agricoledin diferite ˛„ri. Pentru a se simula lumea real„,se fac o serie de presupuneri. Modelul estedeterministic. Nu se consider„ nici un ∫ocstocastic ∫i nici un alt fenomen nesigur. Estestatic. Nu este precizat„ nici o perioad„ de timppentru implementarea politicii sau pentruapari˛ia efectelor economice a acesteia. Œnsf‚r∫it, este un model cu echilibru par˛ial. Œntimp ce modelul Óncearc„ a estima detaliidestul de complexe ale economiei agricole, nuse preocup„ ∫i de efectele reducerii barierelortarifare asupra altor sectoare ale economieina˛ionale. Astfel, efectele asupra sectoruluiindustrial ∫i cel ter˛iar sau asupra pie˛ii munciinu fac parte din analiz„. Aceast„ simplificare amodelului permite specificarea Ón mod detaliata politicilor agricole relevante care au efecteeconomice calculabile. Œn sf‚r∫it, modelul ˛ine

cont de trei categorii de agen˛i economici –produc„torii, consumatorii ∫i guvernul. Drepturmare, rezultatele pot fi prezentate Ón func˛iede produs sau agent economic pentru fiecare˛ar„, regiune sau pe plan mondial.

Versiunea actual„ a modelului include175 ˛„ri, dintre care cei 15 membri (Ónainte de2004) ai Uniunii Europene formeaz„ un singurgrup. ˛„rile care sunt catalogate ca îdezvoltate“sunt definite de Banca Mondial„ ca ˛„ri cu unvenit ridicat, av‚nd un exces de PIB de 9,266 $(Banca Mondial„, 2001). Un alt grup este celal celor 49 de ˛„ri Cel Mai Slab Dezvoltate,conform defini˛iei Na˛iunilor Unite. Modelulinclude un set de 36 de produse care acoper„ Ónmare parte sectorul agricol. Acestea includmulte produse tropicale de mare interes pentru˛„rile Ón dezvoltare, cu toate c„ multe dintreaceste produse nu au o re˛ea comercial„ foarteimportant„ prin compara˛ie cu alte produse dinzona temperat„. Datele modelului provin dinsurse diferite, inclusiv AMAD, FAO, OECD,UN Comtrade, OMC ∫i UNCTAD. Anul debaz„ al modelului este anul 2000.

Sunt multiple limite Ón modelareaschimb„rilor politicilor comerciale ∫i Óninterpretarea rezultatelor prezentate de autori.Acestea includ modelarea accesuluipreferen˛ial, lipsa informa˛iilor privinddistribuirea rentelor, natura static„ amodelului, absen˛a costurilor de ajustare, aefectelor inter-sectorale ∫i macroeconomice ∫ibineÓn˛eles, calitatea informa˛iilor.

O serie de limite specifice sunt legate desubven˛iile ∫i creditele de export ∫i includdisponibilitatea datelor, deja men˛ionat„,dificult„˛i impuse de constr‚ngeri privindvolumul ∫i valorea produselor, ∫i limite legatede utilizarea unor rate de subven˛ii. ModelulATPSM folose∫te de fapt numai constr‚ngerivalorice ∫i bugetare. Sunt disponibile nivelul

18

7 ATPSM Version 3 can be downloaded free of charge from the UNCTAD website at http://www.unctad.org/tab/ andautomatically installed by running the installation program.

angajamentelor privind cantit„˛ile ∫i privindcantitatea exporturilor subven˛ionate, date caresunt folosite pentru a calcula ratelesubven˛iilor de export. Cu toate acestea, acesterate de subven˛ii au fost dec‚t ajustatevolumului de exporturi Ón cadrul ATPSM.

O alt„ limit„ este faptul c„ unele ˛„ricare ofer„ subven˛ii de export au ∫i cote deproduc˛ie pentru produsele subven˛ionate, deexemplu, produsele lactate ∫i cele din carne devit„ Ón cadrul UE. Chiar dac„ cota determin„ olimit„ a subven˛iilor de export nu determin„ Ónmod obligatoriu ∫i o limit„ a exporturilor.Deoarece cotele de produc˛ie nu suntprev„zute Ón cadrul ATPSM, orice schimbare asubven˛iilor de export determin„ modific„ri aleproduc˛iei ∫i stimulentelor de a exporta. Astfel,

efectele reducerii subven˛iilor pot fisupraestimate. De asemenea, impactuleconomic al subven˛ion„rii creditelor pentruexport este diferit de cel al subven˛ion„riiexporturilor. Subven˛iile de export permitexportatorilor de a vinde la pre˛urile mondialechiar dac„ costurile de produc˛ie sunt mairidicate. Astfel, produc„torii beneficiaz„ decheltuielile guvernamentale. Œn cazulcreditelor pentru export, importatoriibeneficiaz„ de cel pu˛in o parte din acestecredite. Cu toate acestea, cum informa˛iileprivind fluxurile bilaterale care beneficiaz„ decredite pentru export ∫i implic‚nd un anumitnivel de subven˛ionare nu sunt disponibile,creditele pentru export sunt tratate ca subven˛iipentru export.

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Interac˛iuni strategice Óntre UE ∫i SUA

Simul„ri cu c‚∫tiguri cardinale

Cojanu a aplicat metodologia descris„mai sus Ón analiza negocierilor pentruextinderea UE. A aplicat acela∫i model ∫inegocierilor privind agricultura, pentrupropunerile OMC, SUA ∫i UE cu ocaziaŒnt‚lnirii Ministeriale de la Cancun. Acestsubcapitol va prezenta rezultatele analizei dejaefectuate, care vor fi ulterior dezvoltate. Deasemenea, analiza va fi realizat„ ˛in‚nd cont destadiul actual al negocierilor.

Autorul construie∫te jocuri alenegocierilor multilaterale privind liberalizareacomer˛ului agricol. Aceste jocuri implic„ 2juc„tori, UE ∫i SUA, 2 strategii, îAcord“ ∫iîDezacord“ privind una dintre cele patrupropuneri pentru reducerea ajutorului pentrufermieri ∫i exportatori, respectiv îStatus Quo(Acordul Rundei Uruguay)’, îScenariulConservativ“, îScenariul Ambi˛ios“ ∫iîScenariul Harbinson“. O descriere mai

detaliat„ a acestor scenarii se reg„se∫te ÓnAnexa B.

Prima parte a simul„rii evalueaz„c‚∫tigurile cardinale folosind o func˛ie politic„a veniturilor propus„ de Abbot ∫i Kallio.Modelul acestora presupune c„ guvernelestabilesc subven˛iile pentru export pentru amaximiza c‚∫tigul respect‚nd Ón acela∫i timpacordul care este valabile Ón acel moment.Venitul ob˛inut – obiectivul fiec„rui juc„tor –este o sum„ ponderat„ a surplusuluiproduc„torilor, consumatorilor ∫i acheltuielilor guvernamentale, mai pu˛inajutorul agricol acordat.

Func˛iile venitului sunt formate dinvenituri absolute relative fa˛„ de scenariul debaz„(∆Wi):

Wi = γp,i . Sp.i + γc,i . Sc.i – (Subi + Ai),i = {1,2},unde

Juc„torul 1 = Uniunea European„;Juc„torul 2 = Statele Unite ale Americii; γp,i,γc,i = coeficien˛i de importan˛„ acorda˛i dec„tre guvern categoriilor produc„torilor/consumatorilor; Sp,i, Sc,i = surplusulproduc„torilor, respectiv al consumatorilor;Subi, Ai = sumele acordate de c„tre guvern subform„ de subven˛ii ∫i ajutor intern direct.

Coeficien˛ii acorda˛i sunt prelua˛iconform specifica˛iilor Abbott- Kallio, γp,1, =1,30; γp,2, = 1,15; γc,1, = 0,90; γc,2, = 0,85 ∫i γg,i = 1pentru cheltuielile bugetare guvernamentale.Atunci c‚nd ponderile de bun„stare sunt egalecu 1 se presupune c„ redistribuirea veniturilornu este un obiectiv al politicii. Nivelulsubven˛iilor ∫i al ajutorului intern au valorileÓnregistrate la momentul actual Ón baza de dateUNCTAD, urm‚nd apoi s„ fie ajustate Ónconformitate cu politica propus„ de fiecarescenariu.

Interac˛iunile strategice Óntre juc„toridetermin„ diferite c‚∫tiguri Ón func˛ie destrategiile oponentului. Calculele se realizeaz„cu ajutorul programului ATPSM care a fostpropus de UNCTAD Ón 1988 ∫i aplicatnegocierilor comerciale multilaterale. ATPSMestimeaz„ indicatori economici precumcererea, oferta, fluxurile comerciale, pentrudiferite produse ∫i ˛„ri ∫i apoi prezint„ diferitescenarii privind rezultatele negocierilorconform presupunerilor f„cute privindpoliticile comerciale ale ˛„rilor implicate.Astfel, este posibil de a estima prinÓncorporarea Ón func˛ia venitului datelecorespunz„toare surplusului consumatorilor, alproduc„torilor ∫i al ajutorului agricol Ón cadrulcelor 4 scenarii. Rezultatele sunt prezentate ÓnTabelul 2.

Dac„ ambii juc„tori nu cad de acordasupra unui scenariu, interac˛iunea va duce lae∫uarea negocierilor ∫i implementareadispozi˛iilor Rundei Uruguay (Status Quo). Deasemenea, acordul unui singur partener

corespunde liberaliz„rii unilaterale Óncondi˛iile respectivului scenariu, Ón timp cecel„lalt partener implementeaz„ solu˛ia StatusQuo. Astfel putem ob˛ine trei jocuri strategicecare corespund la trei scenarii construite Ónvederea ob˛inerii unui progres Ón cadrulRundei Doha. Aceste jocuri sunt reprezentateÓn Figura 5.

Simul„rile prezic blocajul negocierilorfie din cauza ambilor juc„tori, fie din cauza UEÓn cadrul fiec„rui scenariu. Echilibrul estestabil dac„ ambii juc„tori aleg strategiiledominante Ón cadrul fiec„rui joc. Rezultateleredau o imagine fidel„ negocierilor actuale: Ónurma stabilirii unui program ambi˛ios de afinaliza negocierile Ónainte de sf‚r∫itul lui2004, partenerii se reg„sesc bloca˛i deargumentele pro ∫i contra m„surilor deliberalizare ∫i incapabili de a g„si uncompromis.

O parte interesant„ a acestor jocuri estefaptul c„ nici un juc„tor nu are nici unstimulent de a p„r„si echilibrul ini˛ial f„r„ a-∫il„sa partenerul Óntr-o situa˛ie mai proast„. Cualte cuvinte, nu se Óntrevede nici o ∫ans„ canegocierile multilaterale s„ se se finalizeze cusucces date fiind scenariile acestea.

Un alt punct care trebuie men˛ionat estec„ estimarea veniturilor se realizez„ ˛in‚ndu-secont de discrepan˛ele importante Óntreparametrii relativi reducerilor subeven˛iilor ∫iajutorului intern, care variaz„ Óntre eliminareacomplet„ („scenariul ambi˛ios“) ∫i reducerimai mult sau mai pu˛in moderate de 45% ∫i55%, sau 70% ∫i respectiv 20%. Aceste valori,de∫i acceptabile Ón cadrul ATPSM, nu au nicio logic„ economic„ deoarece aceast„metodologie implic„ determinarea acelorvalori – a reducerilor de tarife, efectelor devenit, etc. – care permit partenerilor de aajunge la un acord. Ar trebui s„ fie analizaacestor negocieri care s„ ne indice acestevalori numerice ∫i nu invers.

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Trei scenarii construite Ón urmaŒnt‚lnirii Ministeriale de la Hong Kong

Œn aceast„ parte a lucr„rii, se dezvolt„ oanaliz„ teoretic„ prin prisma teoriei jocurilor apoliticilor agricole, analiz‚nd propunerilef„cute cu ocazia Œnt‚lnirii Ministeriale de laHong Kong. Progresele realizate Ón cadrulacestei Ónt‚lniri au reprezentat un pas Ón plusc„tre finalizarea Rundei Doha chiar dac„r„m‚n a fi negociate numeroase puncte tehniceprivind implementarea formulelor ∫iliberalizarea comer˛ului ter˛iar.

Cele mai importante propuneri privindmodalit„˛ile agricole au apar˛inut SUA, UE, G-20 ∫i G-10.Aceste propuneri au scos Óneviden˛„ discrepan˛ele care exist„, mai alesÓntre SUA ∫i UE, privind modalit„˛ile privindaccesul pe pia˛„, cel mai dificil subiect supusnegocierilor.

Dat fiind faptul c„ propunerea G-10 facereferin˛„ numai la accesul pe pia˛„ ∫i ajutorulintern (nu ∫i la concuren˛a privind exporturile),trei scenario au fost compuse care se bazeaz„pe cele trei propuneri apar˛in‚nd SUA, UE ∫iG-20. Caracteristicile principale ale scenariilor∫i rezultatele simul„rilor realizate cu ATPSMsunt descrise Ón Anexa B.

Cu toate acestea, trebuie men˛ionat de laÓnceput c„ propunerile ini˛iale cuprindnumeroase elemente care nu pot fi analizate cuajutorul programului ATPSM. De exemplu,propunerea UE este foarte flexibil„ Ón privin˛areducerii tarifelor at‚t timp c‚t media este46%.

Impactul celor trei propuneri esteestimat Ón func˛ie de pre˛uri, veniturile pentruguvern, efecte ale venitului din exporturi ∫ibun„stare na˛ional„. Anexa A prezint„ sinteticvalorile surplusului consumatorilor ∫i alproduc„torilor care sunt utilizate Ón estimareaveniturilor celor doi juc„tori – UE ∫i SUA.

Aceste simul„ri utilizeaz„ acela∫i model al luiAbbot ∫i Kallio, ca cel utilizat de Cojanu. Cutoate acestea, datele privind ajurorul agricol aufost aduse la zi utiliz‚nd baza de date amodelului actual ATPSM (ianuarie 2005) ∫isimul„rile pentru scenariul Status-Quo au fostrealizate utiliz‚nd aceast„ versiune amodelului. De asemenea, toate scenariileconsider„ ca nule subven˛iile pentru export Ónagricultur„, dat fiind termenul limit„ de 2013care a fost hot„r‚t la Hong Kong Ón decembrie.

C‚∫tigurile astfel ob˛inute au fostutilizate pentru a construi trei jocuri strategicecare corespund celor trei scenarii anteriorformulate. Aceste jocuri sunt descrise ÓnAnexa B.

Se poate observa c„ toate scenariile auca echilibru situa˛ia Ón care ambii juc„torirefuz„ a coopera, respectiv a liberaliza. Acestrezultat corespunde stadiului actual alnegocierilor de la Hong Kong. Statele Unitepot s„ reprezinte factorul cheie Ón ob˛inereaunui acord, dar nu sunt preg„tite a faceconcesii fiind influen˛ate de oameni politicisceptici ∫i un puternic lobby al fermierilor. Œnacela∫i timp, oferta Uniunii Europene, carecheltuie∫te dublu fa˛„ de SUA pentru ajutorulintern ∫i impune tarife agricole medii cel pu˛inde dou„ ori mai ridicate, nu asigur„ nici unacces mai simplu pe propriile pie˛e. Acesterezultate reamintesc diferen˛ele de interes careexist„ Óntre cei care particip„ la acestenegocieri. Se poate chiar pune Óntrebarea dac„unele ˛„ri participante, precum ˛„rile Óndezvoltare mici ∫i foarte specializate Ónanumite domenii care se confrunt„ cueroziunea sistemului de preferin˛e, au vreuninteres de a finaliza aceast„ rund„.

De∫i s-a ajuns la un acord care stabile∫tenoi termene limit„ pentru finalizarea rundei Ón2006, progresul privind stabilirea formulelornumerice ∫i a modalit„˛ilor – obiectivul ini˛ialal Œnt‚lnirii de la Hong Kong este limitat.

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Astfel, r„m‚n foarte multe detalii a fi precizate.Œn agricultur„, modalit„˛ile ∫i formulele dereducere a tarifelor au r„mas a fi stabilite ulterior.

Conform acordului de la Hong Kong,modalit„˛ile pentru reducerea tarifelor privindprodusele agricole, eliminarea subven˛iilorpentru export ∫i ajutorul intern urmau s„ fiestabilite p‚n„ la 30 aprilie 2006. Pe bazaacestor modalit„˛i, statele membre ar trebui s„redacteze un plan pentru termenele limit„Ónainte de 31 iulie 2006.

La ora actual„, aceste termene au fostdep„∫ite f„r„ a se ajunge la un consens.

Intre 28 iunie ∫i 2 iulie 2006, a avut loc oÓnt‚lnire a mini∫trilor ∫i ∫efilor de delega˛ii laGeneva pentru o serie de negocieri intensiveprivind modalit„˛ile pentru produsele agricole ∫iindustriale. De∫i variantele de text au circulatprintre membri, ele Ónc„ con˛in mari lipsuri acolounde nu s-a reu∫it ob˛inerea unor compromisuri.

Membri cheie ai OMC, cunoscu˛i ca G6care include Brazilia ∫i India (reprezent‚ndgrupul G20 al ˛„rilor Ón dezvoltare), UE, SUA,Australia (reprezent‚nd grupul CAIRNS alexportatorilor agricoli) ∫i Japonia(reprezentant„ a importatorilor net de produseagricole) s-au Ónt‚lnit pentru consult„ri privindcomer˛ul cu produse agricole ∫i industriale, darnu s-a realizat nici un progres Ón diminuareadiferen˛elor de interes. De altfel nu s-a realizatnici un progres nici Ón celelalte domenii ceeace a condus la finalizarea rundei de negocieride la Geneva f„r„ a se Óncheia nici un acord.Din perspectiva e∫ecului negocierilor,termenul de decembrie 2006 pentru a finalizaRunda Doha apare mult mai dificil a firespectat.

Simul„ri cu c‚∫tiguri ordinale

A doua parte a simul„rii aduce Ón primplan îdetaliile contextuale“ ale negocierilor.Dat fiind subiectul abordat, se pot considera

printre acestea, de exemplu, motiva˛iile pentrufinalizarea negocierilor; presiunile politice lacare trebuie s„ fac„ fa˛„ fiecare reprezentantsau raportul de putere Óntre participan˛ii lanegocieri.

Utiliz‚nd modelul cu trei nivele deinterac˛iune elaborat de Aggarwal ∫i Allan, sepoate estima o ordine a preferin˛elor privindcele patru rezultate posibile Ón func˛ie dedecizia partenerilor de a coopera sau nu.Datorit„ faptului c„ at‚t EU, c‚t ∫i SUA ocup„pozi˛ii dominante Ón comer˛ul mondial cuproduse agricole, puterea global„ – nivelulinterca˛iunii de dependen˛„ – este evaluat„ caîputernic„“ pentru ambii juc„tori. Evaluareacelorlalte dou„ variabile – îputerea denegociere privind un domeniu specific“ ∫iîstabilitatea coali˛iei“ – ce corespundnivelelor de interdependen˛„ ∫i independen˛„ale interac˛iunii, sunt sugerate de procesulnegocierilor.

Se pot considera patru situa˛ii Ón care sepot reg„si juc„torii:

– SI1 (situa˛ia individual„ 1): putereputernic„, putere de negociere Óncadrul unui anumit domeniuputernic„, stabilitate a coali˛iei

– SI2: putere puternic„, putere denegociere puternic„, coali˛ie instabil„

– SI3: putere puternic„, putere denegociere slab„, coali˛ie stabil„

– SI4: putere puternic„, putere denegociere slab„, coali˛ie instabil„

Jocurile sunt reprezentate Ón Figura 6.

Varianta (a) a jocului este ilustrativ„pentru condi˛iile ce caracterizau Ónceputulnegocierilor (ambii juc„tori Ón SI1). At‚t UEc‚t ∫i SUA au venit la negocieri fiind puternicimplica˛i Ón dezbaterile privind propunerile de

22

multe ori conflictuale. Reprezentan˛ii acestora∫i-au exprimat p„rerile ˛in‚nd cont de propriileinterese na˛ionale ∫i mai pu˛in de intereselecelorlal˛i membri. Interac˛iunea conduce la unjoc PD (Dilema Prizonierului), Ón cadrul c„ruiacei doi juc„tori Óncearc„ s„ domine jocul ∫irefuz„ Ón consecin˛„ rezultatul optim –cooperarea.

At‚t rolul de mediator asumat de OMCulterior c‚t ∫i pozi˛iile mai categorice asumatede al˛i membri au schimbat Óntr-o oarecarem„sur„ caracterul jocului. O serie de ˛„ri netimportatoare precum Japonia, Norvegia,Elve˛ia ∫i c‚teva ˛„ri din Africa s-au al„turatUE pentru a tempera interesul celorlal˛i Óndirec˛ia liberaliz„rii ∫i de a p„stra pre˛urileinterna˛ionale la un nivel redus. Œn acela∫itimp, Statele Unite au beneficiat de sprijinulunor ˛„ri Ón dezvoltare, Ón special cele careformeaz„ grupul CAIRNS ∫i au Óncercatob˛inerea unor reduceri mai importante aajutorului agricol stabilit Ón timpul rundeiUruguay.

Œn cadrul jocului care a rezultat ambele˛„ri p„streaz„ o pozi˛ie îputernic„“, at‚t globalc‚t ∫i privind respectivul domeniu denegociere, dar se confrunt„ cu coali˛ii fragile,formate Ón mod accidental av‚nd ca punctcomun interesele afi∫ate (SI2). Interac˛iuneaeste descris„ prin varianta (b) a jocului. JoculîDeadlock“ nu presupune ie∫irea juc„torilordin impas, dar spre deosebire de un joc DP, nule ofer„ nici o alternativ„ pentru un rezultatmai favorabil pentru am‚ndoi.

Programul ambi˛ios al Rundei Doha aimpus statelor membre s„ accelereze procesulliberaliz„rii. Membrii au fost obliga˛i s„ aduc„coeren˛„ ∫i credibilitate propriilor propuneri.Coali˛iile au devenit mai stabile, dar un altefect demn de men˛ionat este faptul c„importan˛a celor doi protagoni∫ti s-a redus Ónmod vizibil pe parcursul negocierilor. For˛acoali˛iei a jucat un rol important de∫i

programul alert poate oferi unele explica˛iiprivind desf„∫urarea negocierilor.

O nou„ interac˛iune este descris„ Ónvarianta (c) a jocului – Stag Hunt. Cei doijuc„tori trebuie s„ admit„ beneficiilecooper„rii pentru a ob˛ine un echilibru stabilde îcooperare“ sau dac„ nu, de a prelungiimpasul (SI3). Aceast„ prezicere ofer„ odescriere mai bun„ a negocierilor dec‚t oreprezentare bazat„ pe func˛ii de c‚∫tig. Œntr-adev„r, membrii au reu∫it s„ ob˛in„ uncompromis care s-a materializat Óntr-undocument, elaborat Ón timpul Ónt‚lniriiministeriale de la Cancun din septembrie 2003.Cu toate c„ documentul nu aduce mariprogrese fa˛„ de faza ini˛ial„, rezultatul esteremarcabil din punctul de vedere al analizei.Se poate prezice un echilibru continuu Óntreîacord“ ∫i îdezacord“ ce reprezint„ exactsitua˛ia actual„ a negocierilor.

O analiz„ mai ampl„ a interac˛iunilorstrategice cu c‚∫tiguri ordinale

Compromisul dintre cei doi juc„torireprezint„ un punct de plecare Ón elaborareaschi˛ei documentului de la Cancun. Cu toateacestea, nici una dintre propuneri nu a ob˛inutaprobarea majorit„˛ii statelor participante lanegocieri. Prin urmare, negocierile nu s-aumaterializat Óntr-un acord detaliat. Cum a fostdeja men˛ionat, jocul bazat pe ordonareapreferin˛elor pentru cele patru rezultateposibile explic„ cele mai importante aspecte,factorii care influen˛eaz„ negocierile, modul Óncare s-au format coali˛iile ∫i au interac˛ionatav‚nd ca lideri ai procesului de negociere peUE ∫i SUA. Œn privin˛a stadiului actual alnegocierilor, se pot reg„si urm„toarele situa˛iiÓn care cei doi juc„tori (∫i propriile coali˛ii) s-ar putea reg„si.

Se poate considera c„ SUA se afl„ ÓnSI3. Un nivel slab al puterii de negociere poatefi credibil dac„ se interpreteaz„ drept

23

consecin˛„ a deciziei SUA de a se implica maipu˛in Ón reducerea barierelor tarifarecomerciale dat„ fiind cre∫terea pre˛urilor carear afecta Ón mod negativ marea majoritate aconsumatorilor.

Cu toate acestea, se poate considera c„situa˛ia Statelor Unite este caracterizat„ prinputere global„ puternic„, putere de negociereputernic„ ∫i coali˛ie stabil„ (SI1). AgriculturaStatelor Unite ar trebui s„ fie avantajat„ Ónmare parte de o liberalizare avansat„ acomer˛ului multilateral. Printre avantajelepentru agricultura SUA se pot enumera unacces mai simplu pe pia˛„ prin reducereatarifelor sau cote ale accesului pe pia˛„ maimari nu numai Ón ˛„rile dezvoltate, dar ∫i in˛„rile Ón dezvoltare av‚nd o economie Ónexpansiune. Condi˛iile concuren˛iale pentruexporturile Statelor Unite ar putea s„ seamelioreze odat„ cu eliminarea subven˛iilorpentru export, Ón special Ón privin˛a UniuniiEuropene ale c„rei subven˛ii reprezint„ 90%din subven˛iile agricole mondiale. Astfel,capacitatea de produc˛ie a Statelor Unite sistructura concuren˛ial„ garanteaz„ o putere denegociere puternic„ a Statelor Unite, sus˛inut„de puterea economic„ ∫i militar„.

De fapt, propunerea Statelor Unite dinoctombrie 2005 a revigorat procesulnegocierilor care se afla Ón impas, fiind urmat„la mijlocul lui octombrie de o serie depropuneri privind modalit„˛ile agricoleelaborate de al˛i trei membri importan˛i – UE,grupul G-20 ∫i grupul G-10. Coali˛ia format„Ón jurul SUA pare s„ fie stabil„. SUA, G-20 ∫imembri ai grupului CAIRNS au cerut UniuniiEuropene la Hong Kong s„-∫i Ómbun„t„˛easc„oferta privind accesul pe pia˛„ deoarece ace∫tiasus˛in c„ nu este at‚t de extensiv„ precumpropunerile privind reforma ajutorului intern ∫ia competi˛iei exporturilor, ∫i prin urmare nupermite suficient spa˛iu de negociere. Dreptr„spuns, UE (par˛ial sprijinit„ de G-10 siIndia), sus˛ine c„ nu poate s„ Ó∫i

Ómbun„t„˛easc„ oferta privind accesul pe pia˛„f„r„ a exista o serie de propuneri din parteaaltor ˛„ri privind reforma sectoarelorcomerciale non-agricole – serviciile primare ∫iprodusele industriale. Se poate considera caslab„ posibilitatea unei instabilit„˛i a coali˛iei∫i prin urmare tranzi˛ia c„tre SI2 –improbabil„.

Œn ceea ce prive∫te Uniunea European„,se poate considera momentan c„ se afl„ Ón SI3datorit„ presiunilor din partea OMC ∫i a ˛„rilorÓn dezvoltare, ˛„ri care Óncearc„ s„ p„trund„ pepie˛ele protejate. De asemenea, ˛„rile care auaderat recent la UE g„sesc dificil„ men˛inereaunui nivel at‚t de ridicat al subven˛iilor ∫i tinds„ se confrunte cu o cre∫tere a importuriloragricole dec‚t cu o cre∫tere a exporturilor.

Œn acela∫i timp, se poate observa o seriede diferen˛e de interes Ón cadrul UE. Fran˛a ∫iAnglia sus˛in competitivitatea produselor loragricole prin subven˛ii ridicate careÓmpov„reaz„ bugetul UE ∫i d„uneaz„ indirectconsumatorilor prin intermediul taxelor.Astfel, stabilitatea coali˛iei este relativ fragil„.Œn momentul Ón care OMC va propune un planÓn favoarea ˛„rilor Ón dezvoltare – importatorinet de produse agricole, coeziunea coali˛iei sepoate diminua. Prin urmare, situa˛ia UE poatedeveni SI4.

UE a f„cut o nou„ propunere privindaccesul pe pia˛„ la Ónt‚lnirea ministerial„ de laHong Kong de pe 27 octombrie 2005 ∫i aad„ugat o serie de detalii propunerii saleprivind ajutorul intern, competi˛ia privindexporturile ∫i Indica˛iilor Geografice (GI).Nivelul UE îde ambi˛ie“ este inferior niveluluiG-20 ∫i SUA. O critic„ major„ a propuneriiagricole a Uniunii Europene este faptul c„oferta ei privind accesul pe pia˛„ nu ofer„ niciun stimulent pentru ˛„rile Ón dezvoltare precumBrazilia, Tailanda sau alte state membre G-20care s„ le determine a face concesii privindaccesul pe pia˛a non-agricol„ sau pia˛a

24

serviciilor. SUA ∫i membrii G-20 continu„ s„fac„ presiuni asupra Uniunii Europene pentru aface concesii mai importante privind accesulpe pia˛a agricol„.

Combina˛iile posibile privind caracte-risticile puterii de negociere a celor doijuc„tori sunt prezentate Ón Anexa B, op˛iuneapentru una dintre variante depinz‚nd de fiecaresitua˛ie Ón parte

Putem interpreta rezultatele jocurilorcum urmeaz„: at‚t timp c‚t cei doi juc„tori se

vor afla Ón SI3- SI3, este foarte probabil ca ceidoi s„ coopereze ∫i s„ prefere un compromispentru a Óncheia un acord. Dac„ UE trece ÓnSI4 va coopera dar preferin˛a pentru cooperarescade ∫i SUA va fi c‚t se poate Ón favoareaÓncheierii unui acord. Dac„ SUA Ó∫iconsolideaz„ pozi˛ia ∫i va negocia din SI1,putem considera c„ este foarte probabil canegocierile s„ se blocheze deoarece UniuneaEuropean„ nu se va l„sa influen˛at„ depresiunile exercitate ∫i va Óncerca s„ Ó∫istabilizeze coali˛ia.

25

Concluzii

Negocierile agricole creeaz„ un mediufoarte interactiv con˛in‚nd numeroase detaliicontextuale, care impun o metod„ adecvat„pentru a revela comportamentul strategic datefiind preferin˛ele partenerului (care se supunanumitor restric˛ii). Miza fiec„rui joc rezult„ Ónurma interac˛iunii a trei nivele – dependen˛„,independen˛„ ∫i interdependen˛„ – care poates„ genereze o multitudine de factori ce implic„cooperarea sau necooperarea date fiindanumite concesii posibile.

Limitele analizei trebuie s„ fie notate.Concluziile se bazeaz„ pe simul„rile unorpropuneri pentru acordul privind agricultura. Cutoate acestea, nu s-au putut include Ón simul„ritoate elementele acestor propuneri. Deasemenea, calitatea informa˛iilor nu esteÓntotdeauna fiabil„, Ón special dac„ consider„mrezultatele pentru un anumit sector sau o anumit„˛ar„. Se poate de asemenea considera ca o limit„faptul c„ jocurile construite au numai doijuc„tori, o abordare mai realist„ fiind construireaunor interac˛iuni strategice cu juc„tori multipli.Œn plus, Ón cadrul negocierilor reale, actorii seconfrunt„ cu mai multe op˛iuni strategice (nunumai dou„). Includerea unor nivele multiple deinterac˛iune ar trebui de asemenea s„ consolidezevaliditatea concluziilor.

Cu toate acestea, dat fiind caracterulsimplificat al jocurilor 2x2, rezultatele suntsuficient de compatibile cu rezultatele ∫iprocesul de derulare al negocierilor. Multiplelestructuri strategice de interac˛iune ilustreaz„comportamentul juc„torului supus unorconstr‚ngeri. Observarea atitudinilor decooperare sau rivalitate pe parcursulnegocierilor a condus la o anumit„ ordine depreferin˛e ∫i astfel la schi˛area unui context alinterac˛iunilor adecvat teoriei jocurilor. Cei doijuc„tori ob˛ineau fie un echilibru bazat penecooperare sau aveau un comportament denecooperare reciproc.

Astfel, perspectiva teoriei jocurilorpoate oferi o bun„ Ón˛elegere a modului Ón care˛„rile particip„ la negocierile interna˛ionale. Cutoate c„ lucr„ri de cercetare ulterioare pot s„reanalizeze modelul utilizat Ón aceast„ lucrare∫i astfel s„ consolideze sau s„ contrazic„concluziile prezentate ulterior, acest studiu ademonstrat utilitatea acestui model Ón analizanegocierilor Ón domenii multiple caracterizatede un context foarte interactiv ce implic„ doijuc„tori ∫i care poate s„ conduc„ sau nu la unconsens.

Abbott C.Philllip ∫i Panu K.S. Kallio, îImplications of Game Theory for InternationalAgricultural Trade“ American Journal of Agricultural Economics, august 1996

Aggarwal K.Vinod ∫i Cedric Dupont îGoods, games and institutions“ International PoliticalScience Review, vol.20,no.4, 393-409

Bagwell Kyle ∫i Robert W.Staiger, îStrategic trade, competitive industries and agricultural tradedisputes“ Economics and Politics, vol.13, iulie 2001

Costantini, Valeria Riccardo Crescenzi îBargaining coalitions in the agricultural negotiations ofthe Doha Round: similarity of interests or strategic choices˛ An empirical assessment“ Lucrareprezentat„ la IATRC (International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium) Spania, 19-21 iunie2005.

Cojanu, Valentin The integration game. Strategic Interaction in the Process of the EUEnlargement, Bucure∫ti, ed. Economica, 2005

Hertel, Thomas Hummels, David Ivanic, Maros Keeney Roman îHow confident can we be inCGE-based assessments˛“ Lucrare GTAP nr.26, martie 2004

Majeski Stephen ∫i Shane Fricks îConflict and cooperation in International Relations“, Journalof Conflict Resolution, vol.39, dec.1995

Milner,Helen ∫i B.Peter Rosendorff îInternational trade and domestic politics: the domesticsources of international trade agreements and institutions“, Universitatea Pennsylvania

Pahre, Robert ∫i Paul Papayaonou îUsing Game Theory to link domestic and internationalpolitics“, Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 41 feb.1997

Peters Ralf H. ∫i David Vanzetti, îShifting sands: searching for a compromise in the WTOnegotiations on agriculture“ Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study SeriaNr.23

Piermartini, Roberta The, Robert îDemystifying Modelling Methods for trade policy“ StudiulOMC nr.10 2005

“WTO Doha Round: Agricultural negotiating proposals“ Raport CRS pentruCongres, noiembrie2005

26

Bibliografie

Anexa A

Figura 1

Interese ∫i Alian˛e

27

Tratament

Special i

Diferen ial

T ri în

Dezvoltare Reduceri

ale ajutorului intern

re

Reduceri tarifare moderate Reduceri

i flexibile i ajutor intern tarifare

flexibil substan iale

Japonia

Elve ia

Norvegia

Republica

Coreea

Reduceri ale

creditelor de export

UE

Eliminarea subven iilor

de export

Statele Unite

Sursa: UNCTAD

Tabel 1 Actori cheie Ón negocierile Rundei Doha Ón cadrul OMC8

Grup Membri

Big Two SUA ∫i UE

Big Three SUA, UE ∫i Japonia

New Quad SUA, UE , India ∫i Brazilia

C-4 Grupul celor 4 ˛„ri africane produc„toare de bumbac – Benin, Burkina Faso,Ciad ∫i Mali care au propus o ini˛iativ„ a OMC-ului pentru bumbac

FIPS Cele cinci ˛„ri interesate îFive interested parties“: SUA, UE, India, Brazilia ∫iAustralia

FIPS PLUS FIPS plus Agentina, Canada, Elve˛ia, Japonia, China ∫i Malaiezia

G-5 Grupul celor Cinci: SUA, UE, Japonia, India ∫i Brazilia

8 Pentru mai multe informa˛ii, se poate consulta raportul OMC privind negocierile comerciale « WTO agriculturalnegotiations: the issues and where are we now » « Key to groups », 1 dec 2004, pag 83-84, disponibil la[http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc]

G-6 G-5 plus Australia

G-7 Un grup format din 7 na˛iuni: SUA, Japonia, Canada, Marea Britanie, Fran˛a,Germania ∫i Italia – ai c„ror mini∫tri sau ∫efi de stat se Ónt‚lnesc pentru a discutaprobleme economice ∫i politice

G-8 G-7 plus Rusia

(G-8)+5 G-8 plus 5 ˛„ri: Brazilia, India, Mexic, China ∫i Africa de Sud care au uneledintre cele mai importante economii emergente

G-10 Un grup de 10 ˛„ri dezvoltate, net importatoare care Ó∫i subven˛ioneaz„agricultura na˛ional„: Bulgaria, Islanda, Israel, Japonia, Coreea de Sud,Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norvegia, Elve˛ia ∫i Taipei China

G-20 Un grup de 20+ ˛„ri ai c„ror membri variaz„, dar constituit Ón principal din:Argentina, Bolivia, China, Brazilia, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba,Ecuador, Egipt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexic, Nigeria, Pakistan,Paraguay, Filipine, Africa de Sud, Peru, Tailanda ∫i Venezuela

G-33 Un grup format din 33 state Ón dezvoltare(acum extins la 42) cunoscute caîprieteni ai produselor speciale“ care include China, Turcia, Indonezia, India,Pakistan ∫i o serie de ˛„ri din Africa, Caraibe, America de Sud ∫i Asia

G-90 Grupul ˛„rilor cel mai slab dezvoltate (LDCs)

Cairns Group Membri orienta˛i c„tre o economie de pia˛„ liber„ ∫i suporteri ai liberaliz„riicomerciale Dintre membri fac parte: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazilia,Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonezia, Paraguay, NouaZeeland„, Malaiezia, Filipine, Africa de Sud, Tailanda ∫i Uruguay

LDCs OMC recunoa∫te ca ˛„ri cel mai slab dezvoltate, ˛„rile care au fost denominateastfel de Na˛iunile Unite. La ora actual„ sunt 50 de ˛„ri pe lista Na˛iunilor Unitedintre care 32 sunt membre ale OMC. O list„ complet„ este disponibil„ la adresa[http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm]

Figura 2 Un joc generic al unei interac˛iuni strategice

Juc„torul B

Cooperare (C) Necooperare (D)

28

Cooperare (C)

Consens într-un

anumit domeniu

(MC)

B domin respectivul

domeniu (BP)

Juc torul

A

Necooperare

(D)

B domin respectivul

domeniu (BP)

Necooperare (NC) în

respectivul domeniu

29

Stabilitate Institu ional

Stabil Instabil

Resusele din domeniu

i puterea global a1: CC>DD a2: DD>CC

Putere de negociere puternic

(privind respectivul domeniu)

c1: DC cea mai bun variant

Putere global slab

b2: CD>DD

CD

DC> sau > DD

CC

"Chicken" sau "Leader"

DC>CD>DD>CC

"Hero"

Putere de negociere slab

c2: DC>DD sau CD

Putere global puternic

b1: DD>CD

DC

sau >DD>CD

CC

"Prisoner’s Dilemma" sau

"Stag Hunt"

CC

DC>DD> sau

CD

"Deadlock" sau

"Deadlock analogue"

Putere de negociere i

putere global puternic

d1: DC>CC

c1: DC cea mai bun variant

b1: DD>CD

DC>CC>DD>CD

"Prisoner’s Dilemma"

CD

DC>DD> sau

CC

"Deadlock" sau

"Deadlock analogue"

Putere de negociere i DC>CD>CC>DD DC>CD>DD>CC

Figura 3 Ordinea dedus„ a preferin˛elor (supuse constr‚ngerilor) – din perspectivar‚ndului (pentru coloan„, DC este Ónlocuit cu CD)

Putere global slab

d2: CD>CC

c2: DC>DD sau CD

b2: CD>DD

"Leader" "Hero"

30

Figura 4 Jocuri ordinale deduse simetrice

Resusele din domeniu

i puterea global

Stabilitate Institu ional

Stabil Instabil

Puterea de negociere

puternic i

Puterea global slab

“Chicken”

3,3 2,4

4,2 1,1

“Leader”

2,2 3,4

4,3 1,1

“Hero”

1,1 3,4

4,3 2,2


slab i

Puterea global puternic

“Prisoner’s dilemma”

3,3 1,4

4,1 2,2

“Stag Hunt”

4,4 1,3

3,1 2,2

“Deadlock”

2,2 1,4

4,1 3,3

“Deadlock analogue”

1,1 2,4

4,2 3,3


puternic i

Puterea global puternic

“Prisoner’s dilemma”

3,3 1,4

4,1 2,2

“Deadlock”

2,2 1,4

4,1 3,3

“Deadlock analogue”

1,1 2,4

4,2 3,3


slab i

Puterea global slab

“Leader”

2,2 3,4

4,3 1,1

“Hero”

1,1 3,4

4,3 2,2

31

Tabelul 2 Estim ri ale câ tigurilor ob inute cu “Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model”

(ATPSM)

W� 1 W� 2

Rezultatele negocierilor multilaterale

Status Quo (Uruguay Round Agreement) -2.8 +1.9

Scenariul Conservativ -3.3 +2.4

Scenariul Ambi ios -5.0 +6.6

Scenariul Harbinson -7.5 +2.8

Rezultatele negocierilor unilaterale ale

UE când SUA r mâne la status-quo





SUAcând EU r mâne la status-quo




Not explicativ : Valorile sunt exprimate în miliarde dolari

Figura 5 Simul ri ale negocierilor strategice multilaterale privind comer ul agricol cu câ tiguri

cardinale

a) Scenariul Conservativ

Juc torul 2: SUA

Acord Dezacord

Acord -3.3; +2.4 -3.5; +2.1

Jucatorul 1: UE

Dezacord -2.8; +2.1 -2.8; +1.9

Juc torul 2: SUA

Acord Dezacord

Acord -5.0; +6.6 -7.5; +3.8

Jucatorul 1: UE

Dezacord -2.4; +2.2 -2.8; +1.9

b) Scenariul Ambi ios

32

c) Scenariul Harbinson

Juc torul 2: SUA

Acord Dezacord

Acord -7.5; +2.8 -7.2; +3.5

Jucatorul 1: UE

Dezacord -2.1; +1.5 -2.8; +1.9

Figura 6 Simul ri ale negocierilor strategice multilaterale privind comer ul agricol cu câ tiguri

ordinale

a) Un joc DP (Dilema Prizonierului)

Juc torul 2: SUA

Acord Dezacord

Acord 3 , 3 1 , 4

Jucatorul 1: UE

Dezacord 4 , 1 2 , 2

b) Un joc “Deadlock”

Juc torul 2: SUA

Acord Dezacord

Acord 2 , 2 1 , 4

Jucatorul 1: UE


c) Un joc “Stag Hunt”

Juc torul 2: SUA

Acord Dezacord

Acord 4 , 4 1 , 3

Jucatorul 1: UE


Anexa B

Scenarii alternative de liberalizare9

33

9 Informa˛ii disponibile Ón lucrarea lui Ralf Peters ∫i David Vanzetti îShifting sands: searching for a compromise inthe WTO negotiations on agriculture“

Ambi˛ios O reducere a taxelor vamaleÓn afara contingentului tarifar conformformulei elve˛iene t1=(t0*25)/(t0+25),eliminarea taxelor din contingentul tarifar, om„rire cu 20% a cotelor de import, eliminareaajutorului intern ∫i a subven˛iilor de export Óntoate ˛„rile ∫i pentru toate produsele

Conservativ O reducere a taxele vamaleÓn afara contingentului tarifar a 10% dintreprodusele cele mai sensibile cu 15% (reducerease aplic„ asupra taxei consolidate), o reducerecu 44.1% produselor celelalte, o reducere cu55% a ajutorului intern si o reducere de 45% asubven˛iilor echivalente pentru export Ón ˛„riledezvoltate ∫i dou„ treimi din aceste reducerifiind aplicate ˛„rilor Ón dezvoltare. Nici oreducere aplicat„ ˛„rilor cel mai slabdezvoltate.

Cancún ˛„rile dezvoltate: 40% din tarifesunt supuse formulei stabilite la RundaUruguay; astfel taxele vamale Ón afaracontingentului tarifar a primelor 4 produsedintre cele mai sensibile sunt reduse cu 15% ∫iurm„toarele 10 produse dintre cele maisensibile sunt reduse cu 44.4%(Ón medie,36%;reducerea se aplic„ asupra taxeiconsolidate), 40% din taxe sunt reduseconform formulei elve˛iene av‚nd uncoeficient de 25, 20% din taxele av‚ndvaloarea ini˛ial„ cea mai redus„(taxaconsolidat„) sunt reduse la 0; subven˛iilepentru export sunt reduse cu 80% ∫i ajutorul

intern cu 60%. ˛„rile Ón dezvoltare: 10% dintretaxele privind produsele cele mai sensibile suntreduse cu 5%, urm„toarele 40% produse dintrecele mai sensibile sunt reduse conformformulei Rundei Uruguay, respective taxelevamale Ón afara contingentului tarifar aprimelor 4 produse dintre cele mai sensibilesunt reduse cu 10% ∫i urm„toarele 10 produsedintre cele mai sensibile sunt reduse cu26.7%(media ultimelor dou„ categorii fiind24%), 40% din tarife sunt supuse formuleielve˛iene cu un coeficient de 50, Ón timp cerestul de 10% sunt reduse la 5%; subven˛iilepentru export sunt reduse cu 70%, ajutorulintern este redus cu 20%. Nici o reducereaplicat„ ˛„rilor cel mai slab dezvoltate.

Harbinson O reducere a taxele vamaleÓn afara contingentului tarifar cu 60% pentrutaxele ini˛iale mai mari de 90%, 50% (tarifulini˛ial Óntre 15 ∫i 90), sau 40% (tariful ini˛ialmai mic de 15); o reducere de 80% asubven˛iilor pentru export; ∫i o reducere de60% a ajutorului intern Ón ˛„rile dezvoltate. In˛„rile Ón dezvoltare:o reducere de 40% pentrutaxele ini˛iale mai mari de 120%, 35% (tarifulini˛ial Óntre 60 ∫i 120), 30% ( tariful ini˛ial Óntre20 ∫i 60) ∫i 25% (tariful ini˛ial mai mic de 20);o reducere de 70% a subven˛iilor pentruexport; ∫i o reducere de 20% a ajutoruluiintern. O cre∫tere cu 20% a cotelor de importpentru ˛„rile dezvoltate ∫i pentru ˛„rile Óndezvoltare. Nici o reducere aplicat„ ˛„rilor celmai slab dezvoltate.

Rezultate ale simul„rii cu ATPSM

Scenariul 1

34

Taxa în afara

contingentului

tarifar

Subven ia pentru

export

Ajutorul intern Taxa aplicat sau

consolidat

SUA + Japonia 75 100 53 Consolidat

UE 75 100 75 Consolidat

Celelalte ri

dezvoltate

75 100 31 Consolidat

rile în dezvoltare 55 100 14 Consolidat

( valorile numerice reprezint procentajul reducerilor efectuate asupra factorilor preciza i)

Rezultatele simul rii

UE SUA

Surplusul consumatorilor 29,3207 0,0252

Surplusul produc torilor -49,1453 -1,1851

W -36,467 -1,13378

(Not explicativ : Valorile sunt exprimate în miliarde dolari – indic negocierile multilaterale)

Pentru a ob ine câ tigul, am utilizat aceea i metodologie ca cea prezentat anterior.

Câ tig:

UE= =1,3*(-49,14)+0,9*29,32+1,027= -36,467

SUA= 1,15*(-1,18)+0,85*0,0252+0,2018= -1,13378

Rezultatele negocierilor unilaterale ale UE când SUA r mâne la status-quo

UE SUA

Surplusul consumatorilor 41.6247 -1.7179

Surplusul produc torilor -56,3527 1.8216

W -34,7693 0,708745

(Valorile sunt exprimate în miliarde dolari – indic negocierile unilaterale)

Rezultatele negocierilor unilaterale ale SUA când UE r mâne la status-quo

UE SUA



W -9,47214 -2,4765


35

Scenariul 2

Taxa în afara

contingentului

tarifar

Subven ia pentru

export


consolidat

SUA 46 100 60 Consolidat

UE 46 100 70 Consolidat

Celelalte ri

dezvoltate




UE SUA

Surplusul consumatorilor 28,5737 -0,4124


W -33,062 -2,24227

(Valorile sunt exprimate în miliarde dolari – indic negocierile multilaterale)


UE SUA


Surplusul produc torilor 29,73255593 -1,00151865

W -33,3966 0,35755



UE SUA



W -9,71973 -3,01914


Scenariul 3

Taxa în afara

contingentului

tarifar

Subven ia pentru

export


consolidat

UE+ Japonia 54 100 80 Consolidat

36

SUA 54 100 75 Consolidat

Celelalte ri

dezvoltate




UE SUA



W -36,0806 -2,4764

(Valorile sunt exprimate în miliarde dolari – indic negocierile multilaterale)


UE SUA


Surplusul produc torilor -50,9270 2,3238

W -36,67 0,9769



UE SUA



W -9,66299 -3,9601


Estim ri ale câ tigurilor ob inute cu “Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model” (ATPSM)

W� 1 W� 2

Rezultatele ale negocierilor multilaterale

Status Quo -9,3262 -0,1992

Scenariul 1 -36,467 -1,1337

Scenariul 2 -33,062 -2,2422

Scenariul 3 -36,0806 -2,4764

37

W� 1 W� 2


UE când SUA r mâne la status-quo

Scenariul1 -34,7693 0,7087

Scenariul 2 -33,3966 0,3575

Scenariul 3 -36,67 0,9769


SUA când UE r mâne la status-quo

Scenariul 1 -9,4721 -2,4765

Scenariul 2 -9,7197 -3,0191

Scenariul 3 -9,6629 -3,96005

(Valorile sunt exprimate în miliarde dolari)

Simul ri ale negocierilor strategice multilaterale privind comer ul agricol cu câ tiguri cardinale

Scenariul 1

Juc torul 2 SUA

Acord Dezacord

Acord -36,47 ; -1,13 -34,77; 0,71

Juc torul 1

UE Dezacord

-9,47; -2,48 -9,32; -0,20

Scenariul 2

Juc torul 2 SUA

Acord Dezacord

Acord

-33,06; -2,24 -33,40; -2,48

Juc torul 1

UE Dezacord

-9,72; -3,02 -9,32; -0,20

Scenariul 3

Juc torul 2 SUA

38

Acord Dezacord

Acord -36,08; -2,48

-36,67; 0,98

Juc torul 1

UE Dezacord

-9,66; -3,96 -9,32; -0,20

Simul ri ale negocierilor strategice multilaterale privind comer ul agricol cu câ tiguri ordinale

UE- SI3; SUA- SI1 UE- SI 4; SUA- SI 1

sau

UE- SI3 ; SUA- SI 2

sau

Juc torul 2

SUA

(2; 3) (1; 4) Juc torul 1

UE (4; 1) (3; 2)

Juc torul 2

SUA

(1; 3) (2; 4) Juc torul 1

UE (4; 1) (3; 2)

Juc torul 2

SUA

(2; 2) (1; 4) Juc torul 1

UE (4; 1) (3; 3)

Juc torul 2

SUA

(2; 1) (1; 4) Juc torul 1

UE (4; 2) (3; 3)

UE- SI 4; SUA- SI 2

sau

Juc torul 2

SUA

(4; 3) (1; 4) Juc torul 1

UE (3; 1) (2; 2)

Juc torul 2

SUA

(4; 1) (1; 4) Juc torul 1

UE (3; 2) (2; 3)

Juc torul 2

SUA

(4; 2) (1; 4) Juc torul 1

UE (3; 1) (2; 3)

39

sau sau

UE-SI3; SUA-SI3

Juc torul 2

SUA

(1; 2) (2; 4) Juc torul 1

UE (4; 1) (3; 3)

Juc torul 2

SUA

(1; 1) (2; 4)Juc torul 1

UE (4; 2) (3; 3)

Juc torul 2

SUA

(4; 4) (1; 3) Juc torul 1

UE (3; 1) (2; 2)

sau

Juc torul 2

SUA

(1; 1) (2; 4) Juc torul 1

UE (4; 2) (3; 3)

THE EU-US CONFRONTATIONON THE AGRICULTURE DOSSIER: A LOOK AT WTONEGOTIATIONS

THROUGH GAME-THEORETICAL LENSES

CONFRUNTAREA UE – SUA PRIVIND DOSARUL AGRICOL: O ANALIZ√

A NEGOCIERILOR OMC DINPERSPECTIVA TEORIEI JOCURILOR

(BILINGUAL EDITIONEDIfiIE BILINGV√)

European Institute of Romania

7-9 Regina Elisabeta Blvd. Bucharest, Romania

Tel: (+4021) 314 26 97Fax: (+4021) 314 26 66

E-mail:[email protected] site: www.ier.ro

Editor:Mihai Moia

ISSN: 1582-4993

© European Institute of Romania, 2006

The views expressed in this volume are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the views of the supporting institution .

European Institute of Romania

The EU-US Confrontationon the Agriculture Dossier: A Look at WTO

Negotiations through Game-theoreticalLenses

Authors: Valentin COJANU

Irina ENE

Bucharest, September 2006 Working Paper Series No. 17

Table of Contents

Abstract .............................................................................................................................. 47

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 47

Key issues in the World Trade Organisation negotiations on agriculture ................. 48

Major players in the WTO DDA Negotiations .............................................................. 51

A game theoretic perspective of multilateral negations in agriculture ....................... 53

Strategic games of multilateral negotiations for agricultural trade liberalisation..... 55

Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 65

References .......................................................................................................................... 66

Annexes .............................................................................................................................. 67

45

This material attempts to shed light onthe methodological topic of payoffassessments within the context of the EUnegotiations on agriculture issues at WTO.There are constructed strategic games ofmultilateral negotiations relative toagricultural trade liberalization, which is anongoing issue on the WTO agenda. Thesegames involve 2 players, the EU and the US,and 2 strategies, “Agreement” and“Disagreement” on one of the submittedproposals to reduce support to farmers andexporters.

The first part of simulation is to evaluatecardinal payoffs by using a political payofffunction and then use a static, deterministic,partial-equilibrium computational modeldeveloped by UNCTAD and applied tomultilateral trade negotiations. The secondpart of simulation is meant to bring into

discussion the elements of negotiations’contextual detail. For the purpose of thecurrent topic, these could refer, for instance, tomotivations to resume talks after a longimpasse; to political influences each party hasto face at home; or to the balance of poweramong the negotiating actors.

The paper concludes that the ordinalassessment of payoffs provides a betterdescription of the ongoing negotiations thanthe representation based on gains-from-tradefunctions. The prediction confidentlyemphasizes an equilibrium continuum between“agreement” and “disagreement”, which infact is a perfect match with the current state ofaffairs.

Key words: World Trade Organization,agricultural trade, multilateral negotiations,game theory

47

Abstract

Introduction

As the Doha Round (DR) of the WorldTrade Organization (WTO) negotiationssomewhat expectedly came to a halt in July2006, achieving substantial liberalization ofagricultural trade looks increasinglyproblematic. Agriculture is again causingcontention in international trade negotiations.It caused long delays to the Uruguay Round inthe late 1980s and 1990s, and it is againproving to be the major stumbling block in theWTO multilateral trade negotiations.

Negotiations involve debating differentsituations in order to obtain equilibrium. Thisprocess can be interpreted as a dynamic game.The initial proposals can rarely lead to a uniqueequilibrium or the obtained equilibrium, whichis not always a social optimum (the different

strategies may lead to the maximisation of thesum of players’ payoffs but not to themaximum payoff of each player).

This strategic process may be thought asthe opposition of the interests of the players inan interdependent process whose outcome mayinvolve a situation of conflict or not. It is notthe conflict, which exclusively describes thestrategic nature of interaction; the wholevariety of anticipated events in associationwith gains or pay-offs in game theoreticalapproach, whose predictable occurrencedepends on the other player’s decision, isinstead the proper description of a strategicinteraction. A game refers in this study tostrategic negotiations conducted within theprocess of agricultural liberalisation.

The study begins by sketching theevolution of the DR by pointing out thedifferent phases of agricultural liberalisationand the major actors which determine theresults of the negotiations. The second part ofthe study presents a dual approach of thedevelopments in the analysis of internationaltrade. The theoretic approach considers a moregeneral framework of international relationsand a more specific one – that of agriculturalinternational trade. The second approachbrings forward the use of models in theanalysis of international relations.

The third part introduces a gametheoretic approach of the interactions withinWTO negotiations between European Union(EU) and the United States of America(US).The study develops an analysis of thestrategic interactions with two types of pay-offs: cardinal and ordinal. The estimation ofcardinal payoffs is based on the results ofATPSM (Agricultural Trade Policy SimulationModel) simulations, a model of internationalcommerce elaborated by UNCTAD.

48

Key issues in the World Trade Organisation negotiations on agriculture

Agriculture remains the most distortedsector of the world economy. The UruguayRound Agreement on Agriculture (URAA)took a major step forward by bringing thesector within the purview of the multilateraltrading rules but its success in opening up thesector to global competition was at bestlimited. Therefore, agricultural liberalization isrightly the top priority in the Dohanegotiations.

In 2001, WTO members agreed in Dohato launch a new round of trade negotiations,encompassing the agricultural negotiationsalready started in 2000 according to the so-called “built-in” agenda. The 1994 Agreementon Agriculture, concluded as part of theUruguay Round, laid down liberalisationcommitments under three pillars that will alsoprovide the basis of any new agreement:

• market access, covering tariff ceilings(bindings) and liberalizationcommitments in terms of tariffsreduction and tariff rate quotas;

• domestic support, including subsidiesand other programmes;

• export competition, traditionallylimited to export subsidies, but in thenew round covering also exportcredits, guarantees and insurance, foodaid, exporting state trading enterprises,export restrictions and taxes.

Each of the three pillars includedprovisions for the “special and differentialtreatment” of developing countries, such asexemptions from some commitments, lowerreduction targets, and more time for theirimplementation.

Negotiators missed the 31st March 2003deadline for producing “modalities” (i.e.,numerical targets and formulas) for countries’commitments, and the WTO Ministerialmeeting, held in Cancun (Mexico) inSeptember 2003, ended in deadlock.

Before and at Cancun, countriesexpressed their disappointment with the draftMinisterial text1. Developed Cairns Group

1 Peters Ralf H. and David Vanzetti, “Shifting sands: searching for a compromise in the WTO negotiations on agriculture”

members wanted to see a less flexible andmore ambitious round, whereas countriesincluding Japan, Norway and Switzerlandwanted more flexibility, particularly in theareas of non-trade concerns. Most developingcountries wanted the developed countries toliberalize, but, at this stage, for reasons of ruraldevelopment and food security, were reluctantto open their own markets. Some developedcountries such as the European Union did notwant at that time to eliminate export subsidies,although such subsidies constituted one of themost trade-distorting policy instruments.Essentially, the positions differed concerningthe two dimensions of ambition and the degreeof special and differential treatment. Figure 1shows the positions of some WTO members. Aproblem was that developing countries werenot a homogeneous group with commoninterests. Some were food importers, someexporters, while others had preferential accessto consider.

In an attempt to guide the various partiesto a mutually acceptable agreement, theChairman of the Committee on Agriculture,Mr. Stuart Harbinson, circulated in March2003 a revised version of his first draft ofmodalities for further commitments, submittedin February 2003. Many members on eitherside of the agricultural trade liberalizationspectrum found the Harbinson revised draftinadequate. As a result, negotiations weredeadlocked for months and only very limitedprogress was made. The first deadline for theagreement on modalities, agreed at Doha, wasmissed. In mid-August 2003, the EU and theUnited States jointly proposed a modalitiesframework for further reform of agriculturebut developing countries expressed theirdisappointment at the framework. However,the EC-United States input galvanised theprocess such that several countries and countrygroups tabled alternative texts that modify theEC-United States draft.

Among these texts is a counter-proposalsubmitted by 16 developing countries that hasalso found support from four other developingcountries. By the end of August 2003 a reviseddraft Cancun Ministerial Text from the WTOGeneral Council was circulated and inSeptember a second revision was released. Thedraft Cancun Ministerial Text covers the threepillars of the Agreement on Agriculture, i.e.market access, domestic support and exportcompetition, and in this regard iscomprehensive. It contains formulae, rules andspecial and differential treatment provisions oneach of the three pillars but without specifyingthe level of ambition. The document does notcontain specific figures or ranges forreductions, and many issues are left for furthernegotiations. The document contains a sectionfor “other” issues for which the Harbinsonrevised draft is to serve as a referencedocument.

After Cancun, there were efforts to putthe negotiations and the rest of the workprogramme back on track. The outcome wasthe “framework agreement” reached at the endof July 2004 (the so called “July package”) onmoving forward the Doha Round of tradenegotiations.

As far as domestic support is concerned,the July package includes concrete targets forthe reduction of overall domestic support(“amber box”, “blue box” and de minimis) andspecifies that “blue box” levels will be capped,while no capping is imposed to the “greenbox”, as had been proposed by developingcountries. The reduction will be made under atiered formula that cuts subsidies progressively– higher levels of trade-distorting domesticsupport are subject to greater reductions.

Moreover a down payment is imposed,that is a commitment to reduce the “amberbox” of at least 20% in the first year of theimplementation period. On export

49

competition, the Doha mandate calls for“reductions of, with a view to phasing out, allforms of export subsidies.” In the Julypackage, Members have agreed to establishdetailed modalities to implement theelimination of all forms of export subsidiesand the discipline of all export measures withequivalent effect by a credible end date.

Out of the three main issues undernegotiation, market access stands out as themost contentious ones. The Doha mandatecommits WTO members to “substantiallyimprove market access”. According to the Julypackage, agricultural tariffs will be cut on thebasis of a single, tiered approach: the higherthe tariff, the higher the tariff cut. However,the agreement caters for several concerns:either from developed countries, to addresssome “sensitive products”, or developingcountries, to benefit from a special anddifferential treatment across the board, e.g.lower tariff cuts and special treatment onmarket opening for the so-called “specialproducts”.

Meetings held since August 2004confirmed the existence of different viewsabout the formula to be used for tariffreduction. Some countries argue strongly for anon-linear, Swiss formula to be applied in eachof the band of the tiered approach. This isvigorously objected by other countries,proposing instead average linear reductions(Uruguay Round-style) in each band.2

Furthermore, the tiered approachrequires the calculation of ad valoremequivalents (AVEs) of specific tariffs, in orderto compare them. Far from being a purelytechnical exercise, this became a very sensitiveand highly politicized issue. Only at the “mini-

ministerial” meeting held in Paris in May2005, the so called “Five Interested Parties”(Australia, Brazil, EU, India and the US) foundan agreement on the methodology to befollowed in the computation of the AVEs.

Before the Honk Kong MinisterialMeeting, there were several proposalssubmitted by the interested parties3. The fourmajor DDA negotiating proposals foragricultural modalities are from the UnitedStates, EU, G-20, and the G-10. Each proposalvaries in terms of its degree of specificity foreach of the three negotiating pillars. Exportcompetition negotiations were facilitated bythe EU’s July 2005 pledge to end exportsubsidies (conditioned on parallel treatment ofother forms of export subsidies). Domesticsupport disciplines hinge primarily oncommitments by three countries: the UnitedStates, the EU, and Japan. In contrast, marketaccess has been the most difficult issue,especially for the EU and the G-10, but also forthe G-20.

On December 18, 2005, in Hong Kong,the WTO member countries reachedagreement on a broad outline of negotiatingobjectives for liberalizing global trade inagriculture, manufactures, and services in theDoha Round of multilateral tradenegotiations4.

In agriculture, some progress was madeunder all three pillars. In market access, therevised ministerial text formalises the“working hypothesis” on structuring Memberstariffs for reduction within four bands, withbigger cuts on higher tariffs. On domesticsupport, the text confirms the “workinghypothesis” that the Aggregate Measure ofSupport would be classified in three bands.

50

2 “The Road Ahead: Agricultural Policy Reform in the WTO—Summary Report U.S.” Department of Agriculture3 “WTO Doha Round: Agricultural negotiating proposals” CRS Report for Congress, November 2005 4 The declaration of the WTO’s Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, hereafter referred to as the Hong Kong(HK) declaration is available at [http://www.wto.org/english/ thewto_e/ minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.pdf].

The EU will be in the top band, facing thehighest linear tariff cuts, the US and Japan inthe middle and everyone else in the bottomband. Notably, the text specifies that overallcuts in trade distorting domestic support mustbe at least equal to or greater than the sum ofthe reductions in Amber Box, Blue Box and deminimis (exempted) support. This shouldmake it more difficult for countries to simply

re-classify subsidies in order to dodgereduction commitments. And for exportcompetition, the text calls for the “parallelelimination of all forms of export subsidiesand disciplines on all export measures withequivalent effect” by the end of 2013, with asubstantial part of the elimination to berealised by the end of the first half of theimplementation period.

51

Major players in the WTO DDA Negotiations

The political economy approach hasbeen extensively adopted in the analysis of theWTO negotiations. In particular, somecontributions have focused on the strategicinteractions and the formation of bargainingcoalitions, which have proved to be key actorsin the current negotiation round5.

Several countries’ groups are playing arole in the present round of negotiations (seeTable 1). They can be broadly classifiedaccording to the following typology:

1) Structural groups, whose aggregationis based on specific commercial relationshipssuch as free trade areas (e.g., ASEAN,NAFTA, MERCOSUR, etc.), or on othereconomic interests or geographic similarities(e.g., Least Developed Countries or Net FoodImporting Developing Countries). Thesegroups do not necessarily sponsor specificproposals, but they are often referred to in thenegotiations.

2) Representative groups, which are setup with the specific objective of representing alarge variety of national interests in order toovercome the deadlocks in the negotiations.The members of these groups are selectedamong the key political and economic players

in trade negotiations, assuming that jointproposal coming from them may be acceptablefor all other WTO members. Examples of(more or less) representative groups are thepartnership of the US and the EU in issuingjoint proposals (as happened before the Cancúnmeeting), the so-called Quad (Quadrilaterals)with Canada, the EU, Japan, and the US, or themore recent and already mentioned “FiveInterested Parties” (FIP). Other “informal”representative groups are formed by thecountries attending the so-called “mini-ministerial” meetings, where specificnegotiation issues are discussed with the aim offinding a common point of view to bepresented at the plenary sessions.

3) Bargaining coalitions, where a groupof countries forms a preliminary consensus ona common proposal, aiming at increasing theircollective bargaining power. The CairnsGroup, the G-10, the G- 20, the G-33 are allexamples of “bargaining coalitions”, whichsubmit proposals both on specific issues and onthe whole negotiation agenda.

After the Ministerial meeting in Cancún,most observers agreed that developingcountries had played an innovative role incomparison with the Uruguay Round, showing

5 Costantini, Valeria Riccardo Crescenzi “Bargaining coalitions in the agricultural negotiations of the Doha Round:similarity of interests or strategic choices? An empirical assessment”

a greater capacity to coordinate their positions.In particular, a remarkable development hasbeen the rise of a new powerful negotiatingvoice among developing countries with theformation of the G-20, a group centred onBrazil, India, China and South Africa. Thiswas set up just before the Cancún Ministerial,in order to co-ordinate pressure on EU and theUS to reduce their import tariffs, exportsubsidies and domestic support. Moregenerally, in the current agriculturenegotiations one can distinguish between twomain categories of developing countries: thosemore ‘offensive’, looking for gains in theirmarket share and therefore asking forsubstantial trade liberalization; and those more‘defensive’, aiming at keeping some protectionfor their agricultural markets.

Countries with an “offensive” attitudeare, among others, Brazil, Argentina, Chile,Uruguay, Thailand and, more recently,Pakistan. Countries with a defensive attitudeform the majority of the developing world,including India, China, Indonesia (leader ofthe G-33), Philippines, or the Caribbean andCentral American countries. Most of the G-90countries (a grand coalition formed by theAfrican Union, Least Developed Countriesand the African, Caribbean and Pacific block)have defensive interests as well and, except atministerial meetings (Doha and again inCancún), they have functioned as separategroupings in the WTO. Another bargainingcoalition with a mostly defensive attitude is theG-33, consisting mainly of net food-importingdeveloping countries concerned about theprospects of premature liberalisation at home.

In other cases, existing coalitions aremixed groups, bringing together countriesfrom both the defensive and the offensive side.In the case of the G-20, Brazil and India play a

key role in uniting the two traditionallyopposing camps.

Another coalition bringing togetherseemingly heterogeneous countries is theCairns Group. It was set up just before theUruguay Round began in 1986 to exertpressure towards agricultural tradeliberalization. Its members are diverse,including both developed and developingcountries, but share a common objective -agricultural trade liberalization - and thecommon view that they lack the resources tocompete with larger countries in domestic andexport subsidies.

Finally, the countries joining the G-10call for a conservative approach, oriented atmaintaining as much as possible the highprotection of their domestic agriculturalmarkets.

While it may still be felt that progress inthe DDA remains dependent on a broadmeasure of prior agreement between theUnited States and the EU, it is significant thatthe real motor of negotiations has been the so-called New Quad of the US, EU, India, andBrazil, augmented on occasions into the FiveInterested Parties, including Australia. It wasafter all the FIPs who put together the 2004July Framework Agreement that revived theDoha round. And on occasions, the FIPs arefurther augmented into the G6, which includesJapan.

One of the interesting dynamics at HongKong was the extent to which the G20 soughtto find common cause with the G90, infurthering the interests of developingcountries.

This greater complexity and diversity,may have contributed to the stand-offs thatwere seen before and at Hong Kong.

52

The game theory is utilized as analternative for neoclassical methods for themodelling of situations that involve groupinteractions. Game theory is intended forsituations where decision makers are affectedby interactions of others’ behaviour with theirown. Such situations are importantcomponents of international relations, and thusthe field of international relations would seemto be fertile ground for game theoryapplications.

The agricultural sector is one of themain bones of contentions in internationaltrade negotiations, both in multilateral andregional framework. The Uruguay Roundlasted 7 years, mainly because of the difficultyin finding an agreement on agricultural issues.Article 20 of the 1994 URAA provides thebasis for sectoral negotiations on agriculture.Although sectoral negotiations have beenunderway since March 2000, the 2001 DohaMinisterial Declaration incorporated them intoa comprehensive round of multilateral tradenegotiations and set an agreed negotiatingmandate for agriculture.

One of the most comprehensiveapproaches in this field belongs to Abbott andKallio who point out a stylized model of worldwheat trade which is utilized to illustrate underdiffering institutional arrangements (gamestructures) the levels of export subsidies (ortaxes — the strategies), net exports and thepolitical payoffs for four regions (or players):the United States (U.S.), EU, CAIRNS andImporters. If GATT resulted in an EU-UnitedStates cooperative solution, it should not beentirely surprising that export subsidies persistas a vehicle to exercise market power. Thestylized simulations presented in their papershow that the actual GATT outcome, underwhich export subsidies of the United States

and EU were constrained but not eliminated,dominates the outcome (status quo) whenconstraints are not applied, as well as freetrade. The practical dilemma for policy makerswould be, in their view, in setting thoseconstraints in a world in which the impetus forredistribution toward producers is declining.

The same interest for the negotiationsregarding agricultural issues withinGATT/WTO is to be perceived also fromBagwell and Staiger. The authors concentratetheir attention to a different aspect ofinteractions within WTO, i.e. agricultural tradedisputes which are analysed from theperspective of strategic-trade theory. Theauthors sustain the idea that the theoreticalscope for strategic-export policy is wider thancommonly thought, as it extends beyondoligopolistic markets and into competitivemarkets. The authors consider the manner inwhich subsidies are treated in GATT and theWTO ambiguous. They give as exampleGATT Article XVI which states conditionsunder which export subsidies are prohibitedfor industrial products; yet, importantexceptions for primary products such asagricultural goods are allowed, provided thatthe subsidy received does not displace theexports of another member and therebyprovide the recipient with more than anequitable share of world export trade in thatproduct. We are let to believe that thisambiguity led to disputes among WTOmembers. In the process of reducingsubsidising, the U.S. took the position thatagricultural export subsidies should be phasedout. This view was endorsed as well by aconsortium of countries that are strongexporters in agricultural commodities, know asthe Cairns Group. On the other side of thedebate, the EU agreed to a principle ofprogressive reduction in support, but argued

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A game theoretic perspective of multilateral negations in agriculture

against an outright prohibition of exportsubsidies for agricultural products. As well, agroup of African countries those were netimporters of agricultural products were fearfulof the consequences of a reduction inagricultural export subsidies. Though severalprovisions have been made regarding theallowed level of subsidies since the formationof WTO, the process of negotiation is anongoing issue.

Further in the article, the authorssynthesise the main features of agriculturaldisputes. First, the disputants use exportsubsidies in order to compete for third-countryexport markets.

This is seen to be standing in contrast tothe familiar disputes over import tariffs, wherethe discussion centres on competition for thetrading partner’s home market. Second,exporting governments sought to cooperate byagreeing upon a reduction in export subsidiesof agricultural products, although there weredivergent views among GATT members as tothe proper extent of the reduction. Third,unlike many other subsidy disputes (e.g.,commercial aircraft), the agricultural disputeemerges from a market that has competitivecharacteristics. Finally, political-economyissues are of particular relevance, asagricultural subsidies are often attributed topowerful farm lobbies, who in turn argue thatagriculture warrants special support since thiswould promote national self-sufficiency, offsetthe unusual risks (e.g., weather) that farmersface, and preserve the rural way of life.

In another paper (Piermartini and The)there are presented the most important partialequilibrium models which have beendeveloped to simulate international trade

policy changes. These include the AgriculturalTrade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM)developed by UNCTAD, the Static WorldPolicy Simulation Model (SWOPSIM) of theUS Department of Agriculture and theSMART model bundled into the WorldIntegrated Trade Solutions (WITS) system6.

There are at least five sources ofdifferences in the simulation results. Theseinclude the baseline data and level ofprotection, the nature of the models (whetherthey assume only constant returns to scale oralso allow increasing returns to scale), thedepth of liberalization (whether full or onlypartial liberalization), whether the models arestatic or dynamic and the scope ofliberalization (whether services and tradefacilitation are included or not). The study alsoinsists upon the variance in results of thesimulations of trade reform in agriculture.Some papers generate simulations which showwelfare losses from agriculture liberalization.One other paper shows that trade reform canhave quite opposite welfare effects ondeveloped and developing countries. Howeverin three other simulations surveyed in thisstudy, agriculture is the sector where thegreatest welfare gains are derived. Theseresults suggest that differences in assumptionabout market structure and the presence ofscale economies are important in determiningwhether the world gains from liberalization inagriculture or not. Similar to some of theresults of Computable General Equilibrium(CGE) simulations of the Uruguay Round, netfood importing developing countries arevulnerable to a deterioration in the terms oftrade, if food prices rise in world markets asagricultural subsidies are reduced in industrialcountries.

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6 WITS is a software developed by the World Bank, in close collaboration with UNCTAD. WITS provides access tothe major trade and tariffs databases: COMTRADE maintained by the UNSD, TRAINS maintained by UNCTAD andthe IDB and CTS databases maintained by the WTO. WITS is a data consultation and extraction software withsimulation capabilities.

If the number of studies assessing theimpact of different trade policies is impressive,there are also a number of studies concernedwith the limitations of CGE forecasts. Thestudy says that the forecasts of the CGEmodels are much more modest than they werejust a few years ago. The estimated benefits arenot only small in the aggregate, but alsoskewed toward developed countries; theexpected contribution of trade liberalization toeconomic development and poverty alleviationis extremely limited. Related calculations, forthe expected benefits of services liberalization,trade facilitation measures, and long-termproductivity gains from trade liberalization,remain problematical and/or speculative.Regarding the empirical limitations of CGE

forecasts, the study considers that they rest onbroader theoretical weaknesses: despite all itscomplexity, the theoretical apparatus enforcesarbitrary, undesired simplifications, from theesoterica of Armington elasticities and therigidities of static analysis, to the central flawof ignoring employment effects by design.Also, consumer benefits from tariff reductionsare highlighted, while producer impacts oftrade policy are obscured, by the assumptionsmade before the models are built and applied.The author also mentions that the new modelsbuilt on more adequate theories (eg modellingwith variable employment), which have onlybegun to appear, would paint a very differentpicture of the effects of trade liberalization.

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Strategic games of multilateral negotiations for agricultural tradeliberalisation

In most situations of internationalrelations, actors operate in situations ofinterdependence. This is also the case with theprocess of negotiations within WTO. Gametheory provides a comprehensive toolbox thatfacilitates an in-depth exploration of actor’sinteractions. Game theory assumes actors’basic preferences and their strategicenvironment, and then helps us derive howactors rank the various policy options at theirdisposal and allows us to determine the likelyoutcome of the interplay among a variety ofpolicy choices.

A strategic interaction modelled as agame consists of: relevant players, strategies,outcomes and preferences for payoffsassociated with each outcome. The strategiesrepresent the possible courses of action,provided that the behavioural optionsperceived by the players may be plausiblyreduced to cooperation (C) or non-cooperation(D) on a given issue.

The players: {X, Y}

The strategies: S ={C, D}, C –cooperates; D – not cooperate (defect)

The payoff function: ux(Sx,Sy) – thepayoff of player X depends of his strategy butalso of the player’s Y strategy.

A process of exploring the basicsituations of interaction has been developed inthe works of Aggarwal and Allen (AA),Conybeare (C), and Brams and Kilgour (BK).This study uses an adapted model of strategicinteraction for agricultural negotiations. Ageneric two-person, symmetric normal formgame of strategic interaction is presented inFigure 2.

The set of possible outcomes of thegame are given by considering all of thecombinations of strategies that the playerscould choose. Four possible outcomes mayemerge; from the point of view of actor row

they are: CC (mutual consensus); DD (noconsensus); CD (other’s player winning) andDC (winning).

The preference set specifies how goodor bad each outcome is for each player. Theway preferences are deduced is fundamentalfor finding the predicted conclusion of thenegotiations in the form of one of the fourpossible outcomes. General rules are hard tofind, as they usually are acknowledged bysome authors, but discarded by others. Forexample, cardinal scales of measurements arefound more informative, but at the same timelargely irrelevant for game theory applied tointernational relations.

A typically minimal level that couldwarrant a valid definition of the game structureis provided by ordinal measures ofpreferences. Vinod K. Aggarwal, Pierre Allanand Maxwell Cameron, for example, valuedifferent policy formulations of the actors inutility functions, but then convert cardinalpayoffs to ordinal rankings in empiricalanalysis. Utility scales illustrate a preferenceorder for each player, in which the fourpossible outcomes are simply ranked from best(4) to worst (1).

In their studies regarding the manner inwhich the debt between states andinternational banks is rescheduled, Aggarwaland Cameron consider three levels ofinteraction – dependence, independence andinterdependence – and gather each party’sstrategic capabilities in a game theoreticalcontext with the help of three variables:institutional stability, overall power and issuebargaining power. Analysis of these factors isillustrative of the bargaining strength on theissue and helps square the determinants ofstrategic interaction. Cojanu (2005) has shownthat a similar analysis can be applied to theprocess of negotiation among coutries orgroups of countries in specific international

contexts. By combining the three variables,each from a different level, one can buildstrategic 2x2 games and interpret the results byusing the concept of Nash equilibrium.

Many of the different kinds of structuralsituations of conflict and cooperation thatnation-states find themselves in can becaptured by the following set of (2X2) games:PD, Chicken, Stag, Assurance, and Deadlock.Majesky makes a synthetic presentation of thepreference orderings over the four outcomes ofeach game, the Nash equilibria for the fivegames, key differences in the preferenceorderings over outcomes, and actual payoffsused in the simulations analyses.

The following assumptions are madeabout the relationships among each player’spreference order for payoffs under the threesituational variables exposed earlier.Arguments from the literature review shortlyexplain the choice and the approach similarlysuggested by the adopted models is indicatednext. The corresponding structures of strategicinteraction are indicated further in Figures 3and 4.

a) Institutional stability

a1: each player prefers mutualconsensus to no consensus when institutionallystable (CC > DD) AA

a2: each player prefers no consensus tomutual consensus when institutionallyunstable (DD > CC) AA

The quality of institutions at home is agood indicator as regards the states’ propensityto avoid or accept a confrontational stance innegotiation, i.e. allow for the occurrence of‘CC’ vs. ‘DD’. A climate of stability isgenerally thought to provide a larger room formanoeuvre and increase willingness to seekfor mutually advantageous solutions.Institutions do not however provide enough

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information to presume a country’s behaviouras to its capability to prevail over the otherparty’s demands.

b) Overall power

b1: each player prefers no consensus tothe other player’s winning when power strong(DD> CD) AA

b2: each player prefers the otherplayer’s winning to no consensus when powerweak (CD> DD) AA

A purely asymmetric relationshipfavourable to a player results in obviouspreference for escalation of conflict (DD). Astrong position makes available superiorresources to withstand a conflict. On thecontrary, a big degree of dependence makesindulgence (CD) the most reasonable option.A weak player is always supposed to seeconflict as a destructive choice.

c) Issue-area bargaining power

c1: each player always prefers winningwhen issue-strong (DC is best) AA+BK

c2: each player prefers winning to noconsensus or the other’s playing winning whenissue-weak (DC>DD or CD) AA

Prevalence in negotiations, that isreaching an outcome that exactly matches ownagenda, is probably the only commonobjective for both parties irrespective of theirconstraints in issue area. The differenceappears when the issue-strong player plausiblysees no other alternative. For the issue-weakplayer, the preference is more constrained andshould accordingly allow for possible mutuallyadvantageous solutions as the best outcome.

d) Interactive effect of overall powerand issue-area bargaining power

d1: each player prefers winning tomutual consensus when power strong andissue-strong (DC>CC) BK+C

d2: each player prefers the otherplayer’s winning to mutual consensus whenpower weak and issue-weak (CD>CC) C

In contrast with the model of Aggarwaland Allan, which consecrated this approach,Cojanu considered more appropriately to allowfor the combined effect of both general andspecific capabilities to exercise power ininteraction, instead of integrating the effects ofoverall power and stability. The rationalegiven by the author is twofold. First,institutional stability is arguably a moregeneral variable of independent nature. Itsinfluence becomes manifest rather directlythan in combination. Second, exercise ofpower in interaction is better perceivedthrough a doubled influence both at the generaland specific level. In economic terms at least,because of tangled woven of disparateinterests, it would be impractically to discernthe impact from each origin.

A strengthened position in negotiationsprovides incentives to evaluate conflictescalation better even than consensus. Thisposition offers the highest probability to winout the opponent in interaction. Conversely, aweakened situation is presumed to allow forthe lowest level of compromise: accepting theother party’s demands at the expense of theconsensual outcome.

Agricultural Trade Policy SimulationModel (APTSM) is used to estimate thepotential impact of various proposals forreforming the agricultural trade sector,assuming their implementation is asspecified.7 The static, partial-equilibrium,global, agricultural-trade model is able toestimate the economic effects of changes inwithin-quota, applied and out-quota tariffs,

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7 ATPSM Version 3 can be downloaded free of charge from the UNCTAD website at http://www.unctad.org/tab/ andautomatically installed by running the installation program.

import quotas, export subsidies and domesticsupport on production, consumption, prices,trade flows, trade revenues, quota rents,producer and consumer surplus and welfare.

In their paper, Ralf and Vanzetti detailthe use of the model, its characteristics andlimitations. Thus, the model consists of asystem of equations that represent supply,demand and trade flows for differentagricultural goods in different countries. In anattempt to simulate the real world a number ofassumptions are made. The model isdeterministic. There are no stochastic shocksor other uncertainties. It is static. There is nospecific time dimension to the implementationof policy measures or to the maturing of theireconomic effects. Finally, it is a partialequilibrium model. Whereas the model aims atestimating far-reaching details of theagricultural economy, it does not deal with therepercussions of barrier reductions on otherparts of the national economy. Thus, effects onthe industrial and service parts of the economyor the labour market are not subject to analysis.Simplifying the model in these respects allowsa detailed specification of the most relevantagricultural trade policies having computableeconomic effects. Finally, the model accountsfor three different economic agents withineach economy – producers, consumers andgovernment. Therefore, results can bepresented by commodity and by agent for eachcountry, each region or the world.

The present version of the model covers175 countries of which the current 15European Union members form a singleregion. Countries designated here as‘developed’ are defined by the World Bank ashigh-income countries with per capita GNP inexcess of $9,266 (World Bank 2001). Anothergroup is the 49 least-developed countries asdefined by the United Nations. There are 36commodities in the ATPSM data set, coveringmost of the agricultural sector. This includes

many tropical commodities of interest todeveloping countries, although many of thesehave relatively little trade by comparison withsome of the temperate-zone products. The datain the model come from different sources,including AMAD, FAO, OECD, UNComtrade, WTO and UNCTAD. The year2000 represents the base year for the model.

There are various limitations inmodelling trade policy changes andinterpreting the results presented by theauthors. These include modelling preferentialaccess, the lack of knowledge of thedistribution of quota rents, the static nature ofthe model, the absence of adjustment costs,inter-sectoral and macroeconomic effects and,of course, the data quality.

Specific limitations concerning exportsubsidies and credits include data availability,which is discussed above, the difficulty withboth volume and value constraints and thelimitations given that export subsidy rates areused. In ATPSM effectively only valueconstraints and budgetary outlays are used.Quantity commitment levels and the quantityof subsidised exports are available and havebeen used to calculate the export subsidy rates.However, these subsidy rates were thanadjusted to the ATPSM export volumes.

Another limitation is that somecountries that provide export subsidies haveproduction quotas for products they subsidise,for example, beef and dairy products in thecase of the EU. If the quota is binding areduction of export subsidies may not(immediately) lead to reduced exports. Sinceproduction quotas are not taken into account inATPSM any change of export subsidies leadsto changes of the production and exportincentives. Thus, the production and exportlimiting effect of a reduction of exportsubsidies may be overestimated. Finally, the economic impact of export credit

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subsidy elements is different from exportsubsidies. Export subsidies permit exporters tosell products at world prices even if productioncosts are higher. Thus, producers receive thebudgetary outlay. This need not be the casewith export credits, where importers receive at

least parts of the subsidy element. However,since data about the bilateral flows benefitingfrom export credits with a subsidy elementwere not available, export credits were treatedas export subsidies.

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Strategic interactions between EU and USA

Simulations with cardinal payoffs

Cojanu (2005) applied the methodologypreviously described to analyse thenegotiations in the process of the EUenlargement. He has also applied the model toagricultural negotiations, more specifically tothe WTO, the US and EU proposals for theCancun Ministerial Meeting. This subchapterwill present the results of his analysisregarding the agricultural negotiations, whichare further developed. Also, it integrates thecharacteristics of the current status ofnegotiations.

The author constructs strategic games ofmultilateral negotiations relative to agriculturaltrade liberalization. These games involve 2players, the EU and the US, and 2 strategies,‘Agreement’ and ‘Disagreement’ on one offour submitted proposals to reduce support tofarmers and exporters, namely ‘Status Quo(Uruguay Round Agreement)’, ‘Conservativescenario’, ‘Ambitious scenario’, and‘Harbinson scenario’. A more detaileddescription of these scenarios is presented inAnnex B.

The first part of simulation evaluatescardinal payoffs by using a political payofffunction proposed by Abbott and Kallio.

Their model assumes that governmentsset export subsidies to maximize politicalpayoff in a manner corresponding to theagreement in place. The payoff – each player’s

objective in the game – is a weighted sum ofproducer surplus, consumer surplus, andgovernment budgetary expense, lessagricultural support.

Political payoff functions are given bythe absolute gains relative to the base scenario(∆Wi):

∆Wi = γp,i . ∆Sp,i + γc,i . ∆Sc.i – (∆Subi + ∆Ai),i ={1,2}

Where player 1 is the European Union(EU); player 2 is the United States of America(US); γp,i, γc,i, γg,i are welfare weights whichgovernments assign to groups of producers,consumers, and own expenses, respectively;Sp,i, Sc,i are producer surplus and consumersurplus for player i, respectively; Subi, Ai areforms of government support, i.e. exportsubsidies and domestic direct aid, respectively.The weights coefficients are suggested byAbbott and Kallio as γp,1, = 1,30; γp,2, = 1,15;γc,1, = 0,90; γc,2, = 0,85 and γg,i = 1 (the numeraire)for government budget expense. When welfareweights equal one it is assumed that incomeredistribution is not a policy goal.

The forms of government support to beconsidered are constrained by the availabledatabase. This simulation uses the levels ofsubsidies and domestic aid found in theUNCTAD database. These amounts have to bemodified during the game according withspecific variations each scenario proposes.

The strategic interactions among playersgive rise to differing payoffs depending uponopponents’ strategies. The computations aremade with the help of Agricultural TradePolicy Simulation Model – ATPSM, static,deterministic, partial-equilibrium model,which has been developed by UNCTAD in1988 and applied since to multilateral tradenegotiations.

ATPSM estimates economic indicatorslike demand, supply, and trade flows forvarious commodities and countries, and thenpresents projects for the results of negotiationsaccording to the assumptions made oncountries’ commercial policies. It makes thuspossible to estimate by incorporating in thepayoff function the necessary data forconsumer surplus, produces surplus, andagricultural support under the four scenarios.The results are presented in Table 2.

If both players disagree on a givenscenario, the interaction leads to the failure ofnegotiations and to the implementation of thecurrent Uruguay Round provisions (StatusQuo). Likewise, a negotiating partner’s soleagreement means that it unilaterally liberalizestrade on the proposed scenario’s terms, whilethe other party sticks to the currently agreedmultilateral solution (Status Quo). That leavesthree strategic games that correspond to threescenarios proposed with a view to helping thenegotiations during the Doha Round makeprogress. These games are represented inFigure 5.

The simulations predict that thenegotiations are blocked by disagreementseither from both parties, or only from the EUside in all foreseeable scenarios. Equilibriumis stable as the parties choose their dominantstrategies in all games they play. The resultsare a good representation of the actualnegotiations: after deciding on an impressiveschedule to finish the negotiations by the end

of 2004, the parties find themselvesdeadlocked in pros and cons of liberalizationmeasures and unable to reach a compromise.

An interesting part of these games is thatno party sees any feasible incentive to departfrom the existing equilibrium without leavingthe partner in a worse condition. In otherwords, there is no predictable chance that themultilateral negotiations are to concludesuccessful given the negotiating scenarios.

Another point worth mentioning is thatthe payoff estimation takes into accountsignificantly large discrepancies between theparameters relative to reductions of exportsubsidies and domestic aid, which range fromcomplete elimination (‘ambitious’) to more orless moderate decreases of 45% and 55%, or70% and 20%, respectively. Althoughacceptable in the terms of ATPSM, it would beeconomically meaningless, as thismethodological stance persuasively implies, tosearch for those estimates – of tariffreductions, welfare effects and so on – whichcould make parties agree. It is the analysis ofnegotiations that should tell what the numbersare and not the other way round.

Three scenarios following the proposalssubmitted at the Hong Kong ministerialmeeting

In this part of the paper, we will developthe game-theoretic analysis of agriculturalpolicies by analysing the proposals submittedat the Hong Kong ministerial meeting. TheHong Kong Ministerial has paved the waytowards a completion of the DohaDevelopment Round, even if numeroustechnicalities concerning the implementationof the formulas and liberalisation of trade inservices remain to be further negotiated.

The four major DDA negotiatingproposals for agricultural modalities were

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from the United States, EU, G-20, and the G-10. These negotiating proposals revealed thatwide differences exist, especially between theUnited States and the EU, in the modalitiesproposed for market access, the most difficultissue encountered by negotiators.

As the G-10 has tabled proposals onlyon market access and domestic support (not onexport competition), three scenarios have beendeveloped based on the three proposalssubmitted by the US, EU and G-20. The maincharacteristics of the scenarios and the resultsof the simulations led with the ATPSM modelare described in Annex B.

However, we have to mention from thebeginning that the initial proposals comprisemany elements and not all of them can becaptured within ATPSM. For example the EUproposal comprises flexibility for tariffreductions so long as the average is 46 percent. Impacts of the three proposals areassessed in terms of prices, government andexport revenue effects and national welfare.The annex A presents synthetically the valuesof the consumer surplus and producer surpluswhich are used in the payoff assessments ofthe two players – EU and the US. Thesesimulations use the same model of Abbot andKallio as those of Cojanu. Nevertheless, thedata have been updated for the agriculturalsupport by using the database of the presentmodel of ATPSM (January 2005) and havebeen simulated with this version of theATPSM the status-quo scenario. Also, in allscenarios export subsidies in agriculture arecompletely eliminated, taking into account the2013 deadline agreed in Hong Kong inDecember 2005.

The payoffs thus obtained were used toconstruct three strategic games that correspondto the three scenarios previously proposed.These games are represented in Annex B.

One can observe that all games haveequilibrium in the situation in which bothplayers disagree and thus refuse liberalising.This situation corresponds to the actual state ofnegotiations at Hong Kong. The United Statesmay hold the key to achieving a global tradeaccord but appears unwilling to makeconcessions, amid pressure from scepticallawmakers and powerful farm lobbies. At thesame time, the offer of the European Union(EU), which spends twice as much as theUnited States on domestic support andimposes average agricultural tariffs more thantwice as high, provides no real new access toits markets. The results reminds that thisnegotiation process involves parties havingvery different interests in the Round; one couldwell question, if one considers not only EUand the US, but also the other participants inthe negotiations, whether certain parties, suchas small and highly specialised developingeconomies having to cope with the erosion oftheir preferences, have any incentive to see thisRound completed.

Although there was a Hong Kongagreement concluded which set new deadlinesfor completing the Round in 2006, limitedprogress was made in reaching agreement onprecise numerical formulas or targets(modalities) for liberalizing agricultural trade,the original aim of the Hong Kong Ministerial.This progress notwithstanding, the overallresult left an enormous amount of work still todo. In agriculture, the so-called coremodalities, the formulas for cutting tariffs andsubsidies, were thus left unresolved.

Under the agreement, modalities forcutting tariffs on agricultural products,eliminating export subsidies, and cutting trade-distorting domestic support were to be agreedto by April 30, 2006. Based on thesemodalities, member countries would thensubmit comprehensive draft schedules by July31, 2006.

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At present, this deadline has passedwithout an agreement to be reached.

Ministers and heads of delegations metin Geneva from 28 June to 2 July 2006 forintensive negotiations on template agreements,known as “modalities”, for trade in agricultureand industrial products. Although draft texts ofthe agreements have been circulated to themembers, these still contained large voidswhere members have failed to findcompromises.

Key WTO members, known as the G6and including Brazil and India (representingthe G20 group of developing countries), theEuropean Union, the United States, Australia(representing the Cairns group of agriculturalexporters) and Japan (representing the G10group of net agricultural importers) met on thatoccasion for consultations on trade in farm andmanufactured goods, but no real progress wasmade in narrowing their differences. Therewas no progress achieved in the other areasand the latest round of world trade talks inGeneva has thus ended without agreement. Inview of this collapse of negotiations, the targetof December 2006 for completion of DohaRound seems even more difficult to beattained.

Simulations with ordinal payoffs

The second part of simulation bringsinto discussion that kind of elements ofnegotiations’ ‘contextual detail’. For thepurpose of the current topic, one may consider,for instance, motivations to resume talks aftera long impasse; political influences each partyhas to face at home; or the balance of poweramong the negotiating actors.

Using the original model of three-levelinteraction proposed by Aggarwal and Allan, itis estimated an order of preference relative tothe four possible outcomes depending on how

parties decide to mutually or unilaterally agreeor disagree. Because both the EU and the USoccupy dominant positions in the world tradewith agricultural products, the overall power –the interaction level of dependence – isevaluated to be ‘strong’ for both players.Evaluations of the other two conditions of play– ‘issue bargaining power’ and ‘coalitionalstability’ – corresponding to the interactionlevels of interdependence and independence,respectively, are suggested by the proceeds ofnegotiations.

There are four situations in which theplayers can find themselves:

– IS1 (individual situation1): powerstrong, issue bargaining power strong,coalitional stability

– IS2: Power strong, issue bargainingpower strong, unstable coalition

– IS3: Power strong, issue bargainingpower weak, coalitional stability

– IS4: Power strong, issue bargainingpower weak, unstable coalition

The representation of the games is givenin Figure 6.

The variant (a) of the game is suggestiveof the conditions of play at the start ofnegotiations (both players in IS 1). Both theEU and the US came to negotiations on strongfootholds, committed to individually reasonedyet conflicting proposals. Their representativessubmitted for discussion opinions of almostexclusively domestic interest with only scantregard to other WTO members’ objectives.The interaction leads to a PD game, in whichthe parties try to dominate the game andconsequently choose the second-to-bestoutcome not to cooperate.

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Both the subsequent mediation withinthe WTO and the more assertive negotiationpositions of the other parties however changedthe character of the game. Several net-importing countries like Japan, Norway,Switzerland, and some African countriesjoined the EU in an effort to temper theliberalization zest and thus to keep theinternational price at low levels. On the otherside, the US enjoyed the support from severaldeveloping countries, especially thoseassembled in the CAIRNS group, to pushfurther on the reductions in agriculturalsupport agreed at the Uruguay Round.

The resulting game is one in which thetwo parties continue to play ‘strong’, bothoverall and in issue area, but nevertheless haveto contemplate frail, accidentally formedcoalitions coalesced around their exposedinterests (IS2). The interaction is captioned byvariant (b) of the game. This Deadlock gamestill does not make the players escape from thecontinued impasse, but, in contrast to a PDgame, leaves them no alternative for amutually improved outcome.

The Doha Round with its ambitiousschedule put much pressure on the negotiatingparties to speed up the liberalization process.The parties were forced to make theirproposals more coherent and credible. Thecoalitions became more stable, but anothernoteworthy side effect was that the twoprotagonists diminished visibly their statureduring negotiations. The coalitional forceplayed therein a role too, although theincreasingly constrained agenda settingprobably explains most of the turn of the event.

A new interaction is depicted in variant(c) a Stag Hunt game. The two players have torecognize the benefits of cooperation in orderto reach a stable equilibrium of ‘agreement’ orotherwise prolong the impasse (SI3). Thisprediction provides a better description of the

negotiations than the representation based onpayoff functions. Indeed, the parties succeededin finding ways to a compromise, whichmaterialized in a document, sketched duringthe Cancun ministerial meeting in September2003. Although the compromise does notdepart significantly from the initial positions,the result is remarkably significant from thepoint of view of the analysis. The predictionconfidently emphasizes an equilibriumcontinuum between ‘agreement’ and‘disagreement’, which in fact is a perfectmatch with the state of affairs at the time.

A more developed analysis of thestrategic interactions with ordinal payoffs

The compromise of the two majorplayers represented a point of departure inelaborating the draft of the Cancun document.However, none of the proposals obtained theapproval of the majority of participants at thenegotiations. Thus, the negotiations did notmaterialise in a detailed agreement. As it hasbeen noticed, the game based on the order ofpreferences for the four possible outcomesexplains the most important aspects, theinfluential factors, the way coalitions wereformed and interacted having the EU and theUSA as leaders of the negotiations’ process.For the current status of negotiations, thissection describes the following plausiblesituations in which the two players can foundthemselves at the present time, together withthe coalitions formed around them.

One may consider the US to be currentlyin SI3. A weak issue bargaining power can beplausible if one interprets it as the USAdecision to diminish its direct involvementregarding the problem of reducing commercialbarriers by taking into account the increase inprice levels which would affect the greatmajority of consumers.

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However, one can also consider thesituation of the USA as characterised by astrong overall power, a strong issue bargainingpower and a stable coalition (SI1). Much ofU.S. agriculture would be expected to benefitfrom further multilateral trade liberalization.Benefits to the U.S. agriculture could includeincreased market access through tariffreduction or expanded market access quotas,not only in developed but also in the fast-growing developing country markets.Competitive conditions for U.S. agriculturalexports could be improved with theelimination of export subsidies, especially vis-à-vis the EU, which accounts for about 90% ofthe world’s agricultural export subsidies. Thus,the USA capacity of production and itscompetitive structure guarantee for thebargaining power of the USA empowered alsoby its economic and military power.

Actually, the U.S. proposal in October2005 appeared to break negotiations log-jamas it was followed closely in mid-October byseparate proposals for agricultural modalitiesfrom three other major negotiating participants— the EU, the G-20 developing countries, andthe G-10. The coalition formed around the U.Sappears to be stable. The United States, the G-20, and members of the CAIRNS group calledat the Honk Kong ministerial meeting for theEU to improve and resubmit its offer onmarket access as they claim it is not asextensive as current reform proposals fordomestic support and export competition, andthus provides insufficient bargaining room. Asresponse, the EU (with at least partial backingfrom the G-10 and India) claims that it isunable to improve its market access offerwithout some formal proposals from othercountries on reform in the non-agriculturaltrade sectors — primarily services andindustrial goods. One can consider thepossibility of instability of coalition ratherdiminished, thus the transition to SI2 ratherimprobable.

As regards EU, one can consider that atpresent, it is in SI3 due to the WTO and thedeveloping countries pressures, countrieswhich try to enter the protected markets. Also,the countries which joined recently the EUhave difficulties in maintaining such a highlevel of subsidies and tend to be confrontedwith an increase of their agricultural importsrather than an increase of their exports.

At the same time, one can noticedifferences of interests within EU. France andEngland sustain the competitiveness of theiragricultural products through high subsidieswhich burden the budget of the EU and hurtindirectly the consumers through the taxes.Thus, the coalitional stability is rather fragile.Once the WTO will propose a plan in favour ofthe developing countries – net importers of theagricultural products, the cohesion of thecoalition may diminish. Thus, the situation ofthe EU may develop to SI4.

The EU made a new market accessproposal at the Honk Kong ministerial meetingon October 27, 2005 and provided additionaldetails on its proposal for domestic support,export competition, and GeographicalIndications (GIs). The EU’s “level ofambition” in market access does not reach thatof the G-20 or the United States. A majorcriticism of the EU’s agricultural proposal isthat its market access offer does not provide aninducement for developing countries likeBrazil, Thailand, or other G-20 members tomake concessions in non-agricultural marketaccess or services. The United States and G-20countries continue to pressure the EU to offerfurther concessions on agricultural marketaccess.

The possible combinations between thecharacteristics of the bargaining power of thetwo players are presented in Annex B, thechoice between the different optionsdepending on each individual situation.

64

One can interpret the results of thegames as follows: as long as the two powerswill find themselves in IS3-IS3, it is highlyprobable to wish to cooperate and prefer acompromise in order to reach an agreement. IfEU passes in I4 will cooperate but with asmaller preference for it and USA will be most

in favour in reaching an agreement. If USAstrengthens its position and will negotiate fromIS1, we may consider highly plausible theblocking of negotiations as EU will notsurrender to the pressures and will try first tostabilize the coalition.

65

Conclusions

The agricultural negotiations present ahighly interactive setting, rich of contextualdetail, which requires an appropriate method toreveal strategic behaviour given the partner’sconstrained preferences. The stakes in theconstructed games are engendered from threesignificant levels of interaction – dependence,independence and interdependence- fromwhich originates as many determinants ofdecisions to cooperate or not to cooperatewithin a range of possible concessions.

Limitations to the analysis should bekept in mind. The conclusions are based on thesimulation of several proposals for anagreement on agriculture. However, not allelements of the proposals could be capturedadequately. Also, data quality is an issue,especially when considering the results for aparticular country or sector. One can alsoconsider a limitation the fact that theconstructed games had only two players, amore realistic approach being the constructionof strategic interactions between multipleplayers. Moreover, the actual pursue ofnegotiations involve more than two strategicoptions. The issue of multiple levels ofinteraction should also strengthen the validityof conclusions.

However, given the simplified nature ofthe 2x2 games, the results prove to besatisfactorily consistent with the conduct andresults of negotiations. The different strategicstructures of interaction are illustrative of theplayers’ constrained behaviour. The perceptionof rivalry and cooperation deduced from thereal background of negotiations directed to apredictable order of preferences and hence toframe a game-theoretical based context ofinteraction. The two players reach either fixedno-consensus equilibrium or give wayreciprocally to non-cooperative behaviour.

Thus the game theoretical perspectivecan offer valuable insights on the waycountries conduct negotiations at internationallevel. There is no doubt that the model used inthis paper rests subject to observations offuture research which can strengthen orweaken the conclusions already reached.However, this study shows beyond doubt itssuitability to cases of multiple-negotiableissues and highly interactive contextsinvolving two partners, which may or may notlead to a consensus.

References

Abbott C.Philllip and Panu K.S. Kallio, “Implications of Game Theory for InternationalAgricultural Trade” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, August 1996

Aggarwal K.Vinod and Cedric Dupont, “Goods, games and institutions” International PoliticalScience Review, vol.20, no.4, 393-409

Bagwell Kyle and Robert W.Staiger, “Strategic trade, competitive industries and agriculturaltrade disputes” Economics and Politics, vol.13, July 2001

Costantini, Valeria Riccardo Crescenzi “Bargaining coalitions in the agricultural negotiations ofthe Doha Round: similarity of interests or strategic choices? An empirical assessment” Paperpresented at the IATRC (International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium) Spain June19th-21st 2005

Cojanu, Valentin, The integration game. Strategic Interaction in the Process of the EUEnlargement, Bucharest: Economica, 2005

Hertel, Thomas Hummels, David Ivanic, Maros Keeney Roman “How confident can we be inCGE-based assessments?” GTAP Working Paper no.26, March 2004

Majeski Stephen and Shane Fricks “Conflict and cooperation in International Relations”, Journalof Conflict Resolution, vol.39, Dec.1995

Milner, Helen and B. Peter Rosendorff “International trade and domestic politics: the domesticsources of international trade agreements and institutions”, University of Pennsylvania

Pahre, Robert and Paul Papayaonou “Using Game Theory to link domestic and internationalpolitics”, Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 41 Feb.1997

Peters Ralf H. and David Vanzetti, “Shifting sands: searching for a compromise in the WTOnegotiations on agriculture” Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study SeriesNo.23

Piermartini, Roberta The, Robert “Demystifying Modelling Methods for trade policy” WTO’sDiscussion paper no.10 2005

“WTO Doha Round: Agricultural negotiating proposals” CRS Report for Congress, November2005

66

Annex A

Figure 1

67

Table 1 Major Players in the WTO DDA Negotiations

68

69

Player B

Cooperate (C) Defect (D)

Cooperate (C)

Mutual consensus

(MC) in issue area

B prevails (BP) in issue

area

Player A

Defect (D)

B prevails BP) in

issue area

No consensus (NC) in

issue area

Figure 3 Deduced constrained preference order from row’s perspective (for column, DC is replaced

by CD and conversely)

Institutional stability

Stable Unstable

Issue resources

and overall power

a1: CC>DD a2: DD>CC

Issue strong

c1: DC is best

Power weak

b2: CD>DD

CD

DC> or > DD

CC

"Chicken" or "Leader"

DC>CD>DD>CC

"Hero"

Issue weak

c2: DC>DD or CD

Power strong

b1: DD>CD

DC

or >DD>CD

CC

"Prisoner’s Dilemma" or

"Stag Hunt"

CC

DC>DD> or

CD

"Deadlock" or "Deadlock

analogue"

Issue strong and

Power strong

d1: DC>CC

c1: DC is best

b1: DD>CD

DC>CC>DD>CD

"Prisoner’s Dilemma"

CD

DC>DD> or

CC

"Deadlock" or "Deadlock

analogue"

Issue weak and

Power weak

d2: CD>CC

c2: DC>DD or CD

b2: CD>DD

DC>CD>CC>DD

"Leader"

DC>CD>DD>CC

"Hero"

Figure 2 A generic game of strategic interaction

70

Issue resources &

overall power

Institutional stability

Stable Unstable

Issue strong &

Power weak

Chicken

3,3 2,4

4,2 1,1

Leader

2,2 3,4

4,3 1,1

Hero

1,1 3,4

4,3 2,2

Issue weak &

Power strong

Prisoner’s dilemma

3,3 1,4

4,1 2,2

Stag Hunt

4,4 1,3

3,1 2,2

Deadlock

2,2 1,4

4,1 3,3

Deadlock analogue

1,1 2,4

4,2 3,3

Issue strong &

Power strong

Prisoner’s dilemma

3,3 1,4

4,1 2,2

Deadlock

2,2 1,4

4,1 3,3

Deadlock analogue

1,1 2,4

4,2 3,3

Issue weak&

Power strong

Leader

2,2 3,4

4,3 1,1

Hero

1,1 3,4

4,3 2,2

Figure 4 Symmetric ordinal games

71

Table 2 Estimations of payoffs with Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM)

W� 1 W� 2

Results of multilateral negotiations

Status Quo (Uruguay Round Agreement) -2.8 +1.9

Conservative scenario -3.3 +2.4

Ambitious scenario -5.0 +6.6

Harbinson scenario -7.5 +2.8

Results of EU unilateral negotiations,

While the US sticks to status-quo




W� 1 W� 2

Results of US unilateral negotiations,

While the EU sticks to status-quo




Explanatory note: Data are expressed in USD billions.

Figure 5 Simulation of multilateral strategic negotiations in agricultural trade with cardinal payoffs

a) Conservative scenario

Player 2: US

Agreement Disagreement

Agreement -3.3; +2.4 -3.5; +2.1

Player 1: EU

Disagreement -2.8; +2.1 -2.8; +1.9

b) Ambitious scenario

Player 2: US


Agreement -5.0; +6.6 -7.5; +3.8

Player 1: EU

Disagreement -2.4; +2.2 -2.8; +1.9

72

c) Harbinson scenario

Player 2: US


Agreement -7.5; +2.8 -7.2; +3.5

Player 1: EU

Disagreement -2.1; +1.5 -2.8; +1.9

Figure 6 Simulation of multilateral strategic negotiations in agricultural trade with ordinal payoffs

a) A PD Game

Player 2: US


Agreement 3 , 3 1 , 4

Player 1: EU

Disagreement 4 , 1 2 , 2

b) A Deadlock Game

Player 2: US



Player 1: EU


c) A Stag Hunt Game

Player 2: US



Player 1: EU


Alternative liberalization scenarios8

Ambitious A reduction in applied out-quota tariffs according to the Swiss formulat1=(t0*25)/(t0+25), elimination of in-quotatariffs, a 20% expansion of import quotas,elimination of domestic support and exportsubsidies in all countries and all commodities.

Conservative A reduction in bound out-quota tariffs of the 10% most sensitiveproducts of 15%, a 44.1% reduction ofremaining products, a 55% reduction indomestic support and 45% reduction of exportsubsidy equivalent in developed countries withtwo-thirds of these cuts in developingcountries. No reductions in least-developedcountries.

Cancún Developed countries: 40% oftariff lines are subject to the Uruguay Roundformula, where bound out-quota tariffs of thefour most sensitive products are reduced by15% and the next 10 most sensitive productsby 44.4% (average 36%), 40% of tariff linesare subject to the Swiss formula with acoefficient of 25, 20% of tariff lines with thelowest initial bound values are reduced to zero;export subsidies are reduced by 80% anddomestic support by 60%. Developing

countries: 10% most sensitive tariff lines arereduced by 5% (Special Products), next 40%most sensitive products are subject to UruguayRound formula, where bound out-quota tariffsof the 4 most sensitive products are reduced by10% and the next 10 most sensitive productsby 26.7% (average of last two categories24%), 40% of tariff lines are subject to theSwiss formula with a coefficient of 50, whilethe remaining 10% are reduced to 5%; exportsubsidies are reduced by 70%, domesticsupport reduced by 20%. Least-developedcountries: no reductions.

Harbinson A reduction in bound out-quota tariffs of 60% where the initial tariff ishigher than 90%, 50% (initial tariff between 15and 90), or 40% (initial tariff smaller than 15);an 80% reduction in export subsidies; and a60% reduction of domestic support indeveloped countries. In developing countries:a 40% reduction where the initial tariff arehigher than 120%, 35% (initial tariff between60 and 120), 30% (initial tariff between 20 and60) and 25% (initial tariff smaller than 20); a70% reduction of export subsidies; and a 20%reduction of domestic support; a 20%expansion of import quotas in developed anddeveloping countries. No changes in least-developed countries.

73

8 Data available in Ralf Peters and David Vanzetti “Shifting sands: searching for a compromise in the WTOnegotiations on agriculture”

Annex B

Scenario 1

Out of quota tariff Export subsidy Domestic support Applied or bound

rate

USA + Japon 75 100 53 Bound

EU 75 100 75 Bound

Rest of developed

countries

75 100 31 Bound

Dving countries 55 100 14 Bound

( the numerical values represent the pourcentage of cuts operated to the specified factors)

Results of simulations with ATPSM

74

Results of simulation

EU USA

Consumer surplus 29,3207 0,0252

Producer surplus -49,1453 -1,1851

W -36,467 -1,13378

(Explanatory note: Data are expressed in USD billions – they reflect multilateral negotiations)

In order to obtain the payoff, we have used the same methodology as presented previously.

Payoff:

EU= =1,3*(-49,14)+0,9*29,32+1,027= -36,467

US= 1,15*(-1,18)+0,85*0,0252+0,2018= -1,13378

Results of EU unilateral negotiations, while the US sticks to status-quo

UE SUA

Consumer surplus 41.6247 -1.7179

Producer surplus -56,3527 1.8216

W -34,7693 0,708745

(Data are expressed in USD billions – they reflect unilateral negotiations)

Results of US unilateral negotiations, while the EU sticks to status-quo

UE SUA



W -9,47214 -2,4765

( Data are expressed in USD billions – they reflect unilateral negotiations)

Scenario 2


rate

USA 46 100 60 Bound

EU 46 100 70 Bound

Rest of developed

countries

46 100 50 Bound

DVG countries 35 100 14 Bound


EU USA

Consumer surplus 28,5737 -0,4124


W -33,062 -2,24227

(Data are expressed in USD billions – they reflect multilateral negotiations)

75


EU USA


Producer surplus 29,73255593 -1,00151865

W -33,3966 0,35755



EU USA



W -9,71973 -3,01914

(Data are expressed in USD billions – they reflect unilateral negotiations)

Scenario 3


rate

EU+ Japon 54 100 80 Bound

USA 54 100 75 Bound

Rest of dvd

countries

54 100 70 Bound

DVG countries 45 100 14 Bound


EU USA



W -36,0806 -2,4764

(Data are expressed in USD billions – they reflect multilateral negotiations)


EU USA


Producer surplus -50,9270 2,3238

W -36,67 0,9769


76


EU USA



W -9,66299 -3,9601


Estimations of payoffs with Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM)

W� 1 W� 2

Results of multilateral negotiations

Status Quo -9,3262 -0,1992

W� 1 W� 2

Scenario 1 -36,467 -1,1337

Scenario 2 -33,062 -2,2422

Scenario 3 -36,0806 -2,4764

Results of EU unilateral negotiations,

While the US sticks to status-quo

Scenario 1 -34,7693 0,7087

Scenario 2 -33,3966 0,3575

Scenario 3 -36,67 0,9769

Results of US unilateral negotiations,

While the EU sticks to status-quo

Scenario 1 -9,4721 -2,4765

Scenario 2 -9,7197 -3,0191

Scenario 3 -9,6629 -3,96005

Explanatory note: Data are expressed in USD billions.

77

Simulation of multilateral strategic negotiations in agricultural trade with cardinal payoffs

Scenario 1

Player 2: US


Agreement -36,47 ; -1,13 -34,77; 0,71

Player 1: EU

Disagreement -9,47; -2,48 -9,32; -0,20

Scenario 2

Player 2: US


Agreement

-33,06; -2,24 -33,40; -2,48

Player 1: EU

Disagreement -9,72; -3,02 -9,32; -0,20

Scenario 3

Player 2: US


Agreement -36,08; -2,48 -36,67; 0,98

Player 1: EU

Disagreement -9,66; -3,96 -9,32; -0,20

Simulation of multilateral strategic negotiations in agricultural trade with ordinal payoffs

78

Player 2

USA

(2; 1) (1; 4) Player 1

EU (4; 2) (3; 3)

EU- IS 3; USA- IS 1

EU-IS4,USA-IS2

Or

Player 2

USA

(4; 3) (1; 4) Player 1

EU (3; 1) (2; 2)

Player 2

USA

(4; 1) (1; 4) Player 1

EU (3; 2) (2; 3)

Player 2

USA

(4; 2) (1; 4) Player 1

EU (3; 1) (2; 3)

Player 2

USA

(4; 1) (1; 4) Player 1

EU (3; 2) (2; 3)

2)

1)

EU- SI 4; USA- IS 1

or

EU- IS 3; USA- IS 2

Or

Player 2

USA

(2; 3) (1; 4) Player 1

EU (4; 1) (3; 2)

Player 2

USA

(1; 3) (2; 4) Player 1

EU (4; 1) (3; 2)

Player 2

USA

(2; 2) (1; 4) Player 1

EU (4; 1) (3; 3)

79

Or

EU-IS3; USA-IS3

Player 2

USA

(1; 2) (2; 4) Player 1

EU (4; 1) (3; 3)

Player 2

USA

(4; 4) (1; 3) Player 1

EU (3; 1) (2; 2)

Or

Player 2

USA

(1; 1) (2; 4) Player 1

EU (4; 2) (3; 3)

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