bariere ce duc la creșterea deficitelor

8/12/2019 bariere ce duc la creterea deficitelor

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Fundamentarea teoretic a unor bariere deordin politic, instituional i social care duc la

creterea deficitelor bugetare

The theoretical substantiation of certain political,institutional and social bottlenecks that increase budget

deficits

Svetlana Dodon drd., INCE Svetlana Dodon PhD student, NIER

n articolul dat evideniaz cauzele de ordinpolitic, instituional i social a existenei deficitelor actuale n cretere, ns mai nainte de toate se vaprezentat teoria uniformizrii fiscale i modalitile deaplicare a acesteia.

Actualitatea echilibrului bugetar este caniciodat evident n perioada actual deaceea estedeosebit de important de a eviden ia factorii care impiedic realizarea acestuia i duc la nregistrarea deficitului. Mai os vor fi prezentate doar unele aspectepolitico!institu ionale care contribuie la cre terea deficitelor.

Cuvinte cheie: uniformizarea fiscal, instituiibugetare, teoria alegerii publice, deficit.

"his article highlights the political, institutional andsocial causes of rising of current deficits, but first of all #illbe presented uniform tax theor$ and methods of itsapplication.

%mportance of budgetar$ balance is as never obvious inspecial no# so it is particularl$ important to highlight factorsthat hinder its performance and lead to deficits. &elo# arelisted ust some of politico!institutional aspects thatcontribute to rising of deficits.

Key words: tax smoothing theory, budgetar$ institutions,public choice theor$, deficit.

Jel Classification: I !, "#$, "%,"%%,"!&

ncepem cu o revizuire a teoriei "uniformizriifiscale" (tax smoothing theory) a bugetului de statexplicat n lucrrile !arro, ucas #i $to%ey&',. n fapt,de cele mai recente modele politice sunt explicaii"pozitive" observate a abaterilor de la teoria uniformizriifiscale. *ai mult, susintorii acestei teorii o vizualiza nunumai ca fiind "normativ", dar, de asemenea, ca"pozitiv", fiind o descriere a politicii fiscale actuale.

+eoria "uniformizrii fiscale" a bugetului de stat,consider o economie nchis, fr de capital, n care unagent reprezentativ consum, lucreaz #i economise#te.uvernul este un "-lanificator social binevoitor", caremaximizeaz utilitatea agentului reprezentativ. t/tagentul reprezentativ ct #i guvernul au acela#i orizont detimp, care, pentru simplitate este infinit. +eoria faceabstracie de la aspectele intergeneraionale #i de latermeni finii ai biroului de guvernare.

uvernul trebuie s finaneze o anumit cantitatea cheltuielilor n fiecare perioad prin intermediulimpozitelor pe venit asupra forei de munc, care suntdistorsionate, deoarece acestea afecteaz oferta de munc.

0uncia de utilitate a agentului representativdepinde de consumul privat #i petrecere a timpului liber,dar nu de cantitatea a bunurilor publice, pe care, pentrusimplitate. 1ezultatul decisiv const n ideea c

planificatorul social ar trebui s in constant rata deimpozitare. 2ivelul impozitelor este determinat deconstr/ngerea bugetar intertemporal, ceea ce nseamnc valoarea actualizat a cheltuielilor (care se d exogen)trebuie s fie egal cu valoarea actual a impozitelor. -rin

3e begin 4ith a revie4 of the theory of "fiscaluniformity" (tax smoothing theory) $tate budget explained inthe 4or%s of !arro, ucas and $to%ey &',. 5n fact, the latest

political models are "positive" explanations of observeddeviations from the theory fiscal uniformity. *oreover,

proponents of this theory vie4 it not only as "normative" butalso as "positive" being a description of the current fiscal

policy.+he state budget6s 7tax smoothing8 theory, considers

a closed economy 4ithout capital, in 4hich a representativeagent consumes, 4or%s and saves. overnment is a"benevolent social planner" 4ho maximizes utility ofrepresentative agent. !oth the representative agent as 4ell asgovernment has the same time horizon, 4hich for simplicity isinfinite. +heory ignores the intergenerational aspects andfinite term of the government in office.

overnment should fund a certain amount ofexpenditures in each period through taxes on labor income,4hich are distorted because they affect labor supply.

1epresentative agent utility function depends on

private consumption and leisure, but not of amount of publicgoods, 4hich, for simplicity, is defining as "defenseexpenditure." 9ecisive result lies in the idea that the social

planner should %eep constant tax rate. +ax level is determinedby the intertemporal budget constraint, 4hich means that thepresent value of costs (4hich is given exogenously) must bee:ual to the present value of taxes. ;ence, budget deficits andsurpluses are used as a buffer, deficits occur 4hen expensesare temporarily high and surpluses 4hen they are lo4. +hese

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urmare, deficitele bugetare #i excedentele sunt folosite caun amortizator, deficite apar atunci c/nd cheltuielile sunttemporar ridicate #i surplusuri, atunci c/nd acestea suntsczute. ceste rezultate urmeaz direct din concavitateafunciei a utilitii individuale.

< politic a bugetului echilibrat implic rate

ridicate a impozitelor azi #i rate impozitare sczute m/ine. -olitica uniformizrii fiscale, n schimb, prevederatele constante a impozitelor, un deficit azi #i un surplusm/ine, care (din punct de vedere al valorii actualizate)compenseaz deficitul din perioada actual. =ea de adoua politic predomin deoarece distorsiunile fiscalesuplimentare din perioada actual mai mult dec/tcompenseaz (n termeni de utilitate) c/#tigurile

bunstrii agonisite de pe urma ratelor impozitare maimici din perioada viitoare, din motivul scderii utilitimarginale. cest principiu simplu are n mare msurimplicaii largi asupra politicii fiscale, care suntevideniate n descrierea a c/torva cazuri exemplificatemai >os. $ presupunem c cheltuielile guvernamentalesunt constante, de?a lungul orizontului planificat. -oliticaoptim atunci ar prevedea un buget echilibrat n fiecare

perioad. 5ar dac la timpul n cheltuielile guvernamentalenea#teptat se mresc pentru totdeauna atunci politicaoptim implic un buget echilibrat n fiecare perioad cuo cre#tere permanent a impozitelor la momentul n. $ presupunem c de la perioada zero la perioadan cheltuielile guvernamentale sunt constante, #i se a#tepts fie mereu constante. n perioada n are loc nea#teptat"un #oc economic (rzboi, criza))", iar "#ocul" estecunoscut s dureze p/n la perioada (n @ m). -olitica

optim n acest caz implic un buget echilibrat p/n nperioada n, o "mic" cre#tere permanent a impozitelor lan, un deficit ntre n #i (n @ m), #i un surplus dup aceea. $ presupunem c la timpul n cheltuielileguvernamentale nea#teptat cresc temporar, apoi la (n @ m)scad permanent sub nivelul iniial, astfel nc/t din punctde vedere valorii actuale avem o reducere a sumei totale acheltuielilor. 1educerea permanent de dup (n @ m) maimult dec/t compenseaz cre#terea temporar. -oliticaoptim presupune o reacie a impozitelor la timpul n, undeficit ntre n #i (n @ m), #i un surplus dup (n @ m).

-rincipiul uniformizrii fiscale este destul de clarAdeficitele bugetare #i excedente sunt utilizate n mod

optim pentru minimizarea efectelor de distorsionare aleimpozitrii, av/nd n vedere o anumit reacie acheltuielilor.

9in acelea#i motive prezentate mai sus, principiuluniformizrii fiscale implic faptul c ratele de impozitaretrebuie s fie constante pe parcursul ciclului de afaceri,

prin urmare, ar trebui s observm deficite n timpulrecesiunilor compensate de excedentele n perioade deexpansiune.

results follo4 directly from the concavity of the individualutility function. $uppose that government expenditures must

be "high" today and tomorro4 "lo4". policy of balanced budget implies today high ratesof taxes and at lo4er level tomorro4.

+he state budget6s 7tax smoothing8 theory instead,

provides constant tax rates a deficit today and tomorro4 asurplus, 4hich (in terms of present value) compensatesshortage of current period. +he second policy prevails becausethe additional tax distortions in the current period more thancompensates (in terms of utility) ac:uired 4elfare gains as aresult of lo4er tax rates in future periods, due to decrease ofmarginal utility.

+his simple principle has largely 4idespreadimplications on fiscal policy, 4hich are highlighted in thedescription of several cases mentioned belo4.

5t is assumed that government expenditures areconstant along the planned time horizon. +hen the optimal

policy 4ould provide a balanced budget in each period. nd ifat time n unexpected increase government expendituresforever then the optimal policy 4ould involve a balanced

budget in each period 4ith a permanent increase in taxes atthe time n.

5t is assumed that from time zero to time ngovernment expenditures are constant and are expected to beal4ays constant. 5n the period n occurs unexpectedly an"economic shoc% (4ar, crisis))" and "shoc%" is %no4n to lastup to time (n @ m).


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-rin urmare, n cazul exemplelor prezentateanterior, fiind extinse la un model cu fluctuaiile ciclice a

produciei, implic o a>ustare ciclic a regulii deechilibrare bugetarA bugetul trebuie s fie echilibrat pe

parcursul ciclului de afaceri, dar nu n fiecare an fiscal. nacest model, nu se ofer rol unei politici de stabilizare

%eynesiene, deoarece producia nu este determinat princerere. n modelul care prevede aplicarea politicilor destabilizare, fluctuaiile ciclice ale bugetului ar trebui s fiechiar #i mai pronunate. 5deea esenial ? deficitele bugetare ar trebui s fieobservate n timpul "rzboaielor" #i recesiunii. =a o teorie normativ, modelul uniformizriifiscale este extrem de valoros. uridice i fizice, cu luarea n consideratie a

poten ialului lor economic i a altor criterii stabilite de lege.

5nstituiile bugetare ntrunesc totalitatea regulilor#i reglementrilor n conformitate cu care bugetele suntelaborate, aprobate #i implementate. ceste reguli variazfoarte mult de la o ar la alt, astfel ei pot explica

should be balanced over the business cycle, but not in eachfiscal year. 5n this model, there is no place for part Ceynesianstabilization policy because production is determined bydemand. 5n the model that provides for the application ofstabilization policies, cyclical fluctuations of the budgetshould be even more pronounced.

+he essential idea ? budget deficits should beobserved during "4ars" and the recessions.

s a normative theory, tax smoothing model isextremely valuable. ny positive model of tax policy shouldta%e as a reference point the tax smoothing model as a"positive" theory of budget deficits.

!arro tested the over t4o hundred years of mericanand !ritish data. ;e noted that merican and !ritishexperiences generally are consistent 4ith the basic principlesof tax smoothing theoryA correlation of debt to 2- increasesduring 4ars, decreases in peacetime and fluctuates 4ith the

business cycle.

0urther 4ill be presented some political?institutionalpremises that prevent application of good governancecontradicting 4ith principles of 7fiscal uniformity" theorythus contributing to rising budget deficits.

The role of budgetary institutions and public choiceconcept

-ublic institutions represent those institutionalizedeconomic entities 4hose main function is to redistributeincome and 4ealth on account of services rendered to

population, in cases 4here enterprises, companies do not offersuch services on the mar%et or offer it in insufficient:uantities.

-ublic institutions are also called public administrationsand consist of central, social administration and localadministrations.

-ublic institutions includeA -arliament, the -residentialdministration, ministries, other bodies of central and local

public administration, other public authorities, publicinstitutions, autonomous and subordinated institutions,irrespective of the mode of financing their activities.

-ublic resources from taxes, contributions and non?taxrevenues, collected from businesses and individuals, ta%inginto account their potential economic and other criteriaestablished by la4.

!udgetary institutions >oin all rules and regulationsaccording to 4hich budgets are developed, approved andimplemented. +hese rules vary greatly from one country toanother, so they can explain potential variations from onecountry to another country deficits and debt.

? budgetary institutions are more difficult to change thanthe budget la4 itselfD

? budgetary institutions influence the final vote and

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potenial variaiile de la o ar la alta ar a deficitelor #i adatoriei de stat.

? instituiile bugetare sunt mult mai dificil de a fischimbate, dec/t legea bugetului n sineD

? instituiile bugetare influeneaz votul final #iimplementarea a bugetului.

5nstituiile bugetare se schimb relativ rar, chiardac ele pot fi modificate atunci c/nd acestea nu satisfacnevoile unei comuniti (ctul de !uget al =ongresuluidin 'EFG al $tatelor Hnite este un exemplu al uneireforme ma>ore a instituiilor bugetare). -roblemaesenial, ns, este c instituiile bugetare nu pot fischimbate la fel de u#or #i n mod frecvent ca bugetul nsine, altfel ele ar fi total ineficiente.

$hepsle&I arat c "structura", impus deanumite instituii de procedur a>ut la rezolvarea

problemei imposibilitii legislative a lui rro4 &G. 9eexemplu, o problem?cheie const n determinareadeinerii puterii de stabilire a agendei #i a tipurilor demodificri care sunt admisibile la nivelul legislativA ngeneral vorbind, teoria sugereaz c normele procesualecare limiteaz universalism #i reciprocitate conduc lareinerile fiscale.

ucrarea scris de Jon ;agen &K pune accent peinstituiile bugetare privind acumularea de deficite

bugetare. Bl a testat o interesant "ipotez structural",care susine cA "procedurile bugetare duc la o mrireadisciplinei fiscale n cazul n care acestea dau prerogativ

primului ministru sau ministrului de finane, n cazul ncare limit universalismul, reciprocitate #i amendamentele

parlamentare #i faciliteaz executarea strict a legiibugetului ".

Jon ;agen, a>unge la concluzia c normele au

un anumit efect asupra nivelul #i structurii datoriilor destat. lt, ovry #i -oterba susin c statele americane cu"o strict " regul a echilibrului bugetar reacioneze mai

prompt #i mai energic la #ocuri negative a veniturilor sau#ocuri pozetive a cheltuielilor. B men ionat c deciziile

privind cheltuielile luate la nivel local, #i care suntfinanate prin transferuri de ctre guvernul naionalaceasta va ridic nivelul taxelor. utoritile locale nuinternalizeaz n totalitate efectele deciziilor privindcheltuielile sale asupra bugetului general.

$tructurile autorizate de stat, la nivel central, suntobligate s cunoasc situaia economic curent #i s fiu

pregtite att pentru pentru soluionarea problemelor ct #i

oferirea garaniilor prompte pentru asigurarea condiiilorstabilitii #i durabilitii a cre#terii economice. ns dinmotivul inconsistenei #i necoordonrii deciziilor luate laanumite perioade de timp de ctre diferite autoriti

publice atingerea obiectivului propus este greu de realizat.n g/ndirea economic occidental aceast

problem este cercetat de muli savani L cercettori. no >umate de secol n urm, a aprut teoria alegerii sociale(publice), care a schimbat n mod radical viziunea

implementation of the budget.!udgetary institutions are changing relatively slo4ly, even

if they can be changed 4hen they do not meet the needs of acommunity (=ongressional !udget ct of 'EFG the Hnited$tates is an example of a ma>or reform of budgetaryinstitutions). +he crucial issue, ho4ever, is that state

institutions cannot be changed as easily and fre:uently as thebudget itself, other4ise they 4ould be totally ineffective.$hepsle&I sho4s that the "structure" imposed by certain

of procedural institutional helps resolving the problemof legislative impossibility of rro4 &G. 0or example, a %eyissue is to determine the holding po4er of agenda setting andthe types of changes that are permitted at the legislative levelAgenerally spea%ing, the theory suggests that procedural rulesthat limit universalism and reciprocity lead to fiscal4ithholdings.

+he paper 4ritten by Jon ;agen &K focuses onbudgetary institutions concerning the accumulation of deficits.;e tested an interesting "structural hypothesis" 4hich arguesthat "budgetary procedures lead to increased fiscal disciplineif they give the prerogative of the -rime *inister and *inisterof 0inance, if they limit universalism, reciprocity and

parliamentary amendments and facilitate strict execution ofthe budget la4.8

Jon ;agen concludes that rules have some effect on thelevel and structure of state debt. lt, ovry and -oterba arguethat H.$. states 4ith "strict" rule of budgetary balance reactmore promptly and vigorously to negative shoc%s of incomeor expenditure shoc%s positive. 5t should be noted thatexpenditure decisions ta%en at local level and financed bytransfers from the national government it 4ill raise the level

of taxes. ocal authorities do not fully internalize the effectsof its decisions on general government expenditure.

uthorized state structures at central level are re:uired to%no4 the current economic situation and should be preparedfor solving problems and for providing timely guarantees toensure stability conditions and sustainabilityeconomic gro4th. !ut because of the reason of inconsistencyand not coordination of decisions ta%en at certain times byvarious public authorities to achieve the ob>ective is difficultto achieve.


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managerilor L economi#tilor privind problema luriideciziei colective pentru evaluarea #i furnizarea de bunuri

publice. 1eie ind din aceast teorie, conceptul principal

al teoriei alegerii publice const n determinareacomportrii raionale n procesul lurii deciziilor

argumentate care reflect c ele sunt recomandabile de aatrage #i a utiliza informaia, maxim contribuind laatingerea rezultatelor alegerii publice.

stfel economistul american Cenneth Mosephrro4 &N nc la sf/r#itul anilor KO ai secolului PP, ancercat s cerceteze problema alegerii publice ntr?unsens mai larg ncercnd s gseasc rspunsul la existen a unei ci de a transforma preferinele, din individuale ncolective. n acela#i timp el a formulat premise prin caretranzitivitatea dat este posibil. 9ar, de fapt, teorema luiconinea #i o anumit inconsenven, care exprima #i oanumit ndoial privind posibilitatea crerii unui sistemintegrat de adoptare a deciziilor colective, satisfaceriicerinelor deplinei ordinii #i independene fa de altealternative. +eorema lui rro4 nu nsemn c realizareadeciziilor publice raionale este ca principiu imposibilconst/nd de fapt, doar din lipsa garaniilor raionale.

-unnd la ndoial rolul coordonator al statului#i posibilitatea alegerii colective a obiectivelor #i formriistrategiei dezvoltrii socio?economice, prin aceast teoriaau fost introduse a>ustri semnificative n percepia

>ustiiei #i binefacerii activitii statului. cum, de pestecinci decenii, aceste concluzii rm/n drept obiect alcutrii adevrului #tiinific.

0aptul c adepii teoriei economice tradiionaleconceptual #i reprezentau realizarea politicii de stat,

pornind din urmtoarea baz metodologicA economia de

pia devine efectiv sau, a#a numit Q-areto ? optimal8,exclusiv doar n condiiile concurenei perfecte. =u altecuvinte, ei admit, c situaia dat poate exista doar ncazul redistribuirii resurselor (mi>loacelor) n favoareaintereselor unuia din departamente statale #i nu poate snu afecteze n acela#i timp interesele altor departamente.

*ai mult dec/t at/t, oponenii acestei teorii sepronunau contra cerinelor generale indicate ctrepreferinele publice pentru c conform opiniei acestorafiecare individ trebuie s aib propriile interese #i

preferine. ceast abordare poate fi caracterizat carealizarea deplin a tuturor beneficiilor din cadrulrelaiilor de schimb.

ns cum a artat practica, n multe cazuriatingerea realizrii rezultatului similar impedic diferiteQe#ecuri ale pieei8A procese care declan#eaz undezechilibru macroeconomic, existena monopolurilornaturale, sau alte externaliti diverse. devenit tot maiclar faptul c chiar #i cele externaliti pozitive apar dincauza aducerii beneficiilor pentru tuturor, datoritaQbunurilor publice8, doar n cazul, dac acestea sunt

produse #i consumate de cineva. 9in acest motiv n

maximum results of public choice.

+herefore merican economist Cenneth Moseph rro4&N since the late KORs of the t4entieth century, tried toinvestigate the problem of public choice in a 4ider sensetrying to find the ans4er the existence of a 4ay to transform

individual preferences to collective . t the same time hemade premises 4hich transitivity is possible. !ut in fact,theorem contains a certain inconsistency, and expressing somedoubt concerning the possibility of creating an integratedcollective decision?ma%ing, meeting the re:uirements of fullorder and independent of other alternatives. rro4Rs theoremdoes not mean that achieving rational public decision is in

principle impossible consisting in fact >ust the lac% timelyguarantees rational.

Suestioning the coordinating role of the state andcollective choice of ob>ectives and formation of socio?economic development strategy, through this theory 4ereintroduced significant ad>ustments in the perception of >usticeand beneficence of state activity. 2o4, over five decades,these conclusions remain the ob>ect of scientific search fortruth. +hat traditional economic theorist represented theirconceptual realization of state policy, starting from thefollo4ing basic methodologyA mar%et economy becomeseffective or so?called "-areto ? optimal" exclusively under

perfect competition. 5n other 4ords, they admit that thesituation can only exist if the redistribution of resources(resources) to favor the interests of one of state departmentsand cannot at the same time not affects the interests of otherdepartments. *oreover, opponents of this theory are pronounced

against the general re:uirements set by public preferencesaccording to their vie4 that each individual must have theiro4n interests and preferences. +his approach can becharacterized as the full realization of the benefits of theexchange relations.

!ut as practice sho4s, in many cases achieving of theresult prevent various "mar%et failures"A processes that triggera macroeconomic imbalance, the existence of naturalmonopolies, or other various externalities. 5t becameincreasingly clear that even the positive externalities arisefrom bringing benefits to everyone, because "public goods"

>ust in case if they are produced and consumed by someone.

0or this reason, over a long period of time this problemappeared to be a ma>or obstacle to development of"normative" economy, and the possibility of generalization ofindividual preferences.5n addition, due to lac% of specific methodologicalrecommendations 4as not possible to assess the real andeffective regulation of various social conditions, usingaccepted scientific methods.

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decursul unei perioade ndelungate de timp problema datprea s fie un obstacol ma>or pentru dezvoltareaQnormativ8 a economiei, #i pentru posibilitateageneralizrii preferinelor individuale. n afar de aceasta,din cauza lipsei recomandrilor metodice concrete, nu afost posibil o evaluare real #i o reglementare eficient a

diferitor stri sociale, utiliznd metode #tiinificeacceptabile. naliza problemelor metodologice pe baza

acestor permise continua mai mult de peste cincizeci deani.


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este prezentat n cadrul modelului propus de 2ordhaus('EFK) a "ciclului de afaceri politic". 5deea lucrrilor saleconst faptul c n anii electorali politicienii urmeaz

politicile expansioniste iar instituiile bugetare i alegtorii recompens politicieni fr a nelege (nici anva din trecut) faptul c politicile expansioniste pre?

electorale vor trebui s fie "rspltite" de recesiunile post?electorale&E. =hiar dac modelul 2ordhaus este dezvoltatn termeni de inflaie ? #oma>, acesta poate u#or fi aplicat

pentru explicarea deficitelor bugetare. n noile condiiile, tendinele stabilite au

determinat necesitatea cercetrii rolului statului #i a cilorasigurrii anumitor bunuri #i servicii publice. devenitevident, c fiecare membru al societii nu este n stare dea?#i satisface nevoile proprii sau n cadrul unui grup de

persoane particulare. $oluia acestei probleme a gsitreflecie n cunoscuta versiune mainstream a teorieialegerii publice, n conformite cu care, statul esteinstrumentul ce particip la nlturarea conflictelor deinterese a participanilor relaiilor de pia.

+reptat, pe baza postulatului de baz a acesteiteorii privind aceea c intervenia statului care estenecesar, n limitele conceptului pozitiv a alegerii publicese investigheaz problema privind executarea obligaiilorsale, privind managementul eficient a distribuiei defuncii dintre structurile de putere subordonate. +otodat,este foarte important de subliniat, c cercetrile normativen lumina teoriei alegerii publice sunt legate cuidentificare institutelor care permit indivizilor de a primide la stat ceea ce doresc, fr a fi totodat expu#iadministrrii stricte din partea acestuia.

#a a fost reflectat analiza teoriei alegeriipublice p/n la apariia strii revoluioniste a stadiului

dezvoltrii acesteia. a momentul actual bazametodologic a acestor cercetri s?a schimbat substanial

L acum punctul lor de plecare este ntrebareaA care esteschema organizaional L structural a organului deadministrare a alegerii publice #i mecanismul de luare adeciziilor colectiveW 1spunsul este urmtorulA acestedecizii sunt luate de ctre conducerea statului ? politicieni#i funcionari publici. +otodat, ideea de baz a teorieialegerii publice rm/ne neschimbat #i destul de simplAdepartamentele #i ageniile ndeplinind instruciunilealegtorilor #i indicaiile politicienilor #i a funcionrilor

publici sunt mercantile #i continua sa fie ghidate deinterese personale, care tind s depun eforturi pentru a

asigura folosul maxim pentru sine nsu#i. Bste foarte important de a sublinia c abordareaQcontractual,8 susintorii creia sunt muli reprezentaniai #colii alegerii publice, la stadiul contemporan alrealizrii practice este una din elementele direciilorreglementrii acestei teorii. n structura acesteia sedelimiteaz Qetapa constituional8 ? n care indiviziiaccept n mod unanim regulile >ocului, #i Qfaza postconstituional8 ? atunci c/nd este vorba de reguli

deficits. 5n the ne4 conditions, established trends made necessaryto research the role of state and of 4ays to ensure certaingoods and services. 5t became obvious that every member ofsociety is not able to satisfy o4n needs or in a group ofindividuals. +he solution of this problem has found reflection

in the popular mainstream version of public choice theory,according to 4hich, state is the instrument participating in theremoval of conflicts of interest of the participants of themar%et.

radually, based on the basic postulate of this theoryconcerning the fact that state intervention is necessary, 4ithinthe positive concept of public choice is investigating thematter concerning its o4n performance,concerning the efficient management of the distributionfunction of po4er structures subordinate. ;o4ever, it isimportant to note, that normative research in the light of

public choice theory are connected to the identificationof institutes that allo4 individuals to receive from the state4hat they 4ant, 4ithout strict administration exposed from his

part. +hat 4as reflected in the analysis of public choicetheory until the occurrence of revolutionary stage ofdevelopment. =urrently methodological basis of this researchhas changed substantially ? no4 their starting point is the:uestionA 4hich organizational ? structural scheme ofmanaging body of public choice and mechanism of collectivedecision?ma%ingW +he ans4er isA these decisions are ta%en bythe leadership of the state ? politicians and civil servants.;o4ever, the basic idea of public choice theory remainsunchanged and disarmingly simpleA the departments andagencies fulfilling the instructions of voters and indications of

politicians and civil servants are mercantile and continue to beguided by personal interests, 4hich tend to 4or% to4ards to

providing of maximum benefit for itself.

5t is important to emphasize that the "contractual"approach supporters 4ho are many representatives of the

public choice school, at contemporary stage of practicalrealization is one of the elements of regulation of directionsof this theory. 5n its structure is delimited by "constitutionalstage" ? 4here individuals accept unanimously the concept thegame rules, and "the post constitutional" ? 4hen it comes toeveryday rules of this administrative process. 5t should benoted at the same time observes that second stage of decision

ma%ing usually does not re:uire unanimous approval, but thesupport of the ma>ority.

3hen the :uestion arises, to 4hich decision shouldbe made in terms of production and financing of public goodsat each person appears a desire for increasing o4nre:uirements hoping at receiving appropriate benefits. +hereare theoretical developments of the methods for"determination of preferences" purpose of 4hich is to obtain

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cotidiene ale acestui proces administrativ. Bste necesar demenionat n acela#i timp, c la etap a 55?a pentru luareadeciziilor de regul, nu se cere o aprobare nunanimitate, ci spri>inul ma>oritii.

tunci c/nd apare ntrebarea, asupra creia se iadecizia n ceea ce prive#te producia #i finanarea

bunurilor publice, la fiecare individ apare un stimulpentru ma>orarea cerinelor sale sper/nd la primireabeneficiilor corespunztoare. Bxist elaborri teoretice ametodelor Qdeterminrii preferinelor8, scopul crora estede a obine informaii reale despre importana unor saualtor alternative. 9ennis *ueller cu optimism se refereala metodele date, considernd c acestea n cele din urmvor a>uta la perfecionarea mecanismului de luare adeciziilor colective, n scopul atingerii intereselor comunenaionale. stfel, n cartea sa, "legerea -ublic 5558&'Oautorul analizeaz numeroase recomandri pentrusoluionarea problemei "paradoxul alegerilor", la bazacreia st ideeaA interesele departamentale (individuale)ce nu trebuie vzute n sens ngust, ci n sens larg aacestei noiuni. ltfel, folosul primit de ctre instituii,trebuie s fie legat de expresia "preferinele sociale". ns,organele administraiei centrale (ministere, amente), demulte ori acioneaz lund din punctul lor de vederedecizii raionale, bazate pe interesele lor ngustedepartamentale, ce nu au o legtura cu beneficiilea#teptate din respectarea intereselor naionale #i politicade stat desf#urat.

=onsecinele acestei concluzii sunt extrem deimportante, mai ales in/nd cont de subiectul #i obiectulde studiu, constnd din urmtoareleA alegerea decizieiindividuale conform opiniei a unor savani aproape delocnu influeneaz rezultatul definitiv, adic asupra strii de

echilibru financiar #i stabilitii inflaioniste, i deci n consecin la administraia central a rii ? uvernul #ila autoritile sectoarelor (departamentele) lipsescstimulente pentru a obinerea a maximului de informaiifiabile privind problemele politicii antideficitare.

Htiliz/nd aceast logic, care ncura>eazsocietatea s rm/n neinformat, unde aparatulfuncionar birocrat refuz elaborarea macroindicatorilorechilibrului financiar #i a stabilizrii inflaiei, ce reflectfluxurile financiare primite, distribuite, redistribuite #icheltuite n economia naional #i n acela#i timp tindespre maximizarea bugetelor departamentelor sale,deoarece acest lucru, ma>oreaz privilegiile lor reale.

naliznd comportamentul birocraieidepartamentale cu a>utorul teoriei alegerii publice, pot fimenionate mai multe motive care pun la ndoialcapacitatea statului de a "potrivi" eficient preferinelediferitor departamente #i de a agrega cererile acestora cuobiectivele naionale, economice #i sociale. n acest caz,teoria "alegerii publice" din nou postuleazA departament? structura administrativ obi#nuit a administraieicentrale care, la fel ca #i toi ceilali, tind s asigure

reliable information about the importance of one or anotheralternative. 9ennis *uller optimistically concerned givenmethods, considering that they ultimately 4ill help to improvethe mechanism of collective decision ma%ing in order toachieve common national interests. +hus, in his boo%, "-ublic=hoice 555"&'O author analyzes numerous recommendations

to solve the problem of "the paradox of elections," 4hich liesat the basis of the ideaAdepartmental interests (individual) that should not be seen inthe narro4 sense, but in the broad sense of that term.ect and the ob>ect of ourstudy, consisting of the follo4ingA individual choice does notinfluence the decision, 4hich is confirmed by the opinion ofsome scientists, hardly does not influence the final outcome,ie the steady state of inflation and financial stability, then atcentral administration of the country ? government and sectorauthorities (departments) is lac%ing incentives to obtain the

best reliable information concerning anti?deficit policy issues. Hsing this logic, 4hich encourages society to remainuninformed, 4here the unit bureaucrat cler% refusesdeveloping of financial balance and stabilize the macroindicators of inflation, reflecting received financial flo4s ,distributed, and redistributed spent in the national economyand at the same time tends to maximize its departments

budgets because this increases their real privileges.

nalyzing the behavior of departmental bureaucracy4ith the help of public choice theory may be mentionedseveral reasons that :uestions stateRs ability to "fit" effective

preferences to aggregate different departments and theirdemands national economic and social ob>ectives. 5n this case,the theory of "public choice" again postulatesA department ?common administrative structure of central government, >ustli%e all others tend to ensure maximum benefits forthemselves. ;ence the explanation of the entire range ofissues that prevents performance by overnment of the role ofthe largest supplier in the effective macro supervision and

regulation of financial flo4s in the national economy.

0rom the series of ideas and empirical data, groupedby position of public choice theory, 4here is a certainambivalence ? the essence of 4hich 4as 4ell exposed by9ennis *ueller, in "-ublic =hoice 555"A "$ome researchers

believe the state apparatus as a voracious predator, 4hichtends to advantage as much as possible, using its po4ers oncitizens , but others see it as an e:uivalent institutional mar%et

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beneficii maxime pentru ei nsu#i. 9e aici rezultexplicaia ntreagei game de probleme care mpiedicexecutarea de ctre uvern a rolului celui mai importantfurnizor n supravegherea #i reglementarea eficient amacro fluxurilor financiare n economia naional.

9in seria de idei #i a datelor empirice, grupate

dup poziia teoriei alegerii publice, unde exist oanumit ambivalen ? esena creia a fost bine expus de9ennis *ueller, n Qlegerea public 5558A QHniicercettori consider aparatul de stat ca pe un prdtorlacom, care tinde pe ct este posibil s profite, utiliz/nd

puterile sale asupra cetenilor, alii ns l percep ca unechivalent instituional al pieei, n limitele cruiaconcurena democratic ofer un nivel de eficiencomparabil cu cel care ofer concurena economic810.

-e baza >udecii expuse mai sus, printre adepiiteoriei alegerii publice sunt utilizate dou modele de statAstatul bazat pe cererea cetenilor (de exemplu societateacivil #i interesele naionale) #i de stat?eviathan (deexemplu societatea intereselor statal ? capitaliste #i

preferinelor ngust departamentale).n cadrul modelului bazat pe cererea

cetenilor, 9ennis *ueller explic c Q-oliticaguvernului reflect preferinele alegtorilor8, iar n cadrulmodelului eviathan Q1olul decisiv >oac preferinelestatului sau a persoanelor ce ocup funcii publice8. ndependen de care model este luat drept baz a analizeicauzelor proliferrii statului, aceasta ofer rezultatediferite.

9ennis *ueller menioneaz faptul c sistemulde guvernare bazat pe principiile democraiei directe #ifederalism asigur reinerea eficient a cre#teriieviathan. cest lucru i permite s presupun c

variaiile date a sistemului de stat corespund unui modelbazat pe cererea cetenilor. 9e aici #i provinpresupunerile noastre privind sistemul de stat carepermite formarea subsistemului financiar #iimplementarea cu nalt eficien a politiciiantiinflaioniste, contribuind la echilibrarea, stabilizarea #idurabilitatea cre#terii economice.

Redistribuirea ntre genera ii2atura intertemporal a deciziilor fiscale creaz

legturi ntre genera ii. =u toate acestea, cazul n care fiecrei genera ie i pas suficient de urma ii ei, orizontul finit a fiecrei genera iei este imaterial. n special, abordarea numit ? "echivalen a ricardian" (!arro

('EFG))&'' implic faptul c, av/nd n vedere existen a a unui suficient altruism ntre genera ii, alegerea a modul n care este finan at anumit nivel a cheltuielilor este irelevant. n special, repartizarea sarcinii fiscale pestegenera ie nu este influen at de mrimea datoriei, modificrile n datoria public sunt compensate deschimbri n mo teniri private.

n modelele unde echivalen a ricardian nu seaplic, datoria public poate genera redistribuirea ntre

4ithin 4hich democratic competition provides a level ofefficiency comparable to that is provided by economiccompetition "'O. !ased on the above >udgment among public choicetheorists are used t4o state modelsA state based on the re:uestof citizens (eg civil society and national interests) and

eviathan state (eg state interests society ? capitalist narro4departmental preferences).

5nto the model based on re:uest of citizens, 9ennis*ueller explains that "government policy reflects the

preferences of voters" and in the eviathan model Rpreferencesplay a decisive role of the state, or persons occupying publicfunctions. "9epending on 4hich model is ta%en as a basis toanalyze the causes proliferation of state, it gives differentresults.

9ennis *ueller noted that government system basedon the principles of direct democracy and federalism ensureseffective retention of eviathan gro4th. +his allo4s assumingthat changes in the state system correspond to a model basedon re:uest of citizens. ;ence come our assumptions on thestate system that allo4s financial subsystem formation andimplementation of highly effective anti?inflationary policy,contributing to balancing stabilization and sustainable gro4th.

!ntergenerational redistribution5ntertemporal nature of fiscal decisions creates lin%s

bet4een generations. ;o4ever, if each generation caresenough about its offspring, then finite horizon of eachgeneration is immaterial. 5n particular, the approach %no4n as? "ricardian e:uivalence" (!arro ('EFG))&'' implies that

having regard the existence of a sufficient intergenerationalaltruism the choice of ho4 it is financed certain level ofexpenditures is irrelevant (taxes are not distorted in thismodel). 5n particular, the distribution of the tax burden overgeneration is not influenced by the size of the debt, changes indebt are offset by changes in private be:uests.

5n the models 4here ricardian e:uivalence does notapply to public debt may cause redistribution bet4eengenerations, if the generation that is alive today leaves thedebt burden to future generations. +here is an essentialdifference bet4een the current generation and futuregenerations (including children 4ho are currently living) only

the current generation vote. $o basically a selfish generationcould vote for policy of transfer the tax burden in the future.n obvious limit in this behavior is given by the existence ofintergenerational altruismA parents do care about theirchildren.

=u%ierman and *eltzer&' propose an interestingpolitical model of intergenerational redistribution , theessential idea of this model can be summarized briefly asfollo4s. 5t is assumed that in the current generation are

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bugetul echilibrat. Bsena modelului const n faptul clupta distributiv n r/ndul grupurilor sociale nt/rzieadoptarea politicilor eficiente pentru echilibrarea bugetul. $ presupune c este nevoie de decis privindmodul de mprire a poverei fiscale a procesului destabilizare. =u ct mai mult se amn luarea deciziei cu

at/t mai mari sunt costurile, din dou motiveA distorsiunile fiscale a pre?stabilizrii persist ntimpD

datoria se acumuleaz, astfel c taxele mai marisunt necesare pentru deservirea stabilizrii.

=u toate acestea, nt/rzierile raionale apar n doucondiiiA ') stabilizarea propus este "inechitabil", adicunele institu ii trebuie s suporte o parte disproportionata a poverii fiscaleD ) institu iile nu sunt informai despre costurile fiecrei din ele pe care ar trebui s suporte

pentru stabilizare.ceste costuri pot fi interpretate n dou moduri

care nu se exclud reciprocA unul subliniaz costurile

economice ale distorsiunilor a perioadei de pre?stabilizare, cealalt pune accentul pe costurile politice deprevenire a celuilalt grup al institu iilor de la impunerea unui plan fiscal nedorit. =osturi politice includ costuri delobby, sau costurile aciunii directe a politicii.

nvins, este grupul care va avea de pierdut maimult ca rezultat al stabilizrii fiscale, c/#tigtor estecellalt grup. n general, grupurile ce reprezintinteresele institu iilor nu vor accepta imediat rolul nvinsuluiA ei sper c alt grup va ceda primului. +impuloptim de concesiune este determinat de echivalentul acostului marginal al a#teptrii cu beneficiul marginal ala#teaptrii. !eneficiul marginal este dat de probabilitateacondiionat alt grup reprezentativ va ceda n momentulurmtor, nmulit la diferena de utilitate ntre a fic/#tigtorul #i nvins. dic ntre plata mai mic sau

ponderea mai mare al poverii fiscale =u ct e mai inegal distribuirea costurilor destabilizare, cu att mai t/rziu va fi timpul estimat destabilizare. *ai mult dec/t at/t, cu ct mai mici suntcosturile de trai ntr?o economie instabil, mai t/rziu va fistabilizarea. cest rezultat are dou interpretriA n primulr/nd se sugereaz c mecanisme economice, cum ar ficlauzele indexrii, care reduc costul de instabilitatemacroeconomic au tendina de am/narea a>ustri, n aldoilea r/nd, mecanismul politic care face mai u#oar #imai puin costisitoare de a exercita o puterea veto #i

"blocheaz "planurile de stabilizare propuse, ntrziindstabilizare. 9razen #i rilli&'G extind acest model prinartarea c o criz economic poate anticipa stabilizrii

prin forarea a "soluiei" a rzboiului epuizrii.5deea e c cre#tere a costurilor de pre?stabilizarea

din cauza unei crize o face foarte costisitoare pentrucontinuarea rzboiul epuizrii, i deci are loc adoptarea

solu iilor de ctre institu iile publice. stfel, ntr?o

bearing for stabilization.

+hese costs can be interpreted in t4o 4ays that are notmutually exclusiveA one emphasizes the economic costs ofdistortions of the pre?stabilization period, the otheremphasizes the political costs of preventing other group of

institutions from imposing an un4anted tax plan. -oliticalcosts include costs of lobby or direct action policy costs.

9efeated is group 4hich 4ill lose more as a result offiscal stabilization, the 4inner is the other group. 5n general,groups representing the interests of the institutions 4ill notaccept immediately defeated roleA they hope that another 4illfail first. ustments, secondly, the political mechanism that ma%es iteasier and less expensive to exercise veto po4er "bloc%s"stabilization plans proposed delaying stabilization.

9razen and rilli&'G extend this model by sho4ing

that an economic crisis can anticipate stabilization by forcinga "solution" of 4ar of exhaustion. +he point is that increase in costs due to pre?crisisstabilization ma%es it very expensive to continue the 4ar ofexhaustion, and therefore ta%es place adopting of solution by

public institutions. +hus, in an economic emergency mayultimately be socially beneficialA on the one hand causes aneconomic crisis 4ith its costs, on the other hand, shortens thedelay in the adoption of stabilization re:uired measures.

o4er cohesion involves many difficulties in reachingan agreement on a fair distribution of the costs of fiscalad>ustment and hence to even longer delay of stagnated

gro4th of debt.

#tate debt as a factor of influence +he size of debt stoc% lin%s past policies 4ith future

policies. +he current policy may affect "status 4ord" inheritedby successors, of fiscal choices that determine the size of thedebt. lesina and +abellini&'K argue that a government canseize this strategic opportunity and sho4 that this game inoffice politics bet4een governments at different points in time

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situaie de urgen economic poate, n cele din urm, sfie social beneficA pe de o parte provoac o crizeconomic cu costurile sale, pe de alt parte, scurteazdurata de nt/rziere n adoptarea de msuri privindstabilizare necesare.

=oeziune mai mic implic mai multe dificulti

n realizarea unui acord cu privire la o distribuieechitabil a costurilor de a>ustare fiscal #i, prin urmare,la nt/rziere mai ndelungat n stagnarea cre#terii adatoriei.

$atoria de stat ca element de influen *rimea stocului a datoriei leag politicile din

trecut cu politicile viitoare. ctuala politic poate afecta"starea cuv/ntului" mo#tenit de succesorii, prin alegerilesale fiscale, care determin mrimea datoriei. lesina #i+abellini&'K susin c un guvern poate profita de aceast

posibilitate strategic #i arat c acest >oc politicul ntreguvernele din oficiu, la diferite puncte n timp pot duce lao acumulare a datoriei publice mai mari de ceea ce e

prevzut de modelul "netezirii fiscale".=ea mai simpl ilustrare a acestei idei este, dup

cum urmeazA se consider un sistem cu dou pri iarcele dou pri au preferine diferite asupra compoziieicheltuielilor publice. < institu ie public pledeaz pentru cheltuieli privind "aprare", alta favorizeaz cheltuieli

privind "protecia social". =ele dou pri suntideologice, adic ei reprezint interesele diferitorcircumscripii departamentaleA prile dorescimplementarea politicii dorite n domeniu dat.

5nteresele specifice a diferitor institu ii publice sunt prezentate de partide politice n parlament i deci dac se presupune c actualmente la putere este partidulce promoveaz politica a unor cheltuieli "de aprare"

ridicate, iar rezultatul alegerii structurii cheltuielilorviitoare este incert din cauza #ocurilor preferinelor a

partidului la putere. n cazul dat, este evident c partidulde la putere poate cre#te utilitatea circumscripiei sale prinaprobarea datoriei va aproba cre terea datoriei publice

pentru a nclina structura chetuielilor viitoare n favoareasa, astfel ca n cazul c la guvernare va veni partidul deopozi ie care reprezint interesele atlor institu ii guvernamentale i va fi nevoit s deserveasc datoria mic ornd astfel nivelul posibil al cheltuielilor. ceast interaciune strategic duce la deficite,chiar dac un planificator social care maximizeaz media

ponderat a utilitilor celor dou grupuri ar alege s

echilibreze bugetul n fiecare perioad. -rin urmare, polarizare a poziiilor #i fragilitateguvernului explic acumularea a datoriei.

Hlterior +abellini #i lesina n 'EE&'K audezvoltat o relaie mai precis ntre deficite #i polarizare a

preferinelor individuale, mai mult dec/t doar apreferinelor partidului. Bi consider un model n caredeciziile sunt luate prin regula ma>oritatii, #i orice

propunere poate fi fcut #i aleas prin comparaie a

can lead to an accumulation of public debt exceeding 4hat isprovided by the model of "tax smoothing". +he simplest illustration of this idea is as follo4sA itis considered a system 4ith t4o parties and the t4o partieshave different preferences on the composition of publicspending. public institution advocates for spending on

"defense" another favors expenditure on "social protection".+he t4o parties are ideological, that means that they representthe interests of different constituencies departmentA the parties4ish implementation of desired policy in the given domain.

$pecific interests of various public institutions arepresented by political parties in parliament and thus supposingthat the party currently in po4er is promoting the policy ofhigh spending on "defense", and the election outcome isuncertain structure of future spending because of shoc%s of the

party preferences holding the po4er. 5n this case, it is obviousthat the party in po4er can increase the usefulness of itsconstituency by approving debt so 4ill approve also theincrease of government debt of future spending structure to tiltin his favor so if that in po4er 4ill come opposition partyrepresenting the interests of government institutions and 4illhave to serve debt shrin%ing possible level of expenditures.

+his strategic interaction leads to deficits, even if asocial planner maximizes the 4eighted average of the utilitiesof the t4o groups 4ould choose to balance the budget in each

period. +herefore, the polarization of positions andfragility of government explains the accumulation of debt. +abellini and lesina later in 'EE'&'K developed amore precise relationship bet4een deficits and polarization ofindividual preferences more than >ust of the party preferences.+hey consider a model 4here decisions are made by ma>ority

rule, and any proposal can be made and compared by selectingpairs of variants. 5n these circumstances, the "theory of votingenvironment" implies that the policy adopted is most preferred

by all institutionsmedium. 3ith uncertainty about the future ma>ority

preferences on the structure of expenditure currently averageinstitutions prefers to issue debt to future composition ofexpenditure tilting it in their favor. +abellini and lesinasho4ed that the amount of debt issued is increasing indispersion of votersR preferencesA the more focused to4ardsextreme are electorate preferences, the higher the debt is.

$o the strategic role of debt is to create "conditions"

for public institutions as both future and current. ghion and!olton&'N, *ilesi?0erretti and $polaore&'F argue thatexisting institutions can use debt strategically to influence theoutcome of future expenditure composition.

lesina and +abellini&'K argue that the polarization ofpublic institutions and change of their preferences should beassociated 4ith higher debt. 0or example, lesina and+abellini, interpret deficits during deficits under 1eaganRs

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perechilor de variante. n aceste condiii, "teoria votuluimediu" implic faptul c politica adoptat este cea mai

preferat de ctre toate instiu iile n mediu. =u incertitudine privind preferinele ma>oriti viitoareasupra structurii cheltuielilor, instiu iile n mediu curent

prefer s emit datoria pentru nclinarea compoziiei

viitoare a cheltuielilor n favoarea sa. +abellini #i lesinaau artat c suma datoriei emise este n cre#tere ndispersie cu preferinele alegtorilorA cu ct este maiconcentrat spre extrem preferinele electoratului, cu at/tmai mare este nivelul datoriei. 9eci rolul strategic al datoriilor consta n creareade "condiii" pentru institu iile publice att viitoare ct i curente. ghion #i !olton&'N, *ilesi?0erretti #i$polaore&'F susin c institu iile existente pot folosi strategic datoria public pentru a influena rezultatulcompozi iei cheltuielilor viitoare. lesina #i +abellini&'K susin c polarizareainstitu iilor publice #i schimbrile a preferin elor acestora ar trebui s fie asociate cu datorii mai mari. 9e exemplu,lesina #i +abellini, interpreteaz deficitele de pe timpullui 1eagan ca o manevr cu scopul limitrii cheltuielilorcu privind bunstarea social a viitoarei administraii.

#itua ia din Republica %oldo&a nainte de a purcede la formularea concluziei vom

prezenta graficul ce reflect nivelul i evolu ia soldului bugetar n 1epublica *oldova&'U (graficul ')

raficul dat arat c n principiu se atest proficitdoar n anul OOK ulterior s?a nregistrat deficit nivelulcruia a fost destul de modest pe parcursul perioadeiOOK?OOF, ns odat cu producerea crizei economicemondiale nivelul deficitului bugetar n 1. *oldova brusca crescut atingnd valoarea sa maxim n anul OOE, deIUIN,N milioane lei. Hlterior, pn n prezent, cu mareregret se denot existen a unui nivel impuntor a deficitului ceea ce se datoreaz n mare msur att

administration as a maneuver to limit spending on social4elfare of future administrations.

The situation in Republic of %oldo&a !efore proceeding to formulation of conclusion 4ill

present the chart that reflects the level and evolution of thebudget balance in *oldova&'U (=hart ')

+he given graph sho4s that basically is attested onlyduring OOK a surplus subse:uently 4as recorded a shortagelevel of 4hich 4as :uite modest over the period OOK?OOF,

but 4ith the production of the global economic crisis budgetdeficit in 1. *oldova increased sharply and reaches itsmaximum value in OOE of IUIN,N mil.lei.$ubse:uently, untilno4 4ith great regret it sho4s there is a tremendous leveldeficit that is largely due to both to inefficiency also to

existence of a time gap improvement measures of currentsituation also due to impediments as listed above as more areactual for *oldova

because our country does not have rich natural resourcesthat 4ould allo4 to cover completely the desired level of

budgetary expenditure. $o no4 to the existence of a restrictedbudget is observed even at the stage of budget planning theprogramming of budget deficit although it should be later paidbac%, but this does not concern the current government.

!n conclusion, the 4hole political?institutional approachesmentioned in given article g suggests follo4ingA

accumulation of government debt means furtherincrease of tax burden debt redemption, if it does nothappen but the state again recourse to borro4ing tofinance current expenditures then the percentage ofloans ta%en increases and it is repeated from year toyear by transferring the burden of debtD

cannot be given exclusive preference (eventemporarily) to any of the elements of stateRs national

po4er structure , involved in solving of a range of

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3. $hepsle, C. 'EFEa. "5nstitutional rrangements and B:uilibrium in *ultidimensional voting models".Ymerican Mournal of -olitical $cience. IAN?KED

4. rro4, Cenneth M. andZrard 9ebreu('EKG). "Bxistence of an B:uilibrium for a =ompetitiveBconomy".Bconometrica(((I)A NKLEO. M$+

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